The HMW Accounting and Financial Group v McPherson

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

The HMW Accounting & Financial Group v McPherson and Ors [2020] QSC 3

PARTIES:

THE HMW ACCOUNTING & FINANCIAL GROUP PTY LTD
ACN 078 923 216

(plaintiff)

v
CRAIG McPHERSON
(first defendant)

JAMES HOEFT
(second defendant)

MH PRIVATE PTY LTD
ACN 617 190 066

(third defendant)

FILE NO:

3261 of 2018

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court of Queensland at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

29 January 2020

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

23 September 2019

JUDGE:

Ryan J

ORDERS:

1.   The application for strike out is dismissed.

2.   Costs reserved.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – PLEADINGS – STRIKING OUT – DISCLOSING NO REASONABLE CAUSE OF ACTION OR DEFENCE – where the plaintiff has commenced proceedings seeking to enforce the restraint and confidentiality provisions of their employment contracts – where the plaintiff applies to strike out the defence argument as disclosing no reasonable ground of defence – whether it is clear that there can be no reasonable (or tenable) defence based on a term that the plaintiff was not to act unlawfully, or contrary to the professional code of ethics - where the plaintiff relied on the decision of Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker (2014) 253 CLR 169 in support of proposition that a term not to conduct business unlawfully is not to be implied into employment contracts, in law or in fact – where it cannot be said that a case based on the implication of a term not to conduct business unlawfully is untenable because of the decision in Barker – where the pleadings raise a reasonably arguable defence that a term not to conduct business unlawfully is to be implied in fact into the employment contracts – where it would not be unreasonable to argue that a clause requiring the defendants (as professional employees) to abide by all policies, including a code of ethics, obliged the plaintiff (through its principals) to abide by the code of ethics as well - where that is not to say that the defendants’ arguments will ultimately succeed but it is not considered unarguable or something which should not be placed before a court in the ordinary way.

CONTRACTS – GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES – CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS – IMPLIED TERMS – GENERALLY – whether there is an implied term in the employment contract that business not be conducted unlawfully or contrary to the professional code of ethics – whether the implication of a term not to conduct business unlawfully is necessary to give business efficacy to the employment contracts – where the contracts fall within the class of contracts for the employment of professionals by professionals who are bound by professional obligations - whether a clause within the employment contracts requiring the defendants to abide by all policies of the business, including a code of ethics, imposed mutual obligations on the parties to the contract, all of whom were professionals, to conduct themselves in accordance with the…

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Details
Case
[2020] QSC 3
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The HMW Accounting and Financial Group sought to enforce restraint and confidentiality provisions in their employment contracts against McPherson. The defendants raised a defence based on an implied term that the contracts should not be used to conduct business unlawfully or contrary to the professional code of ethics. The plaintiffs sought to strike out this defence as disclosing no reasonable cause of action or defence.

The court had to determine whether the defendants' defence, based on the implication of a term not to conduct business unlawfully, was reasonably arguable. The plaintiffs relied on the decision of Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker (2014) 253 CLR 169, which held that a term not to conduct business unlawfully is not to be implied into employment contracts. However, the court found that the defendants' argument was not unarguable. The court held that it was not possible to say that a case based on the implication of a term not to conduct business unlawfully was untenable because of the decision in Barker. The court also considered that the pleadings raised a reasonably arguable defence that a term not to conduct business unlawfully is to be implied in fact into the employment contracts.

The court dismissed the application to strike out the defence. The court found that the defendants' argument that a clause requiring them to abide by all policies, including a code of ethics, imposed mutual obligations on the parties to conduct themselves in accordance with the professional code of ethics was not unreasonable. The court held that it was not considered unarguable or something which should not be placed before a court in the ordinary way.

The court ordered that the application for strike out was dismissed and that costs be reserved.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for strike out is dismissed.

2. Costs reserved.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It is also worth considering the next paragraph of Jessup J’s judgment (my emphasis) – [320] Thus in the present case, to take an example, the question whether the appellant owed a duty to its employees to observe its non-contractual redeployment policy lay, or should have lain, at the centre of the respondent’s case. As discussed elsewhere in these reasons, attention might have been given to whether an affirmative answer was required because of the operation of the contractual duty of co-operation; or it might have been investigated whether the appellant was estopped, as against the respondent, from denying the binding force of the policy. But the matter was not decided – and, I presume, was not advanced – along these lines. Where the central question itself was not confronted, the implied term, like a biological enzyme, was utilised to achieve the desired outcome by an indirect, albeit a less problematic, pathway. Paragraph [317] of his Honour’s judgment reflects his Honour’s concerns about the high level of generality of the term of trust and confidence proposed in Barker. That concern is not inconsistent with the observation of the plurality in the High Courtthat the implied term of trust and confidence, by reason of its breadth, imposed obligations on employers and employees which were wider than “necessary” in the relevant sense. Similarly in emphasising (and endorsing) the critical points of the reasons for judgment of Jessup J, Gageler J highlighted the fact that the (rejected) implied term of trust and confidence was of broad and uncertain scope, without prescriptive content. I note too that one of the reasons why the term of trust and confidence was not implied in Gramotnev was its undefined scope and content. I have also considered paragraph [330] of the judgment of Jessup J, which is to be read with paragraph [293]. At [293], his Honour said (my emphasis) – … Since the employee must perform his or her tasks personally … there is a term [implied into contracts of employment] that the employer is to take reasonable care for the safety of the employee (an obligation now considerably overwritten by statute). There is also a term that the employer will not require the employee to perform an illegal act (which may, perhaps, be viewed as another way of stating the limitation on the employee’s duty to obey directions to those which are lawful). Each proceeds from the fundamental premise that the contract of employment is one which requires the employee himself or herself to perform work personally in accordance with directions, and in physical and regulatory environments, over which he or she presumptively has no control … At [330], his Honour said (my emphasis) – … there are indeed respects in which, in any employment relationship, the employee is entitled to have trust and confidence in the employer. Here I return to the subjects of safety and lawfulness first mentioned at [293] above. Because of the obligation borne by the employee to perform his or her work personally, he or she must have trust and confidence in the employer to provide a safe working environment. There is no better way to describe the proper expectations of, for example, an operator who climbs into the cabin of a tower crane, or a miner who travels far beneath the surface of the earth, in compliance with the employer’s directions. The employee must also have trust and confidence that the employer will not require him or her to perform an act that is unlawful or contrary to some applicable code of conduct, such that, for example, a truck driver could not be required to travel over a distance that would inevitably require him or her to break the speed limit, and an employed athlete could not be required to ingest dietary supplements that were contrary to the code governing his or her sport. But the trust and confidence to which these circumstances relate is reflected in the implied obligations to which I have already referred. Those obligations are well-justified by necessity.