Supreme Court of South Australia
(Testamentary Causes Jurisdiction)
IN THE ESTATE OF LANG (DECEASED)
[2022] SASC 112
Judgment of the Honourable Justice Stanley
13 October 2022
SUCCESSION - ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATE - DISTRIBUTION - MATTERS RELATING TO BENEFICIARIES
The applicant, in her capacity as the administratrix, seeks an order pursuant to s 67 of the Administration and Probate Act 1919 (SA) dispensing with the obligation to comply with the requirements of s 65 of the Administration and Probate Act 1919 (SA).
The sole beneficiaries of the deceased’s estate are the children. The uncle of the children seeks orders, inter alia, that the children be joined to the proceedings and that he be appointed their litigation guardian.
Held:
1. The application pursuant to s 67 of the Administration and Probate Act 1919 (SA) to dispense with the obligation to comply with the requirements of s 65 of the Administration and Probate Act 1919 (SA) is allowed.
2. The application to join the children to the proceedings and appoint their uncle as their litigation guardian is dismissed.
3. The application by the administratrix for costs against the proposed litigation guardian is dismissed.
Administration and Probate Act 1919 (SA) ss 65 and 67; Trustee Act 1936 (SA); Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 20A, referred to.
In The Estate of Estall (Deceased) [2011] SASC 188, considered.
IN THE ESTATE OF LANG (DECEASED)
[2022] SASC 112Testamentary causes jurisdiction
STANLEY J:
Background
Clayton Miles Cooper Lang (the deceased) died in the Kangaroo Island bushfires on 3 January 2020. He left a will dated 26 August 2010 (the will) and is survived by his two children, Sophia Iris Carolyn Lang born 4 July 2010 and Madeleine Ella Jean Lang born 5 February 2014 (the children).
By his will, the deceased appointed his wife Christie Joy Lang (Christie Lang), the mother of the children, as his executor and trustee. In the event that she was unable or unwilling to act, the deceased substituted as his executor such of his parents, Richard Lang and Helen Lang as were willing and able to act. At the date of his death, the deceased and Christie Lang were divorced. By reason of the divorce and the operation of s 20A(1)(b) of the Wills Act 1936 (SA) (Wills Act), Christie Lang is precluded from taking up the appointment of executrix of the deceased’s estate.
Richard Lang also died in the Kangaroo Island bushfires on 3 January 2020. The circumstances of the death of both the deceased and his father make it impossible to determine the order of death as between the deceased and Richard Lang. By reason of the divorce of the deceased and Christie Lang, and the effect of s 20A(1)(a) of the Wills Act, the sole beneficiaries of the deceased’s estate under the will are the children.
On 15 September 2020, the Court made orders for a grant of letters of administration with will annexed to Helen Lang (the administratrix). The administratrix is the deceased’s mother. On 5 April…
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- [2022] SASC 112
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the relevant provisions of the Administration and Probate Act and noted that section 67 provides a dispensing power to the court, which may be exercised when it is “beneficial or expedient so to do.” The court observed that section 65 has a beneficial and remedial purpose and that beneficial or remedial legislation is to be interpreted as widely as its terms permit. The court also noted that the key consideration in determining whether a dispensing order should be made is whether a beneficiary who is not sui juris would be properly protected by the proposed dispensing order sought. The court concluded that in this case, it was beneficial or expedient to dispense with compliance with section 65 as the farming operations previously conducted by the testator had been continued by Bruce, who was well qualified to conduct the business.
In conclusion, the court declined to join the children as parties to the application and did not appoint the uncle as their litigation guardian as there was no need to do so. The court found that it was beneficial or expedient to dispense with compliance with section 65 of the Administration and Probate Act 1919 (SA).
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the circumstances I decline to join the children as parties to the application. Accordingly, there is no need for Mr Moule to be appointed as their litigation guardian. Consideration of the application pursuant to s 67 of the Act In In The Estate of Estall (Deceased) Gray J considered the statutory scheme established by ss 65 and 67:[1] [1] [2011] SASC 188 at [7]-[10].It is convenient now to turn to sections 65 and 67 of the Administration and Probate Act. Section 65 provides:(1)Every administrator who is possessed of or entitled to any property within this State, whether personal or real, belonging to any person who—(a) is not sui juris, or(b) is not resident in this State, and has no duly authorised agent or attorney therein:shall deliver, convey, or transfer such property to the Public Trustee immediately after the expiration of one year from the date of the death of the intestate or testator, or within six months after such sooner time as the same or such portion thereof as is available for that purpose, has been sold, realised, collected, or got in.(2)The Public Trustee shall then administer such property according to law, and in accordance with any will affecting such property.(2a)The Public Trustee may, in his discretion, (but subject to the provisions of any will or instrument of trust) realise, or postpone the realisation of, any real or personal property delivered, conveyed or transferred to him under subsection (1) of this section.(3)This section shall not apply in any case where the administrator is a limited company incorporated or taken to be incorporated under the Corporations Act 2001 of the Commonwealth, and is acting as administrator in pursuance of any powers granted to it by any Act.(4)This section shall not apply to an administrator acting under any probate or administration not granted by the Supreme Court but sealed with the seal of the Supreme Court in pursuance of the provisions of section 17 of this Act.(5)Subject to the provisions of any will or instrument of trust, the Public Trustee may, if he is satisfied that it will be advantageous to the beneficiaries, authorise the sale of any trust property, not exceeding four thousand dollars in value, to the administrator, or to the administrator conjointly with any other person, notwithstanding that the property has not been offered for sale by public auction or otherwise.[Emphasis added.]Section 67(1) provides a dispensing power and is relevantly in the following terms: A Judge may, on being satisfied by affidavit that it is beneficial or expedient so to do, order—(a) that any administrator, or proposed administrator, shall not be bound by section 65; or(b) that any administrator, or proposed administrator, shall not be bound by the said section 65 until after a certain time to be mentioned in the order.As extracted, section 67 provides that a Judge may, on being satisfied that it is “beneficial and expedient so to do”, order that an administrator not be bound by section 65. Recently, in In the Estate of Richter I had cause to consider these provisions, and made the following observations regarding the scheme of the provisions:[2] [2] In the Estate of Richter [2011] SASC 124, [13]-[15]. Section 65 seeks to protect a person where an administrator, not an executor, has been appointed by the Court to administer an estate and where a beneficiary is not sui juris. The protection is effected by obligating the administrator to convey the property due to such a beneficiary to the Public Trustee. In enacting section 67 of the Act, Parliament conferred on the Court the power to relieve the administrator from the obligation under section 65 when it is “beneficial or expedient so to do”.…It is clear that section 65 has, at least in part, a beneficial and remedial purpose.[3] It is settled that beneficial and remedial legislation is to be interpreted as widely as its terms permit.[4] [3] In In the Estate of Marden [2008] SASC 312 at [14] with respect to this type of statutory provision, I observed: “A beneficial or remedial statutory provision is one that gives some benefit to a person and thereby remedies some injustice [Re McComb [1999] 3 VR 485, [22]].”[4] In this respect, Brennan CJ and McHugh J in IW v City of Perth (1997) 191 CLR 1 at 12 outlined the approach to be taken to the construction of beneficial or remedial statutory provisions: “[It is a] rule of construction that beneficial and remedial legislation … is to be given a liberal construction. It is to be given “a fair, large and liberal” interpretation rather than one which is “literal or technical”. Nevertheless, the task remains one of statutory construction. Although a provision of the Act must be given a liberal and beneficial construction, a court or tribunal is not at liberty to give it a construction that is unreasonable or unnatural.” [Footnotes omitted.]New South Wales v Amery (2006) 230 CLR 174, [138] (Kirby J) citing Bridge Shipping Pty Ltd v Grand Shipping SA (1991) 173 CLR 231, 260-261 and Qantas Airways Ltd v Christie (1998) 193 CLR 280, [152]. In In the Estate of Richter,[5] I discussed the relevant authorities and concluded that the key consideration in that application was whether a beneficiary who is not sui juris would be properly protected by the proposed dispensing order sought. It is worth repeating that discussion:[6][5] In the Estate of Richter [2011] SASC 124. [6] In the Estate of Richter [2011] SASC 124, [16]-[18]. In In the Estate of Freebairn,[7] an application was made pursuant to section 31(10) of the Administration and Probate Act for an order dispensing with the requirement that the administrator provide a surety in accordance with the obligation under section 31(1) of the Administration and Probate Act. In that decision, Besanko J considered the meaning of the phrase “beneficial or expedient” where section 31(10) provided a judicial discretion to dispense with the requirement to provide a surety upon being satisfied that it was “beneficial or expedient to do so”. Besanko J, referring to observations of Dixon and Williams JJ in Riddle v Riddle,[8] discussed the meaning of the expression and observed:[9]The criterion in s 31(10) of the [Administration and Probate Act] is what is “beneficial” or “expedient”. As far as the word “expedient” is concerned, that has been said to be a criterion of the widest and most flexible kind: Riddle v Riddle (1951) 85 CLR 202 per Dixon J (as he then was) at 214. In the same case, Williams J said (at 221–222) that the ordinary natural grammatical meaning of “expedient” is “advantageous”, “desirable”, “suitable to the circumstance of the case”.It seems to me that the criterion requires a careful consideration of the facts of the particular case, and the important consideration is the due and proper administration of the estate. If the particular circumstances of the case suggest that there is a reduced risk of maladministration or less difficulty is likely to be encountered in recovering loss and damage, should there be maladministration, and there are disadvantages or detriments associated with the provision of a guarantee, then the court may form the view that it is beneficial or expedient to dispense with the requirement of a guarantee.[Emphasis added]After a consideration of these principles in In the Estate of Marden,[10] I concluded that an order postponing the realisation of estate property made under section 64 of the Administration and Probate Act, requiring that the Court first think it “beneficial so to do”, calls on the Court to consider whether the making of an order under that section will be of advantage to the due and proper administration of the estate. However, in my view this is not the only consideration. There are important differences between the use of the phrase “beneficial so to do” as it appears in various Acts and places in Acts. In particular, it is noteworthy that section 65 of the Administration and Probate Act contemplates the conveying of property when it belongs to a person, which must be after completion of the administration of the estate. Accordingly, the section requires, or at the very least allows, the Court to contemplate considerations other than the due administration of the estate. In my view, the key consideration in the within application is whether a beneficiary who is not sui juris is properly protected.“Beneficial” or “expedient” are the relevant criteria for determining if a dispensation should be granted. In In the Estate of Freebairn, Besanko J referred to the earlier decision of Legoe J in In the Estate of Sopru,[11] before observing the following with respect to the relevant criteria as they applied in those two decisions:[12] …In Sopru, the conveyance or transfer of all the property to the Public Trustee would have incurred a considerable amount of conveyancing work and costs. In that case, the estate consisted of real estate and an air charter company. Legoe J found that the administratrix was well qualified to manage and control the company, in which she had a substantial financial interest. Legoe J said that if all of the assets were transferred to the management and control of the Public Trustee, the Public Trustee would have to contract out the control of the business, and that the only logical person to contract out to would be the applicant herself. Legoe J also referred to the capital commission and income commission which would be payable to the Public Trustee. Even though he referred to that as a relevant matter, he considered that it was expedient to make the order because the applicant was capable of continuing to operate the businesses, was especially qualified to do so, and would be able to maintain a reasonably conservative cost structure for the operations.In this case, I think it is beneficial or expedient to dispense with compliance with s 65. Prior to the testator's death, he and Bruce and Bruce's wife were 50/50 co-owners of certain farming plant and equipment, which they shared in the operation of their respective farming businesses that were conducted on nearby parcels of land. Since the testator's death, Bruce has continued the farming operations previously conducted by the testator. He has arranged for crops grown by the testator to be harvested, and he has negotiated a loan facility with the National Australia Bank Limited. Bruce is well qualified to conduct the farming business.[Emphasis added.] [7] In the Estate of Freebairn (2005) 93 SASR 415.[8] Riddle v Riddle (1952) 85 CLR 202. [9] In the Estate of Freebairn (2005) 93 SASR 415, [24]-[25]. See also Re Estate of Sopru(dec’d) (1992) 165 LSJS 133, 145-148.[10] In the Estate of Marden [2008] SASC 312.[11] In the Estate of Sopru (dec’d) (1992) 165 LSJS 133.[12] In the Estate of Freebairn (2005) 93 SASR 415, [39]-[40].