FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
DST18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 1182
ORDERS
SYG 2553 of 2020 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: DST18
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
CHIEF JUDGE ALSTERGREN
DATE OF ORDER:
14 DECEMBER 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The separate question in the application in a proceeding filed by the first respondent on 17 June 2022 be answered as follows:
Question: Following the issuing of a writ of mandamus to the second respondent (Authority) on 18 August 2020 to require it to determine according to law its review of the fast track reviewable decision made by a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) in respect of the applicant (Delegate’s Decision), was material that came into the possession or control of the Secretary of the Department after…
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- Case
- [2023] FedCFamC2G 1182
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the phrase 'referred' in s. 473CB(1)(c) included the act of remitting the decision to the Authority or if it solely referred to the initial referral under s. 473CA. The applicant argued that 'referral' should be interpreted to include 'remittal', based on judicial usage of the terms. The Minister contended that 'referral' should be understood strictly as the initial referral under s. 473CA. The court concluded that the statutory text clearly restricts s. 473CB(1)(c) to documents in the possession or control of the Department at the time of the 'referral' to the Authority. The term 'referral' should be understood in the context of the statutory scheme, specifically as the referral under s. 473CA, and cannot be substituted with 'remittal'. Therefore, the court answered the separate question 'no', meaning that the Authority was not required to consider any documents provided after the initial referral.
The court's reasoning was grounded in the principle of statutory construction, which mandates that the text of the legislation is the primary guide to legislative intention. The court emphasised that historical considerations and extrinsic materials cannot override the clear meaning of the text. The temporal restriction in s. 473CB(1)(c) is explicit, limiting the material to be provided to the Authority to documents in the Secretary's possession or control at the time of the referral to the Authority. Consequently, the court ordered that a writ of certiorari be issued to remove the Authority’s decision into the Court for the purpose of quashing it, and a writ of mandamus be issued, requiring the Authority to redetermine the review according to law.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The fact that it appears the Secretary has given documents pursuant to s. 473CB(1)(c) based upon a construction which is inconsistent with the Minister’s submission is not a matter which ultimately determines the way the provision is to be construed. It has, however, created some difficulty for the Court as to how CNY17-Fed Court is to be applied. Consideration As I have stated above, the question before the Court is one of statutory construction, in particular of the phrase ‘at the time the decision is referred to the Authority’. The question before the Court should be solved by reference to the text of the Act. In Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27, the Court stated (at [47]):This Court has stated on many occasions that the task of statutory construction must begin with a consideration of the text itself. Historical considerations and extrinsic materials cannot be relied on to displace the clear meaning of the text. The language which has actually been employed in the text of legislation is the surest guide to legislative intention. The meaning of the text may require consideration of the context, which includes the general purpose and policy of a provision, in particular the mischief it is seeking to remedy.What is the meaning of ‘referred’ in s. 473CB(1)(c)? The text (of the provision and the statutory scheme) is clear in the Court’s view. Section 473CB(1)(c) of the Act contains an express temporal restriction that the Secretary must give to the Authority “any other material that is in the Secretary’s possession or control and is considered by the Secretary (at the time the decision is referred to the Authority) to be relevant to the review”. That is, s. 473CB(1)(c) of the Act is limited to relevant documents in the possession and control of the Department at the time of the ‘referral’ to the Authority. The parties appear to accept, and agree, as much. The point of disagreement is what is meant by ‘referral’. The applicant contends that ‘referral’ also means ‘remittal’. I acknowledge the applicant’s submissions about the way in which ‘remit’ and ‘refer’ have been used interchangeably, and have been interpreted by the courts.[14] However, those cases are of little assistance. They refer to the use of the word in a judicial context, not in a statutory context. [14] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Wang (2003) 215 CLR 518; Nguyen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 88 FCR 206; Othman v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1991] FCA 455; Histollo Pty Ltd v Director-General of National Parks and Wildlife Service (1998) 45 NSWLR 661; Republic of Turkey v Mackie Pty Ltd (No 2) [2021] VSCA 189. The reference to ‘referral’ must, in my view, be read as the date of the s. 473CA referral. The word ‘referral’ cannot be substituted with ‘remittal’. As the Minister submitted, ‘referral’ is a term that is utilised throughout Part 7AA and should only be understood as the referral under s. 473CA of the Act.