QZGZ and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration)

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QZGZ and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2018] AATA 3683 (3 October 2018)

Division: GENERAL DIVISION

File Number(s):      2018/3907

Re:QZGZ  

APPLICANT

AndMinister for Home Affairs

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Senior Member A. Nikolic AM CSC

Date:3 October 2018

Place:Melbourne

The Tribunal sets aside the reviewable decision and remits the matter to the Respondent for reconsideration of QZGZ’s Bridging Visa application, with the direction that QZGZ passes the character test within the meaning of section 501(6) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

.........[sgd]........................................................

Senior Member A. Nikolic AM CSC

MIGRATION – Bridging Visa refusal – failure to pass the character test – criminal charge pending – whether the risk that the Applicant would engage in criminal conduct is made out if Applicant is allowed to remain in Australia – Applicant passes the character test – decision set aside and remitted for reconsideration with a direction that Applicant passes the character test

Legislation

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic)

Bail Act 1977 (Vic)

Cases

Akpata v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 65
Aksu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 65 ALD 667
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Ali (2000) 106 FCR 313
Brown v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 112 ALD 67
Brown v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 183 FCR 113

Coal and Allied Operations Pty Limited v Australian Industrial Relations Commission and Others (2000) 203 CLR 194

Gong v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 309 FLR 151; [2016] FCCA 561
Hammond v Commonwealth of Australia [1982] 152 CLR 188

LSSY v MIAC [2011] AATA 334

McMahon v Gould (1982) 7 ACLR 202
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Huynh (2004) 139 FCR 505
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SRT (1999) 91 FCR 234

Rokobatini v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 90 FCR 583

Schuster-McFadyen v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 1303
Secretary, Department of Social Security v Alvaro [1994] FCA 1124
Veliu v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 53

Wong v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 44

X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92

Secondary Materials

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, Direction No 65 – Visa refusal and cancellation under s 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under s 501CA; 22 December 2014
Bower, George Spencer, and Turner, Alexander Kingcome, The doctrine of res judicata (Butterworths, 2nd ed., 1969)
Pearce, Dennis, Administrative Appeals Tribunal (LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th ed., 2015)

REASONS FOR DECISION

Senior Member A. Nikolic AM CSC

3 October 2018

INTRODUCTION

  1. Under section 35(3) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act), the Tribunal can restrict the publication or other disclosure of the names of parties to a proceeding and allocate a pseudonym.[1] In light of the specific circumstances of this case, it is considered…

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Details
Case
[2018] AATA 3683
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application for review of a decision by the Minister for Home Affairs to refuse QZGZ a Bridging Visa. QZGZ had arrived in Australia on a Student Visa, which was subsequently cancelled under section 116(1)(e)(i) of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) following a charge of knowingly possessing child abuse material. QZGZ was then taken into immigration detention, and his Bridging Visa application was refused under section 501(1) of the Act on the basis that he failed the character test under section 501(6)(d)(i), as there was a risk he would engage in criminal conduct. The Tribunal was required to determine whether QZGZ passed the character test and, if not, whether the discretion to refuse his Bridging Visa should be exercised.

The Tribunal considered the legal principles surrounding the character test, noting that it requires an assessment of whether there is more than a minimal or trivial risk that a person would engage in conduct of character concern. The Tribunal acknowledged that while past conduct can inform future risk, it is insufficient on its own to establish such a risk. Crucially, the Tribunal addressed the tension between QZGZ's right to silence in relation to the pending criminal charge and the need to assess his character for the visa application. The Tribunal distinguished the present case from previous decisions, finding that applicants should not be compelled to disclose evidence about pending criminal charges in Tribunal proceedings, and that inferences from unproven criminal conduct alone should be treated with caution, particularly when it is the sole basis for a visa refusal.

The Tribunal found that QZGZ was entitled to the presumption of innocence regarding the pending charge, which was yet to be heard by a court and was awaiting the finalisation of technical evidence. The Tribunal noted that QZGZ asserted he had a valid defence and that the material against him was largely founded on suspicion. Given the absence of any previous history of offending or other proven misconduct, the Tribunal concluded that the past was not a fertile ground for supporting the proposition that QZGZ failed the character test or posed an unacceptable risk of future criminal conduct. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the decision to refuse the Bridging Visa and remitted the matter to the Respondent for reconsideration, with a direction that QZGZ passes the character test within the meaning of section 501(6) of the Act.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, the Tribunal sets aside the reviewable decision and remits the matter to the Respondent for reconsideration of QZGZ’s Bridging Visa application, with the direction that QZGZ passes the character test within the meaning of section 501(6) of the Act.BACKGROUND QZGZ arrived in Australia approximately three years ago to study under a Class TU subclass 573 Higher Education Sector Visa (Student Visa). Approximately 12 months ago he was charged with the crime of knowingly possess child abuse material[2] (the charge) and released on bail. The matter is yet to be heard by a court, having been re-listed on a number of occasions. There is no currently scheduled hearing date. QZGZ advised during the hearing that the matter awaits the finalisation of technical evidence being sought by Victoria Police, which was not challenged by the Respondent. [2] Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 51G The circumstances surrounding the charge arise from what Victoria Police allege are serious crimes committed against QZGZ himself in April 2017. Police have charged a number of people in relation to those offences. A letter from Victoria Police dated 13 July 2017 states ‘[i]t is highly likely…this will proceed to a trial’ and QZGZ ‘will be a crucial witness…required to give his evidence during court proceedings’.[3] The letter requests that consideration be given to allowing QZGZ to remain in Australia, including so that he may ‘assist in the coming court proceedings.’[4] An email from Victoria Police dated 10 September 2018 advises that the trial at which QZGZ is required to give evidence has been adjourned until [redacted].[5][3] Exhibit T1.[4] Ibid.[5] Exhibit A4. It is in the context of voluntarily surrendering his mobile telephone to assist the police investigation of the offences committed against him that QZGZ himself was charged. The alleged detection of child exploitation material and the subsequent charge against QZGZ resulted in a delegate of the Minister cancelling his Student Visa under section 116(1)(e)(i) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). This provides: Power to cancel(1)…the Minister may cancel a visa if he or she is satisfied that:(a)-(d) … (e) the presence of its holder in Australia may be, or would be or might be, a risk to:(i) the health, safety or good order of the Australian community or a segment of the Australian community; or… With his Student Visa cancelled, QZGZ was taken into immigration detention where he has since remained. His appeal against the decision to cancel his Student Visa before another division of this Tribunal was unsuccessful. He then applied for a Bridging Visa, but was issued with a Notice of intention to consider refusal of his application. After considering QZGZ’s responses, his Bridging Visa application was refused on 1 June 2018 under section 501(1) of the Act. The delegate determined that QZGZ failed the character test under section 501(6)(d)(i) of the Act, in that there is a risk he will engage in criminal conduct if allowed to remain in Australia. The delegate concluded that: … [QZGZ] represents a risk of harm to the Australian community which is unacceptable. I could not be satisfied that the risk of [QZGZ] reoffending was negligible. I found that there are no sufficient countervailing considerations in this case to warrant the Australian community accepting any level of risk.Having given full consideration to all of these matters, I decided to exercise my discretion to refuse to grant [QZGZ’s] application for a Bridging E (Class WE) visa, under subsection 501(1).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Respondent made further written submissions in response to the issues raised by the Tribunal, which can be summarised as follows:(a)‘The matter is restricted to the pending charge against the applicant. The National Police Certificate…provides that the pending charge…of Knowingly possess child abuse material is the only disclosable Court outcomes recorded against the applicant;’(b)‘In these proceedings the Tribunal must form its own view of the applicant’s conduct in considering whether the applicant is of good character…the Tribunal is required to exercise its powers whether or not there was an error at first instance.[7] That is:[7] Coal and Allied Operations Pty Limited v Australian Industrial Relations Commission and Others (2000) 203 CLR 194.“In the hierarchy of reviews from original decision-maker to the AAT it was not necessary that there be at the outset an original decision that was in all respects validly made, and at each level of review thereafter another decision that was in all respects validly made. The person or tribunal to whom application for each of the reviews was made had jurisdiction to undertake that review so long as the preceding decision-maker had made what purported to be a decision in the exercise of powers conferred by the Act affecting the interest of the person seeking review. It mattered not whether the ground of complaint made about the preceding decision was merely that it is wrong on the merits, or that in law it was not an effective decision because it was made by someone without authority, or in excess of authority, or for improper purposes, or was vitiated through procedural irregularity such as a failure to accord natural justice.”[8][8] Secretary, Department of Social Security v Alvaro [1994] FCA 1124 at [78], cited in LSSY v MIAC [2011] AATA 334 at [22].(c)‘… the delegate’s decision, when read as a whole, indicates that the offending conduct described in the charge against the applicant was serious and that the Australian community would expect that the applicant not hold a visa in light of that conduct;(d)‘The respondent accepts that the applicant has a right against self-incrimination. If the applicant were to exercise his right against self-incrimination, the Tribunal would be required to make a decision on the material before it without hearing further evidence from the applicant…This issue was considered in LLSY v MIAC [2011] AATA 334 at [41]-[54] (LSSY). In LSSY, the asserted conduct which gave rise to the criminal charges was the only basis on which it was suggested that the visa applicant did not pass the character test (at [41]). The applicant in LSSY submitted that the proceedings in the Tribunal should be stayed because their continuance would constitute a contempt of concurrent criminal proceedings, and would result in substantial prejudice to the visa applicant (at [42]). The Tribunal noted in LLSY that “the criminal charges are not merely a future possibility; the Visa applicant was arrested and charged…” (at [45]). The Tribunal accepted that LLSY’s prospects of succeeding in his application to the Tribunal would be greatly prejudiced if he were to claim the privilege against self-incrimination (at [48]). The Tribunal in LLSY found that in relation to s 501 (1) of the Act, “if the visa applicant does not satisfy the decision-maker that he or she passes the character test, there is a discretion to refuse to grant the visa. In view of the information before the Tribunal, the visa applicant would need to give evidence to enable the Tribunal to assess the risks referred to in s 501 (6)(d) of the Act, and he would not be assisted by claiming the right to silence (at [48]). Critically, the Tribunal in LLSY assessed the extent of prejudice to the applicant if he were unable to claim the right to silence (at[49]). The Tribunal found (at [49]):a. The evidence given in the proceedings would not necessarily be admissible in any subsequent criminal proceedings. It would be open to the visa applicant to apply for an order that relevant evidence tended at the hearing of the present proceedings should be maintained in confidence pursuant to s35 of the AAT Act.b. To the extent that relevant information is produced pursuant to a compulsory process of this Tribunal, the resulting information would be subject to an implied undertaking by the respondent not to disclose the information to 3rd parties (citing Commonwealth v Temwood Holdings Pty Ltd [2001] WASC 282; (2001) 25 WAR 31 at [41]).c. The representative for the respondent would not be involved in prosecuting the visa applicant for the pending criminal charges, because the office of the State Director of Public Prosecutions would act in that matter.Further, the Tribunal in LLSY took into account at [50] that:“…the outcome of the present proceedings is unlikely to receive any publicity, and the court hearing the criminal charges is unlikely to pay any regard to, or be influenced by, the findings of this Tribunal; and this is not a matter with the court or jurors who hear the criminal charges would be influenced by such matters. The appropriate standard of proof in the present proceedings, which entail whether the non—citizen satisfies the character test, is the civil, not the criminal, standard of proof, to be approached in accordance with the principles in Briginshaw v Briginshaw & Anor [1938} HCA 34… And that is a further reason why the court hearing the criminal charges would not be affected by the outcome of the present Tribunal proceedings.”The Tribunal noted in LLSY at [51] that the potential prejudice to the visa applicant must be weighed against the obligation of this Tribunal to determine the application before it, as required by the AAT Act, and the public interest and the Tribunal determining the application in the light of all relevant facts in order to make a decision that gives effect to the policy and objectives of the Act and of Direction 41”.The Tribunal in LLSY found at [53] when it was necessary to consider the asserted conduct by the applicant with reference to the character test. The Tribunal found that the potential prejudice to the applicant did not outweigh the Tribunal’s obligation to determine the proceedings before it.(e)‘…the Tribunal hearing “compelling probative evidence” would not jeopardise the criminal proceedings. Further if the case were to be heard by the Tribunal, the Tribunal found against the applicant, and the Court acquitted the applicant, the implications would be inconsequential, noting the difference in the standards of proof to be applied in proceedings before the Tribunal and criminal proceedings.EVIDENCENational Police Records

Decision

Reasons for decision

Deane J’s observations are relevant to the present matter, noting that the evidence here is not being examined in a parallel court proceeding, but precedes the court hearing by some months. That puts QZGZ in a conflicted position. His choice is to either exercise his right to silence ahead of the criminal hearing, which he is entitled to do without an adverse inference being drawn, or waive that right and produce evidence on which his defence of the criminal charge concurrently rests. The Respondent, drawing again from the reasoning in LSSY, submits that QZGZ’s ‘prospects of succeeding in his application to the Tribunal would be greatly prejudiced if he were to claim the privilege against self-incrimination.’[39] I respectfully do not support that view. Applicants who seek administrative review of decisions should not feel compelled to disclose evidence about pending criminal charges in Tribunal proceedings. This is not a burden discernible from the provisions of the Act. It is the Respondent who is required to justify why a person’s conduct supports a visa refusal decision. Just as the Full Court of the Federal Court’s decision in SRT[40] stands for the proposition that it is impermissible to impugn a conviction,[41] inferences from unproven criminal conduct alone should be treated with caution when it is the sole basis used to cancel or refuse a visa. [39] Respondent’s submissions dated 30 July 2018, paragraph 19.[40] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SRT (1999) 91 FCR 234.[41] Ibid, per Branson, Lindgren and Emmett JJ at 240 [25]. CONCLUSION At the time his Student Visa was cancelled, QZGZ had been bailed by police on his own undertaking. The consequence of his student visa cancellation, based solely on a pending criminal charge against him, is that he was immediately taken into immigration detention where he has remained for the last year. While accepting that past conduct can have a bearing on future risk, what QZGZ is alleged to have done is disputed and yet to be determined by a court. Much of the material against him in the present proceeding is founded on suspicion, relying on adverse inferences being drawn from a single, unproven charge. This suspicion is set in the context of no previous history of offending or other proven misconduct. The past is therefore not fertile ground in supporting the proposition that QZGZ fails the character test, or is an unacceptable risk of engaging in criminal conduct in the future. It is clear that police currently consider QZGZ has a case to answer and weight is reasonably placed on that. But assessments of character or risk are not reliably founded on that fact alone. It is also accepted that sexual and violent crimes, particularly those involving children, are very serious and of understandably great community concern. But care must be taken when making inferences from the seriousness of a type or category of offence. On the evidence before me, the police case against QZGZ awaits finalisation of technical evidence before the court can schedule a hearing. QZGZ says he has a valid defence. If, as currently anticipated, the matter proceeds to trial and a conviction is recorded, further adverse implications may arise for QZGZ’s ability to remain in Australia. Until then, he is entitled to the presumption of innocence.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The issues for determination are: (a)whether QZGZ passes the character test within the meaning of section 501(6)(d)(i) of the Act; and(b)if not, whether the discretion in section 501(1) of the Act to refuse his Bridging Visa should be exercised, after applying the considerations at Part B of the Direction to the specific circumstances of his case.TRIBUNAL CONSIDERATION Justice Lander (Carr and Sundberg JJ concurring) of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia explained the nexus between the character test and Parliament’s intent, in Akpata:[21] The definition of a person passing the character test in s 501(6) shows that Parliament intended that persons who have been convicted of relatively serious crime; associate with criminals; have a history including an immediate history of criminal conduct or general conduct indicating bad character; are a significant risk of engaging in criminal conduct or undesirable conduct (s 501(6)(d)), should not be permitted to travel to or remain in Australia. Shortly put, persons who have committed or are likely to commit criminal or other like conduct should not be permitted to travel to or remain in Australia. Because the purpose is to exclude those persons, the matters that are relevant to the exercise of the Minister’s discretion will include any fact or circumstance which would suggest that a person of otherwise bad character (as it is defined in the Act) should be allowed to travel to or remain in Australia. [21] Akpata v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 65 at [105]. It is worth noting that the reference to the word ‘significant’ is no longer used in conjunction with assessing risk since Akpata. Pursuant to the current Direction, I must only be satisfied there is more than a minimal or trivial risk that QZGZ would engage in conduct of character concern within the meaning of section 501(6)(d)(i) if permitted to remain in Australia. It is insufficient to find, however, that he has engaged in conduct of character concern in the past, but that a risk exists of him engaging in future conduct for which a criminal conviction could be recorded.[22] [22] Annex A, section 2, subsection 6.1(2) of the Direction. The Direction provides further guidance in relation to conduct based on Wong at [33]:[23]As a matter of construction it seems to us that conduct can now be both general and criminal at the same time so that the Minister may take into account both conduct which is criminal conduct and conduct which is general conduct…The concepts of criminal conduct and general conduct referred to cannot, now, be considered to be mutually exclusive…[23] Annex A, section 2, clause 5(2) of the Direction, referring to Wong v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 440 (Wong). In this matter, however, the Respondent does not submit that QZGZ has engaged in other serious non-criminal conduct beyond the single pending charge he is currently required to answer. That said, 501(6)(d)(i) of the Act does not require a person to have been convicted of an offence in order to fail the character test. I adopt my reasons in Veliu v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] AATA 1247 in this regard (at [16]).[24] Moreover, the Respondent does not contend that QZGZ offends any of the other provisions at section 501(6) of the Act, beyond section 501(6)(d)(i). I am satisfied on the evidence that only section 501(6)(d)(i) is relevant to my consideration of whether QZGZ passes the character test. [24] See also, Veliu v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 53.