Polglaze v Veterinary Practitioners Board of NSW

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NEW SOUTH WALES SUPREME COURT

CITATION:
Kevin Polglaze v Veterinary Practitioners Board of NSW and Anor [2009] NSWSC 347

JURISDICTION:

FILE NUMBER(S):
30119/08

HEARING DATE(S):
18 March 2009

JUDGMENT DATE:
1 May 2009

PARTIES:
Kevin Polglaze (Plaintiff)
Veterinary Practitioners Board of New South Wales  (First Defendant)
Administrative Decisions Tribunal (Second Defendant)

JUDGMENT OF:
Johnson J      

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:
Administrative Decisions Tribunal

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):
---

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:

LOWER COURT MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:
Polglaze v Veterinary Practitioners Board of NSW [2008] NSWADT 228

COUNSEL:
Mr PM Strickland SC (Plaintiff)
Ms A Katzmann SC (First Defendant)

SOLICITORS:
Nyman Gibson Stewart (Plaintiff)
Dibbs Abbott Stillman (First Defendant)

CATCHWORDS:
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
veterinary practitioner
unsatisfactory professional conduct
failure to provide estimated cost of veterinary services
appeal on question of law
whether Tribunal misdirected itself on standard of proof
whether Tribunal erred in law in construction of clause 16 of code of conduct
whether decision of Tribunal manifestly unreasonable
whether leave ought be granted for Court to undertake merits review
no error established
merits review declined
appeal dismissed

LEGISLATION CITED:
Veterinary Practice Act 2003
Veterinary Practice Regulation 2005
Interpretation Act 1987
Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997

CATEGORY:
Principal judgment

CASES CITED:
Polglaze v Veterinary Practitioners Board of NSW [2008] NSWADT 228
Director of Public Prosecutions v Illawarra Cashmart Pty Limited (2006) 67 NSWLR 402
B & L Linings Pty Limited v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2008] NSWCA 187
Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd [1995]-[1996] 186 CLR 389
Health Care Complaints Commission v Karalasingham [2007] NSWCA 267
State of New South Wales v Macquarie Bank Limited (1992) 30 NSWLR 307
Coleman v Gray (1994) 55 FCR 412 at 423
Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Crazzi (2006) 68 NSWLR 266
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336
Neat Holdings Pty Limited v Karajan Holdings Pty Limited (1992) 67 ALJR 170
B v Medical Superintendent of Macquarie Hospital (1987) 10 NSWLR 440
Gianoutsos v Glykis (2006) 65 NSWLR 539
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] 206 CLR 323
Williams v Bill Williams Pty Limited [1971] 1 NSWLR 547
Vetter v Lake Macquarie City Council (2001) 202 CLR 439
Australian Gas Light Company v Valuer General (1940) 40 SR(NSW) 126
Hope v Bathurst City Council (1980) 144 CLR 1 at 10; Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Limited (1985) 4 NSWLR 139
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Clark (2003) 57 NSWLR 113
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355
IW v City of Perth [1996-1997] 191 CLR 1
Port of Geelong Authority v The Ship Bass Reefer (1992) 109 ALR 505 at 518
Cross v McHugh [1974] 1 NSWLR 500
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Limited ) (1987) 10 NSWLR 247
Bill Williams Pty Limited v Williams (1972) 126 CLR 146
Kalil v Bray [1977] 1 NSWLR 256
Bowen-James v Delegate of the Director General of the Department of Health (1992) 27 NSWLR 457

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Details
Case
[2009] NSWSC 347
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Polglaze v Veterinary Practitioners Board of NSW concerns a veterinary practitioner who was found to have engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct. The dispute arose from a complaint made by Miss Elaine Burn regarding the euthanasia of her dog, Gretal, by the Plaintiff, Dr Polglaze. The Veterinary Practitioners Board of NSW (the Board) investigated the complaint and found that Dr Polglaze had failed to provide an estimated cost of the veterinary services and did not inform Miss Burn during the procedure that an additional charge would be made due to an unusual reaction by the dog. As a result, the Board cautioned Dr Polglaze, imposed a fine, and ordered him to pay hearing costs. Dr Polglaze appealed the decision of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal (the Tribunal) to the Supreme Court of New South Wales, arguing that the Tribunal had misdirected itself on the standard of proof, erred in its construction of clause 16 of the code of conduct, and that its decision was manifestly unreasonable.

The key legal issues before the Court were whether the Tribunal had misdirected itself on the standard of proof, whether it had erred in its construction of clause 16 of the code of conduct, and whether the decision of the Tribunal was manifestly unreasonable. Additionally, the Court considered whether leave should be granted for the Court to undertake a merits review of the case. The Court examined the relevant statutory provisions and the principles of administrative law, including the standard of proof required for disciplinary proceedings and the interpretation of the code of conduct.

The Court found that there was no error established in the decision of the Tribunal. It held that the Tribunal had not misdirected itself on the standard of proof, as the Board was required to establish its case on the balance of probabilities. The Court also held that the Tribunal had not erred in its construction of clause 16 of the code of conduct, which pertains to the provision of information to clients regarding the cost of services. The Court found that the Tribunal's decision was not manifestly unreasonable, as it was supported by the evidence and the applicable law. Consequently, the Court declined to grant leave for a merits review and dismissed the appeal.

The Court's final orders were that the appeal be dismissed, the costs of the appeal be awarded to the Board, and that the decision of the Tribunal remain in place. The Court also noted that the Board's decision was in line with the statutory framework governing veterinary practitioners and the relevant code of conduct.

Background

Background to the litigation

Mr Strickland SC appeared for the Plaintiff at the hearing of the Further Amended Summons. Ms Katzmann SC appeared for the Board, the First Defendant. A submitting appearance was filed on behalf of the Second Defendant, the Administrative Decisions Tribunal. At the hearing, counsel agreed that the Tribunal ought not to have been joined as a party to the proceedings.Background to Appeal The present proceedings result from a complaint made by Miss Elaine Burn to the Board concerning the way in which the Plaintiff had handled the euthanasia on 12 September 2007. of her dog, Gretal, an eight-year old Rottweiler. The Tribunal provided the following factual background in its decision at [4]:“Miss Burn’s dog Gretal was diagnosed with an aggressive tumour and she was advised to have him put down. When her local veterinary surgeon could not do so, he gave Miss Burn Dr Polglaze’s name. After talking to Dr Polglaze on the phone, Miss Burn agreed to him euthanasing Gretal. Miss Burn says that Dr Polglaze gave her a firm price of $155 for the procedure. Dr Polglaze says that he gave her an estimate of $155 plus GST but told her that it could be more depending on the circumstances. Dr Polglaze came to Miss Burn’s home, administered a sedative and then planned to give Gretal an overdose of general anaesthetic. When Gretal did not respond to the sedative after 10 or 15 minutes, Dr Polglaze gave Gretal a second dose of sedative but that did not have the desired effect either. As Dr Polglaze was at his car getting a third dose, Gretal finally went to sleep. Dr Polglaze then administered the anaesthetic and Gretal passed away. The whole process took approximately 50-55 minutes whereas Dr Polglaze had anticipated that it would take 15-20 minutes. At the end of the procedure, Dr Polglaze told Miss Burn that because he had given Gretal extra sedative which took more time, the cost was now $305. Miss Burn said that she thought the price was $155 but paid the full amount in cash. Later she complained to the Board.” The Board, through its Complaints Committee, investigated Miss Burn’s complaint. The Plaintiff provided a written response to the complaint. The Plaintiff elected not to appear before the Complaints Committee or the Board and was content to respond to the complaint in writing. The Board adopted the conclusions of the Complaints Committee to the following effect (Exhibit PDS1, page 52):(a)the Plaintiff did not, prior to 12 September 2007, provide to Miss Burn an estimated range of costs, taking into account factors such as those that actually occurred, because it had not occurred to him that the dog might have such an unusual reaction; and(b)the Plaintiff did not advise Miss Burn during the course of the procedure on 12 September 2007 that the unusual reaction of the dog meant that he would be making an additional charge. The Board found that the Plaintiff had engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct and determined to caution him, as well as imposing a fine of $300.00 and hearing costs of $400.00.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appeal to this Court is brought against a “review decision”, and not an “original decision”, of the Tribunal. Accordingly, s.91C VP Act governs the appeal. Section 91C provides:“91CRight to appeal to Supreme Court against review decision of Tribunal(1)A party to any proceedings in which the Tribunal has made a review decision may appeal to the Supreme Court against the decision of the Tribunal.(2) An appeal under this section to the Supreme Court:(a)may be made on any question of law, and(b)with the leave of the Supreme Court, may extend to a review of the merits of the order or other decision concerned.” It will be observed that s.91C(2) provides for appeal as of right to the Court on any question of law, and by way of review of the merits of the order or other decision concerned with the leave of the Court. In this case, the Plaintiff presses, in the alternative, an appeal via each of these statutory avenues. Section 91F provides for appeal on questions of law:“91F Appeals on questions of law(1)If an appeal under this Part is restricted to questions of law, the Supreme Court is to determine the appeal and may make such orders as it thinks appropriate in light of its determination.(2)The orders that may be made by the Supreme Court on appeal include (but are not limited to):(a)an order affirming or setting aside the decision of the Tribunal, and(b)an order remitting the case to be heard and decided again by the Tribunal (either with or without the hearing of further evidence) in accordance with the directions of the Supreme Court.(3)Without limiting subsection (2), in any appeal against an original decision the Supreme Court may, in respect of the veterinary practitioner concerned:(a)make any order that could have been made under section 51, or(b) vary any decision made by the Tribunal.” Section 91G provides for appeal extending to a review of the merits:“91G Appeals on the merits(1)If an appeal under this Part extends to a review of the merits of a review decision or original decision, the Supreme Court is to decide what the correct and preferable decision is having regard to the material then before it, including the following:(a)any relevant factual material,(b)any applicable written or unwritten law.(2)The Supreme Court may exercise all the functions that are conferred or imposed by or under this Act or the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 on the Tribunal to make the decision concerned.(3) In determining any such appeal, the Supreme Court may decide:(a)to affirm the decision, or(b)to vary the decision, or(c) to set aside the decision and make a decision in substitution for the decision it set aside.”Question of Law Section 91C(2)(a) VP Act provides for appeal, as of right, against the decision of the Tribunal “on any question of law”. In Director of Public Prosecutions v Illawarra Cashmart Pty Limited (2006) 67 NSWLR 402, I observed at 411 [58]-[60]:“There is no universally applicable test for distinguishing questions of law from questions of fact: Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd (1995) 186 CLR 389 at 394; Sood v R [2006] NSWCCA 114 at paragraph 30.The formulation ‘question of law’ employs general words capable of application at different levels of generality: Attorney General for NSW v X (2000) 49 NSWLR 653 at 660 (paragraph 25). The expression ‘question of law’ is wider than ‘error of law’: Attorney General for NSW v X at 677 (paragraph 124). A mixed question of fact and law does not fall within the description of ‘question of law alone’: Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 278 at 287, 314; Attorney General for NSW v X at 663 (paragraph 44).”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court began by noting that the appeal was brought against a review decision of the Tribunal and was governed by s.91C of the Veterinary Practitioners Act. The Court observed that the appeal was brought both on a question of law and for leave to review the merits. The Court considered whether the Tribunal misdirected itself on the standard of proof, noting that the Tribunal had applied the correct standard of proof as per the Act. Regarding the construction of clause 16 of the code of conduct, the Court found that the Tribunal had correctly interpreted the clause in accordance with established legal principles. The Court then addressed whether the decision of the Tribunal was manifestly unreasonable, concluding that the Tribunal's decision was not so unreasonable as to warrant intervention by the Court. Lastly, the Court considered whether leave should be granted to review the merits of the case. The Court found no sufficient grounds to grant leave, as the Tribunal's decision was neither legally flawed nor manifestly unreasonable. The ratio decidendi of this case is that in the absence of error of law or manifest unreasonableness, the Court will not intervene in the decision-making process of the Tribunal. The Court adhered to established legal principles and did not depart from prior authority, affirming the binding nature of its decision on these specific points.