ALA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ALA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 30

Appeal from: ALA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 2047
File number: NSD 1048 of 2015
Judges: ALLSOP CJ, KENNY AND GRIFFITHS JJ
Date of judgment: 10 March 2016
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for extension of time and leave to appeal – judicial review application under s 39B of the Judicial Act 1903 (Cth) – conduct of legal representatives – costs.

MIGRATION – whether primary judge denied applicant procedural fairness by refusing to disqualify himself based on reasonable apprehension of bias - whether comparative statistical analysis of Court’s previous decisions relevant to apprehended bias test.

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), ss 39B, 37N(5), 43(3)(f)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 477(2), 477(2)(b)

Cases cited:

AAV15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 700; (2015) 230 FCR 454

ABT15v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 1051

ALA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 2047

ALA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2015] FCCA 2048

AEG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 702; (2015) 230 FCR 465

AHT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1215

British American Tobacco Australia Services Limited v Laurie [2011] HCA 2; (2011) 242 CLR 283

Concrete Pty Limited v Parramatta Design and Developments Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 55; (2006) 229 CLR 577

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337

Kautoga v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2015] FCCA 1679

Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association [1983] HCA 17; (1983) 151 CLR 288

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1

R v Watson; Ex parte Armstrong [1976] HCA 39; (1976) 136 CLR 248

SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 24; (2005) 228 CLR 294

Sekigawa v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 127

Shrestha v Migration Review Tribunal [2015] FCAFC 87; (2015) 229 FCR 301

SZUQZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 1552

SZWBH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 88; (2015) 229 FCR 317

SZWCW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1217

Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; (2000) 201 CLR 488

Isbester v Knox City Council [2015] HCA 20

Ruddock v Vadarlis [2001] FCA 1865; (2001) 115 FCR 229

Vietnam Veterans’ Association of Australia (New South Wales Branch Inc) v Gallagher [1994] FCA 489; (1994) 52 FCR 34

Date of hearing: 29 February 2016
Registry: New…
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Details
Case
[2016] FCAFC 30
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of ALA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant, a Lebanese citizen who came to Australia on a student visa and subsequently applied for a protection visa, sought judicial review of a decision to refuse his application. The case involved a dispute over the primary judge's refusal to disqualify himself on the grounds of apprehended bias and the relevance of comparative statistical analysis of the Court’s previous decisions to the apprehended bias test. The matter was heard in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA), and subsequently, the Federal Court of Australia.

The legal issues before the court included whether the primary judge denied the applicant procedural fairness by refusing to disqualify himself based on a reasonable apprehension of bias, and whether the comparative statistical analysis of the Court’s previous decisions was relevant to the apprehended bias test. The applicant argued that the primary judge was predisposed to view applications in migration matters as without merit and that his previous judgments demonstrated a trenchant attitude, which raised concerns about his ability to hear the case impartially.

The court examined the applicant's argument that the primary judge had a history of making judgments in favor of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection in a high percentage of cases, and often delivered judgments ex tempore. The court acknowledged the applicant's pro bono representation but emphasized the importance of adhering to the court's orders. It was determined that the applicant's submissions did not provide sufficient grounds for the primary judge to recuse himself. The court found that the applicant's claims of bias were not substantiated and that the statistical analysis presented did not adequately demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court dismissed the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal, and also dismissed the judicial review application, ordering the applicant to pay the respondent's costs. The decision underscored the necessity of substantial evidence to support claims of judicial bias and highlighted the importance of procedural adherence, even in pro bono cases. The final orders included dismissing both the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal, and the amended application for judicial review, with the applicant to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for extension of time and leave to appeal be dismissed.

2. In respect of the application described in order 1 above, the applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.

3. The amended application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) be dismissed.

4. In respect of the amended application described in order 3 above, the applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons which follow, we consider that:(a)the application for extension of time and leave to appeal should formally be dismissed, with costs; and (b)the judicial review proceedings should be dismissed, with costs. Summary of background facts The applicant is a citizen of Lebanon. He came to Australia on 24 October 2010 on a student visa, which expired on 30 August 2013. He applied for a protection visa on 13 August 2013. The applicant was born a Sunni Muslim. He claimed to have had a very strict religious upbringing and says that his parents, siblings and close relatives were all strict adherents of the Sunni Islamic faith. His claim for protection was because of his religion. He said that after he arrived in Australia he developed his own religious views which led him completely to reject fundamentalist Islam. He claimed that this caused a severe rift between him and his parents. He said that his relationship with his father had deteriorated to the point that he had been disowned and his father refused to talk to him. He claimed that since 2011 his father stopped sending him money to help with his education and living expenses and that he had to support himself, including by working part-time. He claimed that his parents expected him to return to Lebanon after completing his studies and to marry a girl of their choosing. He said that if he returned to Lebanon he feared that he would be forced by fundamentalists to fight in Syria or other war zones. He also claimed to fear that his family, particularly his father, and his community would torture and beat him because of his lack of faith. The applicant’s application for a protection visa was refused by the Minister’s delegate on 20 March 2014. He applied to have that decision reviewed by the Tribunal. The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision on 23 February 2015. The FCCA proceedings On 13 April 2015, the applicant filed in the FCCA an application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. As these proceedings were not commenced within 35 days of the Tribunal’s decision, the applicant required an extension of time under s 477(2) of the Act. The first return date in respect of the proceeding was 14 May 2015. The primary judge declined to approve consent orders regarding the future conduct of the proceeding. Instead, the Court ordered the Minister to file and serve the Court Book within two weeks (i.e. by 28 May 2015). The applicant was directed to file an amended application with any evidence to be relied upon within two further weeks (i.e. on or before 11 June 2015). The final hearing was initially set down for 10 July 2015 but this was subsequently deferred to 29 July 2015. At the commencement of the hearing in the FCCA on 29 July 2015, the applicant sought leave to file a further amended application and two affidavits in support. He sought orders that:(a)the primary judge disqualify himself; (b)leave be granted to further amend his amended application; and(c)time be extended under s 477 of the Act.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Court acknowledges that the applicant’s legal representatives were acting on a pro bono basis. Such involvement generally assists in the due and efficient administration of justice and the Court is grateful to practitioners who become involved on a pro bono basis. It is no excuse, however, for not complying with the Court’s orders in the manner and frequency which occurred here. Conclusion For these reasons, the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal, and the amended application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act, will both be dismissed, with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Kline’s findings may be summarised as follows:(a)He identified 286 decisions of Judge Street during the relevant period, of which 254, or 88.81% were in the area of immigration law where the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection was the respondent (immigration judgments). (b)In all 254 or 100% of the immigration judgments, they were, or appeared to be, delivered ex tempore. (c)Only in two of the 254 immigration judgments, or 0.79% of the immigration judgments, Judge Street found in favour of the applicant against the respondent Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. (d)In 252 out of the 254 immigration judgments, or 99.21%, Judge Street found in favour of the respondent Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. (e)There were only two judgments where the primary judge found in favour of the applicant. In ABT15v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 1051, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection conceded that there was an error and in Kautoga v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2015] FCCA 1679, that there was jurisdictional error. (f)In at least 163 of the 254 immigration judgments, or 64.96%, the immigration judgments were given at the first court date. In approximately another dozen cases it was not possible to tell if they were delivered at the first court date or not. (g)During the relevant period, the remaining eight judges of the FCCA in Sydney delivered 309 immigration judgments, or 54.89% of the immigration judgments in the Sydney Registry of the FCCA, whilst the primary judge personally delivered 45.11% of the immigration judgments. (h)The most recent Annual Report of the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT) – Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) disclosed that 10.8% of MRT decisions and 12.2% of RRT decisions were set aside, compared with only 0.79% being set aside by the primary judge on judicial review. The applicant, who was represented by Mr Jay Williams of counsel on 29 July 2015, contended that the primary judge was predisposed to the view that applications in migration matters were without merit and that the primary judge’s previously stated views and conduct were characterised by such trenchancy that it was not possible for him to hear the applicant’s application with an open mind. His Honour’s judgments were said to be characterised by the use of forceful phrases which give an appearance of absolute certainty. Mr Williams submitted to the primary judge (without any supporting evidence) that a search of the BarNet-Jade website of his Honour's immigration judgments between 1 January 2015 and 29 May 2015 revealed:·140 cases in which the phrase, “no substance” was used by the primary judge; and ·160 cases in which the phrase, “it is clear” was used by him. After hearing the recusal application, the primary judge dismissed it and gave ex tempore reasons (ALA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 2047 (ALA15 (No 1)). His Honour observed at [8] that the applicant’s recusal submissions went beyond Mr Kline’s affidavit and also referred to alleged expressions which the primary judge had used in other proceedings which, the applicant contended, could be characterised as a “vehement or entrenched expression of view”.