FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Peacock v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission [2002] FCA 984
HUMAN RIGHTS - alleged discrimination on account of age - compulsory retirement from Commonwealth public service - retirement required by statute on attaining age of 65 years unless decision made by Secretary to retain officer on the basis that it is desirable in the interests of the Commonwealth, that the officer continue in service - whether applicant could be compared with other groups or individuals in assessing whether discrimination occurred - whether Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission erred in law in finding that it was precluded from considering certain issues as a result of an earlier Federal Court judgment concerning the same parties, legislative provisions, and facts.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – principle that one judge should follow the judgment of another judge on issues of construction – determination of ratio of earlier judgments.
WORDS AND PHRASES – “according to law”
Public Service Act 1922 (Cth), s 76V
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth), ss 3, 21, 31Secretary, Department of Defence v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Burgess, Collins and Lipping (1997) 78 FCR 208 discussed
Commonwealth of Australia v Peacock (2000) 104 FCR 464 followed
Wu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 182 ALR 548 discussed
Telstra Corp Ltd v Treloar (2000) 102 FCR 595 cited
S115/00A v The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 540 discussed
O'Donovan v Vereker (1987) 18 FCR 101 cited
Harradine v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1990) 25 FCR 35 cited
Kapagama v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1881 cited
Yulianti v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 142 citedR Cross and J W Harris, Precedent in English Law (4th Edn) at p 72.
Sir Anthony Mason, The Use and Abuse of Precedent (1988) Australian Bar Review 93 at p 103.MORTIMER PEACOCK v HUMAN RIGHTS & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION & ANOR
N 54 OF 2002MOORE J
8 AUGUST 2002
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
0054 OF 2002
BETWEEN:
MORTIMER PEACOCK
APPLICANTAND:
HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
FIRST RESPONDENTCOMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
SECOND RESPONDENTJUDGE:
MOORE J
DATE OF ORDER:
8 AUGUST 2002
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
0054 OF 2002
BETWEEN:
MORTIMER PEACOCK
APPLICANTAND:
HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
FIRST RESPONDENTCOMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
SECOND RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
MOORE J
DATE:
8 AUGUST 2002
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This is an application for an order of review by Mr Mortimer Peacock (“the applicant”) of two decisions made by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (“HREOC”) on 11 January 2002. The application is brought under the Administrative…
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- Case
- [2002] FCA 984
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Commissioner had erred in concluding that he was precluded from considering whether there was relevant inequality between the applicant and other persons seeking a favourable exercise of the discretion under section 76V(2) of the Public Service Act. The applicant argued that the Commissioner should have compared the applicant’s situation with that of other individuals of the same age who sought to exercise the discretion to continue employment beyond the retirement age. The court examined whether the Commissioner was legally bound to consider such a comparison and concluded that the Commissioner’s decision not to do so was consistent with the reasoning of Justice Wilcox in a previous case. The court found that the Commissioner was not precluded by law from considering the issue of inequality but chose not to do so because it was not necessary to determine whether there had been discrimination. The court upheld the Commissioner’s decision and dismissed the application for judicial review.
The court ordered that the application be dismissed and that the applicant pay the respondents’ costs. This outcome affirmed the Commissioner’s decision that there was discrimination on the basis of age in the exercise of the discretion under section 76V(2) of the Public Service Act and upheld the approach taken by the Commissioner in considering the complaint.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: MOORE J
On 23 January 2002, the applicant lodged an application for an order of review of the Commissioner’s decision. An amended application for an order of review was filed on 21 March 2002. The stated grounds for review of the first decision were:“a)The First Respondent erred in law by failing to exercise its jurisdiction under s 31 of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986.b)The First Respondent erred in law by failing to make a decision under s 31 of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986.c)The First Respondent erred in law by failing to determine whether there was relevant inequality between the applicant and other persons seeking a favourable exercise of the discretion conferred by s 76V(2) of the Public Service Act 1922.”The stated grounds for review of the second decision were:“a)The First Respondent erred in law by failing to exercise its jurisdiction under s 21 of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986.b)The First Respondent improperly exercised the power conferred by s 21 of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 by failing to take into account a relevant consideration namely that the applicant could be compared with other persons seeking a favourable exercise of the discretion conferred by s 76V(2) of the Public Service Act 1922 and that information and documents probative of that issue was relevant to the inquiry.”Consideration of the issues I turn to consider the first issue raised in this application. It concerns whether Commissioner Ozdowski erred in taking the approach that he was precluded from considering the question of whether there was relevant inequality between the applicant and other persons seeking a favourable exercise of discretion conferred by s 76V(2). Having regard to the submissions made by the applicant, Commissioner Ozdowski was considering whether the theoretical possibility adverted to by Wilcox J in [42] of his reasons existed in the case of the applicant. It is to be recalled that in the paragraph of Commissioner Ozdowski’s reasons preceding the observation that he was precluded from considering the question, the Commissioner appears to be suggesting that such a comparison could be made for the purpose of determining whether there had been discrimination of the proscribed type. Thus, the Commissioner can be taken to have been indicating he was precluded, as a matter of law, from considering the applicant’s position in a way involving comparison with other people of essentially the same age seeking exercise of the discretion. While Commissioner Ozdowski does not explain why he believed he was constrained in this way, it is presumably because either Wilcox J had stated the relevant operation of the law as part of the ratio of his judgment or because the order made by his Honour required the Commission to give effect to the conclusion reflected in [43] of his Honour’s reasons (though this may possibly be two different ways of describing essentially the same thing).