Legal Research
Cases
Qantas Airways Ltd v Christie

Qantas Airways Ltd v Christie

Link copied

Case Copied 19 March 1998 72 min read

Contents

On this page

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BRENNAN CJ,
GAUDRON, McHUGH, GUMMOW AND KIRBY JJ

QANTAS AIRWAYS LIMITED APPELLANT

AND

JOHN BAILLIE CHRISTIE RESPONDENT

Qantas Airways Limited v Christie (S194-1996) [1998] HCA 18
19 March 1998

ORDER

Appeal allowed with costs.

Set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Industrial Relations Court of Australia and in lieu thereof order that the appeal to that Court be dismissed with costs.

On appeal from Industrial Relations Court of Australia

Representation:

D M J Bennett QC with I M Neil for the appellant (instructed by
Blake Dawson Waldron)

D F Jackson QC with F L Wright QC for the respondent (instructed by
Paul Murphy)

Intervener:

P M Kite SC intervening on behalf of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (instructed by M Nicholls, Solicitor, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission)

Notice: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

CATCHWORDS

Qantas Airways Limited v Christie

Industrial Law – Termination of Employment – Whether termination of employment at initiative of employer – Whether contract of employment ended with effluxion of time.

Industrial Law – Termination of Employment – Discrimination on the basis of age – "Rule of 60" – Inherent requirement of the particular position – International airline pilot – Distinction between "position" and "job".

Discrimination Law – Termination of Employment – Discrimination on the basis of age – "Rule of 60" – Inherent requirement of the particular position – International airline pilot – Distinction between "position" and "job".

Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth), ss170DE, 170DF, 170EA, 170EDA, 170EE.

BRENNAN CJ. I am in respectful agreement with what Gaudron J has written except in relation to the final, and critical, question of fact, namely, whether it was an inherent requirement of the position which Mr Christie occupied as a pilot of Qantas B747-400 aircraft that such a pilot should not be excluded from flying those aircraft to or over those countries which enforce the Rule of 60. In particular, I agree that a stipulation in a contract of employment is not necessarily conclusive to show whether a requirement is inherent in an employee's position. The question whether a requirement is inherent in a position must be answered by reference not only to the terms of the employment contract but also by reference to the function which the employee performs as part of the employer's undertaking and, except where the employer's undertaking is organised on a basis which impermissibly discriminates against the employee, by reference to that organisation. In so saying, I should wish to guard against too final a definition of the means by which the inherent nature of a requirement is determined. The experience of the courts of this country in applying anti-discrimination legislation must be built case by case. A firm jurisprudence will be developed over time; its development should not be confined by too early a definition of its principles.
Evidence is not needed to show that the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Qantas Airways Ltd v Christie and more:

Read every judgment in full
Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
Download judgments as PDF or Word

Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details

Case: [1998] HCA 18
Decision Date: 19 March 1998

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Qantas Airways Ltd appealed to the High Court of Australia against a decision of the Full Court of the Industrial Relations Court of Australia concerning the termination of Mr Christie's employment. Mr Christie, an international airline pilot, had his employment terminated by Qantas, and he alleged this termination was discriminatory on the basis of age, contrary to federal legislation. Qantas contended that the termination was due to the effluxion of time and the inherent requirements of the position.

The High Court was required to determine whether Mr Christie's employment was terminated at the initiative of Qantas, and if so, whether this termination was unlawful under the relevant provisions of the *Industrial Relations Act 1988* (Cth). Specifically, the Court had to consider whether the termination was for a reason prohibited by s 170DF(1)(f) of the Act, which prohibits termination based on age, unless that reason was based on the inherent requirements of the particular position, as permitted by s 170DF(2). The Court also considered the distinction between the "position" of an international airline pilot and the "job" itself, and whether a mandatory retirement age constituted an inherent requirement.

The Court reasoned that the termination of Mr Christie's employment was at the initiative of Qantas, and that the "Rule of 60" (a policy requiring pilots to retire at age 60) was not an inherent requirement of the position of an international airline pilot. The Court found that the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standard for retirement age was arbitrary and not supported by current medical or safety evidence, nor by advancements in physiological and psychological testing. The Court emphasised that the purpose of the Act was to replace arbitrary standards with rational criteria free from stereotyping, and that courts have a duty to give effect to the Parliament's will in enacting anti-discrimination legislation.

The High Court allowed Qantas' appeal, setting aside the orders of the Full Court of the Industrial Relations Court of Australia and ordering that the appeal to that Court be dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed with costs.

2. Set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Industrial Relations Court of Australia and in lieu thereof order that the appeal to that Court be dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

In my opinion, the first question should be answered, No and the second question should be answered, Yes.The statutory background Section 170DF of the Act[36] relevantly provides:"(1) An employer must not terminate an employee's employment for any one or more of the following reasons, or for reasons including any one or more of the following reasons:...(f)race, colour, sex, sexual preference, age, physical or mental disability, marital status, family responsibilities, pregnancy, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin;...(2) Subsection (1) does not prevent a matter referred to in paragraph (1)(f) from being a reason for terminating employment if the reason is based on the inherent requirements of the particular position."[36]Although it was not in issue at any stage of these proceedings, it would seem that s 170DE could also be of relevance. Section 170DE(1) provides:"An employer must not terminate an employee's employment unless there is a valid reason, or valid reasons, connected with the employee's capacity or conduct or based on the operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service."Section 170DE(2), which stated that a reason was not valid if the termination was "harsh, unjust or unreasonable", was found to be invalid but severable in Victoria v The Commonwealth (Industrial Relations Act Case) (1996) 187 CLR 416 at 517.The employment of Mr Christie The respondent ("Mr Christie") was employed by the appellant ("Qantas") pursuant to a letter of appointment dated 30 April 1964. The letter of appointment gained contractual force when it was signed by Mr Christie to indicate that he had "read the conditions of employment set out above and accept[ed] appointment in accordance therewith". A number of conditions of employment were specified in the letter of appointment. Paragraph 2 of the letter stated that Mr Christie was employed by Qantas "as a Pilot for duty as required by the Company in any part of the world". Two further conditions are relevant. Paragraph 4 dealt with termination of Mr Christie's employment. It provided:"(a) During your employment, your services may be terminated by the Company or yourself by the giving of notice or payment or forfeiture of salary in lieu thereof in accordance with the agreement covering Airline Pilots employed by Qantas Empire Airways Limited.(b) You are reminded that should you at any time, in the opinion of the Company be guilty of misconduct, neglect of duty, gross inefficiency or breach of Company instructions, the Company may terminate your employment without notice."No provision was made for termination of Mr Christie's employment by reason of the reaching of any specified age. However, par 19 of the conditions of employment provided:"The abovementioned conditions of employment are to be read in conjunction with and are supplementary to the terms of any enactment industrial agreement or award specifically covering your employment with this Company." A letter of agreement addressed by Qantas' Director of Flight Operations to an officer of the Australian Federation of Air Pilots ("the AFAP"), an industrial organisation of which Mr Christie was a member, provided for retirement by reason of age. The letter of agreement was dated 20 November 1974 ("the 1974 letter") and provided for the extension of a pilot's employment beyond the "normal date of his retirement". The 1974 letter designated the "normal date of retirement" as 1 July following the pilot's 55th birthday. In evidence, after referring to Qantas' superannuation plan, Qantas' General Manager of Flight Operations indicated that 55 had been the accepted date of retirement for Qantas pilots prior to the 1974 letter.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

BRENNAN CJ GAUDRON J (dissent) GUMMOW J

Unless the foregoing approach to the construction of the Act is adopted, there is a real risk that "operational issues" or "operational requirements" will be elevated to "inherent requirements" of particular positions to the destruction of the high purpose to which s 170DF of the Act is directed. Only by upholding the application of the Act is it likely that the employer would be persuaded to lend its support to the international review of the arbitrary and discriminatory standards of ICAO which help to sustain the attitudes of aviation authorities in some overseas countries in the Qantas network. The primary judge found that ICAO's standard was not justified by the medical or safety evidence which Qantas called. International law has advanced since the ICAO standard was first drawn up. So have the available physiological and psychological tests for determining pilot capability. So has the law of this country. Arbitrary standards should be replaced by rational criteria freed from stereotyping. That is the purpose of the Act. Until it is given effect by the courts, it is clear enough that there will be no real stimulus to Qantas either to promote change internationally or so to alter its international and domestic system as to conform to the anti-discrimination principles which the Australian Parliament adopted in 1993[234] and re-enacted in 1996[235]. It is the duty of this Court, the provisions of the Act being constitutionally valid, to give effect to the will of the Parliament.[234]In the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth).[235]Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth).Conclusions and orders A notice of contention was filed for Captain Christie. It principally sought to rely upon the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW)[236] to render unlawful the application to any term of his employment of a policy of Qantas which required him to retire at age sixty. As I would hold the operation of that policy unlawful under federal law, this question does not need to be considered by me.[236]Pt 4E. The appeal should be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BRENNAN CJ, GUMMOW J

Full text does not contain this section.