BHP Coal Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union

Link copied
Case Copied 78 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BHP Coal Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2013] FCAFC 132

Citation: BHP Coal Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2013] FCAFC 132
Appeal from: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (No 3) [2012] FCA 1218
Parties: BHP COAL PTY LTD v CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION
File number: QUD 637 of 2012
Judges: DOWSETT, KENNY AND FLICK JJ
Date of judgment: 13 December 2013
Corrigendum: 22 July 2014
Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – adverse action – where employee dismissed following participation in industrial action – whether dismissal was because employee had participated in industrial action – whether employee’s impugned conduct fell within s 347(b)(iii) or (v) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – where primary Judge accepted evidence from employer that employee was not dismissed because of any conduct within s 347(b)(iii) or (v) – whether primary Judge then bound by decision in Barclay to find termination not unlawful
Legislation: Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) s 9
Fair Work Act2009 (Cth) ss 340, 346, 347, 360, 361
Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009 (Cth)
Summary Offences Act2005 (Qld) s 6
Cases cited:

Automotive, Foods, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v Australian Health and Nutrition Association Ltd [2003] FCA 590, 147 IR 380
Barclay v Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education (2011) 191 FCR 212
Barclay v Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education (2010) 193 IR 251
Barloworld Coatings (Aust) Pty Ltd v Australian Liquor, Hospitality & Miscellaneous Workers Union [2001] NSWSC 826
BHP Coal Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2012] FCA 1495
Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay [2012] HCA 32, 86 ALJR 1044
Cicciarelli v Qantas Airways Ltd [2012] FCA 56
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1201
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v McCorkell Constructions Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCA 446
Cuevas v Freeman Motors Ltd (1975) 25 FLR 67
Fair Work Ombudsman v AJR Nominees Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 467
General Motors Holden Pty Ltd v Bowling (1976) 12 ALR 605
Harrison v P & T Tube Mills Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 102, 188 IR 270
Hyde v Chrysler (Australia) Ltd (1977) 30 FLR 318
Jones v Queensland Tertiary Admissions Centre Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 399, 186 FCR 22
Murphy v Plasterers Society [1949] SASR 98
Pearce v W D Peacock & Co Ltd (1917) 23 CLR 199
Voigt v Loveridge; Ex parte Loveridge [1938] St R Qd 303

Date of hearing: 21 May 2013
Place: Brisbane
Division: FAIR WORK DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 112
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr I Neil SC with Mr R Dalton
Solicitor for the Appellant: Ashurst
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr DF Jackson QC with Ms C Howell
Solicitor for the Respondent: Hall Payne…
CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read BHP Coal Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2013] FCAFC 132
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of BHP Coal Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union involved an employee, Mr Henk Doevendans, who was dismissed for his participation in industrial action. The central dispute was whether Mr Doevendans' dismissal was lawful under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining the legality of the dismissal in light of Mr Doevendans' involvement in the industrial action and the subsequent disciplinary proceedings against him.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether Mr Doevendans' dismissal was due to his participation in protected industrial action and whether his conduct fell within the exceptions to unfair dismissal outlined in sections 347(b)(iii) or (v) of the Fair Work Act. The court needed to assess the employer's justification for the dismissal and whether the primary judge, who had already found that the dismissal was not because of the specified conduct, was obligated to follow a previous decision in Barclay.

The court found that the primary judge's assessment of the employer's evidence was not flawed and that the judge was not bound by the decision in Barclay. The primary judge had concluded that the employer's decision to terminate Mr Doevendans' employment was based on his repeated and deliberate use of the word'scab' during the industrial action, which constituted unacceptable workplace behaviour. The court affirmed the employer's right to enforce workplace policies and culture, which Mr Doevendans had flagrantly violated. It was determined that the termination was not unlawful because it was not due to the protected industrial action but rather due to the employee's repeated and deliberate misconduct.

The orders of the court were to set aside the reinstatement order and the pecuniary penalty imposed on the employer. The court also directed the parties to exchange submissions on costs by a specified deadline.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. The order made on 7 November 2012 reinstating Mr Henk Doevendans to the position he occupied prior to the termination of his employment on 21 May 2012 is set aside.

3. The order made on 21 December 2012 that a payment of a pecuniary penalty in the amount of $7,500 in respect to a contravention of s 346 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) be set aside.

4. The parties exchange submissions as to costs and file such submissions on or before 31 January 2014.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

At this point, it is most useful to set out the primary judge’s own account and findings. His Honour wrote (at [28]):In the days which followed, Mr Brick gave consideration to Mr Ingrey’s letter of 11 May 2012, and to Mr Doevendans’ situation generally. On 17 May 2012, Mr Hamilton advised him that he could not postpone a decision on the matter any longer. Mr Brick agreed that that was the case. Under the agreement which then existed, there were four steps, of increasing severity, that might be taken in relation to an employee for conduct which required disciplinary action. The third step was a final warning, and the fourth step was “disciplinary action, which is commensurate with the severity and/or frequency” of the conduct in question. Mr Hamilton expressed the view to Mr Brick that it was appropriate to terminate Mr Doevendans’ employment. Mr Brick, however, was also giving serious consideration to action under the third step of the disciplinary process, that is to say, to the issuing of a final warning. Referring to the respondent’s “just culture decision tree” as the “JCDT”, in his affidavit read in the present case, Mr Brick said:As I went through the JCDT, the only considerations that were in my mind as reasons why I might land on Step 4 were as follows:(a) Henk Doevendans had held and waved a sign with the word ‘scab’;(b)This was not an isolated incident, as he had held and waved the Scab Sign on four occasions over three days;(c)He had a choice of signs in the protest area, but deliberately and repeatedly held and waved the Scab Sign;(d) He admitted to the allegations about his conduct;(e)He acknowledged that he knew his conduct was inappropriate and contrary to the Charter and Conduct Policy;(f)I understood that he did not accept that he had done anything wrong; and(g)I doubted whether he was capable of being rehabilitated to the just culture I was developing and had developed at the Saraji Mine.These considerations left me with the powerful impression that that termination was the only appropriate outcome. I asked myself ‘do I want an individual at Saraji Mine who has demonstrated a lack of contrition, low potential to change or modify his behaviour and who is unwilling to learn any lesson from this incident?’. My answer was ‘no’. This confirmed to me that Step 4 termination rather than a Step 3 was the appropriate disciplinary outcome.....My decision depended on my assessment that all of the following factors were present: (a) Connection with work;(b) Use of the word ‘scab’;(c)Intentional behaviour. This was not an isolated case where he had accidentally picked up the Scab Sign on one occasion;(d)Deliberate behaviour, as he chose to hold and wave the Scab Sign in circumstances where a range of signs were available;(e)Repeated behaviour, as he had held and waved the Scab Sign on four occasions over each of 16, 17 and 19 February 2012;(f)Deviant behaviour, as he admitted that he knew the word ‘scab’ was inappropriate in the workplace but nevertheless deliberately and repeatedly held and waved the Scab Sign;(g) Offensive, humiliating, harassing and intimidating behaviour;(h)Behaviour that was unacceptable in the workplace and not tolerated by [BHP Coal];(i) Flagrant violation of the Charter and Conduct Policy;(j)Completely contrary to the culture I had developed and was continuing to develop at the Saraji Mine;(k)No contrition or acknowledgement that his behaviour was inappropriate;(l)His behaviour was unlikely to change and he was unlikely to be able to be rehabilitated to the culture I had developed and was continuing to develop at the Saraji Mine;(m)His defensive and arrogant demeanour during my meetings with him on 12 April 2012 and 4 May 2012; and(n)The fact that I had personally heard him admit to the allegations about his conduct. This made a powerful impression on my final decision.If any one or more of these factors had not been present, I may have come to a different decision. For example, if it had been an isolated occasion of having held the Scab Sign on a single occasion, even if the employee had not of shown any contrition, I may not have landed on a Step 4. However, this was not the case here, as Henk Doevendans had not only failed to demonstrate any contrition, but also, his conduct was repeated and deliberate. This was not a case of mistake or accident. (Emphasis added.)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.