McVeigh v National Australia Bank Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

McVeigh, in the matter of Piccolo v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] FCA 187

MORTGAGES – general principles of construction – mortgage given to support guarantee used to obtain banking facilities – whether charging clause to be read down in light of consideration clause – whether guarantee and principal credit agreement relevant in construing mortgage – scope of liability under “all moneys” clause in guarantee – whether extension of further facilities to borrower contemplated by guarantor – whether guarantor’s obligation discharged by extension of further facilities – effect of clause in guarantee preserving liability notwithstanding subsequent variations to principal agreement

CONTRACTS – construction and interpretation of contracts – circumstances in which separate instruments are to be construed together – separate instruments part of one transaction – instruments not all between same parties – all parties aware of content of all instruments

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s 30(1), s 58
Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic), s 74, s 91A, s 91B

Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Raphael [1935] AC 96 referred
National Bank of Nigeria Ltd v Awolesi [1964] 1 WLR 1311 cited
Bank of India v Patel [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 507 cited
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd v West [1978] 2 NZLR 451 cited
Geelong Building Society (in liq) v Encel [1996] 1 VR 594 discussed
Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 149 CLR 337, cited
Goldshede v Swan (1847) 1 Exch 154 cited
Charrington & Co Ltd v Wooder [1914] AC 71, cited
Cambridge Credit Corp Ltd v Lombard Australia Ltd (1977) 136 CLR 608 cited
Davidson v Sydney County Council Employees’ Credit Union Ltd [1979] 1 NSWLR 41 cited
Smith v Chadwick (1882) 20 ChD 27 discussed
Manks v Whiteley [1912] 1 Ch 735 referred
Whiteley v Delaney [1914] AC 132 cited
Joint Stock Bank v Mortimer (1867) 6 SCR(NSW) 248 discussed
Bank of India v Trans Continental Commodity Merchants Ltd [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 506 cited
Catley Farms Ltd v ANZ Banking Group (NZ) Ltd [1982] 1 NZLR 430 cited
Panebianco v Bendigo Bank Ltd [1999] VSC 50 cited
Re Bankrupt Estate of Murphy; Donnelly v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd (1996) 140 ALR 46 referred
Fountain v Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association (1992) 5 BPR 11,817 cited
Burke v State Bank of New South Wales Ltd (1994) 37 NSWLR 53 cited
Re Clarke’s Refrigerated Transport Pty Ltd (in liq) [1982] VR 989 cited
Estoril Investments Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp (1993) 6 BPR 13,146 referred
Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Comer (1993) 5 BPR 11,748 referred

Jageev Pty Ltd v State Bank of New South Wales (No. 2) (unreported, SC(NSW), Sperling J, 26 March 1996) referred

Radin v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1998] FCA 1361 referred
Ankar Pty Ltd v National Westminster Finance (Aust) Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 549 cited

Scarf v Jardine (1882) 7 AppCas 345 cited
Leader v…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 187
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal before the court in McVeigh v National Australia Bank Ltd involved the appellant, McVeigh, contesting the liability he had incurred as a guarantor under a guarantee and mortgage agreement with the National Australia Bank Ltd. McVeigh argued that the mortgage was limited to the financial accommodation extended to the company at the request of the mortgagor and could not support new arrangements made. The court had to determine whether the guarantee and mortgage terms extended beyond the initial loan offer made by the Bank.

The primary legal issue was whether the guarantee and mortgage terms were limited to the two facilities granted in September 1995 or if they could extend to other banking arrangements made between the Bank and the company. The court examined the plain language of the guarantee and mortgage, concluding that the guarantee was clear and comprehensive, providing security for all amounts owed by the company to the Bank at any time. The court further found that the guarantee was based on the Bank's promise to give facilities to the company, both now and in the future, and was not confined to any particular form of bank facility or to the bank facility which happens to be the first one put in place. Therefore, the liability of the customer, as expressly contemplated by the guarantee, was the one that was relevant. The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the first respondent's costs, including reserved costs, and directed the second respondent to file and serve submissions on the question of costs, including indemnity costs, by a specified date.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, including reserved costs.

3. The second respondent file and serve submissions on the question of costs, including indemnity costs, on or before 3 March 2000.

4. The appellant and the first respondent file and serve submissions in reply on or before 10 March 2000.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On the appeal counsel for the appellant again argued that the mortgage was limited to financial accommodation extended to the company at the request of the mortgagor. The mortgage could not, it was said, be read as supporting the new arrangements made. It was limited to the two facilities granted in September 1995. Conclusion The Bank’s offer of 29 August 1995 was made to the Company. It was the Company that had to arrange the production of the guarantee and mortgage for which the Bank stipulated. If the documentation which the Bank subsequently required the guarantors to execute extended beyond the terms of the letter of offer, that was a matter between the guarantors and the Bank. In any event, the Bank’s letter of offer expressly stated that the terms in the letter were “in addition to, but not in substitution of any terms and conditions contained in supporting loan security documentation”. The plain words of the guarantee and mortgage are conclusive against the appellant’s argument. The guarantee appears to be a standard form document. In contrast to much traditional bank security documentation, it is clear and comprehensible. Clause 1 records the consideration. The guarantors are asking the Bank “to give or to continue giving credit and banking facilities [note the plural] to the customer” and the guarantors are to give the guarantee and indemnity “in return for (the Bank) agreeing to do so”. The consideration for the guarantors executing the guarantee is the promise of the Bank to give facilities to the customer, both now and in the future. It is the Bank’s promise which is the consideration. Further, by cl 6.1 the guarantors’ guarantee is that the customer will pay the Bank “all the amounts which the customer owes us at any time”. So the language of the guarantee is not confined to any particular form of bank facility or to the bank facility which happens to be the first one put in place. Still less is it limited to only those bank facilities which the Bank in the future is to grant to the customer at the express request of the guarantors. This reading of the guarantee is in accordance with the underlying commercial reality. The customer is identified (the Company). The monetary limit is fixed ($1,050,000 plus interest). Within those parameters the ordinary expectation would be that banking arrangements between the Bank and its customer the Company would in all probability vary from time to time, but the guarantors’ liability would remain. That being so, money owing by Mr Piccolo under the guarantee is money owing by him as surety and therefore within par (a) of the definition of “the monies hereby secured” in the memorandum of common provisions. Therefore that amount answers the description of “the Secured Amounts” for which the mortgage is security. In my opinion it is not necessary to consider whether the 1996 arrangements were new or replacement arrangements. Nor is cl 13 of the guarantee relevant. That clause only operates to prevent what might otherwise be a discharge of the guarantor’s obligation by reason of variation of arrangements with the customer. However for the reasons mentioned, the liability of the customer is the one expressly contemplated by the guarantee.Order

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As the passage from Rowlatt (which is set out above) indicates, the approach of the Court in Encel was not novel. An early example in Australian courts of essentially the same approach is Joint Stock Bank v Mortimer (1867) 6 SCR(NSW) 248. That case concerned the proper construction of a bond, initially sought by the Bank from Messrs Church & Kemp and executed between Mortimer as surety and Messrs Church & Kemp to secure “the payment of all moneys whatsoever”. Liability on the bond was expressly limited to ₤2,000 and interest. There was no other explicit limitation. The Bank entered into an arrangement to make advances to Church & Kemp for a period of two years, that being the anticipated term of a partnership which was then to commence between them. Church & Kemp presented the bond given by Mortimer as security for the Bank’s advances. The two years passed by and the partnership did not end. Instead, the partnership borrowed more money from the Bank. When Church & Kemp defaulted, the Bank sued Mortimer on his bond. Mortimer demurred upon the basis that the “bond sued on was executed by Church & Kemp, and received by [the Bank] as security; and was executed by [Mortimer] to secure advances made during the two years, and not for any longer period – whereas the advances, for repayment of which [the Bank is] suing, were made wholly after the expiration of that term”. The Court upheld the demurrer. Stephen CJ stated:[T]he allegation may be considered sufficient for the purpose; for the bank could not enforce, from a mere surety (in the absence, at least, of a distinct contract to that effect), any payment for which his principal was not liable. And then the question comes simply to this; whether [Mortimer] can be held to the written terms of an obligation, which he entered into for Church & Kemp, and the bank accepted from them, with a different understanding. In other words, whether [the bank] – because of [Mortimer] having, as surety, knowingly executed a bond unlimited as to time, – can make him answerable for advances to the principal debtors, whensoever made, in the face of an agreement between the bank and the latter, that the bond should (as to them, at all events), be a security for advances only up to a limited period.We are of opinion, that [Mortimer] cannot be so held liable. If the bond is to be read, in the case of the principals, as a bond to secure the payment of sums lent during two years, the same words cannot be read differently against the surety. Their undertaking … was not, by the bond, to pay sums advanced at any time, although such was the tenor of the instrument; for the previous and still subsisting arrangement controlled its terms. In effect, the Court, in that case, construed the surety’s obligations under the bond by reference to the terms of the initial loan arrangement made between the bank and the borrower, though the parties were different. Plainly enough, the bond and the initial advance were made contemporaneously in relation to the same transaction and were executed to accomplish a relevantly common purpose.(d) The operation of the rule in the United States