FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Robinson v Pilbara Iron Company (Services) Pty Ltd [2022] FedCFamC2G 647
File number(s): PEG 8 of 2021 Judgment of: JUDGE LUCEV Date of judgment: 12 August 2022 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application for separate hearing of separate question – consideration of whether conditions for separate hearing of separate question met
INDUSTRIAL LAW – Fair Treatment System – whether a safety net contractual entitlement
Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 12, 139, 542, 543, 570
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) Pt 18, r 18.02
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 190
Federal Circuit Court of Australia Rules 2001 (Cth) Pt 17
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 30.01
Cases cited: Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union & Anor v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd [2022] HCA 1; (2022) 96 ALJR 89; (2022) 312 IR 1
Devonshire v Magellan Powertronics Pty Ltd [2013] FMCA 207; (2015) 231 IR 198; (2013) 275 FLR 273; (2015) 65 AILR 101-892
Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 439
Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 177; (2014) 231 FCR 403; (2014) 247 IR 315; (2014) 315 ALR 243; (2014) 143 ALD 239; (2014) 67 AILR 102-324
State of Western Australia v Galati [2017] FCA 236
Thomson v Kimberly College Limited & Ors [2020] FCCA 3361
Westpac Banking Corporation v Wittenberg and Others [2016] FCAFC 33; (2016) 242 FCR 505; (2016) 256 IR 181; (2016) 330 ALR 476
White v Westfield Vet Hospital & Ors [2018] FCCA 3833
WorkPac Pty Ltd v Rossato [2020] FCAFC 84; (2020) 278 FCR 179; (2020) 296 IR 38; (2020) 378 ALR 585
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 25 Date of last submission/s: 22 October 2021 (determined on the papers) Place: Perth Solicitor for the Applicant: Dasey Legal Pty Ltd Solicitor for the Respondent: Mills Oakley ORDERS
PEG 8 of 2021 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: DAVID ROBINSON
Applicant
AND: PILBARA IRON COMPANY (SERVICES) PTY LTD
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE LUCEV
DATE OF ORDER:
12 AUGUST 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Pursuant to r 18.02 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) the Court orders that the following question be separately determined in these proceedings:
Is the Respondent’s “Fair Treatment System” policy a “safety net contractual entitlement” for the purposes of s 542(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)?
2.Costs, if any, of the Respondent’s application in a case filed 20 July 2021 be reserved.
3.The matter be adjourned to a directions hearing at 9.00am on 9 September 2022.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to…
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- Case
- [2022] FedCFamC2G 647
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the relevant legal principles derived from case law and the Federal Circuit and Family Court Rules. It was established that a separate hearing on a question may be appropriate if it could dispose of the action or significantly narrow the scope of issues, thereby saving time and cost. The decision to grant a separate hearing should be based on whether it is just and convenient to do so. PIC argued that determining the question separately would save time and potentially dispose of the action, while Mr Robinson argued that the question was not ripe for separate determination and should be resolved in the main proceeding.
The court found that the question was not ripe for separate determination because it involved mixed questions of fact and law that required the consideration of the entire employment relationship and the context in which the Fair Treatment System was offered. The court highlighted that determining the question separately would likely cause delay and did not align with the general principle that all issues should be resolved at one time unless there are compelling reasons to do otherwise. Consequently, the court refused to make a separate determination on the proposed question.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Robinson made the following submissions concerning the application for a hearing of separate issues:(a)as to the effect of the pleadings:(i)PIC admits that it invited Mr Robinson to use the Fair Treatment System: Statement of Claim (“SOC”) at [34], admitted in Defence at [25];(ii)the Fair Treatment System is referred to in the Contract Letter: Mr Dasey’s Affidavit, Annexure JD2, page 11, and is referred to separately and distinctly from “Policies and Procedures”;(iii)PIC admits that Mr Robinson submitted a Fair Treatment claim: SOC at [47], admitted, in effect, in Defence at [39];(iv)PIC admits that the Fair Treatment System was designed to be beneficial: SOC at [46], admitted in Defence at [38.1].(v)PIC denies that the Fair Treatment System was a contractual entitlement of or to Mr Robinson: Defence at [60]. The explanation for that appears to be at [2.2] and [2.3] of the Defence, by reference to Mr Dasey’s Affidavit, Annexure JD2, that the effect that the benefits provided to Mr Robinson under PIC’s policies are discretionary in nature, and do not form part of Mr Robinson’s contract of employment, and PIC:(A)says that the Fair Treatment System was characterised as a policy; and(B)maintains that position even though it expressly invited Mr Robinson to use the Fair Treatment System, in connection with its decision to terminate his employment;(vi)PIC does not admit (but does not say why) that the Fair Treatment System relates to s 139(1)(j) of the FW Act, which deals with procedures for consultation, representation and dispute settlement;(vii)in Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 177; (2014) 231 FCR 403; (2014) 247 IR 315; (2014) 315 ALR 243; (2014) 143 ALD 239; (2014) 67 AILR 102-324, (“Romero Appeal”) Farstad (the employer) argued that the policy there in issue was not contractual or part of the contract of employment: Romero Appeal at [49] per Allsop CJ, Rares and McKerracher JJ;(viii)whether or not a policy will be incorporated into a contract of employment will depend upon the parties’ intentions as objectively ascertained: Romero Appeal at [34] per Allsop CJ, Rares and McKerracher JJ;(ix)in approaching the task of ascertaining the parties’ intention, the starting point will be the language of the contract, to be viewed in context, not in abstract isolation, and regard must be had to the purpose and object of the transaction: Romero Appeal at [35] per Allsop CJ, Rares and McKerracher JJ;(x)it is necessary to consider context, and particularly at the time that PIC gave Mr Robinson the Termination Letter: Mr Dasey’s Affidavit, Annexure JD3, page 16: Romero Appeal at (particularly) [21] and [35] per Allsop CJ, Rares and McKerracher JJ;(xi)the Contract Schedule at page 11 makes it clear that:(A)Mr Robinson was required to comply with PIC’s policies, and noncompliance with policies was a reason for Mr Robinson’s termination: see Termination Letter; and (B)if Mr Robinson utilised the Fair Treatment System, he was required to follow its processes;(xii)when read with the Offer Letter: Mr Dasey’s Affidavit, Annexure JD1, page 5, which requires Mr Robinson to comply with PIC’s policies, the Fair Treatment System is expressed to contain obligations on PIC; (xiii)the obligations under the Fair Treatment System were mutual; (xiv)mutuality of obligations under policies was considered in Romero Appeal at [39], [41] and [43] per Allsop CJ, Rares and McKerracher JJ;(xv)in Romero Appeal at [43] per Allsop CJ, Rares and McKerracher JJ, mention is made of a case in which a Court rejected a contention, that although it was common ground that an employee was bound by a policy, the employer would not be contractually bound, for the reason that it defied both logic and common sense;(xvi)even in a case similar to this where the employer sought to rely on exclusionary provisions, similar to the ones that PIC seeks to rely on (despite, in this case, expressly offering Mr Robinson the particular benefit), in this case, it is necessary to look at the whole relationship and not only at what was said and done when the relationship was first formed. In the dynamic and fluid environment of a contract of employment, the subsequent actions of the parties may impliedly vary or amend the contract such that the true agreement between the parties is no longer reflected by the written contact: WorkPac Pty Ltd v Rossato [2020] FCAFC 84; (2020) 278 FCR 179; (2020) 296 IR 38; (2020) 378 ALR 585 (“WorkPac – FCAFC”) at [90] to [93] per Bromberg J;(xvii)both the Contract Letter and Termination Letter, which invited Mr Robinson to use the Fair Treatment System, make it clear that the Fair Treatment System was a benefit under Mr Robinson’s contract of employment;(xviii)courts have been prepared to determine all questions, in one hearing, in similar cases: see, for example, Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 439 at [26] per Marshall J where it is noted that “Farstad rejected the notion that the Policy formed a part of Ms Romero’s contract of employment”, although it does not seem that any party in that matter asked for a separate question to be determined; and(xix)these submissions should be considered in the context of the Court considering the likelihood of PIC succeeding on its arguments in relation to whether the Fair Treatment System was a safety net contractual entitlement, if they were to be considered in one hearing, rather than as a preliminary question. If the chances of success are minimal (as Mr Robinson submits they are) then the Court should refuse to deal with the matter as a separate question; and(b)in response to PIC’s written submissions:(i)PIC admits: (A)it had a Fair Treatment policy: SOC at [40]; Defence at [31], and admits that Annexure JD4 to Mr Dasey’s Affidavit is the FTS Policy;(B)the FTS Policy allowed Mr Robinson to address his concerns and ensured his concerns were addressed: SOC at [44]; Defence at [36]; and (C)the FTS Policy was a benefit: SOC at [46]; Defence at [38.1];(ii)PIC does not dispute any of the annexures to Mr Dasey’s Affidavit: see [4(f)(i) and (iii)] above;(iii)the starting point is that all issues of fact and law should generally be determined at one time;(iv)notwithstanding the heading “Application of Principles”, no effort has been made to apply the principles, and there is no more than a restatement of the principles themselves;(v)[8(a)-(d)] below is just a statement of the law with no explanation as to how or why and no application of the principles, and [8(d)] is speculative and vague;(vi)the starting point is whether or not Mr Robinson had a safety net contractual entitlement; (vii)despite there being no dispute, on the facts, the Proposed Question for determination, is still one of fact and law. It is largely because there is no dispute on the facts that the question is not “ripe” for determination, now, as a separate question, and Mr Robinson submits that the answer is clear and obvious but should be dealt with, and determined, in one proceeding;(viii)in relation to [4(g)] above, it is not appropriate to make a submission to the effect that determining the separate questions will take a short time as PIC has no basis and cannot say how long it will take the Court to deal with the question and to make a judgement. Delay, will almost certainly occur, for the reasons set out in Annexure EM2 to Ms Moran’s Affidavit; and(ix)in relation to [4(i)] above, Mr Robinson’ perspective is completely the opposite, and PIC has pleaded no factual circumstances to support that submission.CONSIDERATIONRules