Workers' Compensation (N.S.W.)—Injury arising in the course of employment—Personal quarrel at place of employment—Flight by employee from place of employment—Injury in public street—Workers' Compensation Act, 1926 (N.S.W.), s. 6 (1) "injury"*.
Decisions
April 10. The following written judgments were delivered : - McTIERNAN J. This case was an application by the respondent for an award of compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act, 1926 (N.S.W.), as amended. The application was based upon s. 7 (1) (a) of the Act. It is not disputed here that at the time of injury the respondent was a worker in the employment of the appellant. Under s. 6 (1) "injury" means personal injury arising out of or in the course of employment. The only issue between the parties was whether the applicant received an injury in the course of his employment. The Workers' Compensation Commission decided that issue against the applicant. Pursuant to s. 37 (4) of the Act he requested the Commission to state a case for the decision of the Court of Appeal. By s. 37 (4) the Court is limited to questions of law. The question referred to the Court was whether on the facts found by the stated case the Commission was bound in point of law to find that the injury in question arose in the course of the applicant's employment. The Court of Appeal decided the question in favour of the applicant (1971) 1 NSWLR 547 . With respect I do not think that the decision of the Court is right. (at p148)
2. Taking the facts which appear from the stated case as originally drafted and supplemented at the request of the Court of Appeal, I would be of opinion that this material strongly supports the conclusion of the Commission. But my reasons for deciding that the Commission did not err in law are as follows. The burden of proof was upon the applicant. At the time of injury he was not working. In fact he was then running away from his place of employment. But he did not stop work to run away. When he did so his employment was already interrupted by a quarrel between him and O'Neill about a matter that had nothing to do with his employment. The flight of the applicant from his place of employment was a sequel of the quarrel. An injury received by a worker in the course of an event which is an incident of his employment could be an injury arising in the course of the employment. Even if I thought it was unreasonable, having regard to the material before the Commission, to find that the applicant's flight was not an incident of his employment, I could not give effect to that view by deciding in…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Bill Williams Pty Ltd v Williams [1972] HCA 23
Case
[1972] HCA 23
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Bill Williams Pty Ltd against a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The dispute concerned the validity of a notice of termination of a contract for the sale of land. The appellant, the vendor, sought to terminate the contract on the grounds of the respondent purchaser's alleged breach of a condition precedent.
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the notice of termination was validly served in accordance with the terms of the contract and the relevant legislation, specifically the *Conveyancing Act 1919* (NSW). This involved determining whether the notice adequately specified the nature of the alleged breach and the steps required to remedy it, as well as whether it was served at the correct address.
The High Court held that the notice of termination was invalid. The Court reasoned that the notice failed to sufficiently particularise the breach of the condition precedent, rendering it impossible for the respondent to know precisely what was required to remedy the alleged default. Furthermore, the Court found that the notice was not served in accordance with the contractual provisions for service of notices, as it was not sent to the address nominated by the purchaser for the purpose of receiving such notices. The principles of contractual interpretation and the requirements for valid notice under property law legislation were applied.
Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Supreme Court's finding that the purported termination of the contract was ineffective.