Jones v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Jones v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2002] FCA 1054

TRADE PRACTICES – application by chicken meat processors to Australian Competition and Consumer Commission for authorisation under s 88 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) – application opposed by chicken meat growers on whose behalf purportedly made – whether processors have standing – whether applicant for authorisation must be at risk of contravening s 45 – whether s 45 applies to vertical conduct – derivative liability under s 75B

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – judicial review – decision by Australian Competition and Consumer Commission to grant authorisation pursuant to s 88 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) – standing to seek authorisation – meaning of “by or on behalf of a corporation” – whether application can be brought by corporation not at risk of contravening s 45 – derivative liability under s 75B – member of Commission said to be affected by apprehended bias – waiver - whether claim of prejudgment waived – availability of alternative remedy

WORDS & PHRASES – “by or on behalf of a corporation”

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 5
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 45, 45A, 75B and 88
Broiler Chicken Industry Act 1978 (Vic)

Re Applications by Australasian Performing Rights Association (1999) ATPR 41-701 at 42,937 referred to
Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd; Re Defiance Holdings Ltd (1976) 25 FLR 169 at 180 referred to
Re Applications by Concrete Carters Association (Victoria) (1977) 31 FLR 193 at 245-246 referred to

R v Portus, Ex parte Federated Clerks Union of Australia (1949) 79 CLR 428 at 435 referred to
Re Ross, Ex parte The Attorney-General for the Northern Territory of Australia (1980) 54 ALJR 145 at 149 referred to
Digby Brown & Co v Lyall 1995 SLT 932 referred to
Trade Practices Commission v Queensland Aggregates Pty Ltd (1982) 44 ALR 391 referred to
Walplan Pty Ltd v Wallace (1985) 8 FCR 27 referred to
Snyman v Cooper (No 2) (1990) 25 FCR 470 referred to
Adelaide Petroleum NL v Poseidon Ltd (1990) 98 ALR 431 referred to
R v Toohey; Ex parte the Attorney-General for the Northern Territory (1980) 145 CLR 374 referred to
Citizens Airport Environment Association Inc v Maritime Services Board (1993) 114 ALR 473 referred to

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v SIP Australia Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 824 at par 92 considered
South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Ltd v News Ltd (1999) 169 ALR 120 at 135 per Hely J referred to
South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Ltd v News Ltd (2000) 177 ALR 611 at 680 per Finn J referred to
South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Ltd v News Ltd (2001) 111 FCR 456 at 481 and 517-518 per Heerey , Moore and Merkel JJ considered

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Visy Paper Pty Ltd (2002) 186 ALR 731 at 749 considered
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Visy Paper Pty Ltd

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 1054
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Jones v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission involved the applicant, Marven Poultry Pty Ltd, seeking authorisation under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) for a proposed arrangement within the Victorian chicken meat industry. The applicant aimed to establish a contract growers' association, which would represent the interests of current and future growers. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) denied the authorisation, leading the applicant to challenge the ACCC's decision in the Federal Court of Australia. The primary legal issue was whether Dr Cousins, a delegate of the ACCC, had an apprehended bias that would disqualify him from making the decision. The court had to determine if Dr Cousins' prior involvement in a review that recommended the repeal of the existing regulatory framework demonstrated a prejudgment of the authorisation issue, thereby creating a reasonable apprehension of bias.

In examining the issue of apprehended bias, the court considered whether Dr Cousins had prejudged the matter before him. The court found that the references to a KPMG report by the ACCC did not establish that Dr Cousins had prejudged the authorisation issue. The report merely highlighted that the existing arrangements might contravene competition law, which was a different issue from the statutory test for authorisation under section 88 of the Act. The court concluded that the overlap between the KPMG review and the authorisation decision did not demonstrate that Dr Cousins had formed an opinion on the authorisation issue that he would not change regardless of the evidence. The court held that no reasonable person would conclude that Dr Cousins had prejudged the authorisation matter. Consequently, the court dismissed the application and ordered the applicant to pay the ACCC's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

The application for authorisation was originally lodged on 21 September 2000 under the name “Victorian Chicken Meat Council, (Processors)” representing the named processors, and was said to be made on behalf of current and future growers of those processors. It was subsequently amended to be in the name of “Marven Poultry Pty Ltd for itself and on behalf of Victorian Chicken Meat Processors and Chicken Growers” (defined as current and future contract growers of those processors). BACKGROUND TO VICTORIAN CHICKEN MEAT INDUSTRY The Victorian Chicken Meat Industry comprises processors, who supply day old hatchlings, and growers, who raise the chickens on an outsourcing basis, until they reach the broiler stage. The growing process takes some seven to eight weeks. The chickens remain at all times the property of the processors. After the completion of the growing process they are returned by the growers to the processors. Victoria has approximately 200 contract grower farms which account for about 92% of broiler chickens grown in that State. The VFFCMG is a body which represents the growers. For the past 25 years the industry in Victoria has utilised a contract system of chicken growing. Under that system, growers are independent contractors. They are not employees of processors. It should be noted that growers are typically located in close proximity to processors, generally within one hour’s drive, in order to ensure that transport costs are kept to a minimum. Growers are also linked, through contractual arrangements, with particular processors. The Victorian market is primarily supplied by six processors. They are the processors by, and on whose behalf, the application for authorisation was sought. The four largest have a combined market share of approximately 80%. The industry in Victoria is regulated by the Broiler Chicken Industry Act 1978 (Vic) (“the BCI Act”) and the Broiler Chicken Regulations 1992. The BCI Act is administered by the Victorian Department of Natural Resources and Energy (“the Department”). That Act prescribes certain conduct relating to the supply of broiler chickens in that State. It establishes a regulatory body, the Victorian Broiler Industry Negotiation Committee (“the VBINC”) which represents the interests of both processors and growers. The VBINC consists of an independent Chairman, four grower representatives, four processor representatives, and two independent members with commercial expertise. It is empowered, inter alia, to determine the standard growing fee for broiler chickens across the industry, and to recommend terms and conditions of contracts. In determining the standard growing fee, the practice is for grower representatives to confer in order to formulate a common position. The same is true of the processor representatives. The independent members than determine the standard growing fee within the parameters set by the collective positions of the two representative groups.THE NATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY REVIEW OF THE BCI ACT

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

WEINBERG J
The following comment from Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 170 CLR 70 at 100, per Gaudron and McHugh JJ, demonstrates the scope of the test for apprehended bias, at least in relation to prejudgment: “A reasonable bystander does not entertain a reasonable fear that a decision-maker will bring an unfair or prejudiced mind to an inquiry merely because he has formed a conclusion about an issue involved in the inquiry. …When suspected prejudgment of an issue is relied upon to ground the disqualification of a decision-maker, what must be firmly established is a reasonable fear that the decision-maker’s mind is so prejudiced in favour of a conclusion already formed that he or she will not alter that conclusion irrespective of the evidence or arguments presented to him or her.” (emphasis added)Was the apprehended bias test met? In my opinion, the evidence does not establish, “firmly” or otherwise, that Dr Cousins should be regarded as having, in the relevant sense, prejudged the issue before him. The fact that the ACCC referred in its Determination on a number of occasions to the KPMG Report and, in particular, to the view expressed in that report that the existing arrangements under the BCI Act might contravene s 45, does not give rise to a finding of apprehended bias. There is little doubt that the KPMG Report was correct in concluding that those arrangements might contravene that section, as the VFFCMG itself conceded in its correspondence with the ACCC. In other words, the report was simply stating the obvious. That means that there is little scope for an argument regarding “prejudgment” of that issue. Moreover, the criteria applicable to the KPMG Review, and the issue facing the ACCC under s 88, were in truth quite different. The task which confronted KPMG was identified in its report. It was not the “statutory test” for authorisation which the ACCC was required to address. The fact that Dr Cousins was responsible for a review which ultimately recommended, inter alia, that the BCI Act be repealed, does not demonstrate prejudice in favour of a conclusion already formed, on a different issue, relating to the exercise of a statutory power under s 88, that he would not alter irrespective of the evidence or arguments presented to him. The issue to be considered under s 88 was whether the public benefits likely to result from the “proposed arrangements” were sufficient to outweigh any anti-competitive detriment that may arise, and therefore warranted the grant of an authorisation. No reasonable bystander, properly informed as to the nature of the process under s 88, would regard Dr Cousins as having relevantly prejudged that issue. Although there was a degree of overlap between some of the matters considered by the KPMG Review, and some of the matters incidental to the ultimate decision taken by the ACCC, there was “no conclusion already formed ... irrespective of the evidence or arguments presented” in relation to that ultimate decision.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WEINBERG J

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