Tropoulos v Journey Lawyers Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Tropoulos v Journey Lawyers Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 436

File number: QUD 33 of 2017
Judge: COLLIER J
Date of judgment: 2 April 2019
Catchwords:

HUMAN RIGHTS – employment – discrimination – direct discrimination under Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) s 5(2) – legal practitioner – where employee suffers from depressive disorder – reasonable adjustments to nature of employment – whether working five half days per week is reasonable adjustment – whether adjustment would impose unjustifiable hardship on employer within meaning of Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) s 21B

HUMAN RIGHTS – employment – discrimination – appropriate hypothetical comparator – whether an employee injured at work is an appropriate comparator

HUMAN RIGHTS – employment – discrimination – reasonable adjustments – where contractual dispute not pleaded – whether failing to engage in mediation was failure to make reasonable adjustments – whether employer treated “less favourably” ­– whether instructing counsel on first day back at work, reallocation of clients to other lawyers and allocation of legal aid clients, office relocation, change in position and salary failed to constitute reasonable adjustments

HUMAN RIGHTS – exception – inherent requirements of employment – whether employee could satisfactorily carry out inherent requirements of practice as Australian legal practitioner – victimisation – director of  incorporated legal practice – duties and responsibilities – whether Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 117 requires director to report person who may not be “fit and proper” – whether threat of victimisation occurred because of disability

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – jurisdiction – whether Federal Court has jurisdiction to hear complaint of victimisation – Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) s 42

EVIDENCE – admissibility and relevance – expert opinion evidence – specialised knowledge – evidence of family law – whether knowledge of conduct of daily practice in family law is specialised

COSTS – whether appropriate to depart from usual order as to costs – whether costs ought to be assessed on indemnity basis

Legislation:

Australian Human Rights Commissioner Act 1986 (Cth) ss 3,  26, 46PO, 46PH

Disability Discrimination Act1992 (Cth) ss 3, 4, 5,11, 15, 21A, 21B, 29A, 42

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 79(1)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43

Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)

Explanatory Memorandum to the Disability Discrimination and Other Human Rights Legislation Amendment Bill 2008 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)

Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) ss 9, 51, 118, 418

Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) s 228

Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Regulation 2014 (Qld)

UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008)

Cases cited:

Astley v Austrust Ltd [1999] HCA 6; (1999) 197 CLR 1

Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R. 67

Burns v Sunol (No 2) [2017] NSWCATAD 236

Collier v Austin Health [2011] VSC 344; (2011) 36 VR 1

Coshott v Prentice [2014] FCAFC 88; (2014) 221 FCR 450

Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 436
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Tropoulos v Journey Lawyers Pty Ltd, the applicant, Mr Tropoulos, alleged that Journey Lawyers had discriminated against him on the basis of his disability, specifically his depressive disorder, in contravention of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DD Act). The applicant also alleged that Journey Lawyers had victimised him within the meaning of s 42 of the DD Act. The Federal Court was required to determine whether Journey Lawyers had breached the DD Act by discriminating against Mr Tropoulos and whether the firm had victimised him. The Court also considered the appropriate remedy and costs. The Court found that Journey Lawyers had not discriminated against Mr Tropoulos or victimised him as alleged. The Court held that the firm had acted reasonably in requiring Mr Tropoulos to work full-time hours, given the nature of his work as a family law practitioner. The Court also found that Mr Tropoulos' disability did not prevent him from performing the inherent requirements of his job. The Court rejected the applicant's claims and dismissed his application. The Court considered awarding indemnity costs but ultimately decided against it, ordering the applicant to pay the respondent's costs on a party-party basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The originating application under the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) filed on 25 January 2017 be dismissed.

2. The Applicant pay the costs of the Respondent on a party-party basis, to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Finally, Mr Tropoulos alleged that Journey Lawyers failed to comply with cl 25 of his employment contract concerning mediation of employment disputes, and more particularly in his originating application that Journey Lawyers had breached his contract of employment in refusing to participate in the process prescribed by cl 25 of the contract. Nonetheless Mr Tropoulos has not pleaded breach of contract in his amended statement of claim, and he made no submissions in respect of this issue. Accordingly I understand that this issue is not pressed. BACKGROUNDDepressive disorder Since his teenage years, Mr Tropoulos has suffered from a depressive disorder. He deposed that he has managed this disability by a combination of chemical and therapeutic treatments. For more than 10 years his primary medical practitioner in respect of this disability has been psychiatrist Dr Joshua Geffen. I note that Dr Geffen gave evidence in this proceeding, including a diagnosis that Mr Tropoulos suffers from Bipolar Disorder type II, being an evolution of his initial diagnosis of major depressive disorder. Mr Tropoulos’ employment history, and Journey Lawyers Mr Tropoulos completed an arts/law degree at James Cook University in 2001 and was admitted as a solicitor on 15 July 2002. Since that time, he has worked for various law firms in the greater Brisbane area. In 2006, Mr Tropoulos obtained the degree of Master of Laws (Public Law) from Queensland University of Technology. In about February 2012 Mr Tropoulos responded to an advertisement for a “Senior Family Lawyer” with the respondent, being a permanent, full-time position. Mr Galvin interviewed Mr Tropoulos, and Mr Tropoulos commenced a three day trial, at the end of which Mr Tropoulos was advised orally and in writing that he was the successful candidate. Mr Tropoulos signed a contract of employment with Journey Lawyers on 24 February 2012 with a base salary of $100,000, exclusive of superannuation and bonuses. A copy of that contract of employment was annexed to Mr Tropoulos’ affidavit of 15 May 2017. Journey Lawyers is an incorporated legal practice of which Mr Bryan Galvin is the principal. As at August 2015, the firm employed approximately eight lawyers (including Mr Galvin) and eight support staff. Mrs Lynette Galvin, who is married to Mr Galvin, made Court appearances on behalf of the firm. Journey Lawyers specialised in matrimonial disputes including separation and divorce, the breakdown of de facto relationships, child custody and access, financial maintenance, property settlements, domestic violence and areas of law related to family law. I understand that these other areas include wills, powers of attorney and estate matters. The firm’s primary practice is in the Family Court of Australia and the family law jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. Journey Lawyers’ clients are almost exclusively natural persons who seek advice and representation in respect of family law matters. I understand this includes both private clients and legal aid clients. Deterioration in Mr Tropoulos’ condition

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The amended defence further pleads that Mr Tropoulos was not able to carry out the inherent requirements of the particular work that he undertook with the respondent. In particular: 19. At all times material to this proceeding: (a)it has been and it remain a common feature of Family Law clients that they find themselves – frequently, for the first time in their lives – in circumstances:(i) of heightened emotional vulnerability; and(ii)further or alternatively, of unaccustomed financial austerity; and(iii) further or in the further alternative, of extreme anxiety; and(iv) further or in the further alternative, of great distress; (b) moreover, Family Law clients sometimes either:(i) are in jeopardy of domestic violence; or(ii)apprehend that they are in jeopardy or domestic violence; and (c)a special relationship of trust, confidence and personal dependency therefore routinely arises between a Family Law client and the legal practitioner handling the client’s file. 20.For the reasons set forth in paragraph 19 of this pleading, Family Law clients usually have a reasonable expectation: (a) that the client:(i) will have ongoing access to the legal practitioner handling the client’s file;(ii) in particular, will have timely access to the legal practitioner handling the client’s file when urgent or unforeseen exigencies cause concern to the client; and(iii) will not have his or her file transferred, more often than necessary, between different legal practitioners; and(b)specifically, where the legal practitioner handling the client’s file had advised the client to pursue a particular course of action (such as making an application to a court), that the same legal practitioner:(i) will generally see that course of action through to completion; and(ii) will be available to explain the outcome to the client, especially when the outcome is less favourable for the client than had been anticipated.21. Some areas of legal practice are more conducive than others to part-time or fractional employment, such that:(a) areas of legal practice which are generally more conducive to part-time or fractional employment include:(i) conveyancing and property law;(ii) securities;(iii) corporate and commercial;(iv) intellectual property;(v) employment law;(vi) immigration law;(vii) mining and resources; and(viii) tax; and(b) areas of legal practice which are generally less conducive to part-time or fractional employment include any area of legal practice involving litigation, such as:(i) criminal law;(ii) personal injuries;(iii) commercial litigation;(iv) planning and environment; and(v) Family Law.22. The reasons why Family Law (in particular) is generally not conducive to part-time or fractional employment, and especially part-time or fractional employment comprising less than the minimum acceptable working hours, are:(a)in most courts and tribunals, there is only limited scope for listing matters on a date and at a time which is suitable to a part-time or fractional employee;(b) major litigious matters often take more than one day, further limiting the scope for listing matters on a date and at a time which is suitable to a part-time or fractional employee;(c) even for a litigious matter which is not expected to take more than one day, preparation for a hearing generally requires the availability, in the lead-up to the hearing, of the legal practitioner handling the client’s file;(d) a Family Law practitioner who does not regularly participate in court proceedings:(i) tends to lose touch, generally, with the practice and jurisprudence of the courts which exercise jurisdiction in Family Law;(ii) tends to lose touch, in particular, with the attitude and disposition of such courts, and of individual judges thereof, towards the exercise of discretionary powers; and(iii) therefore becomes less capable of providing competent advice to Family Law clients; and(e)in addition, part-time or fractional employment is not compatible with the reasonable expectations of clients, as set for in paragraph 20 of this pleading. 23. At all times material to this proceeding:(a) success as a Family Law practitioner depended upon:(i) the practitioner’s ability to provide sound, competent, reliable and dispassionate legal advice in Family Law; and(ii) the practitioner’s behaving in a manner consonant with the special relationship of trust, confidence and personal dependency set forth in subparagraph 19(c) of this pleading; and(b) the most vital attributes for a successful Family Law practitioner therefore relevantly included:(i) soundness and reliability of the practitioner’s thought processes;(ii) emotional stability;(iii) good judgement; and(iv) an even temperament. …26. In the premises set forth in the preceding paragraphs in Part III of this pleading, the inherent requirements of the employment of Tropoulos by Journey, within the meaning of section 21A of the DDA:(a) relevantly included:(i) the ability to work on a full-time basis, or on a part-time or fractional basis comprising not less than the minimum acceptable working hours, rather than on a part-time or fractional basis of less than the minimum acceptable working hours;(ii) soundness and reliability of his thought processes;(iii) emotional stability;(iv) good judgement; and(v) an even temperament; and(b) were therefore inconsistent with:(i) the inability of Tropoulos to work on a full-time basis, or on a part-time or fractional basis comprising not less than the minimum acceptable working hours, rather than on a part-time or fractional basis of less than the minimum acceptable working hours;(ii) Tropoulos being susceptible to adverse affection of his thought processes, emotions and judgement (as alleged in paragraph 10 of the Amended Statement of Claim); or(iii) the propensity of Tropoulos (as also alleged in paragraph 10 of the Amended Statement of Claim) to engage in disturbed behaviour.27. Further in the premises set forth in the preceding paragraphs in Part III of this pleading, and if the facts alleged in paragraphs 8 and 10 of the Amended Statement of Claim are true, either:(a) despite his qualifications and experience, Tropoulos is, to all intents and purposes, unemployable as a Family Law practitioner; or(b) alternatively, if Tropoulos is employable as a Family Law practitioner, he has failed to mitigate any loss or damage which he has suffered, by seeking and obtaining such employment.…28.At the time when Tropoulos was first employed by Journey (on or about 24 February 2012):(a) Journey was seeking:(i) a senior solicitor, capable of working on his own files without regular or ongoing supervision; and(ii) a full-time employee, rather than a part-time or fractional employee; and(iii) an employee who was not susceptible to adverse affection of the employee’s thought processes, emotions and judgement; and(iv) an employee who was not subject to a propensity to engage in disturbed behaviour;(b) Journey employed Tropoulos on the understanding, in the belief, and without any reason to suppose the contrary, that Tropoulos:(i) satisfied those criteria; and(ii) was likely to continue to satisfy those criteria. 29.Tropoulos did not disclose to the Respondents, prior to his being employed by Journey, or at any time thereafter until Journey received Geffen’s 13 August 2015 email:(a) as alleged in paragraph 8 of the Amended Statement of Claim:(i) that Tropoulos was then suffering from the alleged mental illness; or(ii) that Tropoulos had been suffering from the alleged mental illness since his late teenage years; or(iii) that the management of the alleged mental illness required a combination of medication and therapeutic counselling; or(iv) that Tropoulos had been under ongoing specialist psychiatric care, as at 24 February 2012, for at least 6 years; or(b) as alleged in paragraph 10 of the Amended Statement of Claim:(i) that Tropoulos was then susceptible to adverse affection of his thought processes, emotions and judgement; or(ii) that Tropoulos was then subject to a propensity to engage in disturbed behaviour.30. At all times material to this proceeding:(a) there has been an over-supply of law graduates and qualified solicitors seeking employment in South-East Queensland; and(b) that over-supply has been most acute in the case of law graduates and qualified solicitors seeking employment on a part-time or fractional basis, whether:(i) as a lifestyle choice; or(ii) due to family commitments; or(iii) for health reasons; or(iv) for some other reason. …39. In the premises of:(a) the inability of Tropoulos to work on a full-time basis, or on a part-time or fractional basis comprising not less than the minimum acceptable working hours, rather than on a part-time or fractional basis of less than the minimum acceptable working hours;(b) Tropoulos being susceptible to adverse affection of his thought processes, emotions and judgement, as alleged in paragraph 10 of the Amended Statement of Claim (if true); and(c) Tropoulos being subject to a propensity to engage in disturbed behaviour, as further alleged in paragraph 10 of the Amended Statement of Claim (if true),at all times material to this proceeding, it was reasonably apparent that Tropoulos may, from time to time, fail to:(i)act in the best interests of a client; or(ii) deliver legal services competently, diligently, and as promptly as reasonably possible; or(iii) refrain from committing conduct which may diminish the client’s confidence in the administration of justice; or(iv) provide clear and timely advice to assist a client to understand relevant legal issues and to make informed choices about action to be taken during the course of a matter.40. In the premises set forth in paragraph 39 of this pleading:(a)an incorporated legal practice which was aware of those premises could not permit the practice to employ Tropoulos as a Family Law practitioner, consistently with the professional duties of a legal practitioner at Common Law, under the LPA, and under the ASCR; and(b) a legal practitioner director of an incorporated legal practice who was aware of those premises could not permit the practice to employ Tropoulos as a Family Law practitioner, consistently with:(i) the professional duties of a legal practitioner at Common Law, under the LPA, and under the ASCR; and(ii) the duties of a legal practitioner director of an incorporated legal practice under section 117 of the LPA.…41.The nature of the Journey’s incorporated legal practice, as set forth in paragraphs 17 and 18 of this pleading, has the consequences that:(a) it is unusual for Journey to receive “repeat business” from former clients;(b) the most effective and salutary promotion of the practice is by recommendations and “word of mouth” from satisfied previous clients;(c) a significant proportion of Journey’s clientele is attracted as a result of such recommendations and “word of mouth”; and(d) if previous clients were to “bad mouth” or deprecate Journey or the service provided by Journey, that would likely:(i) have a substantial negative impact on Journey’s capacity to attract new clientele; and(ii) deprive Journey of a substantial part of the commercial benefit of advertising conducted by Journey and on its behalf.42. Factors critical to Journey’s achieving satisfaction amongst its clients include the ability of Journey, and of all Family Law practitioners employed by Journey, to:(a) behave in a manner consonant with the special relationship of trust, confidence and personal dependency set forth in subparagraph 19(c) of this pleading; and(b) meet the reasonable expectations set forth in paragraph 20 of this pleading.43. Were Journey, and each of the Family Law practitioners employed by Journey, unable to fulfil the factors set forth in paragraph 42 of this pleading, that would have a substantial detrimental impact on:(a)the level of satisfaction amongst Journey’s clients;(b) the likelihood that Journey’s clients may continue to recommend Journey, or promote Journey’s practice by “word of mouth”;(c) Journey’s ability to attract new clients;(d) Journey’s capacity to conduct a financially successful and profitable practice; and(e) Journey’s capacity to meet its financial commitments, including the payment of salaries and other benefits to Journey’s staff.44. In the premises of:(a) the inability of Tropoulos to work on a full-time basis, or on a part-time or fractional basis comprising not less than the minimum acceptable working hours, rather than on a part-time or fractional basis of less than the minimum acceptable working hours;(b) Tropoulos being susceptible to adverse affection of his thought processes, emotions and judgement, as alleged in paragraph 10 of the Amended Statement of Claim (if true); and(c) Tropoulos being subject to a propensity to engage in disturbed behaviour, as further alleged in paragraph 10 of the Amended Statement of Claim (if true),at all times material to this proceeding, Tropoulos lacked the ability to:(i) behave in a manner consonant with the special relationship of trust, confidence and personal dependency set forth in subparagraph 19(c) of this pleading; and(ii) meet the reasonable expectations of clients set forth in paragraph 20 of this pleading.(Amendment formatting omitted.)RELEVANT EVIDENCEThe evidence of Mr Tropoulos

Decision

Reasons for decision

I am not satisfied that Journey Lawyers can be taken to have committed an act of victimisation against Mr Tropoulos within the meaning of s 42 of the DD Act. In these circumstances it is not necessary for me to determine available, or appropriate, remedies.CONCLUSION Mr Tropoulos’ application before the Court should be dismissed. Ordinarily, costs follow the event: Firebird Global Master Fund II Ltd v Republic of Nauru [No 2] [2015] HCA 53; (2015) 90 ALJR 270 at [6], Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11; (1998) 193 CLR 72. However, Journey Lawyers has submitted that this may be a case where it is appropriate for the Court to exercise discretion pursuant to s 43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) to depart from the usual order as to costs and to order that costs be assessed on the indemnity basis. It makes this submission on the following grounds:·Mr Tropoulos is a qualified lawyer. ·In the course of cross-examination, Mr Tropoulos appeared to make admissions that aspects of his statement of claim were not true, especially in relation to his “belief”.·A lawyer is required to certify the claims made in the statement of claim. ·Mr Tropoulos made his TPD Claim and concurrently pressed for a remedy of reinstatement in this matter (though the claim for reinstatement was withdrawn at the beginning of the trial). ·Indemnity costs were previously awarded in respect of the inclusion of Mr Galvin as the former second respondent to this application, on the basis that Mr Galvin was improperly included as a respondent. ·Mr Tropoulos’ lawyers hold themselves out to have expertise in the area of anti-discrimination law. ·Mr Tropoulos persisted with a claim for reinstatement until he abandoned that aspect of his claim in March 2018, notwithstanding that he had been certified as totally and permanently unfit and received a substantial payout from his insurers in November 2017. Recently in Umoona Tjutagku Health Service Aboriginal Corporation v Walsh [2019] FCAFC 32 at [48] the Full Court affirmed the principles on which costs ought to be awarded on an indemnity basis. As their Honours observed: It has long been established that the Court may, in the exercise of the discretion under s 43 of the FCA Act, award costs on a solicitor/client or indemnity basis where the particular circumstances of the case warrant the Court departing from the ordinary practice of awarding costs on a party and party basis. As Sheppard J explained in Colgate Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Limited [1993] FCA 536; (1993) 46 FCR 225 (Colgate Palmolive) at 233, there should be some special or unusual feature in the case to justify the Court departing from the ordinary practice. Examples of circumstances identified by Sheppard J which may justify an order for indemnity costs include “an imprudent refusal of an offer to compromise”: Colgate Palmolive at 233 [5]. This includes, but is not necessarily limited to, the refusal of a so-called “Calderbank offer”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Journey Lawyers’ clients are almost exclusively natural persons who seek advice and representation in respect of family law matters. I understand this includes both private clients and legal aid clients. Deterioration in Mr Tropoulos’ condition Mr Tropoulos deposed that he began to experience an increase in the severity of the symptoms of his depressive disorder in or around July 2015. At this point Mr Tropoulos held the position of Senior Associate with Journey Lawyers. Mr Tropoulos deposed that this deterioration in his mental health coincided with a period in the firm where he worked continuously for around 20 days to ensure that client demands and court deadlines were met, and in the context of significant ongoing tension between staff members at the office around this time. Journey Lawyers disputes Mr Tropoulos’ claims that he worked continuously for 20 days and that there was such alleged tension. On 10 August 2015, Mr Tropoulos left the office and went to see Dr Geffen. Dr Geffen counselled Mr Tropoulos to take urgent leave, changed the dosage of Mr Tropoulos’ medication and prescribed new medication for him. Also on 10 August 2015, Dr Geffen sought permission to disclose the nature of Mr Tropoulos’ medical condition to Journey Lawyers, and Mr Tropoulos consented to this. On 13 August 2015, Dr Geffen forwarded a medical certificate to Ms Julie Hawley, the respondent’s practice manager, certifying Mr Tropoulos as unfit for work up to and including 18 August 2015. On 3 September 2015, Mr Tropoulos forwarded an additional medical certificate to Ms Hawley. The medical certificate, dated 31 August 2015, indicated that Dr Geffen had reviewed the applicant on 27 August 2015 and advised him not to attend work from 27 August 2015 to 18 September 2015 inclusive. On 18 September 2015, Ms Hawley emailed Mr Tropoulos advising that he would not be able to return to work until he was medically cleared and that “reduced days and workload” would need to be discussed.Key events in respect of the complaint The following events are material to Mr Tropoulos’ complaint before the Australian Human Rights Commission (Commission), and claim in this Court.1. First return to work – 22 September 2015 Mr Tropoulos attempted to return to work on or about 22 September 2015. However it is clear that the attempt was unsuccessful. Mr Tropoulos recommenced sick leave from 23 September 2015.2. Absence from work – 23 September to 20 October 2015, and relevant correspondence During his absence from work following the first attempted return to work, Mr Tropoulos emailed Ms Hawley on 1 October 2015 in the following terms:Hi julie I saw my doctor yesterday. He has suggested that I pop in on a couple of occasions and say hi get my desk ready have a short discussion with my coworkers get an cases or practice updates and then leave. Rather than placing pressure of discussions on a particular return to work date. He has suggested that I work for a few hours a day 5 days for the first week or so. He is of the view that getting ready for work etc will aid in my recovery rather then being isolated. I have told my doctor that management do not want me coming to work until I am better. He said go anyway to pick up drop off etc and that is what high level professionals do whether they are sick or on holidays etc. I was going to call but I don't know your hours that you are in the office etc and we may end up trying to get each other on the phone.Yes it all sounds confusing to me too but I can see the benefit as well. I am getting better every day. I am seeing my doctor again on 6 October and I am on a wait list if someone cancels before 19 October in order to obtain certification for fitness for work that you require. Steve Tropoulos (Errors in original.)