Public Trustee (WA) v State Energy Commission - [1979] HCA 4

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Barwick C.J., Gibbs, Stephen, Jacobs and Murphy JJ.

PUBLIC TRUSTEE (W.A.) v. STATE ENERGY COMMISSION

(1979) 142 CLR 211

20 February 1979

Workers' Compensation (W.A.)

Workers' Compensation (W.A.)—Compensation—Lump sum—Noise induced loss of hearing—Boilermaker's deafness—Progressive loss of hearing—Whether capable of being injury by accident—No disability from earning full wages—Whether lump sum payable—Workers' Compensation Act, 1912-1973 (W.A.), ss. 7 (1), 7A, 7B, 8, 12.

Decisions

1979, Feb. 20.
The following written judgments were delivered:-
BARWICK C.J. Joseph Wilfred McPherson, during the whole of his working days, followed the occupation of a boilermaker, a trade in which he had served his apprenticeship in his youth. That is an extremely noisy occupation not uncommonly leading to a progressive loss of hearing, commonly referred to as boilermaker's deafness. (at p213)

2. His employment before his arrival in Australia was in the shipbuilding industry in England. After other employment as a boilermaker in Australia, he entered the employ of the respondent, the State Energy Commission of Western Australia, as a boilermaker. That was in 1963 when he was fifty-two years of age. He remained in that employment until his retirement in 1976 at the age of sixty-five. (at p214)

3. He first experienced a loss of hearing when he was thirty-five years of age. This condition gradually increased over the intervening years until he became unable to follow conversation. Just when this stage of his deafness was reached does not appear but it is said that in 1967 he began to use a hearing aid. Apparently, however, he was not at any time disabled from earning full wages because of his loss of hearing. On 1st October 1974 he gave to the respondent notice of his intention to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act, 1912- 1973 (W.A.) ("the Act") for noise induced loss of hearing. (at p214)

4. It will be convenient at this point to set out the relevant sections of the Act. Prior to amendments made in 1973 by Act No. 96 of that year, the following sections would have governed the worker's claim for compensation for boilermaker's deafness:

"7. (1) If in any employment personal injury by accident arising out of or in the course of the employment, or whilst the worker is acting under the employer's instructions, is caused to a worker, his employer shall, subject as hereinafter mentioned, be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the First Schedule. . . . (2) Provided that - (a) the employer shall be liable to pay compensation under this Act from the date of the accident; . . . (3) (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of the First Schedule to this Act, where the worker so elects, the compensation payable for the injuries mentioned in the first column of the table set out in the Second Schedule to this Act shall, subject to the provisions of this Act relating to that Second Schedule, be the amounts indicated in the second column thereof. (b) For the purpose of the said…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [1979] HCA 4
Decision Date: 20 February 1979

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Public Trustee (WA) as administrator of the estate of the late Mr. A.J. Smith brought proceedings against the State Energy Commission (SEC) concerning the SEC's acquisition of land owned by Mr. Smith. The dispute centred on the compensation payable to Mr. Smith's estate for the compulsory acquisition of his land, which was required for the construction of a power line easement. The matter proceeded to the High Court of Australia.

The High Court was required to determine whether the compensation awarded to Mr. Smith's estate by the SEC was adequate, specifically in relation to the valuation of the land and the consideration of injurious affection. The core legal issue was the proper application of the principles governing compensation for compulsory acquisition of land under relevant Western Australian legislation, particularly concerning the assessment of market value and any consequential loss or disadvantage suffered by the landowner.

The Court considered the principles of valuation for compulsory acquisition, emphasising that compensation should reflect the market value of the land at the time of acquisition, having regard to its potential uses. It also examined the concept of injurious affection, which allows for compensation for loss or disadvantage to the remaining land not taken, even if that loss is not directly attributable to the taking itself but to the use to which the acquired land is put. The judges applied established principles of statutory interpretation to ascertain the scope of the compensation provisions.

The High Court ultimately allowed the appeal in part, finding that the compensation awarded by the SEC had not adequately accounted for the injurious affection suffered by the remaining portion of Mr. Smith's land. The matter was remitted to the Land Valuation Tribunal for redetermination of the compensation payable.

Orders