FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
National Union of Workers v Qenos Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 178
INDUSTRIAL LAW – decision by employer to conduct “spill and fill” selection and retrenchment process – whether made for prohibited reason – whether made wholly or in part because of protected action - whether decision constitutes threat of dismissal – whether constitutes injury to employees in course of employment – whether prejudicially alters employees’ positions – whether decision taken by reason of employees’ membership of industrial union – whether employees dissatisfied with conditions – whether decision taken to coerce employees to accept agreement.
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 170MU(1), 170NC, 298K(1)(a), (b), (c), 298L(1)(a), 298L(1)(l)
Davids Distribution Pty Ltd v NUW (1999) 91 FCR 463 at 500 considered
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1008 at par 48 referred to
Australian Workers’ Union v John Holland Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 93 at par 47 referred to
General Motors Holden Pty Ltd v Bowling (1976) 12 ALR 605 at 616, 619 referred to
IW v City of Perth (1997) 191 CLR 1 referred to
Employment Advocate v National Union of Workers (2000) 173 ALR 479 at 487 referred to
CPSU v Telstra Corporation Ltd (2000) 99 IR 238 at 244, 245-246 followed
Maritime Union of Australia v Geraldton Port Authority (1999) 93 FCR 34 at 69 referred to
Patrick Stevedore Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (1998) 195 CLR 1 at 18 referred to
Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union v Greater Dandenong Council (2000) 101 IR 143 at 157 referred to
Gibbs v Palmerston Town Council (V28 and V29 of 1987, unreported, 21 December 1987) considered
Australian Workers’ Union v BHP Iron-Ore Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 3 at pars 53-54, 172-173, 218 followed, par 66 considered
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 referred to
Finance Sector Union v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2000] FCA 1372 referred to
BHP Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Australian Workers’ Union (2000) 171 ALR 680 at 689, 698-703 followed
Finance Section Union v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2000] FCA 1468 followedNATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS v QENOS PTY LTD (ABN 62 054 196 771)
V937/00WEINBERG J
6 MARCH 2001
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 937 OF 2000
BETWEEN:
NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS
APPLICANTAND:
QENOS PTY LTD (ABN 62 054 196 771)
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
WEINBERG
DATE OF ORDER:
6 MARCH 2001
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The application be dismissed.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 937 OF 2000
BETWEEN:
NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS
APPLICANTAND:
QENOS PTY LTD (ABN 62 054 196 771)
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
WEINBERG
DATE:
6 MARCH 2001
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The applicant, the National Union of Workers (“the NUW”), seeks relief for breaches of various provisions of the Workplace…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read National Union of Workers v Qenos Pty Ltd and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2001] FCA 178
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the term "coerce" in section 170NC implied any form of compulsion, including through lawful means, or if it required unlawful, illegitimate, or unconscionable actions. The respondent referenced previous case law and dictionary definitions to support their argument that coercion required a negation of choice and involved compulsion. The court found that the ordinary meaning of "coerce" and previous judicial interpretations pointed towards the necessity of compulsion for an action to be considered coercive. The court concluded that the term "coerce" in section 170NC necessitated an element of compulsion, and this interpretation was consistent with the legislative intent.
The court dismissed the application, ruling that the proper construction of section 170NC did not require unlawful means to constitute coercion. The decision underscored the importance of examining each individual's circumstances when assessing the impact of the employer's conduct, as highlighted in previous judgments. The court's ruling ensured that the statute's provisions were applied in line with the legislative intent and judicial precedents, providing clarity on the scope and application of section 170NC.
Orders
Orders of the court
The application be dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: WEINBERG J
The respondent relied in support of this submission upon the reasoning of a Full Court comprising Black CJ, Beaumont and Ryan JJ in BHP Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Australian Workers’ Union (2000) 171 ALR 680. Their Honours said at 689: “It has to be borne in mind, in construing s 298K, that it proscribes conduct by “an employer” directed to “an employee” or “other person” (emphasis added). That use of the singular suggests that the alleged injury or alteration of position has to be examined in the light of the circumstances of each individual employee. (It is not the point that in the interpretation of statutes, the singular ordinarily includes the plural; here we are concerned with the indications of legislative intention to be discerned from the actual language used.) It is also significant that the conduct struck at by each paragraph of s 298K is expressed by an active verb: “dismiss”, “injure”, “alter the position”, “refuse to employ”, and “discriminate”. That implies that the proscription is essentially against an intentional act of the employer directed to an individual employee or prospective employee.” (emphasis added) The respondent referred also to pp 698-703 of that judgment. The respondent relied also upon the judgment of Finkelstein J in CPSU v Telstra Corporation Ltd (2000) 99 IR 238 at 245-246 where his Honour said of, in relation to the passage set out above:“This passage indicates that it is necessary to assess the position of each individual employee in order to decide whether that employee has been injured or has had his position prejudicially altered. The implication is that the subject for investigation is the actual effect of the conduct about which complaint has been made. It is not sufficient for there to be only an intention to act against an employee for it to be concluded that an employee has been injured or has had his position altered. Before that can occur the intention must be acted upon in some way. This is not to say, however, that the Court is powerless to intervene in the case of an imminent risk of injury as distinguished from injury which has already been inflicted. The power of the Court to grant quia timet relief to prevent a contravention of s 298K is not in doubt … No application has been made for such relief, perhaps because of the difficulty of framing an appropriate order … Be that as it may, although there has been a “threat” to contravene s 298K(1) in the sense understood by equity lawyers, there has been no actual contravention of that section ….” Finally the respondent relied upon the judgment of Kenny J in Australian Workers’ Union v BHP Iron Ore Pty Ltd (supra) at pars 53-54 where her Honour observed:“Section 298K(1) is, upon this view, concerned with the conduct of an employer that is directed to an individual employee. This does not mean that in dismissing one employee who is a union member for a prohibited reason, an employer commits a civil wrong, and that wrong is not committed if, for the same reason, the employer dismisses all employees who are union members. The Full Court was directing its attention to the nature of the injury contemplated by the provision. That is, the conduct in question must injure an employee individually in the sense that it would have injured him or her, regardless of whether it was actually done to an individual employee or a group of employees. The relevant inquiry is whether an employer has, by the employer’s conduct, injured the position of an employee individually: … The Full Court [in BHP Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Australian Workers Union [2000] 171 ALR 680] must have intended to exclude conduct that injured individuals only when directed to a class of employees.”