National Union of Workers v Qenos Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

National Union of Workers v Qenos Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 178

INDUSTRIAL LAW – decision by employer to conduct “spill and fill” selection and retrenchment process – whether made for prohibited reason – whether made wholly or in part because of protected action - whether decision constitutes threat of dismissal – whether constitutes injury to employees in course of employment – whether prejudicially alters employees’ positions – whether decision taken by reason of employees’ membership of industrial union – whether employees dissatisfied with conditions – whether decision taken to coerce employees to accept agreement.

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 170MU(1), 170NC, 298K(1)(a), (b), (c), 298L(1)(a), 298L(1)(l)

Davids Distribution Pty Ltd v NUW (1999) 91 FCR 463 at 500 considered
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1008 at par 48 referred to
Australian Workers’ Union v John Holland Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 93 at par 47 referred to
General Motors Holden Pty Ltd v Bowling (1976) 12 ALR 605 at 616, 619 referred to
IW v City of Perth (1997) 191 CLR 1 referred to
Employment Advocate v National Union of Workers (2000) 173 ALR 479 at 487 referred to
CPSU v Telstra Corporation Ltd (2000) 99 IR 238 at 244, 245-246 followed
Maritime Union of Australia v Geraldton Port Authority (1999) 93 FCR 34 at 69 referred to
Patrick Stevedore Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (1998) 195 CLR 1 at 18 referred to
Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union v Greater Dandenong Council (2000) 101 IR 143 at 157 referred to
Gibbs v Palmerston Town Council (V28 and V29 of 1987, unreported, 21 December 1987) considered
Australian Workers’ Union v BHP Iron-Ore Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 3 at pars 53-54, 172-173, 218 followed, par 66 considered
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 referred to
Finance Sector Union v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2000] FCA 1372 referred to
BHP Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Australian Workers’ Union (2000) 171 ALR 680 at 689, 698-703 followed
Finance Section Union v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2000] FCA 1468 followed

NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS v QENOS PTY LTD (ABN 62 054 196 771)
V937/00

WEINBERG J
6 MARCH 2001
MELBOURNE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 937 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS
APPLICANT

AND:

QENOS PTY LTD (ABN 62 054 196 771)
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

WEINBERG

DATE OF ORDER:

6 MARCH 2001

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

The application be dismissed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 937 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS
APPLICANT

AND:

QENOS PTY LTD (ABN 62 054 196 771)
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

WEINBERG

DATE:

6 MARCH 2001

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant, the National Union of Workers (“the NUW”), seeks relief for breaches of various provisions of the Workplace…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 178
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of National Union of Workers v Qenos Pty Ltd, the dispute centered around the interpretation and application of section 170NC, a provision within the Australian Workplace Agreements Act. The respondent argued that this section should be narrowly construed, following the precedent set by Gyles J in Finance Sector Union v Commonwealth Bank of Australia. The crux of the argument hinged on the definition and implications of the term "coerce" within the legislative context.

The court had to determine whether the term "coerce" in section 170NC implied any form of compulsion, including through lawful means, or if it required unlawful, illegitimate, or unconscionable actions. The respondent referenced previous case law and dictionary definitions to support their argument that coercion required a negation of choice and involved compulsion. The court found that the ordinary meaning of "coerce" and previous judicial interpretations pointed towards the necessity of compulsion for an action to be considered coercive. The court concluded that the term "coerce" in section 170NC necessitated an element of compulsion, and this interpretation was consistent with the legislative intent.

The court dismissed the application, ruling that the proper construction of section 170NC did not require unlawful means to constitute coercion. The decision underscored the importance of examining each individual's circumstances when assessing the impact of the employer's conduct, as highlighted in previous judgments. The court's ruling ensured that the statute's provisions were applied in line with the legislative intent and judicial precedents, providing clarity on the scope and application of section 170NC.

Orders

Orders of the court

The application be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The respondent submitted that s 170NC should be construed strictly, in accordance with the approach taken by Gyles J in Finance Sector Union v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2000] FCA 1468 and not in the broader sense supported in some of the other authorities dealing with this section. In Finance Sector Union v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Gyles J observed that the proper construction and application of the section was not settled. He said at pars 18-34:“18. The critical question is the meaning of the word “coerce” in s 170NC. There is an inconclusive discussion of that question by the Supreme Court of Victoria Court of Appeal in National Workforce Pty Ltd v Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union (No 2) (1997) 76 IR 200 at 221. The only other general statement in the cases which have dealt with the section to which I have been referred is that by Finkelstein J in his interlocutory judgment in Finance Sector Union v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2000] FCA 1372, where his Honour said (at par 44):“What constitutes coercion? Presumably it is no more than one form of inducement, but a particularly nasty form. A person will coerce another to act in a particular way if the first person brings about that act by force. It is for that reason that a threat will amount to coercion. Coercion will cause a person to act in a way that is, in a sense, non‑voluntary (I do not mean involuntary in the legal sense).”That was said in a context in which his Honour was considering s 298M as well as s 178NC. …19. The Macquarie Dictionary defines “coerce” in the following way:“1. To restrain or constrain by force, law, or authority; force or compel, as to do something. 2. To compel by forcible action.”The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines “coerce” as:“1. Forcibly constrain or impel (into obedience, compliance, etc); force or compel to do. (b) Enforce. 2. Enforce obedience; use coercive measures.”“Coercion” is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as:“1. Constraint, restraint, compulsion; the controlling of a voluntary agent or action by force. 2. The faculty or power of coercing or punishing; the power to compel assent. 3. Government by force; the employment of force to suppress political disaffection and disorder. 4. Physical pressure; compression. Now rare.”20. The legal dictionaries refer to line of authority which was summarised in National Workforce v AMWU (No 2) (supra) at 221 as holding that the word “coerce” required wrongful, illegitimate or illegal action or, at any rate, the negation of choice (Allen v Flood [1898] AC 1 at 98, 128-9; Hodges v Webb [1920] 2 Ch 70 at 86-7; White v Riley [1921] 1 Ch 1; and Goddard v Osborne (1978) 35 FLR 122). I confess to having some difficulty in understanding the discussion of a legal as opposed to an ordinary meaning of “coercion” in National Workforce v AMWU (No 2) at 221. All of the dictionary meanings involve the negation of choice or compulsion. In my opinion, there is a significant difference in ordinary meaning between concepts such as influence, persuasion, inducement and the like, on the one hand, and coercion, on the other.…25. I am satisfied that the ordinary meaning of “coerce”, the line of cases beginning with Allen v Flood (supra) to which I have referred (particularly in an industrial setting) and the authorities in relation to s 170WG, particularly that of the Full Court in Schanka, all point in the same direction, and are to be applied. This conclusion is directly contrary to proposition (3) put by Mr Hodgkinson, and requires further consideration of his propositions (1) and (5).26. The genesis of proposition (3) (see par 16) is to be found in the interlocutory judgment of Merkel J in Australian Workers Union v Yallourn Energy Pty Ltd (1999) 95 IR 207 ([2000] FCA 65). In that case (as here) the parties were engaged in bargaining during a bargaining period initiated pursuant to s 170MI of the Act. Industrial action caused the Yallourn Energy site to cease functioning, leading to financial losses by Yallourn Energy of many millions of dollars (and serious power shortages in Victoria). The unions claimed that the industrial action was protected action for the purposes of the immunity granted under s 170MT(2). Merkel J held that on a prima facie basis on the evidence before him it was likely that the action was protected.27. Yallourn Energy gave notice to the Industrial Relations Commission (“IRC”) under s 166A of the Act of its intention to bring an action in tort against the unions and their officers, members and employees arising out of the industrial action. In the event, a certificate was only sought in relation to the conduct of the unions and not of its members. The IRC granted the certificate, with the consequence that Yallourn Energy was entitled to commence proceedings in tort in relation to the industrial action. Proceedings were brought by the unions to restrain the bringing of any such proceedings as to do so would be a breach, inter alia, of s 170NC(1) of the Act. Reliance is placed on behalf of the Bank upon the following passage from the judgment (at 73) in relation to the finding that there was a serious issue to be tried under s 170NC:“There is a degree of unreality about the submission of counsel for Yallourn Energy that the threatened proceeding is extraneous to and is unconnected with the employer’s bargaining position in relation to the new enterprise agreement. Earlier in these reasons I outlined the steps taken by the various parties in the course of the present dispute. In my view each step and counter step by the parties in the current dispute appears to be intended to advance their respective bargaining positions in relation to the new enterprise agreement. Whilst there will be additional reasons for particular conduct to be engaged in during the escalation of the dispute, each step appears to be integrally related to each party’s position in the bargaining process. Thus, whilst a reason for the proposed proceeding might be to recover loss, I would infer from the limited evidence before me that, on a prima facie basis, the proposed proceeding is another step to assist the position of Yallourn Energy in the bargaining process.” (emphasis added)28. This concept appears to be directly reflected in the interlocutory judgment of Marshall J in Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union v Multiplex Constructions (supra):“27. A reason for the Supreme Court action, or further proposed Supreme Court action, may well be to recover financial loss but if it is also taken with intent to advance a position in a bargaining process or detract from the position of a party in the bargaining process s 170NC(1) of the Act will be contravened.”29. For the sake of completeness, I should say that I derive little assistance on the question of construction from the interlocutory decisions in CFMEU v Master Builders Association of Victoria (No 1) [2000] FCA 168, CFMEU v Mirvac Constructions Pty Ltd (2000) 96 IR 458 ([2000] FCA 341) and Auspine Ltd v CFMEU [2000] FCA 501.30. It is clear that if the passages of Merkel J and Marshall J relied upon by the Bank are intended to state the test for breach of s 170NC, then they are far wider than, and inconsistent with, my construction of the section. Mr Kimber SC, for the Union, submits that they do not represent the considered view of either judge as the proper construction of intent to coerce in s 170NC, but are merely observations in the course of urgent interlocutory proceedings during a far reaching industrial campaign. He submits that they are to be understood in a context where it was held that there was a prima facie case that most of the industrial action had been protected action.31. I agree with Mr Kimber’s submissions. Neither of their Honours express themselves in a manner which suggests that he was resolving an issue as to the construction of the section, and neither refer to pertinent authority. This is not surprising in view of the nature of the proceedings. The fact that the result in these, as well as other, interlocutory decisions might have been different if what I regard as the proper test had been applied is not to the point.32. I should also refer again to the decision of Finkelstein J in Finance Sector Union v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (supra), a case between these parties arising out of the very negotiations which are the context for this case. I have already set out par 44 (see par 18). His Honour later said (at par 51):“The question for the bank then was how it could force the union to accept its July offer, remembering that it was of the view that a higher offer was not commercially justified. The bank needed to find a lever to compel the union to act. The union was reasonably aggressive in its negotiations, with the support of its members.”33. These passages are consistent with my view as to the necessity for compulsion if coercion is to be intended within the section. His Honour does not, however, refer to the necessity for the means of coercion to be unlawful, illegitimate or unconscionable. The Bank submits that his Honour must have taken the view that it was unnecessary to so find, because it is difficult to see how it could be concluded on any basis that offering Australian workplace agreements to workers could be so described without denuding that requirement of all content. Far from being unlawful, illegitimate or unconscionable, the Act encourages the offer of Australian workplace agreements by employers to employees (cf Ryan J in Maritime Union of Australia v Burnie Port Corporation (supra) para 61-72). Indeed, it is submitted on behalf of the Bank that if the decision of Finkelstein J was correct, it follows that it should succeed on its cross-claims. 34. I do not agree. It would be rare (if ever) that a decision as to whether to grant an interlocutory injunction would be of later precedent value on a substantive issue of law, particularly an issue of law not directly addressed in the decision. I am not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the decision. I appreciate that the result is that the Bank may have the worst of all worlds in relation to the current negotiations, but I cannot let that govern my construction of the statute. The interlocutory orders restraining the Bank will only be in operation until further order of the Court, and presumably there will be an urgent final hearing to alleviate the unfairness to the Bank which will ensue if it ultimately succeeds. In any event, as I have said, his Honour did apply an intent to compel test which is consistent with my view of the section.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

WEINBERG J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WEINBERG J

The respondent relied in support of this submission upon the reasoning of a Full Court comprising Black CJ, Beaumont and Ryan JJ in BHP Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Australian Workers’ Union (2000) 171 ALR 680. Their Honours said at 689: “It has to be borne in mind, in construing s 298K, that it proscribes conduct by “an employer” directed to “an employee” or “other person” (emphasis added). That use of the singular suggests that the alleged injury or alteration of position has to be examined in the light of the circumstances of each individual employee. (It is not the point that in the interpretation of statutes, the singular ordinarily includes the plural; here we are concerned with the indications of legislative intention to be discerned from the actual language used.) It is also significant that the conduct struck at by each paragraph of s 298K is expressed by an active verb: “dismiss”, “injure”, “alter the position”, “refuse to employ”, and “discriminate”. That implies that the proscription is essentially against an intentional act of the employer directed to an individual employee or prospective employee.” (emphasis added) The respondent referred also to pp 698-703 of that judgment. The respondent relied also upon the judgment of Finkelstein J in CPSU v Telstra Corporation Ltd (2000) 99 IR 238 at 245-246 where his Honour said of, in relation to the passage set out above:“This passage indicates that it is necessary to assess the position of each individual employee in order to decide whether that employee has been injured or has had his position prejudicially altered. The implication is that the subject for investigation is the actual effect of the conduct about which complaint has been made. It is not sufficient for there to be only an intention to act against an employee for it to be concluded that an employee has been injured or has had his position altered. Before that can occur the intention must be acted upon in some way. This is not to say, however, that the Court is powerless to intervene in the case of an imminent risk of injury as distinguished from injury which has already been inflicted. The power of the Court to grant quia timet relief to prevent a contravention of s 298K is not in doubt … No application has been made for such relief, perhaps because of the difficulty of framing an appropriate order … Be that as it may, although there has been a “threat” to contravene s 298K(1) in the sense understood by equity lawyers, there has been no actual contravention of that section ….” Finally the respondent relied upon the judgment of Kenny J in Australian Workers’ Union v BHP Iron Ore Pty Ltd (supra) at pars 53-54 where her Honour observed:“Section 298K(1) is, upon this view, concerned with the conduct of an employer that is directed to an individual employee. This does not mean that in dismissing one employee who is a union member for a prohibited reason, an employer commits a civil wrong, and that wrong is not committed if, for the same reason, the employer dismisses all employees who are union members. The Full Court was directing its attention to the nature of the injury contemplated by the provision. That is, the conduct in question must injure an employee individually in the sense that it would have injured him or her, regardless of whether it was actually done to an individual employee or a group of employees. The relevant inquiry is whether an employer has, by the employer’s conduct, injured the position of an employee individually: … The Full Court [in BHP Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Australian Workers Union [2000] 171 ALR 680] must have intended to exclude conduct that injured individuals only when directed to a class of employees.”