DST18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

DST18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 1182

File number(s): SYG 2553 of 2020
Judgment of: CHIEF JUDGE ALSTERGREN
Date of judgment: 14 December 2023
Catchwords: MIGRATION – separate question – meaning of ‘at the time of the referral’ in s. 473CB(1)(c) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – separate question answered no
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s. 33

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) pt 7, 7AA ss. 5(1), 65, 473BA, 473CA, 473CB, 473CC, 473DA, 473DB, 473DC, 473DD, 473EA, 473GA, 473GB, 476

Cases cited: Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27; [2009] HCA 41
AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2020) 269 CLR 494; [2020] HCA 37
BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 29; [2019] HCA 34
CNY17 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 2731
CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 76; [2019] HCA 50
CNY17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 1568
Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1; [2004] HCA 39
DST18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCCA 1813
Histollo Pty Ltd v Director-General of National Parks and Wildlife Service (1998) 45 NSWLR 661
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Wang (2003) 215 CLR 518; [2003] HCA 11
Nguyen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 88 FCR 206
Othman v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1991] FCA 455
Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 217; [2018] HCA 16
Republic of Turkey v Mackie Pty Ltd (No 2) [2021] VSCA 189
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 62
Date of last submissions: 10 November 2022
Date of hearing: 10 November 2022
Place: Sydney
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Mostafa and Mr Reynolds
Solicitor for the Applicant:  Varess
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr Lenehan SC and Mr Kaplan
Solicitor for the First Respondent: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers
The Second Respondent: Submitting an appearance save as to costs

ORDERS

SYG 2553 of 2020

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

DST18

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

CHIEF JUDGE ALSTERGREN

DATE OF ORDER:

14 DECEMBER 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The separate question in the application in a proceeding filed by the first respondent on 17 June 2022 be answered as follows:

Question: Following the issuing of a writ of mandamus to the second respondent (Authority) on 18 August 2020 to require it to determine according to law its review of the fast track reviewable decision made by a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) in respect of the applicant (Delegate’s Decision), was material that came into the possession or control of the Secretary of the Department after…

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Details
Case
[2023] FedCFamC2G 1182
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, the case of DST18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs involved an Afghan national, DST18, who had entered Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival. The Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs had decided to refuse the grant of a protection visa to DST18, which was subsequently affirmed by the Immigration Assessment Authority. DST18 sought judicial review of this decision. The central issue before the court was the interpretation of the phrase 'at the time the decision is referred to the Authority' in s. 473CB(1)(c) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

The court was required to determine whether the phrase 'referred' in s. 473CB(1)(c) included the act of remitting the decision to the Authority or if it solely referred to the initial referral under s. 473CA. The applicant argued that 'referral' should be interpreted to include 'remittal', based on judicial usage of the terms. The Minister contended that 'referral' should be understood strictly as the initial referral under s. 473CA. The court concluded that the statutory text clearly restricts s. 473CB(1)(c) to documents in the possession or control of the Department at the time of the 'referral' to the Authority. The term 'referral' should be understood in the context of the statutory scheme, specifically as the referral under s. 473CA, and cannot be substituted with 'remittal'. Therefore, the court answered the separate question 'no', meaning that the Authority was not required to consider any documents provided after the initial referral.

The court's reasoning was grounded in the principle of statutory construction, which mandates that the text of the legislation is the primary guide to legislative intention. The court emphasised that historical considerations and extrinsic materials cannot override the clear meaning of the text. The temporal restriction in s. 473CB(1)(c) is explicit, limiting the material to be provided to the Authority to documents in the Secretary's possession or control at the time of the referral to the Authority. Consequently, the court ordered that a writ of certiorari be issued to remove the Authority’s decision into the Court for the purpose of quashing it, and a writ of mandamus be issued, requiring the Authority to redetermine the review according to law.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

For the following reasons, I have determined that the separate question should be answered ‘no’.Background The applicant is a citizen of Afghanistan. He entered Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival on 10 July 2013. On 9 November 2017, a delegate of the Minister made a decision, under s. 65(1)(b) of the Act, to refuse the grant of a protection visa to the applicant (‘Delegate’s Decision’).[1][1] Court Book pages 88–103. On 14 November 2017, the Delegate’s Decision was referred to the Authority pursuant to s. 473CA of the Act. On 22 June 2018, the Authority affirmed the Delegate’s Decision (‘Authority’s First Decision’). On 18 July 2018, the applicant filed an application in this Court seeking judicial review of the Authority’s First Decision. That application, which was amended on 22 May 2020, was heard on 3 July 2020 and judgment was delivered on 18 August 2020.[2] The Court ordered that:1.A writ of certiorari shall issue, removing the record of the Immigration Assessment Authority made on 22 June 2018 into this Court for the purpose of quashing it. 2.A writ of mandamus shall issue, requiring the Immigration Assessment Authority to redetermine according to law the review referred to it. [2] DST18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCCA 1813. On 13 October 2020, the Authority again affirmed the Delegate’s Decision. It is this decision which the applicant seeks to have this Court review. Statutory Scheme I respectfully adopt, with some variations, the Minister’s summary of the statutory scheme relating to Part 7AA of the Act.[3] [3] See also Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 217 at [13]–[38]; BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 29 at [3]–[17]; CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 76 at [2]–[8]. Part 7AA of the Act provides for what the simplified outline in s. 473BA describes as “a limited form of review” of a “fast track decision” constituted by a refusal to grant a protection visa to an applicant designated to be a “fast track review applicant”. It is not in dispute that the applicant is a “fast track review applicant”. A “fast track decision” is, subject to presently immaterial exceptions, a decision to refuse to grant a protection visa to a fast track applicant, and the decision of the delegate here is, it is agreed, a “fast track reviewable decision”. The Authority’s jurisdiction is enlivened by undertaking the duty imposed by s. 473CA, which provides:473CA Referral of fast track reviewable decisionsThe Minister must refer a fast track reviewable decision to the Immigration Assessment Authority as soon as reasonably practicable after the decision is made. Unlike reviews by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal under Part 7 of the Act (which also relates to protection visas) where it is the responsibility of the visa applicant to initiate a merits review, under Part 7AA it is the responsibility (or duty) of the Secretary to initiate merits review – achieved by way of the ‘referral’ under s. 473CA.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Authority’s jurisdiction is enlivened by undertaking the duty imposed by s. 473CA, which provides:473CA Referral of fast track reviewable decisionsThe Minister must refer a fast track reviewable decision to the Immigration Assessment Authority as soon as reasonably practicable after the decision is made. Unlike reviews by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal under Part 7 of the Act (which also relates to protection visas) where it is the responsibility of the visa applicant to initiate a merits review, under Part 7AA it is the responsibility (or duty) of the Secretary to initiate merits review – achieved by way of the ‘referral’ under s. 473CA. Noting its importance to the question, it is useful to outline s. 473CB in full:473CB Material to be provided to Immigration Assessment Authority(1) The Secretary must give to the Immigration Assessment Authority the following material (review material) in respect of each fast track reviewable decision referred to the Authority under section 473CA:(a) a statement that:(i) sets out the findings of fact made by the person who made the decision; and(ii) refers to the evidence on which those findings were based; and(iii) gives the reasons for the decision;(b) material provided by the referred applicant to the person making the decision before the decision was made;(c) any other material that is in the Secretary’s possession or control and is considered by the Secretary (at the time the decision is referred to the Authority) to be relevant to the review;(d) the following details:(i) the last address for service provided to the Minister by the referred applicant for the purposes of receiving documents;(ii) the last residential or business address provided to the Minister by the referred applicant for the purposes of receiving documents;(iii) the last fax number, email address or other electronic address provided to the Minister by the referred applicant for the purposes of receiving documents;(iv) if an address or fax number mentioned in subparagraph (i), (ii) or (iii) has not been provided to the Minister by the referred applicant, or if the Minister reasonably believes that the last such address or number provided to the Minister is no longer correct—such an address or number (if any) that the Minister reasonably believes to be correct at the time the decision is referred to the Authority;(v) if the referred applicant is a minor—the last address or fax number of a kind mentioned in subparagraph (i), (ii), (iii) or (iv) (if any) for a carer of the minor.(2) The Secretary must give the review material to the Immigration Assessment Authority at the same time as, or as soon as reasonably practicable after, the decision is referred to the Authority. The Authority’s core function is to review the fast track reviewable decision that has been referred to it by the Minister: s. 473CC(1). If the Authority is satisfied that the criteria for the grant of a protection visa have been met, the appropriate decision is to remit the visa application to the Minister in accordance with such directions or recommendations as are permitted by the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth): s. 473CC(2)(b). If, however, the Authority is not so satisfied, the Authority will affirm the decision under review: s. 473CC(2)(a).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The fact that it appears the Secretary has given documents pursuant to s. 473CB(1)(c) based upon a construction which is inconsistent with the Minister’s submission is not a matter which ultimately determines the way the provision is to be construed. It has, however, created some difficulty for the Court as to how CNY17-Fed Court is to be applied. Consideration As I have stated above, the question before the Court is one of statutory construction, in particular of the phrase ‘at the time the decision is referred to the Authority’. The question before the Court should be solved by reference to the text of the Act. In Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27, the Court stated (at [47]):This Court has stated on many occasions that the task of statutory construction must begin with a consideration of the text itself. Historical considerations and extrinsic materials cannot be relied on to displace the clear meaning of the text. The language which has actually been employed in the text of legislation is the surest guide to legislative intention. The meaning of the text may require consideration of the context, which includes the general purpose and policy of a provision, in particular the mischief it is seeking to remedy.What is the meaning of ‘referred’ in s. 473CB(1)(c)? The text (of the provision and the statutory scheme) is clear in the Court’s view. Section 473CB(1)(c) of the Act contains an express temporal restriction that the Secretary must give to the Authority “any other material that is in the Secretary’s possession or control and is considered by the Secretary (at the time the decision is referred to the Authority) to be relevant to the review”. That is, s. 473CB(1)(c) of the Act is limited to relevant documents in the possession and control of the Department at the time of the ‘referral’ to the Authority. The parties appear to accept, and agree, as much. The point of disagreement is what is meant by ‘referral’. The applicant contends that ‘referral’ also means ‘remittal’. I acknowledge the applicant’s submissions about the way in which ‘remit’ and ‘refer’ have been used interchangeably, and have been interpreted by the courts.[14] However, those cases are of little assistance. They refer to the use of the word in a judicial context, not in a statutory context. [14] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Wang (2003) 215 CLR 518; Nguyen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 88 FCR 206; Othman v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1991] FCA 455; Histollo Pty Ltd v Director-General of National Parks and Wildlife Service (1998) 45 NSWLR 661; Republic of Turkey v Mackie Pty Ltd (No 2) [2021] VSCA 189. The reference to ‘referral’ must, in my view, be read as the date of the s. 473CA referral. The word ‘referral’ cannot be substituted with ‘remittal’. As the Minister submitted, ‘referral’ is a term that is utilised throughout Part 7AA and should only be understood as the referral under s. 473CA of the Act.