Robinson v Pilbara Iron Company (Services) Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Robinson v Pilbara Iron Company (Services) Pty Ltd [2022] FedCFamC2G 647

File number(s): PEG 8 of 2021
Judgment of: JUDGE LUCEV
Date of judgment: 12 August 2022
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application for separate hearing of separate question – consideration of whether conditions for separate hearing of separate question met

INDUSTRIAL LAW – Fair Treatment System – whether a safety net contractual entitlement

Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 12, 139, 542, 543, 570

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) Pt 18, r 18.02

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 190

Federal Circuit Court of Australia Rules 2001 (Cth) Pt 17

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 30.01

Cases cited:

Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union & Anor v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd [2022] HCA 1; (2022) 96 ALJR 89; (2022) 312 IR 1

Devonshire v Magellan Powertronics Pty Ltd [2013] FMCA 207; (2015) 231 IR 198; (2013) 275 FLR 273; (2015) 65 AILR 101-892

Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 439

Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 177; (2014) 231 FCR 403; (2014) 247 IR 315; (2014) 315 ALR 243; (2014) 143 ALD 239; (2014) 67 AILR 102-324

State of Western Australia v Galati [2017] FCA 236

Thomson v Kimberly College Limited & Ors [2020] FCCA 3361

Westpac Banking Corporation v Wittenberg and Others [2016] FCAFC 33; (2016) 242 FCR 505; (2016) 256 IR 181; (2016) 330 ALR 476

White v Westfield Vet Hospital & Ors [2018] FCCA 3833

WorkPac Pty Ltd v Rossato [2020] FCAFC 84; (2020) 278 FCR 179; (2020) 296 IR 38; (2020) 378 ALR 585

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 25
Date of last submission/s: 22 October 2021 (determined on the papers)
Place: Perth
Solicitor for the Applicant: Dasey Legal Pty Ltd
Solicitor for the Respondent: Mills Oakley

ORDERS

PEG 8 of 2021

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

DAVID ROBINSON

Applicant

AND:

PILBARA IRON COMPANY (SERVICES) PTY LTD

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE LUCEV

DATE OF ORDER:

12 AUGUST 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Pursuant to r 18.02 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) the Court orders that the following question be separately determined in these proceedings:

Is the Respondent’s “Fair Treatment System” policy a “safety net contractual entitlement” for the purposes of s 542(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)?

2.Costs, if any, of the Respondent’s application in a case filed 20 July 2021 be reserved.

3.The matter be adjourned to a directions hearing at 9.00am on 9 September 2022.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to…

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Details
Case
[2022] FedCFamC2G 647
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia was asked to decide whether the Fair Treatment System policy of Pilbara Iron Company (Services) Pty Ltd (PIC) was a term of the employment contract of Mr Robinson and whether it constituted a "safety net contractual entitlement" under section 542(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The central issue was whether this policy was incorporated into Mr Robinson's contract and if it could be considered a safety net contractual entitlement that required separate preliminary determination.

The court considered the relevant legal principles derived from case law and the Federal Circuit and Family Court Rules. It was established that a separate hearing on a question may be appropriate if it could dispose of the action or significantly narrow the scope of issues, thereby saving time and cost. The decision to grant a separate hearing should be based on whether it is just and convenient to do so. PIC argued that determining the question separately would save time and potentially dispose of the action, while Mr Robinson argued that the question was not ripe for separate determination and should be resolved in the main proceeding.

The court found that the question was not ripe for separate determination because it involved mixed questions of fact and law that required the consideration of the entire employment relationship and the context in which the Fair Treatment System was offered. The court highlighted that determining the question separately would likely cause delay and did not align with the general principle that all issues should be resolved at one time unless there are compelling reasons to do otherwise. Consequently, the court refused to make a separate determination on the proposed question.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Application in a Case before the Court was filed by the respondent, Pilbara Iron Company (Services) Pty Ltd (“PIC”), and seeks a separate preliminary hearing on a separate question in these proceedings. The separate question (“Proposed Question”) sought to be determined is as follows: Is the Respondent’s “Fair Treatment System” policy: (a) incorporated as a term of the Applicant’s contract of employment; and (b)a “safety net contractual entitlement” for the purposes of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) section 542(1)?BACKGROUNDSubstantive Application The substantive application is brought under s 543 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (“FW Act”), which permits a national system employee to apply to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia to enforce an entitlement of the employee arising under s 542(1) of the FW Act. Mr Robinson alleges that PIC’s Fair Treatment System was a safety net contractual entitlement, that he was not given fair treatment or the benefit of the Fair Treatment System, and that PIC’s failure to comply with Mr Robinson’s safety net contractual entitlement was a contravention of the FW Act. Mr Robinson seeks certain declarations in terms similar to the above allegations and an order reinstating Mr Robinson to his position of Production Superintendent or alternatively awarding him compensation for loss (the relief sought is set out fully at [11] below). For present purposes the relevant background is uncontroversial and is as follows:(a)by letter dated 1 April 2011 (“Contract Letter”), PIC offered Mr Robinson the “role” of Production Superintendent based in or at the Brockman 2 mine site;(b)the Contract Letter stated that:(i)Mr Robinson would report to the Mine Operations Manager;(ii)Mr Robinson’s total fixed remuneration would be $201,415.65 including base salary, appropriate allowances and superannuation and that his total remuneration, including bonuses was “targeted at” $216,430.95;(iii)full details of Mr Robinson’s remuneration were detailed in the Summary of Remuneration and Benefits;(iv)the terms and conditions of Mr Robinson’s employment are recorded in the attached Schedule of Remuneration, Benefits and Employment Conditions; (v)Mr Robinson would be working nine days on and five days off; and(vi)Mr Robinson would commence as Production Superintendent on 1 April 2011;(c)included with the Contract Letter was a document with the title Schedule of Remuneration, Benefits and Employment Conditions (“Contract Schedule”);(d)the Contract Schedule provided:(i)that Mr Robinson’s employment status was “Full Time”;(ii)That the Contract Schedule should be read in conjunction with the Contract Letter;(iii)under a heading called “Policies, procedures and standards”, that PIC operated a “Fair Treatment System” which Mr Robinson could access, if he believed a decision had been made which unfairly affected him and that could not be resolved through consultation with his leader;(iv)the following termination provisions: (A)“… Except in cases of serious misconduct, the Company may terminate your employment by giving you one months’ notice in writing. If you are over 45 years of age and have more than 2 years continuous service, the Company will provide you with 5 weeks notice”; and (B)“The Company may elect to pay you in lieu of notice at your Total Remuneration rate and in the circumstances you will not be required to work out your notice period.”; and(v)Mr Robinson was entitled to superannuation.SUBMISSIONSPIC’s Submissions

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Part 18 of the GFL Rules is as follows:Part 18—Separate decision on question18.01 Definitions for Part 18In this Part:question includes a question or issue in a proceeding, whether of fact or law, or partly of fact and partly of law, and whether raised in a document, by agreement of the parties or otherwise.18.02 Order for decisionThe Court may make an order for the decision by the Court on a question separately from another question at any time in a proceeding.18.03 Separate questionA separate question must: (a) set out the question or questions to be decided; and(b) be divided into paragraphs numbered consecutively.18.04 Orders, directions on decisionIf a question is decided under this Part, the Court may make the orders and directions that the nature of the case requires.18.05 Disposal of proceedingThe Court may, in relation to a decision on a question under this Part:(a) dismiss the proceeding or any part of the proceeding; or(b) give judgment, including a declaratory judgment; or(c) make another order.Case law The case law concerning whether there ought to be a separate hearing on a separate question is not seriously in dispute, and has been set out in a series of cases in relation to the former Part 17 of the FCC Rules: see Devonshire v Magellan Powertronics Pty Ltd [2013] FMCA 207; (2015) 231 IR 198; (2013) 275 FLR 273; (2015) 65 AILR 101-892 (“Magellan Powertronics”) at [24]-[34] per Lucev FM; White v Westfield Vet Hospital& Ors [2018] FCCA 3833 (“Westfield Vet Hospital”) at [6]-[16] per Judge Kendall; Thomson v Kimberly College Limited & Ors [2020] FCCA 3361 (“Kimberly College”) at [22]-[24] per Judge Jarrett. In part, that case law can be summarised as follows:(a)the law developed in relation to r 30.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) guides the exercise of the relevant discretion: Kimberly College at [22] per Judge Jarrett; Westfield Vet Hospital at [8] per Judge Kendall, applying Magellan Powertronics;(b)the party applying for a separate hearing of an issue prior to the hearing of the substantive matter, bears the onus of demonstrating that there should be the preliminary hearing contended for: Kimberly College at [23] per Judge Jarrett; Westfield Vet Hospital at [9] per Judge Kendall citing State of Western Australia v Galati [2017] FCA 236 per Gilmour J at [10]; and(c)in general, it is preferable that all issues of fact and law in a proceeding be determined at one time, but the preliminary determination of separate questions or issues may be appropriate where their determination in a separate question may dispose of the action or contribute to the saving of time and cost by substantially narrowing the scope of issues to be decided: Kimberly College at [24] per Judge Jarrett. In Magellan Powertronics at [27]-[28] per Lucev FM reference was made to the relevant principles as summarised by the Federal Court as follows:27.The principles governing whether an order for determination of a separate question ought to be made have been conveniently and succinctly summarised in the Federal Court’s judgment in Reading Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Mutual Provident Society (1999) 217 ALR 495 as follows (at [8] per Branson J):(a) the term “question” in O 29 r 1 includes any question or issue of fact or law in a proceeding. The distinction in the rule between an “issue” and a “question” is the distinction between that which, when resolved, will result in an adjudication in favour of one party or the other, being an “issue”, and less decisive matters of dispute being “questions” (Landsal Pty Ltd (in liq) v REI Building Society (1993) 41 FCR 421 at 425; 113 ALR 643 at 647);(b)a question can be the subject of an order for a separate decision under O 29 r 2 even though a decision on such a question will not determine any of the parties’ rights (Landsal Pty Ltd (in liq) v REI Building Society at FCR 425; ALR 647);(c)however, the judicial determination of a question under O 29 r 2 must involve a conclusive or final decision based on concrete and established or agreed facts for the purpose of quelling a controversy between the parties (Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334; 161 ALR 399; [1999] HCA 9 at [45]);(d)where the preliminary question is one of mixed fact and law, it is necessary that the question can be precisely formulated and that all of the facts that are on any fairly arguable view relevant to the determination of the question are ascertainable either as facts assumed to be correct for the purposes of the preliminary determination, or as agreed facts or as facts to be judicially determined (Jacobson v Ross [1995] 1 VR 337 at 341, referring to Nissan v Attorney-General; [1970] AC 179 at 242-3; [1969] 1 All ER 629 at 663-4 per Lord Pearson; Bass v Perpetual Trustee at [53]);(e)care must be taken in utilising the procedure provided for in O 29 r 1 to avoid the determination of issues not “ripe” for separate and preliminary determination. An issue may not be “ripe” for separate and preliminary determination in this sense where it is simply one of two or more alternative ways in which an applicant frames its case and determination of the issue would leave significant other issues unresolved (CBS Productions Pty Ltd v O’Neill (1985) 1 NSWLR 601 per Kirby P at 606);(f)factors which tend to support the making of an order under O 29 r 2 include that the separate determination of the question may:(i) contribute to the saving of time and cost by substantially narrowing the issues for trial, or even lead to disposal of the action; or(ii) contribute to the settlement of the litigation (CBS Productions Pty Ltd v O’Neill per Kirby P at 607);28.In Reading Australia the Federal Court concluded that the making of an order is ultimately to be determined by whether it is just and convenient to do so: Reading Australia at [9] per Branson J.CONSIDERATION

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Robinson made the following submissions concerning the application for a hearing of separate issues:(a)as to the effect of the pleadings:(i)PIC admits that it invited Mr Robinson to use the Fair Treatment System: Statement of Claim (“SOC”) at [34], admitted in Defence at [25];(ii)the Fair Treatment System is referred to in the Contract Letter: Mr Dasey’s Affidavit, Annexure JD2, page 11, and is referred to separately and distinctly from “Policies and Procedures”;(iii)PIC admits that Mr Robinson submitted a Fair Treatment claim: SOC at [47], admitted, in effect, in Defence at [39];(iv)PIC admits that the Fair Treatment System was designed to be beneficial: SOC at [46], admitted in Defence at [38.1].(v)PIC denies that the Fair Treatment System was a contractual entitlement of or to Mr Robinson: Defence at [60]. The explanation for that appears to be at [2.2] and [2.3] of the Defence, by reference to Mr Dasey’s Affidavit, Annexure JD2, that the effect that the benefits provided to Mr Robinson under PIC’s policies are discretionary in nature, and do not form part of Mr Robinson’s contract of employment, and PIC:(A)says that the Fair Treatment System was characterised as a policy; and(B)maintains that position even though it expressly invited Mr Robinson to use the Fair Treatment System, in connection with its decision to terminate his employment;(vi)PIC does not admit (but does not say why) that the Fair Treatment System relates to s 139(1)(j) of the FW Act, which deals with procedures for consultation, representation and dispute settlement;(vii)in Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 177; (2014) 231 FCR 403; (2014) 247 IR 315; (2014) 315 ALR 243; (2014) 143 ALD 239; (2014) 67 AILR 102-324, (“Romero Appeal”) Farstad (the employer) argued that the policy there in issue was not contractual or part of the contract of employment: Romero Appeal at [49] per Allsop CJ, Rares and McKerracher JJ;(viii)whether or not a policy will be incorporated into a contract of employment will depend upon the parties’ intentions as objectively ascertained: Romero Appeal at [34] per Allsop CJ, Rares and McKerracher JJ;(ix)in approaching the task of ascertaining the parties’ intention, the starting point will be the language of the contract, to be viewed in context, not in abstract isolation, and regard must be had to the purpose and object of the transaction: Romero Appeal at [35] per Allsop CJ, Rares and McKerracher JJ;(x)it is necessary to consider context, and particularly at the time that PIC gave Mr Robinson the Termination Letter: Mr Dasey’s Affidavit, Annexure JD3, page 16: Romero Appeal at (particularly) [21] and [35] per Allsop CJ, Rares and McKerracher JJ;(xi)the Contract Schedule at page 11 makes it clear that:(A)Mr Robinson was required to comply with PIC’s policies, and noncompliance with policies was a reason for Mr Robinson’s termination: see Termination Letter; and (B)if Mr Robinson utilised the Fair Treatment System, he was required to follow its processes;(xii)when read with the Offer Letter: Mr Dasey’s Affidavit, Annexure JD1, page 5, which requires Mr Robinson to comply with PIC’s policies, the Fair Treatment System is expressed to contain obligations on PIC; (xiii)the obligations under the Fair Treatment System were mutual; (xiv)mutuality of obligations under policies was considered in Romero Appeal at [39], [41] and [43] per Allsop CJ, Rares and McKerracher JJ;(xv)in Romero Appeal at [43] per Allsop CJ, Rares and McKerracher JJ, mention is made of a case in which a Court rejected a contention, that although it was common ground that an employee was bound by a policy, the employer would not be contractually bound, for the reason that it defied both logic and common sense;(xvi)even in a case similar to this where the employer sought to rely on exclusionary provisions, similar to the ones that PIC seeks to rely on (despite, in this case, expressly offering Mr Robinson the particular benefit), in this case, it is necessary to look at the whole relationship and not only at what was said and done when the relationship was first formed. In the dynamic and fluid environment of a contract of employment, the subsequent actions of the parties may impliedly vary or amend the contract such that the true agreement between the parties is no longer reflected by the written contact: WorkPac Pty Ltd v Rossato [2020] FCAFC 84; (2020) 278 FCR 179; (2020) 296 IR 38; (2020) 378 ALR 585 (“WorkPac – FCAFC”) at [90] to [93] per Bromberg J;(xvii)both the Contract Letter and Termination Letter, which invited Mr Robinson to use the Fair Treatment System, make it clear that the Fair Treatment System was a benefit under Mr Robinson’s contract of employment;(xviii)courts have been prepared to determine all questions, in one hearing, in similar cases: see, for example, Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 439 at [26] per Marshall J where it is noted that “Farstad rejected the notion that the Policy formed a part of Ms Romero’s contract of employment”, although it does not seem that any party in that matter asked for a separate question to be determined; and(xix)these submissions should be considered in the context of the Court considering the likelihood of PIC succeeding on its arguments in relation to whether the Fair Treatment System was a safety net contractual entitlement, if they were to be considered in one hearing, rather than as a preliminary question. If the chances of success are minimal (as Mr Robinson submits they are) then the Court should refuse to deal with the matter as a separate question; and(b)in response to PIC’s written submissions:(i)PIC admits: (A)it had a Fair Treatment policy: SOC at [40]; Defence at [31], and admits that Annexure JD4 to Mr Dasey’s Affidavit is the FTS Policy;(B)the FTS Policy allowed Mr Robinson to address his concerns and ensured his concerns were addressed: SOC at [44]; Defence at [36]; and (C)the FTS Policy was a benefit: SOC at [46]; Defence at [38.1];(ii)PIC does not dispute any of the annexures to Mr Dasey’s Affidavit: see [4(f)(i) and (iii)] above;(iii)the starting point is that all issues of fact and law should generally be determined at one time;(iv)notwithstanding the heading “Application of Principles”, no effort has been made to apply the principles, and there is no more than a restatement of the principles themselves;(v)[8(a)-(d)] below is just a statement of the law with no explanation as to how or why and no application of the principles, and [8(d)] is speculative and vague;(vi)the starting point is whether or not Mr Robinson had a safety net contractual entitlement; (vii)despite there being no dispute, on the facts, the Proposed Question for determination, is still one of fact and law. It is largely because there is no dispute on the facts that the question is not “ripe” for determination, now, as a separate question, and Mr Robinson submits that the answer is clear and obvious but should be dealt with, and determined, in one proceeding;(viii)in relation to [4(g)] above, it is not appropriate to make a submission to the effect that determining the separate questions will take a short time as PIC has no basis and cannot say how long it will take the Court to deal with the question and to make a judgement. Delay, will almost certainly occur, for the reasons set out in Annexure EM2 to Ms Moran’s Affidavit; and(ix)in relation to [4(i)] above, Mr Robinson’ perspective is completely the opposite, and PIC has pleaded no factual circumstances to support that submission.CONSIDERATIONRules