Sharma v Minister for Immigration
[2016] FCCA 1773
•15 July 2016
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SHARMA & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2016] FCCA 1773 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – English language competence – applicant admitting to not possessing requisite linguistic skills for 485 visa – failure to appear before Tribunal when invited to do so – no jurisdictional error by Tribunal – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, s.75 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.357A, 360, 360A, 379A, 379G, 474, 476 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), regs.1.15C, 4.21(4), cls.485.221, 485.215 of Sch.2 |
| Cases cited: Ajaya v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 718 Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 896 |
| First Applicant: | NEELU SHARMA |
| Second Applicant: | AKASHDEEP KHURANA |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | MLG 1247 of 2014 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Wilson |
| Hearing date: | 17 May 2016 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 17 May 2016 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 15 July 2016 |
REPRESENTATION
| First Applicant in person |
| Solicitor-Advocate for the First Respondent: | Ms P. Mitchell |
| Solicitors for the First Respondent: | Clayton Utz |
ORDERS
The application filed on 24 June 2014 is dismissed.
The applicants pay the costs of the first respondent.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MLG 1247 of 2014
| NEELU SHARMA |
First Applicant
| AKASHDEEP KHURANA |
Second Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
The issue in this case was whether the Migration Review Tribunal,
now the Administrative Appeals Tribunals (“the Tribunal”) erred
in refusing a visa to Neelu Sharma (“the first applicant”) and
Akashdeep Khurana (“the second applicant”) (collectively
“the applicants”) in circumstances where the first applicant provided no evidence to the Tribunal that her English language skills were competent and she declined to attend the Tribunal hearing.
The delegate of the Minister (“the delegate”) refused to grant the
applicants a visa.[1] The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision.[2]
In this proceeding the applicants sought the review of the Tribunal’s decision.[3]
[1] Court Book filed on 28 November 2014 at pp.165-168.
[2] Court Book filed on 28 November 2014 at pp.220-222.
[3] Application filed on 24 June 2014.
Synopsis
For the reasons that follow, in my view this application for review must be dismissed. The Tribunal made no jurisdictional error.
Factual setting of this case
On 10 September 2012 the first applicant applied for a
Skilled Graduate (Temporary) (Class VC, subclass 485) visa.
She nominated her occupation as a ‘cook’ and she stated that
Trades Recognition Australia (“TRA”) had provided a skills assessment on 21 January 2010, providing receipt TRA10/152263812.[4]
[4] Court Book filed on 28 November 2014 at p.11.
In her visa application, the first applicant stated that she had undertaken an International English Language Testing System (“IELTS”) test within the 36 months prior to her submission of the visa application. The first applicant stated that she sat the IELTS test on
1 May 2012 and had obtained competency in her language ability.
On 22 January 2013, the Department of Immigration and Citizenship, as the first respondent’s department was then known
(“the Department”), requested the first applicant to provide a
skills assessment from the relevant assessing authority showing that her skills had been assessed as suitable for her nominated occupation.
The first applicant did not provide any evidence that she had completed a skills assessment.
The delegate’s decision – the first time
The delegate decided that in the circumstances outlined above,
the first applicant did not meet the requirements of cl.485.221(1) of Sch.2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“the Regulations”) and therefore she did not meet the requirements for the grant of a
Skilled (Provisional) (class VC) subclass 485 (Skilled – Graduate) visa. The delegate refused to grant the visa.[5]
[5] Court Book filed on 28 November 2014 at pp.43-46.
On 18 March 2013 the first applicant applied to the Tribunal for the review of the delegate’s decision.[6]
[6] Court Book filed on 28 November 2014 at pp.52-62.
By letter dated 11 September 2013,[7] the Tribunal invited the applicants to appear before it on 8 October 2013. The first applicant did not indicate that she intended to appear. That letter contained a statement in bold informing the first applicant that up to that date, the first applicant had not supplied the Tribunal with evidence that her skills had been assessed by the appropriate authority and that the Tribunal requested the first applicant to provide that material before the hearing.
[7] Court Book filed on 28 November 2014 at pp.73-74.
Rather than providing the material sought, the first applicant
wrote to the Tribunal’s officer informing the Tribunal by letter dated
5 October 2013 that the first applicant had appointed an agent and that the agent had not submitted the skills assessment when the agent should have done so.[8]
[8] Court Book filed on 28 November 2014 at pp.83-84.
On the same date, the first applicant completed the response to hearing invitation form indicating that she would attend the Tribunal hearing.[9]
[9] Court Book filed on 28 November 2014 at pp.90-91.
The first applicant gave notice to the Tribunal ahead of the hearing on
8 October 2013 that she was unable to attend the hearing by reason of medical matters.[10] A doctor provided a certificate stating that the
first applicant was unfit for work from 7 October 2013 to
9 October 2013.[11]
[10] Court Book filed on 28 November 2014 at p.101.
[11] Court Book filed on 28 November 2014 at p.102.
On 7 October 2013, the Tribunal informed the first applicant that the hearing would proceed the following day and the first applicant could be heard by telephone.[12]
[12] Court Book filed on 28 November 2014 at p.105.
On 8 October 2013, TRA contacted the Tribunal informing the Tribunal that the first applicant had in fact been validly assessed in the occupation of cook.[13]
[13] Court Book filed on 28 November 2014 at p.108.
In the Tribunal - the first time
At 3.04 p.m. on 8 October 2013, the Tribunal conducted its hearing and concluded the hearing at 3.11 p.m.[14]
[14] Court Book filed on 28 November 2014 at pp.111-114.
On 9 October 2013, the Tribunal decided to remit the application to the delegate for reconsideration[15] and the Tribunal informed the
first applicant of that by letter dated 14 October 2013.[16]
[15] Court Book filed on 28 November 2014 at pp.118-120.
[16] Court Book filed on 28 November 2014 at p.117.
The delegate’s decision - the second time
On 23 October 2013, the Department wrote to the first applicant seeking further information.[17] In that letter the Department stated that the first applicant had 28 days within which to provide the information requested, in default of which the application could be decided without the information sought. The 28-day period expired in November 2013.
[17] Court Book filed on 28 November 2014 at pp.125-127.
On 4 December 2013, the Department (by that date known by its current name) wrote to the first applicant informing her that she had not provided the requested information and that the 28-day period previously mentioned had lapsed. The Department gave the
first applicant 7 further days to state whether she wished to continue with the application and if so, what the progress was in the provision of the information requested on 23 October 2013.[18]
[18] Court Book filed on 28 November 2014 at p.135.
On 11 December 2013, the Department wrote again to the
first applicant giving her until 9 January 2014 within which to provide the documentary information sought on 23 October 2013.[19]
[19] Court Book filed on 28 November 2014 at p.143.
The first applicant did not provide the information first requested by the Department on 23 October 2013, despite several requests for her to do so made by the Department.
On 14 February 2014, the delegate decided to refuse the first applicant the visa on the basis that she did not satisfy cl.485.215 of Sch.2 of the Regulations.[20]
[20] Court Book filed on 28 November 2014 at pp.165-168.
The delegate wrote to the applicant with its decision refusing the visa on 14 February 2014.[21]
[21] Court Book filed on 28 November 2014 at pp.160-164.
In the Tribunal – the second time
On 1 March 2014, the first applicant sought the review of the delegate’s refusal to grant the visa.[22]
[22] Court Book filed on 28 November 2014 at pp.177-179.
On 15 April 2014, the Tribunal wrote to the first applicant inviting her to give evidence and present arguments before the Tribunal at a hearing to be conducted on 20 May 2014.[23]
[23] Court Book filed on 28 November 2014 at pp.201-203.
On 19 May 2014, the first applicant completed the response to hearing invitation indicating that she would not be attending the hearing.[24]
[24] Court Book filed on 28 November 2014 at pp.209-210.
On the same day, at 3.44 p.m., a person called Jayapal Reddy Vadlakonda, the applicants’ representative, emailed the Tribunal stating that the first applicant did not attain the requisite IELTS score band in order to meet the subclass 485 criterion and that the first applicant would not attend the hearing.[25] At 3.46 p.m. on the same day,
Mr Vadlakonda telephoned a representative of the Tribunal stating that the first applicant did not achieve the required IELTS score and so she would not be attending the hearing.
[25] Court Book filed on 28 November 2014 at pp.211-212.
On 21 May 2014, the Tribunal wrote to the applicants to inform them that the first applicant’s application to the Tribunal failed and that the delegate’s decision remained in full force.[26]
[26] Court Book filed on 28 November 2014 at p.217.
The Tribunal’s decision was made on 20 May 2014.[27] The reasons were short. In essence, the Tribunal found that –
There is no evidence before the Tribunal that the (first) applicant has achieved the specified test score results in a relevant test conducted in the 3 years immediately before the day on which the visa application was made. The Tribunal finds that the (first) applicant does not have competent English as defined in r.1.15C(1).[28]
[27] Court Book filed on 28 November 2014 at pp.220-222.
[28] Court Book filed on 28 November 2014 at p.222.
The Tribunal found that the first applicant did not therefore meet the requirements of cl.485.215 of Sch.2 of the Regulations.
Review in this Court
By application filed in this Court on 24 June 2014, the applicants sought an order that the Minister and the Tribunal show cause why a remedy should not be granted under s.476 of the Migration Act1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) in respect of the Tribunal’s decision made
20 May 2014.
Grounds of review
The applicants advanced 11 “grounds” of review in the application. They were as follows (copied verbatim) –
1. Migration Review Tribunal has not understand the situation why could not come to hearing and Tribunal has not gone through the documents
2. I have clearly mentioned in the letter of Migration review application that documents have been provided to DIBP whatever required and whatever case officer requested so at Initial stage.
3. After documents provided to DIBP case officer has refused, when I come to tribunal remits the application back to DIBP.
4. Again, DIBP has refused my application and went to Migration Review Tribunal
5. After provided evidence, Migration review Tribunal has refused my Review application is unjust and it is not even legitimate.
6. I wasn’t satisfied with Migration Review Tribunal decision as tribunal has not accepted my out cry
7. Now, my question is who could give me natural justice in this situation? I have thought I would take this case to Federal Circuit court to explain the exact problem.
8. Eventually my case has been affirmed not to grant the visa on shore, this decision has been by Migration Review Tribunal, Melbourne Registry.
9. I am bring this decision to Federal circuit court under the Migration Act 1958 to appeal on the name of judicial review.
10. I did not have chance to make some submissions in regarding my situation how I wasn’t able to get all evidence to submit at Tribunal.
11. I have felt this is unfair and not legitimate to me as I have lost the future in Australia as well as time and money.[29]
[29] Application filed 24 June 2014 at p.4.
None amounted to proper grounds of review. None indicated the existence of jurisdictional error or even the possibility of debate about the existence of jurisdictional error. In many ways, that would be sufficient to dispose of this proceeding. However, the
legal representative of the Minister, Ms P. Mitchell, listed issues that the first applicant may have intended to address had she been legally represented. I have considered those below.
The first applicant appeared before me with an interpreter but without the benefit of legal representation. Of course, she was entitled to do that. Sometimes, in migration cases in this Court judges have the good fortune to receive submissions from counsel who appear pro-bono for impecunious applicants. Regrettably, this was not one of those cases. As a result, in the hearing before me and immediately after the interpreter was sworn to well and faithfully interpret matters put to her, the following exchange took place between myself and Ms Mitchell –
Ms Mitchell, you will be familiar with my practice of requiring the Minister to have the running of a case such as this,
even though the Minister is the respondent, and I will require you to highlight not only every aspect of the case favourable to the Minister but also every aspect of the case favourable to the applicant.[30]
[30] Transcript of Proceedings, 17 May 2016, p.2 at lines 24-28.
Ms Mitchell duly responded and presented the case as well as it may have been put on behalf of the first applicant had she had the benefit of her own counsel.
Legal principles
Under the Act, the power to make decisions about matters concerning visas is given to the delegate of the Minister. The Act, and the Regulations made under it, specify the things the delegate is required to take into account when an applicant seeks a visa. Different considerations apply depending on the type of visa the applicant seeks. The underlying intention of this field of the Act is to render decisions made by the delegate impervious to review by courts. That is the import and effect of s.474 of the Act. However, s.474 of the Act is subject to s.75 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act and must be construed in conformity with established principles of constitutional law. Hence, even though s.474 of the Act purports to mean that a privative clause decision cannot be reviewed, that statutory stipulation will be effective only if the relevant decision is not infected with jurisdictional error.
In the passages below I set out (although not exhaustively) the lengths and breadths of administrative decisions that can be reviewed (because they are adversely affected by jurisdictional error) and the administrative decisions that cannot be reviewed (because they are not adversely affected by jurisdictional error).
Judicial review under s.474 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Section 474 of the Act creates a statutory scheme providing for the finality of a privative clause decision. In essence, s.474(1) of the Act provides that a privative clause decision is final and conclusive and that it cannot be challenged or appealed against, nor can it be reviewed, quashed or called into question in any court. Further, under s.474, a privative clause decision is not subject to administrative law remedies of prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account.
Under s.474(2) of the Act, a “privative clause decision” is a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made or required to be made under the Act.
Privative clauses are strictly construed, as was held by the majority (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ) in the High Court of Australia in Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealthof Australia[31] (“Plaintiff S157/2002”).
[31] (2003) 211 CLR 476 at [72].
That is because it is fundamental to the rule of law that persons affected by administrative decisions should have access to the courts to challenge those decisions. Gleeson CJ made that point in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj[32] (“Bhardwaj”). But the point is of considerable veneration as is revealed by Clancy v Butchers’ Shop Employees Union,[33] Hockey v Yelland,[34] Public Service Association (SA) v Federated Clerks Union South Australian Branch and Anor[35] and Darling Casino Ltd v NSW Casino Control Authority.[36]
[32] (2002) 209 CLR 597.
[33] (1904) 1 CLR 181, 204.
[34] (1984) 157 CLR 124, 130.
[35] (1991) 173 CLR 132, 160.
[36] (1997) 191 CLR 602, 653.
An administrative decision will not be a valid privative clause decision if the relevant decision is infected with jurisdictional error. That is for the simple reason that an administrative decision which involves jurisdictional error is regarded in law as being no decision at all.
So much was held by the High Court in Bhardwaj.[37]
[37] (2002) 209 CLR 597.
The majority in Plaintiff S157/2002[38] held to like effect. Accordingly, an administrative decision made under the Act may be amenable to judicial review if the applicant seeking judicial review can establish that the administrative decision is tainted by jurisdictional error.
[38] (2003) 211 CLR 476 at [76].
The circumstances exhibiting jurisdictional error have been described in a variety of ways. In Craig v State of South Australia[39] (“Craig”) the majority of the High Court (Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ) held that jurisdictional error is at its most obvious when the inferior tribunal purports to act wholly or partly outside of the general area of its jurisdiction in the sense of entertaining a matter or making a decision or order of a kind which wholly or partly lies outside the theoretical limits of its functions and powers.[40] In the same case, it was held that an inferior tribunal can, while acting wholly within the general area of its jurisdiction, fall into jurisdictional error by doing something it lacks authority to do.[41]
[39] (1995) 184 CLR 163.
[40] (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 177.
[41] Ibid.
Similarly, jurisdictional error will occur where an inferior tribunal disregards or takes into account some matter in circumstances where the statute establishing the tribunal and conferring its power requires that a particular matter be taken into account or ignored as a precondition of the exercise of any authority to make an order or decision in the circumstances of the particular case.[42]
[42] Ibid.
Further, an administrative tribunal will exceed its authority and fall into jurisdictional error if it misconstrues the statute pursuant to which it was created and thereby misconceives the nature of the function which it is performing or the extent of its powers in the circumstances of a particular case.[43]
[43] Ibid.
An administrative tribunal falls into error of law amounting to jurisdictional error with the effect of invalidating any order or decision of the tribunal if the tribunal –
a)identifies a wrong issue;
b)asks itself a wrong question;
c)ignores relevant material;
d)relies on irrelevant material; or
e)in some instances, makes an erroneous finding or reaches a mistaken conclusion.[44]
The majority (McHugh Gummow and Hayne JJ) applied that test in the decision of the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf[45] (“Yusuf”).
[44] Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163.
[45] (2001) 206 CLR 323, 351 at [82].
These are illustrations only of the ambit of jurisdictional error.[46] As the High Court in Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission (NSW)[47] held, it was neither necessary nor possible to attempt to mark the metes and bounds of jurisdictional error as the reasoning in Craig[48] does not provide a rigid taxonomy of jurisdictional error.
[46] See MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391 at [33].
[47] (2010) 239 CLR 531 at [71] and [73].
[48] (1995) 184 CLR 163.
So far as the onus of proving jurisdictional error is concerned,
an applicant seeking judicial review must show that the approach adopted by the Tribunal manifested a legally erroneous view as to what it was about which it needed to be satisfied. The High Court made that observation in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu[49] (“Eshetu”).
[49] (1999) 197 CLR 611, 629 at [55].
It has been held that judicial review is concerned with whether the relevant decision was one authorised rather than it providing an appellate procedure enabling either a general review of the relevant decision or a substitution of the decision the court thinks should have been made. As recently as December 2015, the High Court so held in Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[50] (“Plaintiff M64/2015”). In that case, the High Court approved earlier statements to similar effect in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v
Peko-Wallsend Ltd[51] (“Peko-Wallsend”) and Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin[52] (“Quin”).[50] [2015] HCA 50 at [23].
[51] (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 41-42.
[52] (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 45-46.
In the context of administrative decision-making, the High Court instructs that courts are not astute to discerning error where an administrative officer makes a statement in the form of a broad administrative evaluation that was not, and was not intended to be, a statement of reasons in the nature of a judicial decision. Authority for that proposition is Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang[53] as well as Plaintiff M64/2015.[54]
[53] (1996) 185 CLR 259.
[54] [2015] HCA 50.
The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia held in Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd[55] that the reasons of the decision under review are not to be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error.
[55] (1993) 43 FCR 280 at 287.
Grounds of review as best understood by the Minister
Quite properly, the Minister submitted in writing[56] that it was difficult for the Minister to respond, having regard to the discursive nature of the grounds of review. That said, the Minister condensed the
11 grounds of review put forward by the applicants into one possible ground of review. It amounted to whether the Tribunal had or had not exhibited procedural fairness to the applicants.
[56] Outline of the first respondent’s submissions filed 2 May 2016.
That construction of the 11 propositions urged by the applicants was set against a backdrop that, essentially at the eleventh hour, the
first applicant indicated through her representative twice (once by email and once by telephone) that she did not possess the requisite linguistic requirements for the relevant visa and therefore that she chose not to attend the Tribunal hearing. In the face of those communications, one might ask rhetorically what more the Tribunal ought to have done. To my mind, the statements made twice on her behalf through her representative were as good as a full concession that the review was hopeless and that no point would be served in even conducting the hearing as the first applicant’s case before the Tribunal was utterly devoid of merit.
Superficially at least, such an interpretation of the events of this case might have had some attraction. However, the legal position is to be found in the provisions of the Act itself.
The content of the rules of procedural fairness are enshrined in Div.5 of Pt.5 of the Act. That division is an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to matters it deals with. Section 357A of the Act states as much.
It therefore became necessary to examine the provisions of Div.5 of Pt.5 of the Act for the specific requirements of the division, having regard to the fact that the division is an exhaustive statement of the natural justice requirements.
The Tribunal invited the first applicant to attend a hearing on the nominated date, to present evidence and to make arguments.
The first applicant chose not to attend the hearing. The reason for the first applicant’s unwillingness to appear was twice given by the
first applicant’s representative. In extending the invitation for the first applicant to attend the hearing, the Tribunal complied with ss.360, 360A, 379A and 379G of the Act as well with as reg.4.21(4) of the Regulations. Once the first applicant indicated that she chose not to attend, the Tribunal was entitled to proceed in her absence, as s.360(2)(b) of the Act permitted.
The Tribunal did nothing wrong. It did not fall into jurisdictional error by proceeding in the way it did.
Having expressly stated that she chose not to appear before the Tribunal, it ill behoves the first applicant to now complain that the Tribunal somehow acted wrongly in doing precisely what it said it would do if she chose not to attend, namely, to proceed in her absence.
No jurisdictional error was made by the Tribunal in the conduct of the hearing on 20 May 2014.
Non-compliance with the “competent English” criterion
The first applicant twice conceded to the Tribunal that she had not achieved the requisite score in language competence. That had the consequence that she did not satisfy an essential precondition to the grant of a visa.
The Tribunal explained that for the purposes of reg.1.15C(1)(a) and (c) of the Regulations, the Minister specified two language tests and scores. The first was the IELTS test in which a test score of at least six for each of the four test components was required. The second was the Occupational English Test in which a test score of at least “B” standard for each of the four test components was required.
The Tribunal stated that there was no evidence before it that the
first applicant had achieved the specified test score results in a relevant test conducted in the three years immediately prior to the visa application being made. The Tribunal therefore found that the
first applicant did not have competent English for the purposes of reg.1.15C of the Regulations.
To my mind, that finding was open. It did not admit of jurisdictional error.
Before me, the Minister relied on the decision of Justice Barker in Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[57] in support of the proposition that it is irrelevant whether an applicant,
who subsequent to the date of the visa application, may have passed the relevant language test. The relevant period in which the language competency must be demonstrated was prescribed in the Regulations.
[57] [2014] FCA 185 at [16] – [17].
Unsurprisingly, there is a huge volume of reported cases on the subject of language competence. Ms Mitchell very helpfully brought them to my attention. They make the same point time and again, namely, that the Regulations require the applicant to have successfully completed the relevant language skills testing and to the requisite level within the prescribed time before the making of the visa application.[58]
[58] See Sandhu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2014] FCA 486; Ajaya v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 718; Patel v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 823; Baig v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 855; Lal v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2014] FCA 892; Bali v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 986; Sidhu v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2014] FCA 1078; Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1297; Kumar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1336; Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 85; Mann v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 65; Ashraf v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 167; Chahal v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 181; Khan v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 162; Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 193; Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 220; Kaushal v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 421; Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 480; Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 896; Milanes v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1105; and Kumar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1189.
The overwhelming body of authority shows that the Tribunal in this case was correct in its findings.
Conclusion
In my judgment, the Tribunal made no jurisdictional error. None of the grounds of review were made out.
This application for review is dismissed. I order the applicants to pay the Minister’s costs.
I certify that the preceding seventy (70) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Wilson
Date: 15 July 2016
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