FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Clarke v Service to Youth Council Incorporated [2013] FCA 1018
Citation: Clarke v Service to Youth Council Incorporated [2013] FCA 1018 Parties: DEBRA ANNE CLARKE v SERVICE TO YOUTH COUNCIL INCORPORATED, PAUL EDGINTON, LEE DYER and MICHAEL CLARK File number: SAD 170 of 2013 Judge: WHITE J Date of judgment: 10 October 2013 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – General protections court application under Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – application for extension of time under s 371 – whether applicant has satisfied the Court that an extension of time is appropriate
Held: Application for extension of time refused.
Legislation: Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) Part IIB
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), Part 3.1, Division 8, ss 351, 352, 361, 365, 369, 371Cases cited: Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 referred to
Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd (1995) 67 IR 298 referred to
Transport Workers’ Union v School Bus Contractors Pty Ltd [2011] FMCA 28; (2011) 201 IR 327 referred toDate of hearing: 4 September 2013 Place: Adelaide Division: FAIR WORK DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 40 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr R Manuel Solicitor for the Applicant: AM Legal Counsel for the First, Second, Third and Fourth Respondents: Mr M Douglas Solicitor for the First, Second, Third and Fourth Respondents: Minter Ellison
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
FAIR WORK DIVISION
SAD 170 of 2013
BETWEEN: DEBRA ANNE CLARKE
Applicant
AND: SERVICE TO YOUTH COUNCIL INCORPORATED
First RespondentPAUL EDGINTON
Second RespondentLEE DYER
Third RespondentMICHAEL CLARK
Fourth Respondent
JUDGE:
WHITE J
DATE OF ORDER:
10 OCTOBER 2013
WHERE MADE:
ADELAIDE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for an extension of time be dismissed.
2.The general protections court application be dismissed.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
FAIR WORK DIVISION
SAD 170 of 2013
BETWEEN: DEBRA ANNE CLARKE
Applicant
AND: SERVICE TO YOUTH COUNCIL INCORPORATED
First RespondentPAUL EDGINTON
Second RespondentLEE DYER
Third RespondentMICHAEL CLARK
Fourth Respondent
JUDGE:
WHITE J
DATE:
10 OCTOBER 2013
PLACE:
ADELAIDE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The applicant seeks an extension of the time in which to bring a general protections court application in respect of her dismissal from employment with the respondent, SYC. A judge of this Court directed (in effect) that the application for the extension of time be heard in advance of the other issues raised by the application.
The applicant’s employment was terminated on 25 January 2013 on the stated ground of redundancy. The applicant contends, however, that the real reason for the dismissal was her ill-health and, accordingly, that the dismissal contravened Part 3.1 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FWA).
As contemplated by Part 3.1 Div 8 of the FWA, the applicant applied to the Fair Work Commission (FWC) for it to deal with the alleged contravention (s…
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- Case
- [2013] FCA 1018
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered several factors in making its decision. Firstly, the court noted that the applicant needed an extension of over 15 weeks, which was a relatively long period considering the 14-day limitation period. The applicant attributed her delay in commencing proceedings to her emotional and physical health issues, particularly following surgery for a brain tumour. However, the court found that Clarke had not provided any medical evidence to support her claim of impaired health or impaired decision-making ability. The court also noted that Clarke had been aware of the limitation period, as evidenced by the prominent notice in the certificate issued by the Fair Work Commission. Despite acknowledging the emotional and physical challenges Clarke faced, the court found that her decision not to commence proceedings within the time limit was unsatisfactory and that considerations of justice did not require waiving strict compliance with the statutory limitation period.
As a result, the court dismissed Clarke's application for an extension of time. Consequently, the general protections court application was also dismissed. The court concluded that Clarke had not demonstrated sufficient grounds to warrant an extension of time, and therefore, the application was refused. This decision underscores the importance of strict compliance with statutory limitation periods, particularly in employment law, where timely action is crucial to protect the rights of employees.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for an extension of time be dismissed.
2. The general protections court application be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As already noted, the applicant did not commence her proceedings in this Court until 4 July 2013.Consideration It is convenient to consider the application for the extension of the 14 day period under the following headings.The length of the extension required As already seen, the applicant needs an extension of time of over 15 weeks. This is a relatively long period bearing in mind the applicable limitation period of 14 days.The explanation for the proceedings not being commenced in time The applicant acknowledges that she was informed by O’Callaghan SDP in the FWC that she had only a limited period in which to commence court proceedings. Further, the s 369 Certificate issued by the FWC, under a prominent heading “Important Note”, had the following endorsement:The person dismissed … has 14 days from the date of this certificate within which to make a general protections court application to the Federal Court of Australia or the Federal Magistrates Court for a civil remedy order, unless the Court extends the time for making such an application.There is no evidence that the applicant read this note but, given its prominence, it is reasonable to suppose that she did so. Accordingly, I proceed on the basis that this is not a case of an applicant who allowed the limitation period to expire because of ignorance of its existence. As already noted, the basis of the applicant’s present claim for relief is essentially the same as that which she asserted in the FWC. This is not a case of an applicant learning of the possible basis for a claim only after the expiration of the limitation period. The applicant attributes her failure to commence proceedings within time to her emotional and physical health. She deposed that at the beginning of March she did not have the “emotional strength” to make the decision to take SYC to Court, saying that that may have put her long term emotional and financial well-being at risk. The applicant said that she suffered from fatigue, mild dizziness, loss of appetite and irritability, and attributed those symptoms to the medication which she was taking following the surgery for the removal of the brain tumour. She deposed to having attended two sessions with a psychologist during March and said that her general practitioner had prepared a mental health care plan for her. The applicant considers, in retrospect, that she has been suffering from depression, having been reluctant to leave her home, and being fatigued, crying frequently and feeling helpless. She deposed that she has now recovered to the stage at which she feels she can make major decisions and face the prospect of litigation. In particular, she became aware, in June 2013, that two other former SYC employees had commenced action against SYC in respect of the termination of their employment. Through this means, she became aware that it may be possible to obtain legal assistance and moral support in the litigation. SYC objected to the admissibility of much of the applicant’s affidavits on this topic. With the exception of two matters, I overruled those objections, noting that the applicant’s statements were in the nature of statements of her subjective feelings and belief. However, the applicant did not adduce any medical evidence to support a conclusion that impaired health or an impaired ability to make decisions concerning litigation accounted for the omission to commence the proceedings between 4 March and 4 July 2013 and, in particular, within the 14 day limitation period.