FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
ALA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 30
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- Case
- [2016] FCAFC 30
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the primary judge denied the applicant procedural fairness by refusing to disqualify himself based on a reasonable apprehension of bias, and whether the comparative statistical analysis of the Court’s previous decisions was relevant to the apprehended bias test. The applicant argued that the primary judge was predisposed to view applications in migration matters as without merit and that his previous judgments demonstrated a trenchant attitude, which raised concerns about his ability to hear the case impartially.
The court examined the applicant's argument that the primary judge had a history of making judgments in favor of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection in a high percentage of cases, and often delivered judgments ex tempore. The court acknowledged the applicant's pro bono representation but emphasized the importance of adhering to the court's orders. It was determined that the applicant's submissions did not provide sufficient grounds for the primary judge to recuse himself. The court found that the applicant's claims of bias were not substantiated and that the statistical analysis presented did not adequately demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of bias.
The court dismissed the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal, and also dismissed the judicial review application, ordering the applicant to pay the respondent's costs. The decision underscored the necessity of substantial evidence to support claims of judicial bias and highlighted the importance of procedural adherence, even in pro bono cases. The final orders included dismissing both the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal, and the amended application for judicial review, with the applicant to pay the respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for extension of time and leave to appeal be dismissed.
2. In respect of the application described in order 1 above, the applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.
3. The amended application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) be dismissed.
4. In respect of the amended application described in order 3 above, the applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Kline’s findings may be summarised as follows:(a)He identified 286 decisions of Judge Street during the relevant period, of which 254, or 88.81% were in the area of immigration law where the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection was the respondent (immigration judgments). (b)In all 254 or 100% of the immigration judgments, they were, or appeared to be, delivered ex tempore. (c)Only in two of the 254 immigration judgments, or 0.79% of the immigration judgments, Judge Street found in favour of the applicant against the respondent Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. (d)In 252 out of the 254 immigration judgments, or 99.21%, Judge Street found in favour of the respondent Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. (e)There were only two judgments where the primary judge found in favour of the applicant. In ABT15v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 1051, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection conceded that there was an error and in Kautoga v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2015] FCCA 1679, that there was jurisdictional error. (f)In at least 163 of the 254 immigration judgments, or 64.96%, the immigration judgments were given at the first court date. In approximately another dozen cases it was not possible to tell if they were delivered at the first court date or not. (g)During the relevant period, the remaining eight judges of the FCCA in Sydney delivered 309 immigration judgments, or 54.89% of the immigration judgments in the Sydney Registry of the FCCA, whilst the primary judge personally delivered 45.11% of the immigration judgments. (h)The most recent Annual Report of the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT) – Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) disclosed that 10.8% of MRT decisions and 12.2% of RRT decisions were set aside, compared with only 0.79% being set aside by the primary judge on judicial review. The applicant, who was represented by Mr Jay Williams of counsel on 29 July 2015, contended that the primary judge was predisposed to the view that applications in migration matters were without merit and that the primary judge’s previously stated views and conduct were characterised by such trenchancy that it was not possible for him to hear the applicant’s application with an open mind. His Honour’s judgments were said to be characterised by the use of forceful phrases which give an appearance of absolute certainty. Mr Williams submitted to the primary judge (without any supporting evidence) that a search of the BarNet-Jade website of his Honour's immigration judgments between 1 January 2015 and 29 May 2015 revealed:·140 cases in which the phrase, “no substance” was used by the primary judge; and ·160 cases in which the phrase, “it is clear” was used by him. After hearing the recusal application, the primary judge dismissed it and gave ex tempore reasons (ALA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 2047 (ALA15 (No 1)). His Honour observed at [8] that the applicant’s recusal submissions went beyond Mr Kline’s affidavit and also referred to alleged expressions which the primary judge had used in other proceedings which, the applicant contended, could be characterised as a “vehement or entrenched expression of view”.