Ogawa v President, Australian Human Rights Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ogawa v President, Australian Human Rights Commission [2023] FCA 940

Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal Orders of Justice Perry on 21 June 2023
File number: QUD 291 of 2023
Judgment of: CHARLESWORTH J
Date of judgment: 10 August 2023
Catchwords:

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – application for leave to appeal from an interlocutory order fixing a time by which an application to transfer proceedings may be filed – order not affecting the applicant’s substantive rights – allegation the impugned order was affected by apprehended bias – applicant failing to make any application for a recusal order before the primary judge despite having opportunities to do so – applicant seeking relief from the Full Court that can and should appropriately be sought in the primary proceeding – leave to appeal refused

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for an order that a judge presiding on an application for leave to appeal be disqualified on the grounds of apprehended bias – applicant aggrieved by past exercises of judicial and administrative power by the presiding judge – allegations of apprehended bias having no proper evidentiary foundation – facts incapable of supporting a claim of apprehended bias – recusal application dismissed

Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24
Cases cited:

ALA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 30

Burgess v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 259 FCR 197

Charisteas v Charisteas (2021) 273 CLR 289

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337

Ecap Finance Pty Ltd v Ottoway Engineering Pty Ltd (No 2) [2017] FCA 237

Isbester v Knox City Council (2015) 255 CLR 135

Ogawa v Finance Minister [2022] FCAFC 145

Division: General Division
Registry: Queensland
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 64
Date of hearing: 8 August 2023
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: The First Respondent filed a Submitting Notice
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr N Swan
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

QUD 291 of 2023
BETWEEN:

MEGUMI OGAWA

Applicant

AND:

PRESIDENT OF THE AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

First Respondent

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

CHARLESWORTH J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 AUGUST 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

CHARLESWORTH J

  1. The Court has before it an application for leave to appeal to the Full Court.  The application is suitable for hearing and resolution before a single Judge.

  2. By an interlocutory application filed on 7 August 2023 the applicant sought an order that I be disqualified from presiding in the matter for any purpose.  I made an order dismissing that application on 8 August 2023 and proceeded to hear submissions in relation to the application for leave to appeal.  Judgment on the application was reserved.

  3. I…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 940
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Ogawa v President, Australian Human Rights Commission, the applicant sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order concerning the time frame for filing an application to transfer proceedings. The dispute arose within the Australian Human Rights Commission and was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The applicant contested the validity of the order, alleging it was influenced by apprehended bias on the part of the presiding judge. Despite having opportunities to do so, the applicant did not seek a recusal order before the primary judge.

The court had to determine whether the order was indeed subject to apprehended bias and whether the applicant's failure to seek a recusal order before the primary judge affected the validity of the appeal. Additionally, the court considered the discretion to grant leave to appeal under the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, specifically section 24(1A). The principles guiding the discretion to grant leave to appeal were reiterated, emphasising flexibility and the importance of not interfering with interlocutory decisions affecting practice and procedure unless there is sufficient doubt and substantial injustice.

The court found that the applicant's allegations of apprehended bias lacked proper evidentiary foundation and the facts did not support a claim of bias. The applicant's failure to seek a recusal order before the primary judge further undermined the validity of the appeal. The Full Court applied the principles from Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc and recognised the legislative endorsement of restraint in appellate courts concerning practice and procedure. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The court's final order was that the application for leave to appeal is dismissed. This ruling underscores the importance of adhering to procedural requirements and the court's discretion in granting leave to appeal interlocutory orders.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The orders of the primary judge are interlocutory. Leave to appeal is required: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24(1A). It is convenient to repeat what I said in Ecap Finance Pty Ltd v Ottoway Engineering Pty Ltd (No 2) [2017] FCA 237 with respect to the principles guiding the discretion to grant leave:5… In Samsung Electronics Co Limited v Apple Inc [2013] FCAFC 138 (Samsung) at [19], the Full Court emphasised the need for flexibility in the exercise of the discretion conferred under s 24(1A) of the FCA Act:The very width of the discretion and the prudence in not seeking to confine the manner in which it is to be exercised is a necessary corollary of the myriad of interlocutory decisions which may be made — ranging from interlocutory decisions affecting the substantive rights of parties (and effectively being final orders) to matters of practice and procedure (including decisions to extend time, the granting or refusal of adjournments and the filing of evidence). The different character of interlocutory decisions which may be made and the different factual and forensic circumstances in play when such decisions are made nevertheless have occasioned a different emphasis from one judgment to another upon one particular factor or factors rather than others.6In Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 (Décor Corporation) the Full Court (Sheppard, Burchett and Heerey JJ) identified ‘an appropriate litmus test for the general run of cases in which leave to appeal from an interlocutory decision is sought’ (at 399). The test involves an inquiry firstly into whether the judgment of the primary judge is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by the Full Court and secondly into whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision to be wrong. The two aspects of the test are not to be applied in a tick-a-box fashion. They bear upon each other such that the degree of doubt sufficient to justify the grant of leave in one case may differ from that required in another, having regard to the nature and degree of substantial injustice that might result should leave be refused. It is in this respect that the discretion to grant leave may involve a fine balance of competing considerations: see Sharp v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [1988] FCA 76; (1988) 88 ATC 4,184 at 4,186 (Burchett J) (approved by the Full Court in Décor Corporation at 398 - 399).7As White J observed in Ferdinands v The State of South Australia [2017] FCA 32, s 24(1A) of the FCA Act is a legislative endorsement of the recognised principle that appellate courts should exercise restraint before interfering with matters concerning practice and procedure. The consequences of a lack of appellate restraint were identified by Jordan CJ in In re the Will of F.B. Gilbert (dec.) (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 318 at 323:… I am of the opinion that, … there is a material difference between an exercise of discretion on a point of practice or procedure and an exercise of discretion which determines substantive rights. In the former class of case, if a tight rein were not kept upon interference with the orders of Judges of first instance, the result would be disastrous to the proper administration of justice. The disposal of cases could be delayed interminably, and costs heaped up indefinitely, if a litigant with a long purse or a litigious disposition could, at will, in effect transfer all exercises of discretion in interlocutory applications from a Judge in Chambers to a Court of Appeal.That passage was cited with approval by the High Court in Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170 at 177.Consideration