Clarke v Service to Youth Council Incorporated

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Clarke v Service to Youth Council Incorporated [2013] FCA 1018

Citation: Clarke v Service to Youth Council Incorporated [2013] FCA 1018
Parties: DEBRA ANNE CLARKE v SERVICE TO YOUTH COUNCIL INCORPORATED, PAUL EDGINTON, LEE DYER and MICHAEL CLARK
File number: SAD 170 of 2013
Judge: WHITE J
Date of judgment: 10 October 2013
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – General protections court application under Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – application for extension of time under s 371 – whether applicant has satisfied the Court that an extension of time is appropriate

Held: Application for extension of time refused.

Legislation: Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) Part IIB
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), Part 3.1, Division 8, ss 351, 352, 361, 365, 369, 371
Cases cited: Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 referred to
Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd (1995) 67 IR 298 referred to
Transport Workers’ Union v School Bus Contractors Pty Ltd [2011] FMCA 28; (2011) 201 IR 327 referred to
Date of hearing: 4 September 2013
Place: Adelaide
Division: FAIR WORK DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 40
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr R Manuel
Solicitor for the Applicant: AM Legal
Counsel for the First, Second, Third and Fourth Respondents: Mr M Douglas
Solicitor for the First, Second, Third and Fourth Respondents: Minter Ellison

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

FAIR WORK DIVISION

SAD 170 of 2013

BETWEEN:

DEBRA ANNE CLARKE
Applicant

AND:

SERVICE TO YOUTH COUNCIL INCORPORATED
First Respondent

PAUL EDGINTON
Second Respondent

LEE DYER
Third Respondent

MICHAEL CLARK
Fourth Respondent

JUDGE:

WHITE J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 OCTOBER 2013

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time be dismissed.

2.The general protections court application be dismissed.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

FAIR WORK DIVISION

SAD 170 of 2013

BETWEEN:

DEBRA ANNE CLARKE
Applicant

AND:

SERVICE TO YOUTH COUNCIL INCORPORATED
First Respondent

PAUL EDGINTON
Second Respondent

LEE DYER
Third Respondent

MICHAEL CLARK
Fourth Respondent

JUDGE:

WHITE J

DATE:

10 OCTOBER 2013

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant seeks an extension of the time in which to bring a general protections court application in respect of her dismissal from employment with the respondent, SYC.  A judge of this Court directed (in effect) that the application for the extension of time be heard in advance of the other issues raised by the application.

  2. The applicant’s employment was terminated on 25 January 2013 on the stated ground of redundancy. The applicant contends, however, that the real reason for the dismissal was her ill-health and, accordingly, that the dismissal contravened Part 3.1 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FWA).

  3. As contemplated by Part 3.1 Div 8 of the FWA, the applicant applied to the Fair Work Commission (FWC) for it to deal with the alleged contravention (s…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 1018
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Clarke v Service to Youth Council Incorporated is a case concerning an application for an extension of time to lodge a general protections court application under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The applicant, Clarke, was employed by the Service to Youth Council (SYC) and was dismissed from her position. She alleged that her dismissal was unlawful, and she sought a civil remedy under the Fair Work Act. Clarke did not commence her proceedings within the 14-day limitation period, and therefore sought an extension of time to file her application. The central legal issue in this case was whether the applicant had satisfied the court that an extension of time was appropriate. Specifically, the court had to determine whether Clarke had demonstrated sufficient grounds to warrant an extension beyond the 14-day statutory period.

The court considered several factors in making its decision. Firstly, the court noted that the applicant needed an extension of over 15 weeks, which was a relatively long period considering the 14-day limitation period. The applicant attributed her delay in commencing proceedings to her emotional and physical health issues, particularly following surgery for a brain tumour. However, the court found that Clarke had not provided any medical evidence to support her claim of impaired health or impaired decision-making ability. The court also noted that Clarke had been aware of the limitation period, as evidenced by the prominent notice in the certificate issued by the Fair Work Commission. Despite acknowledging the emotional and physical challenges Clarke faced, the court found that her decision not to commence proceedings within the time limit was unsatisfactory and that considerations of justice did not require waiving strict compliance with the statutory limitation period.

As a result, the court dismissed Clarke's application for an extension of time. Consequently, the general protections court application was also dismissed. The court concluded that Clarke had not demonstrated sufficient grounds to warrant an extension of time, and therefore, the application was refused. This decision underscores the importance of strict compliance with statutory limitation periods, particularly in employment law, where timely action is crucial to protect the rights of employees.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time be dismissed.

2. The general protections court application be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Accordingly, I proceed on the basis that it is for the applicant to satisfy the Court that an extension of time is appropriate. That onus is to be discharged in the context that the legislature has fixed a short limitation period.Background The evidence on the application for the extension was wholly documentary. It indicates that the applicant commenced employment with SYC on 10 October 2011, initially working three days per week but increasing to four days per week in May 2012. Her original position was that was of Event Coordinator. The applicant underwent surgery for a brain tumour on 15 October 2012 and was off work altogether until 6 November 2012. Thereafter she returned to work on a graduated basis while undergoing rehabilitation. At the time of her termination, the applicant was working 30 hours per week. Approximately 40% of that time was, with SYC’s approval, working from home. On Monday, 21 January 2013, the applicant was called to a meeting in which she was told that her position was being targeted for redundancy because of budgetary issues. She was then escorted from the premises of SYC but asked to attend a second meeting on 25 January 2013. At that meeting, the applicant’s redundancy was confirmed and her employment terminated with immediate effect. The applicant then lodged an application with the FWC in relation to her dismissal. Her concerns were summarised in the following paragraphs of that application:[7]I also feel very strongly that the decision to select my role for redundancy and to terminate my employment related to the fact that I had been on an extended period of sick leave due to the benign brain tumour which I had been diagnosed as suffering … on 11 October 2012 and which was removed on 15 October 2012.[8]… I feel very strongly that had I not been unwell and away from the workplace, that SYC would not have selected my position for redundancy.[9]Making a decision to terminate my employment because of my temporary illness is unlawful. Discriminating against me on the basis of my illness is also unlawful. Both acts, if proven, will constitute a breach of the general protections provisions set out in Part 3-1 of the Fair Work Act and entitle me to seek a civil remedy against SYC. As can be seen, the applicant contends that her dismissal was unlawful. In the present proceedings, she alleges contraventions by SYC of ss 351 and 352 of the FWA. Essentially, these are the same complaints which underpinned her application to the FWC. The individual respondents to the proceedings are senior officers of SYC. The applicant alleges that they were involved in the contraventions of SYC of the FWA. The applicant sought advice from Bradbrook Lawyers in relation to the termination of her employment. That firm wrote to SYC on 11 February 2013, but the applicant was unrepresented at the conference in the FWC on 4 March 2013. As already noted, the applicant did not commence her proceedings in this Court until 4 July 2013.Consideration

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is not necessary to explore these competing contentions in detail. The possible availability of an alternative remedy under the AHRC Act seems to me to be a relatively neutral consideration in the present circumstances.Conclusion As I indicated at the outset, it is for the applicant to satisfy the Court that grounds exist for exercising the discretion to extend time in her favour. I am not satisfied that she has done so. I am satisfied that the applicant made a conscious decision within the limitation period not to commence proceedings. There are aspects of her explanation for the failure to take action before 4 July 2013 which I regard as unsatisfactory. Given these matters and the relatively long extension which the applicant requires, I consider that this is not one of the cases in which considerations of justice require that strict compliance with the limitation period fixed by the Parliament should, in effect, be waived. The application for an extension of time under s 371 of the FWA is, accordingly, dismissed. This has the consequence that the general protections court application is also dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As already noted, the applicant did not commence her proceedings in this Court until 4 July 2013.Consideration It is convenient to consider the application for the extension of the 14 day period under the following headings.The length of the extension required As already seen, the applicant needs an extension of time of over 15 weeks. This is a relatively long period bearing in mind the applicable limitation period of 14 days.The explanation for the proceedings not being commenced in time The applicant acknowledges that she was informed by O’Callaghan SDP in the FWC that she had only a limited period in which to commence court proceedings. Further, the s 369 Certificate issued by the FWC, under a prominent heading “Important Note”, had the following endorsement:The person dismissed … has 14 days from the date of this certificate within which to make a general protections court application to the Federal Court of Australia or the Federal Magistrates Court for a civil remedy order, unless the Court extends the time for making such an application.There is no evidence that the applicant read this note but, given its prominence, it is reasonable to suppose that she did so. Accordingly, I proceed on the basis that this is not a case of an applicant who allowed the limitation period to expire because of ignorance of its existence. As already noted, the basis of the applicant’s present claim for relief is essentially the same as that which she asserted in the FWC. This is not a case of an applicant learning of the possible basis for a claim only after the expiration of the limitation period. The applicant attributes her failure to commence proceedings within time to her emotional and physical health. She deposed that at the beginning of March she did not have the “emotional strength” to make the decision to take SYC to Court, saying that that may have put her long term emotional and financial well-being at risk. The applicant said that she suffered from fatigue, mild dizziness, loss of appetite and irritability, and attributed those symptoms to the medication which she was taking following the surgery for the removal of the brain tumour. She deposed to having attended two sessions with a psychologist during March and said that her general practitioner had prepared a mental health care plan for her. The applicant considers, in retrospect, that she has been suffering from depression, having been reluctant to leave her home, and being fatigued, crying frequently and feeling helpless. She deposed that she has now recovered to the stage at which she feels she can make major decisions and face the prospect of litigation. In particular, she became aware, in June 2013, that two other former SYC employees had commenced action against SYC in respect of the termination of their employment. Through this means, she became aware that it may be possible to obtain legal assistance and moral support in the litigation. SYC objected to the admissibility of much of the applicant’s affidavits on this topic. With the exception of two matters, I overruled those objections, noting that the applicant’s statements were in the nature of statements of her subjective feelings and belief. However, the applicant did not adduce any medical evidence to support a conclusion that impaired health or an impaired ability to make decisions concerning litigation accounted for the omission to commence the proceedings between 4 March and 4 July 2013 and, in particular, within the 14 day limitation period.