Peacock v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Peacock v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission [2002] FCA 984

HUMAN RIGHTS - alleged discrimination on account of age - compulsory retirement from Commonwealth public service - retirement required by statute on attaining age of 65 years unless decision made by Secretary to retain officer on the basis that it is desirable in the interests of the Commonwealth, that the officer continue in service - whether applicant could be compared with other groups or individuals in assessing whether discrimination occurred - whether Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission erred in law in finding that it was precluded from considering certain issues as a result of an earlier Federal Court judgment concerning the same parties, legislative provisions, and facts.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – principle that one judge should follow the judgment of another judge on issues of construction – determination of ratio of earlier judgments.

WORDS AND PHRASES – “according to law”

Public Service Act 1922 (Cth), s 76V
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth), ss 3, 21, 31

Secretary, Department of Defence v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Burgess, Collins and Lipping (1997) 78 FCR 208 discussed
Commonwealth of Australia v Peacock (2000) 104 FCR 464 followed
Wu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 182 ALR 548 discussed
Telstra Corp Ltd v Treloar (2000) 102 FCR 595 cited
S115/00A v The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 540 discussed
O'Donovan v Vereker (1987) 18 FCR 101 cited
Harradine v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1990) 25 FCR 35 cited
Kapagama v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1881 cited
Yulianti v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 142 cited

R Cross and J W Harris, Precedent in English Law (4th Edn) at p 72.
Sir Anthony Mason, The Use and Abuse of Precedent (1988) Australian Bar Review 93 at p 103.

MORTIMER PEACOCK v HUMAN RIGHTS & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION & ANOR
N 54 OF 2002

MOORE J
8 AUGUST 2002
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

0054 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

MORTIMER PEACOCK
APPLICANT

AND:

HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
FIRST RESPONDENT

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MOORE J

DATE OF ORDER:

8 AUGUST 2002

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application be dismissed.

2.        The applicant pay the respondents’ costs.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

0054 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

MORTIMER PEACOCK
APPLICANT

AND:

HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
FIRST RESPONDENT

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MOORE J

DATE:

8 AUGUST 2002

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. This is an application for an order of review by Mr Mortimer Peacock (“the applicant”) of two decisions made by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (“HREOC”) on 11 January 2002.  The application is brought under the Administrative…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 984
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Peacock v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission involved an application for judicial review by the applicant, who was compulsorily retired by the Commonwealth at the age of 65, challenging the decision of the Human Rights Commissioner. The applicant had previously applied for and was refused retention beyond the retirement age under section 76V(2) of the Public Service Act 1922. The applicant subsequently lodged a complaint with the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC), alleging discrimination on the basis of age. The Human Rights Commissioner, Commissioner Sidoti, found that the exercise of the discretion under section 76V(2) constituted discrimination against the applicant. The applicant then sought judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision, arguing that the Commissioner had erred in failing to consider the issue of inequality between the applicant and other persons seeking a favourable exercise of the discretion.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Commissioner had erred in concluding that he was precluded from considering whether there was relevant inequality between the applicant and other persons seeking a favourable exercise of the discretion under section 76V(2) of the Public Service Act. The applicant argued that the Commissioner should have compared the applicant’s situation with that of other individuals of the same age who sought to exercise the discretion to continue employment beyond the retirement age. The court examined whether the Commissioner was legally bound to consider such a comparison and concluded that the Commissioner’s decision not to do so was consistent with the reasoning of Justice Wilcox in a previous case. The court found that the Commissioner was not precluded by law from considering the issue of inequality but chose not to do so because it was not necessary to determine whether there had been discrimination. The court upheld the Commissioner’s decision and dismissed the application for judicial review.

The court ordered that the application be dismissed and that the applicant pay the respondents’ costs. This outcome affirmed the Commissioner’s decision that there was discrimination on the basis of age in the exercise of the discretion under section 76V(2) of the Public Service Act and upheld the approach taken by the Commissioner in considering the complaint.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

I turn now to set out, in summary, the background leading to these proceedings.Background The present application is preceded by what is now a long history of litigation between the applicant and the Commonwealth over his compulsory retirement at the age of 65 years. In 1996 the applicant was employed as the Director of Psychology – Navy by the Commonwealth of Australia in the Department of Defence (“the Department”). On 11 March 1996, the applicant applied to the Secretary of the Department to be retained in employment for six months beyond retirement age. That is, he sought the exercise of the discretionary power conferred by s 76V(2) in his favour. The applicant later sought to be retained in employment indefinitely. The applicant’s application for retention was initially declined by Mr Tonkin, Deputy Secretary of the Department on 15 May 1996. The applicant appealed under the Public Service Regulations. The appeal was considered by Mr Ayers, the Secretary of the Department, who, in a letter dated 10 July 1996, again declined the applicant’s application for retention. On 19 July 1996, the applicant turned 65 and was compulsorily retired by operation of s 76V(1). The applicant challenged, unsuccessfully, the termination of his employment in a number of forums. One avenue the applicant pursued was a complaint to HREOC which he made on 3 June 1996. The complaint was ultimately considered by the Human Rights Commissioner, Commissioner Sidoti.The decision of Commissioner Sidoti In considering the applicant’s complaint, Commissioner Sidoti sought to give effect to the judgment of Branson J in Secretary, Department of Defence v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Burgess, Collins and Lipping (1997) 78 FCR 208 (“Burgess”). The Commissioner said her Honour had concluded that having regard to the terms of s 76V(1), an officer is compulsorily retired by the force of the subsection, and not by reason of any “act or practice” (within the meaning of s 31(b) of the HREOC Act) of the employer (the Commonwealth). Commissioner Sidoti concluded any inquiry about whether there had been discrimination was limited to a consideration of the exercise of the discretion under s 76V(2) of the PS Act. The Commissioner then considered whether the decision of the Secretary or delegate when exercising their discretion under s 76V(2) constituted an “act or practice” under s 31(b) of the HREOC Act. He concluded, having regard to the reasoning of Branson J in Burgess (at 216), that the exercise of discretion did constitute an “act”, and that this was the relevant “act” to which the applicant’s complaint related. The Commissioner then considered whether there had been discrimination on the basis of age in the exercise of the discretion. Commissioner Sidoti examined the reasons given (both verbal and written) by Mr Ayers in his refusal to extend the applicant’s employment. The Commissioner viewed as of particular relevance, the fact that Mr Ayers had stated in his letter to the applicant on 10 July 1996: “...there is a Commonwealth interest in maintaining a balanced age profile in the Department and providing career opportunities for other suitable eligible staff, particularly at a time of significant staff reductions, and these interests would tend to mitigate against your continued employment”.Mr Ayers repeated this view in oral evidence to the Commission. Having regard to these statements and the examples given by Justice Branson in Burgess in relation to a distinction in relation to age, Commissioner Sidoti found that the Secretary’s opinion, resulting in the refusal of the applicant’s request to continue work, was formed at least “by reference to” age. The Commissioner concluded that the manner in which the discretionary power conferred by s 76V(2) was exercised was proscribed discrimination under the HREOC Act.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MOORE J
The applicant’s application for retention was initially declined by Mr Tonkin, Deputy Secretary of the Department on 15 May 1996. The applicant appealed under the Public Service Regulations. The appeal was considered by Mr Ayers, the Secretary of the Department, who, in a letter dated 10 July 1996, again declined the applicant’s application for retention. On 19 July 1996, the applicant turned 65 and was compulsorily retired by operation of s 76V(1). The applicant challenged, unsuccessfully, the termination of his employment in a number of forums. One avenue the applicant pursued was a complaint to HREOC which he made on 3 June 1996. The complaint was ultimately considered by the Human Rights Commissioner, Commissioner Sidoti.The decision of Commissioner Sidoti In considering the applicant’s complaint, Commissioner Sidoti sought to give effect to the judgment of Branson J in Secretary, Department of Defence v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Burgess, Collins and Lipping (1997) 78 FCR 208 (“Burgess”). The Commissioner said her Honour had concluded that having regard to the terms of s 76V(1), an officer is compulsorily retired by the force of the subsection, and not by reason of any “act or practice” (within the meaning of s 31(b) of the HREOC Act) of the employer (the Commonwealth). Commissioner Sidoti concluded any inquiry about whether there had been discrimination was limited to a consideration of the exercise of the discretion under s 76V(2) of the PS Act. The Commissioner then considered whether the decision of the Secretary or delegate when exercising their discretion under s 76V(2) constituted an “act or practice” under s 31(b) of the HREOC Act. He concluded, having regard to the reasoning of Branson J in Burgess (at 216), that the exercise of discretion did constitute an “act”, and that this was the relevant “act” to which the applicant’s complaint related. The Commissioner then considered whether there had been discrimination on the basis of age in the exercise of the discretion. Commissioner Sidoti examined the reasons given (both verbal and written) by Mr Ayers in his refusal to extend the applicant’s employment. The Commissioner viewed as of particular relevance, the fact that Mr Ayers had stated in his letter to the applicant on 10 July 1996: “...there is a Commonwealth interest in maintaining a balanced age profile in the Department and providing career opportunities for other suitable eligible staff, particularly at a time of significant staff reductions, and these interests would tend to mitigate against your continued employment”.Mr Ayers repeated this view in oral evidence to the Commission. Having regard to these statements and the examples given by Justice Branson in Burgess in relation to a distinction in relation to age, Commissioner Sidoti found that the Secretary’s opinion, resulting in the refusal of the applicant’s request to continue work, was formed at least “by reference to” age. The Commissioner concluded that the manner in which the discretionary power conferred by s 76V(2) was exercised was proscribed discrimination under the HREOC Act.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MOORE J

On 23 January 2002, the applicant lodged an application for an order of review of the Commissioner’s decision. An amended application for an order of review was filed on 21 March 2002. The stated grounds for review of the first decision were:“a)The First Respondent erred in law by failing to exercise its jurisdiction under s 31 of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986.b)The First Respondent erred in law by failing to make a decision under s 31 of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986.c)The First Respondent erred in law by failing to determine whether there was relevant inequality between the applicant and other persons seeking a favourable exercise of the discretion conferred by s 76V(2) of the Public Service Act 1922.”The stated grounds for review of the second decision were:“a)The First Respondent erred in law by failing to exercise its jurisdiction under s 21 of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986.b)The First Respondent improperly exercised the power conferred by s 21 of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 by failing to take into account a relevant consideration namely that the applicant could be compared with other persons seeking a favourable exercise of the discretion conferred by s 76V(2) of the Public Service Act 1922 and that information and documents probative of that issue was relevant to the inquiry.”Consideration of the issues I turn to consider the first issue raised in this application. It concerns whether Commissioner Ozdowski erred in taking the approach that he was precluded from considering the question of whether there was relevant inequality between the applicant and other persons seeking a favourable exercise of discretion conferred by s 76V(2). Having regard to the submissions made by the applicant, Commissioner Ozdowski was considering whether the theoretical possibility adverted to by Wilcox J in [42] of his reasons existed in the case of the applicant. It is to be recalled that in the paragraph of Commissioner Ozdowski’s reasons preceding the observation that he was precluded from considering the question, the Commissioner appears to be suggesting that such a comparison could be made for the purpose of determining whether there had been discrimination of the proscribed type. Thus, the Commissioner can be taken to have been indicating he was precluded, as a matter of law, from considering the applicant’s position in a way involving comparison with other people of essentially the same age seeking exercise of the discretion. While Commissioner Ozdowski does not explain why he believed he was constrained in this way, it is presumably because either Wilcox J had stated the relevant operation of the law as part of the ratio of his judgment or because the order made by his Honour required the Commission to give effect to the conclusion reflected in [43] of his Honour’s reasons (though this may possibly be two different ways of describing essentially the same thing).