Aurizon Network Pty Ltd v Glencore Coal Queensland Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Aurizon Network Pty Ltd v Glencore Coal Queensland Pty Ltd & Ors [2019] QSC 163

PARTIES:

AURIZON NETWORK PTY LTD ACN 132 181 116

(Plaintiff)

v
GLENCORE COAL QUEENSLAND PTY LIMITED ACN 098 156 702

(First Defendant)

AND

CALEDON COAL PTY LIMITED ACN 120 967 839 (IN LIQ)
(Second Defendant)

AND

YARRABEE COAL COMPANY PTY LTD ACN 010 849 402
(Third Defendant)

AND

WESFARMERS CURRAGH PTY LTD ACN 009 362 565
(Fourth Defendant)

AND

WASHPOOL COAL PTY LTD ACN 139 976 819
(Fifth Defendant)

AND

COLTON COAL PTY LTD ACN 140 768 636
(Sixth Defendant)

FILE NO/S:

BS No 2880 of 2016

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Trial - Claim

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

27 June 2019

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18 and 19 September 2018

JUDGE:

Jackson J

ORDER:

The order of the court is that:

1.   It is declared that each of the notices given by the defendants under clause 6.1(c) of the contracts made between the plaintiff and the defendants styled the “Wiggins Island Project Deed (2011)” is invalid and of no operative contractual effect.

2.   The defendants’ counterclaims are dismissed.

3.   The parties are directed to provide submissions in writing on the question of costs within 21 days. 

CATCHWORDS:

CONTRACTS – GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES – CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS – CUSTOM AND USAGE – INCORPORATION INTO CONTRACT – CONSISTENCY WITH EXPRESS TERMS – where ordinary meaning of text is clear - where defendants submit that legal meaning of text cannot be affected by extrinsic facts - whether the ambiguity requirement is a gateway that must be passed through before admission of evidence of extrinsic facts in every dispute relating to the construction of a contractual term in a formal written contract – whether ambiguity gateway does not apply where something has clearly gone wrong with the text on its ordinary meaning.

CONTRACTS – GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES – CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS – CUSTOM AND USAGE – INCORPORATION INTO CONTRACT – CONSISTENCY WITH EXPRESS TERMS – where ordinary meaning of text is clear - where defendants submit that legal meaning of text cannot be affected by surprising operation or commercial inconvenience or disadvantage to the plaintiff - whether the operation of the text on its ordinary meaning amounts to a commercial absurdity – whether the court may depart from ordinary meaning in order to avoid a commercial absurdity – whether the construction contended for is sufficiently clear

CONTRACTS – GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES – CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS – IMPLIED TERMS – GENERALLY – where ordinary meaning of text is clear - where defendants submit that term cannot be implied because of failure to satisfy requirements for implication of a term implied in fact – whether the implied term contended for is sufficiently clear

CONTRACTS – GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES – CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS – IMPLIED TERMS – GENERALLY – where each defendant notified the plaintiff and each Other…

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Details
Case
[2019] QSC 163
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Aurizon Network Pty Ltd initiated proceedings against Glencore Coal Queensland Pty Ltd, contesting the validity of notices provided by the latter under clause 6.1(c) of the Wiggins Island Project Deed (2011). The dispute centred on whether these notices were effective in altering the defendants' liability for the WIRP Fee and shifting the burden onto other Segment Customers. Glencore argued that the notices were valid and that no ambiguity existed in the contract's terms. The court needed to determine the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to interpret the contract and whether the notices conformed to the contractual obligations.

The legal issues in this case revolved around the construction and interpretation of contractual terms, particularly the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to resolve ambiguities or ascertain the meaning of the contract. The defendants argued that an ambiguity must be identified before extrinsic evidence can be considered, while the plaintiff contended that the ordinary meaning of the text should be the starting point and that extrinsic evidence could be admitted to avoid commercial absurdity or to imply terms that were not explicitly stated in the contract. The court had to decide whether the traditional view requiring an ambiguity before admitting extrinsic evidence still held or if the modern approach, which allows for more flexible interpretation, was applicable.

The court found that the traditional view, which strictly required an ambiguity before admitting extrinsic evidence, was not historically accurate. It adopted a more flexible approach, allowing for the consideration of extrinsic evidence even when the text's ordinary meaning appeared clear. The court determined that the notices issued by Glencore were invalid because they had the effect of reducing their liability to zero and shifting the burden onto other customers, which was not consistent with the contract's purpose and object. Additionally, the court found that an implied term of good faith in giving such notices existed, further supporting the invalidity of the notices.

The court ordered that the notices issued by Glencore under clause 6.1(c) of the WIRP Deed were invalid and had no operative contractual effect. The defendants' counterclaims were dismissed, and the parties were directed to submit written arguments on the question of costs within 21 days.

Orders

Orders of the court

The order of the court is that:

1. It is declared that each of the notices given by the defendants under clause 6.1(c) of the contracts made between the plaintiff and the defendants styled the “Wiggins Island Project Deed (2011)” is invalid and of no operative contractual effect.

2. The defendants’ counterclaims are dismissed.

3. The parties are directed to provide submissions in writing on the question of costs within 21 days.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 5 September 2011, the WIRP Deeds were entered into. Admissibility of evidence of extrinsic facts None of the parties challenges the accepted principles of construction of written commercial contracts that the court of construction is to determine the meaning of the terms objectively, by what a reasonable business person in the position of the parties would have understood them to mean, having regard to the relevant and admissible surrounding circumstances, object and purpose of the transaction.[51][51]Ecosse Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Gee Dee Nominees Pty Ltd (2017) 261 CLR 544, 551, [16]; Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 104, 116-117 [46]-[50], 131-132 [108] and 134 [119]; Electricity Generation Corporation Woodside Energy Ltd (2014) 251 CLR 640, 656-657 [35]; Byrnes v Kendle (2008) 243 CLR 253, 284 [98]; International Air Transport Association v Ansett Australia Holdings Ltd (2008) 234 CLR 151, 160 [8], 174 [53]; Toll (FGCT)Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165, 179 [40]; Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas (2004) 218 CLR 451, 461-462 [22]. There is, however, a significant dispute as to the admissibility of extrinsic facts in aid of the construction of the WIRP Deeds. Argument focussed on three points. First, the defendants generally object to the admissibility of any evidence of the negotiations. Second, the defendants object to the admissibility of evidence of the pleaded fact that at the time of entry into the WIRP Deeds, the Customers were of materially varying experience in mining and exporting coals and varying financial means.[52] Third, the defendants object to the admissibility of evidence of the pleaded fact that at the time of entry into the WIRP Deeds, there was a prospect that a Customer’s Segment under a WIRP Deed may cease to be necessary to enable the plaintiff to provide the Aggregate Access Rights under the WIRP Deed for the Customer.[53] [52] Third Further Amended Statement of Claim, paragraph 10A.[53] Third Further Amended Statement of Claim, paragraph 10C. The defendants advance a number of bases for their objections. Summarising, the first defendant submits that ambiguity is a prerequisite to admissibility of extrinsic evidence and cl 6.1(c) is not ambiguous. Second, it submits that the scope of the admissible facts that may be considered by way of extrinsic evidence, in order to resolve a relevant ambiguity, does not include any fact constituted by the pre-contractual exchanges or negotiations between the parties. Third, it submits that an unsatisfied condition of admissibility of evidence of any otherwise relevant extrinsic fact is that the fact was known to all relevant parties at the time of making the contract. Fourth, it submits that the admissibility of evidence of any relevant extrinsic fact is subject to contractual exclusion. Some of these questions engage difficulties that are familiar to contract lawyers. Two of them are whether an ambiguity in the meaning of a contractual term to be construed must be ascertained before any extrinsic evidence is admissible and whether extrinsic evidence is admissible to raise the ambiguity. Another lies in drawing the line between admissible evidence of extrinsic facts that are raised in negotiations and inadmissible evidence of prior negotiations that would tend to reveal or prove the parties’ subjective intentions.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It is not necessary to explore all of the relevant history in order to decide this case. The occasions for a trial Judge to expound upon contractual hermeneutics are thankfully few. But it is useful to make some points relevant to this case by reference to case law that antedates by 100 years or more the rigorous application of the requirement of ambiguity relied upon by the defendants, as not historically accurate, before dealing with more modern case law. Extrinsic evidence – unresolved disputes I will term the question whether an ambiguity or susceptibility to more than one meaning must be identified before extrinsic evidence of surrounding circumstances is admissible, the “ambiguity gateway”.[54] Some, who I will, for convenience and at the risk of inaccuracy, term “traditionalists”, hold that extrinsic evidence is not admissible unless, first, an ambiguity or susceptibility to more than one meaning can be identified in the text of the contract to be construed. Others, who I will for convenience term “modernists”, say that “ambiguity” itself is ambiguous and deny that there is any ambiguity gateway. A common context for the debate is a dispute about the extent of what out of the negotiation process can or cannot be used in aid of construction.[55] [54]The term was first used in Martin K, “Contractual construction: Surrounding circumstances and the ambiguity gateway” (2013) 37 Australian Bar Review 118, that was judicially referred to before publication in Netglory Pty Ltd v Caratti [2013] WASC 364, [216] . It was first directly used in a judgment in Cherry v Steele-Park (2017) 96 NSWLR 548, 565 [71].[55]As discussed by Mason J in Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 149 CLR 337, 352. Who is right? My tentative answer is that there are weaknesses in both positions. Some of the traditionalists tend to overstate the rigidity of the ambiguity gateway, as if it extends to surrounding circumstances, in general, in all or almost all cases. Some of the modernists may be mistaken in thinking that their views about admissibility of evidence of extrinsic facts are a recent development. Although there are recent statements at high levels in Australia about the existence or role of the ambiguity gateway, the differences of opinion at intermediate appellate court level are not yet directly answered by the High Court. It is appropriate, therefore, to approach the disputed questions as to the ambiguity gateway, as it relates to this case, as a matter of principle by reference to three questions. First, should the disputed question be answered by reference only to the modern contract cases, or should attention be paid to the principles of interpretation of instruments more broadly, as was done in former times? Second, do the older cases support the argument that the rule excluding extrinsic evidence where the meaning of the contract is clear on its face operated rigidly to confine construction to the text only? Third, if the modern law is not settled, what might be some of the advantages and disadvantages of the ambiguity gateway?

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.