Western Union Business Solutions (Australia) Pty Ltd v Robinson

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Western Union Business Solutions (Australia) Pty Ltd v Robinson [2019] FCAFC 181

Appeal from: Robinson v Western Union Business Solutions (Australia) Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 1913
File number: NSD 125 of 2019
Judges: KERR, O'CALLAGHAN AND THAWLEY JJ
Date of judgment: 23 October 2019
Catchwords:

INDUSTRIAL LAW - Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 351(1) – adverse action - mental disability - whether prolonged failure to attend work a manifestation of Appellant’s disability – consideration of Shizas v Commissioner of Police [2017] FCA 61; 268 IR 71 – not a manifestation – no adverse action because of Appellant’s disability

INDUSTRIAL LAW – Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 351(1) – adverse action – mental disability – mental process of decision-maker – where decision-maker did not know whether or not Appellant was ill and believed he was not– where decision maker did not perceive failure to attend work to be a manifestation of Appellant’s disability – no adverse action because of Appellant’s disability

INDUSTRIAL LAW – Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 351(2)(b) – adverse action – mental disability – whether employee could not perform inherent requirement of employment – Appellant unwilling or unable to perform duties – no adverse action because of Appellant’s disability

INDUSTRIAL LAW – Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 545 – adverse action – mental disability - compensation order – likelihood of return to work – refusal to attend independent medical examination an alternative and sufficient reason for termination – no economic loss sustained

Legislation:

Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) ss 4, 15(4) (repealed)

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) Ch 3, Pt 3-1, Divs 4, 7, ss 340, 346, 351(1), 352(2)(b), 351(3)(ab), 352, 360, 361, 545(1), 545(2), 570

Fair Work Regulations 2009 (Cth) reg 3.01

Cases cited:

Airservices Australia v Canadian International Airlines Ltd (1999) 202 CLR 133

Barclay v The Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education [2011] FCAFC 14

Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay [2012] HCA 32; 248 CLR 500

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd [2014] HCA 41; 253 CLR 243

Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union v Endeavour Coal Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 76; 231 FCR 150

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Endeavour Coal Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCCA 1518

Coulton v Holcombe [1986] HCA 33; 162 CLR 1

Gauci v Commissioner of Taxation [1975] HCA 54; 135 CLR 81

RailPro Services Pty Ltd v Flavel [2015] FCA 504; 242 FCR 424

Shizasv Commissioner of Police [2017] FCA 61; 268 IR 71

State of Victoria (Office of Public Prosecution) v Grant (2014) 246 IR 441

Steinberg v Commissioner of Taxation (1975) 134 CLR 640

Victoria v Grant [2014] FCAFC 184

Water Board v Moustakas [1988] HCA 12; 180 CLR 491

X v The Commonwealth (1999) 200 CLR 177

Date of hearing: 27 May 2019
Date of last submissions: 14 May…
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Details
Case
[2019] FCAFC 181
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Western Union Business Solutions (Australia) Pty Ltd appealed a decision by the Fair Work Commission that it had taken adverse action against Mr Robinson, an employee, because of his mental disability. The Fair Work Commission had also dismissed Western Union’s cross-appeal against an order for Mr Robinson to be paid compensation. The Fair Work Commission found that Western Union had terminated Mr Robinson’s employment because of his disability, contrary to section 351 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The Fair Work Commission concluded that Western Union had terminated Mr Robinson's employment because of his disability, specifically because of his unreasonable failure to attend an independent medical examination and because of concerns as to his capacity to return to work. The Fair Work Commission further found that these reasons were because of Mr Robinson’s mental disability. Western Union argued that the Fair Work Commission erred in finding that its decision to terminate Mr Robinson’s employment was because of his mental disability, and that the Fair Work Commission erred in ordering Western Union to pay compensation to Mr Robinson. The Full Bench of the Federal Circuit Court held that the Fair Work Commission erred in finding that Western Union’s decision to terminate Mr Robinson’s employment was because of his mental disability. The decision maker did not perceive Mr Robinson’s failure to attend an independent medical examination to be a manifestation of his disability, and the decision maker did not take adverse action because of his disability. Therefore, Western Union did not take adverse action against Mr Robinson because of his mental disability. The Full Bench of the Federal Circuit Court held that the Fair Work Commission erred in ordering Western Union to pay compensation to Mr Robinson. The Full Bench of the Federal Circuit Court held that Mr Robinson did not sustain any economic loss as a result of Western Union’s decision to terminate his employment.

The appeal was allowed and the cross-appeal was dismissed. The orders of the primary judge were set aside. The Appellant had leave to apply for costs within seven days of the publication of the Court’s orders. Unless an application was made pursuant to Order 4, there would be no order as to costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The cross-appeal be dismissed.

3. The orders of the primary judge dated 30 November 2018 be set aside.

4. The Appellant have leave to apply within 7 days of the publication of the Court’s orders for any order for costs it might be advised to seek.

5. Unless an application is made pursuant to Order 4, there be no order as to costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The sum of $15,000.00 awarded to Mr Robinson for general damages was at the lowest end of what might have been awarded. However, I am not satisfied that this aspect of Mr Robinson’s award of damages was so unreasonable or plainly unjust as to require appellate correction.CONCLUSION For the reasons I have set out I am satisfied that Grounds 1, 3, and 4 of the appeal have been made out. Ground 5 must be dismissed. I am satisfied that the cross-appeal must be dismissed. I have not heard submissions as to costs, but I apprehend that a costs order may not be available to be made having regard to the terms of s 570 of the Fair Work Act. Should the Appellant wish to contend that it be entitled to costs either of the appeal or in the court below, I would grant leave to it to apply within seven days of the publication of the Court’s reasons for such an order. Otherwise I would make no order as to costs. I would make the following orders:(1)The appeal be allowed.(2)The cross-appeal be dismissed.(3)The orders of the primary judge dated 30 November 2018 be set aside.(4)The Appellant have leave to apply within 7 days of the publication of the Court’s orders for any order for costs it might be advised to seek.(5)Unless an application is made pursuant to Order 4, there be no order as to costs. For these reasons, the (perceived) increased risk of injury arising from the physical condition of ankylosing spondylitis was to be regarded as a manifestation or part of the disability. In the present case, the primary judge held that Mr Robinson’s ‘capacity’, as it was affected by his mental condition, was a ‘manifestation’ of his mental disability and that it could not be severed from it. Whilst Ms Pickles genuinely thought that she did not take into account Mr Robinson’s mental disability, she must have taken the adverse action “because” of the mental disability, because her concerns must have been “occasioned (at least in part)” by the claimed psychiatric condition and could not be severed from it: J[40], [56]. At J[40], his Honour stated:[40]The letter of termination and – in particular – the reference in that letter to “concerns about [Mr Robinson’s] capacity to return to work” – has (of course) to be understood in the factual context in which it was written. Part of that factual context, as expressed in the letter, was the past history of Mr Robinson’s responses to the requests made of him to attend medical examinations. Part of that factual context also included the content of the claims being made by Mr Robinson, namely his repeated claims that he was “unwell” and claims that he was “suffering a psychiatric condition”. In the absence of any other reason going to the “capacity” of Mr Robinson to return to work, the reference in the 8 May letter to “capacity” can be nothing other than a concern occasioned (at least in part) by the claimed “psychiatric condition”. Other than more generally expressed claims as to his feeling “unwell”, Mr Robinson was advancing no other basis upon which he would be lacking in capacity to resume his employment. His claimed “psychiatric condition” formed part of the decision-making processes of Ms Pickles when she expressed her “concerns” as to Mr Robinson’s “capacity to return to work”, and any question of Mr Robinson’s capacity could not be severed from the disability itself.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

With respect to Mr Robinson’s submissions that the construction advanced by Western Union would undermine the “protective purpose” of s 351(1), it submits as follows (at [17]-[18]):First, to speak of the protective purpose of the provision says little when the scope of the provision is limited in its operation to a decision that has to be shown to made for the proscribed reason, and is attenuated by 'defences' or qualifying provisions. Second, it is trite that legislation of this type - like others - reflects a political compromise, which does not pursue its purpose "at all costs"; "the question is how far does the legislation go in pursuit of that purpose or object?". Third, taking those matters together, it may be conceivable that there may be circumstances where the manifestation of a disability is so interwoven with the disability such that it is observable or known that the taking of action because of the manifestation would contravene s.351 of the FW Act (e.g. where the disability is physical and the manifestations of it are obvious/observable and known to the decision maker). Contrary to RS[34], it is not necessary for the decision maker to be "fully apprised of evidence of unusually intensive medical examination". All that is required is that the decision maker was sufficiently aware that the manifestation is a manifestation of the disability. To the extent that a decision maker seeks to "ensure they were never apprise of such medical evidence …” those are matters that can be tested. It is no different to the decision-maker in Barclay stating that she did not make the decision to terminate because Mr Barclay was a union delegate, but because in discharging his duties as a union delegate he sent an offensive email.Third, s.351 exists in an industrial and legislative landscape where the rights of injured workers are well protected and it is a civil remedy provision contravention of which may sound in a civil penalty. In this context, s.351 of the FW Act should be construed in favour of the employer (respondent below) and consistently with the balance of legislative purpose addressed in Barclay at [61]-[62].Consideration It is settled law that for the purposes of s 351(1) of the Fair Work Act it is the reasons of the effective decision maker which are to be looked to in determining whether or not an adverse action has been taken because of an employee’s race, colour, sex, sexual orientation age, physical or mental disability, marital status, family or carer’s responsibilities, pregnancy, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin. In this proceeding, the primary judge concluded at [33] and [36] of his Honour’s reasons that Ms Pickles had two reasons for terminating Mr Robinson’s employment:(1)Mr Robinson’s unreasonable failure to attend an independent medical examination, described in the 8 May 2017 letter (termination letter) as “[his] unreasonable failure to cooperate with the Company’s attempts to obtain up-to-date, specialist medical advice”;(2)Ms Pickles’ concern or uncertainty as to Mr Robinson’s capacity to return to work, described in the termination letter as “the Company’s serious concerns about [his] capacity to return to work”.