Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia
(DIVISION 2)
Jain v Special Broadcasting Service Corporation [2022] FedCFamC2G 814
File number: SYG 909 of 2020 Judgment of: JUDGE CAMERON Date of judgment: 6 October 2022 Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – workplace right – whether a worker’s duty under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (NSW) to take reasonable care for his or her own health and safety while at work was a role or responsibility under a workplace law – meaning of “at work”
INDUSTRIAL LAW – discrimination because of disability – meaning of “disability” – distinction may be drawn between adverse action taken because of a disability and its manifestations, and adverse action taken because of the consequences of a disability and its manifestations – inherent requirements of the position
WORDS AND PHRASES – at work, disability
Legislation: Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) s 4
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 340, 341, 342, 351
Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic) s 25
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) s 19
Special Broadcasting Service Act 1991 (Cth) s 5
Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth) ss 7, 28, 29
Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (NSW) ss 7, 28, 29
Cases cited: Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union v Endeavour Coal Pty Ltd (2013) 234 IR 190
Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union v Endeavour Coal Pty Ltd (2015) 231 FCR 150
Hodkinson v Commonwealth (2011) 248 FLR 409
Morton v Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (No 2) [2019] FCA 1754
Railpro Services v Flavel (2015) 242 FCR 424
Shizas v Commissioner of Police (2017) 268 IR 71
Stephens v Australian Postal Corporation [2011] FMCA 448
Western Union Business Solutions (Australia) Pty Ltd v Robinson (2019) 272 FCR 547
Division: Fair Work Division Number of paragraphs: 138 Date of last submissions: 19 August 2021 Dates of hearing: 22-24 June 2021 Place: Sydney The Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person by video-link Counsel for the Respondent: Ms P. Bindon Solicitors for the Respondent: Mills Oakley
Table of Corrections 8 November 2022 In paragraph 5, “September 2017” has been replaced with “October 2018”. 8 November 2022 In paragraph 25, “10 December 2010” has been corrected to “10 December 2019”. ORDERS
SYG 909 of 2020 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: PALLAVI JAIN
Applicant
AND: SPECIAL BROADCASTING SERVICE CORPORATION ABN 91 314 398 574
Respondent
order made by:
JUDGE CAMERON
DATE OF ORDER:
6 October 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal…
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- Case
- [2022] FedCFamC2G 814
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue in this case was whether Ms Jain's dismissal constituted "adverse action" as defined in the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The Fair Work Act prohibits adverse action against an employee for exercising a workplace right, which includes the right to take reasonable care for one's health and safety under the Work Health and Safety Act. Ms Jain argued that her absence from work due to health issues related to her working relationship with Ms Merani constituted the exercise of her workplace right under the Work Health and Safety Act. SBS, on the other hand, contended that Ms Jain was not "at work" when she was absent and thus her absence did not amount to the exercise of a workplace right.
The Fair Work Commission found that Ms Jain had indeed suffered from the aggravation of an anxiety disorder, a fact largely undisputed by SBS. The Commission also accepted that Ms Jain had a workplace right under the Work Health and Safety Act to take reasonable care for her health and safety. However, the Commission held that Ms Jain's absence from work did not constitute the exercise of a workplace right because she was not "at work" during her absence. The Commission reasoned that the concept of being "at work" under the Work Health and Safety Act typically refers to being physically present and engaged in activities under the direction or supervision of the employer, which was not the case here.
Given this finding, the Commission concluded that Ms Jain's dismissal did not constitute adverse action within the meaning of the Fair Work Act, and thus her claim for unfair dismissal was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
SBS also submitted that reinstatement was not practical given that it would be futile. In that regard SBS referred to two newspaper articles in which Ms Jain had participated concerning Ms Jain’s dismissal and this proceeding which were published the day before the trial of this matter commenced. CONSIDERATIONBackgroundFactual preliminaries SBS’s written submissions disputed whether it had been proved in this proceeding that Ms Jain had suffered from the aggravation of an anxiety disorder. However, more relevantly, Ms Wicks and Ms O’Neil indicated that they had accepted that she did suffer from that condition. The other relevant facts were largely uncontroversial and so credibility is not generally an issue. I find that Ms O’Neil was the relevant decision maker. When she was dismissed in December 2019, Ms Jain had not performed work for SBS for over a year and, she agreed, she was not receiving compensation payments. Section 340 FW Act Section 340(1)(a) of the FW Act prohibits a person from taking “adverse action”, which is defined by s.342(1) of the FW Act to include dismissal, against another because they have exercised a workplace right. “Workplace right” is defined by s.341(1)(a) of the FW Act to include having the benefit of, or a role or responsibility under, a workplace law. The first limb of Ms Jain’s case was that she had been dismissed for exercising the workplace right and responsibility under s.28 of the WHS Act to take reasonable care for her health and safety by, in her case, being absent from work because of the adverse health consequences for her of reporting to Ms Merani. She also submitted that her absences while receiving compensation payments were the exercise of a workplace right under s.19 of the SRC Act. Statutes such as the WHS Act are workplace laws: AMWU v Visy at 86-87 [78], and s.28(a) of the WHS Act creates in persons working in a business or undertaking, a workplace right and responsibility to protect their own health and safety: Yu v ACT Education Directorate [2022] FCAFC 110 at [39]; AMWU v Visy at 95 [120], 97 [129]. Similarly to the Victorian Occupational Health and Safety Act considered in AMWU v Visy, the WHS Act imposes a responsibility on all persons working in a business or undertaking to exercise reasonable care in relation to health and safety, contravention of which attracts criminal liability and is punishable by significant penalties. Even so, the circumstances in which s.28(a) of the WHS Act will found a workplace right are not unlimited: Yu v ACT Education Directorate at [39]. For instance, the paragraph applies a reasonableness test and so conduct that does not meet that test will not amount to the exercise of a workplace right under the FW Act. Section 28(a) also only applies in circumstances where the person working in a business or undertaking is “at work”. SBS submitted that even if s.28(a) of the WHS Act could create a workplace right, a proposition it disagreed with, the paragraph did not do so in Ms Jain’s case because it did not apply unless she was “at work” and it could not be said that she had been “at work” when she had in fact been absent from work. Ms Jain argued that an employee is “at work” when engaged in activities at the direction, or under the supervision, of their employer and that she had been so engaged when “carrying out the rehabilitation process”, even if she was absent from work.