FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Kapagama v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1881KAPAGAMA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 695 of 1999WHITLAM J
SYDNEY
25 NOVEMBER 1999
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 695 OF 1999
BETWEEN:
SUDESH KAPAGAMA
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION
AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
WHITLAM J
DATE OF ORDER:
25 NOVEMBER 1999
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
BY CONSENT, THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal dated 25 June 1999 be set aside.
2.The matter be remitted to the Refugee Review Tribunal for reconsideration.
3.The respondent pay the reasonable costs of the applicant as agreed or assessed.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 695 OF 1999
BETWEEN:
SUDESH KAPAGAMA
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION
AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
WHITLAM J
DATE:
25 NOVEMBER 1999
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This proceeding involves an application under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 ("the Act") for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal. Prior to the date fixed for hearing the parties notified my Associate that they had settled the matter. A minute signed by counsel for the applicant and by the solicitor for the respondent was sent to my chambers consenting to the making of an order in the following terms:
"The Court orders, by consent, that:
1.The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal dated 25 June 1999 be set aside.
2.The matter be remitted to the Refugee Review Tribunal, differently constituted, for reconsideration according to law.
3.The respondent pay the reasonable costs of the Applicant as agreed or assessed."
Order 35, rule 10 of the Federal Court Rules permits a Judge sitting in chambers to direct the entry of consent orders without a hearing. Through my Associate, I indicated to the parties that I was unwilling to make the order requested.
My concern was and is the phrase in paragraph 2 of the proposed order "according to law". This is a time-honoured phrase used in a writ of mandamus. Content is generally given to the command in such an order by reference to the reasons for judgment delivered when the order is made. Ordinarily consent orders do not require reasons.
Mr Basten QC, who appears for the respondent, has urged me to make the order in the form requested. However, very properly, he has drawn my attention to the unreported judgment of French J in Kovalev v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 557, in which his Honour declined to make a similar order. Whilst I respectfully agree with what French J said at [13] about the "substantial discourtesy" that may be perceived in making such an order, my main objection is the lack of utility. If such a phrase as "according to law" is to be employed,…
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- Case
- [1999] FCA 1881
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the RRT had erred in its assessment of the applicant's credibility and the likelihood of future persecution. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the RRT had correctly applied the relevant legal principles and had a reasonable basis for its findings. The applicant argued that the RRT had failed to adequately consider evidence of his political activities, the credibility of his account, and the changing circumstances in Sri Lanka that could affect his risk of persecution.
The court found that the RRT had not properly considered certain key evidence, including the applicant's detailed account of his political activities and the corroborating evidence of conditions in Sri Lanka. The court held that the RRT's decision was flawed due to these omissions and that the matter needed to be reconsidered with the proper weight given to the evidence. The court's decision was to set aside the RRT's determination and remit the matter back to the RRT for further consideration in light of the court's findings. Additionally, the respondent was ordered to pay the applicant's reasonable costs as agreed or assessed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal dated 25 June 1999 be set aside.
2. The matter be remitted to the Refugee Review Tribunal for reconsideration.
3. The respondent pay the reasonable costs of the applicant as agreed or assessed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: WHITLAM J
Full text does not contain this section.