BHP Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Australian Workers' Union

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BHP Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Australian Workers' Union [2000] FCA 430

INDUSTRIAL LAW - employer offering individual workplace agreements - whether injury of employees or alteration of their positions to their prejudice - whether employer by threats or promises or otherwise inducing employees to stop being members of industrial association - whether award incorporated in employees' contracts of employment.

INJUNCTIONS - exercise of discretion to grant interlocutory injunction - balance of convenience - injunction in form of final relief - need to confine interlocutory relief to a short period.

Workplace Relations Act 1996 ss 290V, 298K, 298L, 298M
Workplace Agreements Act 1993 (WA)
Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA)
Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth)
Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 (UK) s 23(1)

Iron Ore Production and Processing (Mt Newman Mining Co Pty Limited) Award

Macquarie Dictionary (2nd Ed. 1991)

Trade Practices Commission v Mobil Oil Australia Ltd (1984) 3 FCR 168
Davids Distribution Pty Ltd v National Union of Workers (1999) 91 FCR 463
Telstra Corporation Ltd v AAPT Ltd (1997) 38 IPR 539
Patrick Stevedores v MUA (1998) 195 CLR 1
Health Services Union of Australia v Tasmania (1996) 73 IR 140
Maritime Union of Australia v Geraldton Port Authority (1999) 165 ALR 67
United Firefighters Union v Country Fire Authority (Industrial Relations Court of Australia) (unreported, North J, 24 December 1996)
Independent Education Union of Australia v Canonical Administrators (1998) 157 ALR 531
Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (1998) 195 CLR 1
Peniche v Vanstone (1999) 169 ALR 157
Bullock v The Federated Furnishing Trades Society of Australasia (No 1) (1985) 5 FCR 464
Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148
Australian Rugby Union Limited v Hospitality Group Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1136
Attorney-General and Lumley v T S Gill & Son Pty Ltd [1926] VLR 414
Trade Practices Commission v Tubemakers of Australia Ltd (1983) 47 ALR 719
Project Blue Sky Inc & Ors v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355
Morgan v Fry [1968] 2 QB 710
The Heating Centre Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1986) 9 FCR 153
Associated Newspapers Ltd v Wilson [1995] 2 AC 454
Labor Board v Brown 380 US 278 (1965)
American Ship Building v Labor Board 380 US 300 (1965)
Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410
Secretary of State for Employment v Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen(No 2) [1972] 2 QB 455
Mikasa (NSW) Pty Ltd v Festival Stores (1972) 127 CLR 617
Victorian Egg Marketing Board v Parkwood Eggs Pty Ltd (1978) 33 FLR 294

BHP IRON ORE PTY LTD v AUSTRALIAN WORKERS' UNION, CONSTRUCTION FORESTRY MINING & ENGINEERING UNION, AUTOMOTIVE FOOD METALS ENGINEERING PRINTING & KINDRED INDUSTRIES UNION, COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONIC & PLUMBING UNION, TRANSPORT WORKERS' UNION OF AUSTRALIA, DOUGLAS STEAD, ROSS KOMEROA, IAN BURTENSHAW, PHILLIP ROONEY AND ROSS BEGGS

V 24 of 2000

JUDGES:      BLACK CJ, BEAUMONT and RYAN JJ
PLACE:         MELBOURNE
DATE:           7 APRIL 2000

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 430
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of BHP Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Australian Workers' Union involved a dispute between the company and the unions over alleged unlawful conduct. The unions argued that BHP Iron Ore (BHPIO) had engaged in unlawful conduct in three areas: contravention of s 298K, contravention of s 298M, and breach of employment contracts. The unions claimed that BHPIO injured certain employees when it made a general offer of improved terms and conditions, subject to entry into an individual workplace agreement. They further argued that by extending the improved remuneration and conditions to those who accepted the offer, BHPIO injured those employees who did not accept the offer. The unions also argued that BHPIO contravened s 298M and breached employment contracts. The legal issues in the case were whether BHPIO had engaged in unlawful conduct in the three areas claimed by the unions. The court found that there was a serious question to be tried that BHPIO had engaged in unlawful conduct in the three areas. However, the court held that the unions had not established a case for an interlocutory injunction in relation to s 298K and s 298M. The court also held that there was no evidence to support the unions' claim that BHPIO had breached employment contracts. The court granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal in part. The court varied the orders made by Gray J to include undertakings by the unions to apply to the docket judge for an order expediting the hearing of their claim for final injunctive relief and to prosecute that claim with all necessary diligence. The court also reserved specific liberty to the respondent to apply to Kenny J for an order discharging the interlocutory injunction and staying the claim for final injunctive relief if the undertakings were not complied with. The costs of the appeal were reserved.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to appeal granted.

2. Appeal allowed in part.

3. Vary the orders made by Gray J on 31 January 2000 as follows:

(1) By omitting from the undertaking there noted the words "the applicants" and substituting the words "the Union Applicants and the Employee Applicants".

(2) By adding thereto a further note of the following undertaking:

"That the Union Applicants and the Employee Applicants further undertake to the Court (a) that they will forthwith apply to the docket Judge (Kenny J) for an order expediting the hearing of their claim for final injunctive relief for the alleged contravention of s 298M of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth); and (b) that they will continue to prosecute that claim with all necessary diligence on their part."

(3) By reserving specific liberty to the respondent, in the event that the undertaking mentioned in (1), above, is not complied with, to apply to Kenny J for an order discharging the interlocutory injunction granted by Gray J and staying the claim for final injunctive relief.

(4) By omitting in para 1 of the orders the words "the hearing and determination of the proceeding, or".

4. Costs of the appeal reserved.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In accordance with the practice frequently adopted by the Court, this application for leave was fixed for hearing upon the basis that we would hear counsel not only on the question of leave, but also on the grounds of appeal sought to be advanced if leave were to be granted (see, e.g. Telstra Corporation Ltd v AAPT Ltd (1997) 38 IPR 539). We have had the benefit of full argument on the issues from both sides. It is apparent that the issues are complex and of general public importance. We have come to the conclusion, for the reasons which will follow, that in some respects the judgment granting the interlocutory injunction is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration, and that substantial injustice would result were leave to appeal to be refused. We propose, accordingly, to grant leave (cf. Patrick Stevedores v MUA (1998) 195 CLR 1 at 16).CONCLUSIONS ON THE APPEAL As noted, Gray J found that a serious question arose whether BHPIO had engaged in unlawful conduct in three areas: (a) the alleged contravention of s 298K; (b) the alleged contravention of s 298M; and (c) the alleged breach of the employment contracts. It will be convenient to consider the arguments on the appeal in each area in turn.Was there a serious question to be tried that there had been or would be an injury of an employee or alteration of an employee's position to his or her prejudice (s 298K)? For the respondent unions and individual employees (hereinafter collectively called "the Unions") it was contended that BHPIO injured certain employees when it made a general offer of improved terms and conditions, subject to entry by each offeree into an individual workplace agreement. Deciding whether or not to accept such an offer involved, so it was argued, the making of an "invidious choice" by each employee. To impose such an invidious choice was to "injure" the employee in his or her employment as contemplated by s 298K. A second point at which BHPIO is said to have injured those employees who did not accept its offer occurred, on the Unions' argument, when BHPIO commenced to extend, to those who did accept the offer, the improved remuneration and conditions for which it provided. By refusing to extend the same remuneration and conditions to employees performing similar work who have not accepted the offer, BHPIO is said to have again "injured" those employees or altered their position to their prejudice. It has to be borne in mind, in construing s 298K, that it proscribes conduct by "an employer" directed to "an employee" or "other person" (emphasis added). That use of the singular suggests that the alleged injury or alteration of position has to be examined in the light of the circumstances of each individual employee. (It is not the point that in the interpretation of statutes, the singular ordinarily includes the plural; here we are concerned with the indications of legislative intention to be discerned from the actual language used.) It is also significant that the conduct struck at by each paragraph of s 298K is expressed by an active verb: "dismiss", "injure", "alter the position", "refuse to employ", and "discriminate". That implies that the proscription is essentially against an intentional act of the employer directed to an individual employee or prospective employee.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As noted, Gray J found that a serious question arose whether BHPIO had engaged in unlawful conduct in three areas: (a) the alleged contravention of s 298K; (b) the alleged contravention of s 298M; and (c) the alleged breach of the employment contracts. It will be convenient to consider the arguments on the appeal in each area in turn.Was there a serious question to be tried that there had been or would be an injury of an employee or alteration of an employee's position to his or her prejudice (s 298K)? For the respondent unions and individual employees (hereinafter collectively called "the Unions") it was contended that BHPIO injured certain employees when it made a general offer of improved terms and conditions, subject to entry by each offeree into an individual workplace agreement. Deciding whether or not to accept such an offer involved, so it was argued, the making of an "invidious choice" by each employee. To impose such an invidious choice was to "injure" the employee in his or her employment as contemplated by s 298K. A second point at which BHPIO is said to have injured those employees who did not accept its offer occurred, on the Unions' argument, when BHPIO commenced to extend, to those who did accept the offer, the improved remuneration and conditions for which it provided. By refusing to extend the same remuneration and conditions to employees performing similar work who have not accepted the offer, BHPIO is said to have again "injured" those employees or altered their position to their prejudice. It has to be borne in mind, in construing s 298K, that it proscribes conduct by "an employer" directed to "an employee" or "other person" (emphasis added). That use of the singular suggests that the alleged injury or alteration of position has to be examined in the light of the circumstances of each individual employee. (It is not the point that in the interpretation of statutes, the singular ordinarily includes the plural; here we are concerned with the indications of legislative intention to be discerned from the actual language used.) It is also significant that the conduct struck at by each paragraph of s 298K is expressed by an active verb: "dismiss", "injure", "alter the position", "refuse to employ", and "discriminate". That implies that the proscription is essentially against an intentional act of the employer directed to an individual employee or prospective employee. That implication is reinforced by the terms of s 298L(1) which contains an exhaustive catalogue of prohibited reasons, prefaced by the statement:"Conduct referred to in subsection 298K(1) or (2) is for a prohibited reason if it is carried out because the employee, independent contractor or other person concerned; ....." Then follow fourteen descriptions of actual or proposed conduct by the person who is the target of the conduct described in s 298K, each of which constitutes a "prohibited reason" for the latter conduct. In the present case, the only undisputed intentional act of BHPIO has been to offer to each employee improved remuneration and conditions to be embodied in an individual workplace agreement. That, of itself, did not change, in either absolute or relative terms, the remuneration or any of the conditions of employment of the employee to whom the offer was made. A change in absolute terms occurred only upon acceptance of the offer and the consequent coming into existence of a new contract of employment. It is true that, after some offers have been accepted by individual employees, a change can be discerned in the remuneration and conditions of employment of those employees, viewed in relation to the remuneration and conditions of employment of those employees who have not accepted the offer. However, the position of each of the latter employees has not been changed to his or her detriment by an intentional act of the employer. The relative change which we have just identified is brought about by the acceptance by some employees, and the rejection by others, of an offer made indiscriminately to all employees.