IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M110 of 2016
B e t w e e n -
THI KIM NGOC NGUYEN
Plaintiff
and
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Defendant
Summons
GORDON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT MELBOURNE ON WEDNESDAY, 15 FEBRUARY 2017, AT 10.06 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR A. ALEKSOV: If it please the Court, your Honour, I appear for the plaintiff. (instructed by Williamson Leske Wardlaw Pty Ltd)
MR L.T. BROWN: If it please your Honour, I appear for the defendant. (instructed by DLA Piper Australia)
HER HONOUR: Thank you.
MR ALEKSOV: If your Honour pleases, this is an application for an extension of time under section 486A of the Migration Act seeking to challenge a decision of a delegate of the Minister in refusing to grant the plaintiff a partner visa.
HER HONOUR: Yes.
MR ALEKSOV: Could I just check, your Honour, that the Court has received our submissions and reply?
HER HONOUR: Yes. So I have the plaintiff’s submissions, I have the application for a show cause and the affidavit and your submissions, I have an outline of submissions from Mr Brown and I have a plaintiff’s reply together with a further affidavit from Wardlaw – so two affidavits.
MR ALEKSOV: Yes, thank you, your Honour. I rely on both of those affidavits. Your Honour will notice that the argument and some of the evidence is amplified in reply which in some measure gives Mr Brown little opportunity to respond to it in writing. Regrettable though that is, that is where we are. Your Honour, the test is whether it is in the interests of the administration of justice that there be an extension. Your Honour will be familiar with the decision of Justice McHugh in Marks.
HER HONOUR: Yes.
MR ALEKSOV: Of course an extension is not automatic, it involves a broad discretion. Your Honour, the relevant factors in this case are the length of the delay and the explanation for the delay. The length of delay for the purposes of section 486A is about five and a quarter months. The explanation is set out in the two Wardlaw affidavits. In summary, your Honour, there are a series of different reasons explaining parts of the delay. Your Honour will have read those materials and it is probably not that helpful for me to revisit all of them, but in short, the applicant first learns of the decision after the time that she could apply for review to the AAT.
The reason for this is that her husband – late husband – handled communications with the Department. There was a representation to him about when to expect a decision in the visa; that representation was about September 2015 and was to the extent of 18 months from that date and ultimately a decision is made much sooner than that.
HER HONOUR: Assuming for the moment, Mr Aleksov, that even…
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- Case
- [2017] HCATrans 28
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Court were twofold. Firstly, whether Ms Nguyen had provided a sufficient explanation for the delay in filing her application for review, which was approximately five and a quarter months. Secondly, and more substantively, the Court was required to determine whether the delegate had failed to take into account all the information in the visa application, as required by section 54(1) of the Act, and whether the delegate had conflated the mandatory considerations under regulation 1.15A with the statutory criteria under section 5F of the Act, thereby failing to apply the correct legal test.
The plaintiff argued that the delay was explained by a series of circumstances, including the late husband's handling of departmental communications and a misrepresentation regarding the expected decision timeframe. Regarding the merits, it was contended that the visa application contained substantive material concerning the genuineness of the relationship, including financial and social aspects, and the husband's medical condition, which the delegate failed to mention or consider in the decision record. The plaintiff submitted that the absence of these arguments in the operative parts of the decision record, coupled with formulaic statements at the beginning and end, supported an inference that the delegate did not have regard to this information. Furthermore, it was argued that the delegate appeared to have supplanted the broad considerations under regulation 1.15A for the specific statutory test under section 5F(2), evidenced by the structure of the decision record and the lack of clear correlation between the delegate's findings and the statutory criteria.
The Minister, through counsel, conceded that the explanation for the delay was improved by new material but maintained that it was not adequately explained. The Minister also raised a point regarding the repeated references in the decision record to the delegate having considered all facts and material. However, the Court ultimately heard submissions on the merits of the case, with the plaintiff's counsel detailing the specific arguments and evidence that were allegedly overlooked by the delegate and the alleged conflation of regulatory considerations with statutory tests. The Court reserved its decision.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi