FXF18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

FXF18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 729

File number(s): SYG 3158 of 2018
Judgment of: JUDGE GIVEN
Date of judgment: 18 August 2023 
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Recusal application – waiver – whether previously vacated litigation guardian order should be reinstated – whether applicants should be entitled to reopen their case – request by applicants that Judge wear wig in order to appear impartial
Legislation:

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) ss 190, 191

Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37M, 37N

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 65

Cases cited:

ALA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 30

Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1

British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Laurie (2011) 242 CLR 283

Choi v Secretary, Dept of Justice and Communities (2022) 405 ALR 714

CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 FCR 87

CUR24 v Director of Public Prosecutions (2012) 83 NSWLR 385

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337

GoddardElliott (A Firm) v Fritsch [2012] VSC 87

Inspector-General in Bankruptcy v Bradshaw [2006] FCA 22

Isbester v Knox City Council (2015) CLR 135

Johnson v Johnson (No 3)  (2000) 201 CLR 488

Kennedy v Secretary, Department of Industry (No 2) [2016] FCA 746

Matson v Attorney-General (Cth) [2021] FCA 161

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQHH (2012) 200 FCR 223

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507

QYFM v Minister for Immigration (2023) 409 ALR 65

R v Commonwealth Conciliation & Arbitration Commission; Ex parte The Angliss Group (1969) 122 CLR 546

R v George (1987) 9 NSWLR 527

R v Leckie; Ex parte Felman (1977) 52 ALJR 155

Raybos Australia Pty Ltd v Tectran Corporation Pty Ltd [No 4] (1986) 6 NSWLR 674

Re JRL; Ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342

Young v Hughes Trueman Pty Ltd (No 5) [2017] FCA 690

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 143
Date of hearing: 15 August 2023
Solicitor for the Applicants: In person
Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr B Kaplan
Solicitor for the Respondents: Minter Ellison

ORDERS

SYG 3158 of 2018

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

FXF18

First Applicant

FXG18

Second Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

order made by:

JUDGE GIVEN

DATE OF ORDER:

18 August 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Each of the applications in a proceeding filed on 16 May 2023 (interlocutory applications) is dismissed.

2.The applicants must pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements, of and incidental to, the interlocutory applications, as agreed or taxed.

3.Final judgment remains reserved from 19 April 2023, to a time and date to be notified to the parties.

4.No further documents are to be accepted…

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Details
Case
[2023] FedCFamC2G 729
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of FXF18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs, the applicants sought judicial review of a decision made by the Tribunal regarding their immigration matters. The primary issue before the Court was whether the judge should recuse themselves from the case due to the applicants' claims regarding the judge's Judaism and its potential impact on the impartiality of the proceedings. The Court had to determine whether the applicants had provided sufficient grounds for the judge to recuse themselves, considering the well-established legal test for judicial recusal.

The legal issues involved assessing the validity of the applicants' claims and whether they met the threshold required to justify recusal. The Court noted that the applicants' concerns about the judge's Judaism were not a focus of the proceedings and that there was no evidence suggesting the judge would not decide the case based on the law and the merits. The Court applied the hypothetical fair-minded lay observer test to determine whether the applicants had demonstrated that the judge's perceived bias might affect the outcome of the case. The Court concluded that the applicants had not provided any logical or reasonable basis for the judge's recusal and that the application was an attempt to disrupt the proceedings.

The Court found that the applicants' concerns were unsubstantiated and amounted to mere assertions without factual support. The Court held that the applicants had failed to establish a reasonable basis for believing that the judge would not be impartial. As a result, the application for the judge's recusal was refused. The Court emphasized that judges should not be easily swayed from their duties by the assertions of parties and that recusal applications should be treated with seriousness and caution.

In summary, the Court rejected the applicants' application for the judge's recusal and determined that the matter would proceed before the same judge. The Court found no valid grounds for the judge to recuse themselves and ruled that the applicants had not met the necessary criteria for such a significant action.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The hypothetical lay observer would also be informed no part of the proposed further amended application or the final hearing before me focused on the applicants’ Judaism as forming part of the jurisdictional error alleged in the Tribunal’s decision. Even if that were not so, and grounds were advanced in respect of their claimed Judaism, I am not satisfied that the applicants have established any connection between me, Jewish faith and/or the Jewish community which might distract me from my judicial oath and the determination of the question of whether the Tribunal erred at law in deciding their case, such that I should recuse myself. Neither this Court, nor any of my brother or sister judges would be determining the question of the applicants’ respective faith or the impact that it or their Judaism has on their protection claims. The only question for this Court is whether the Tribunal adhered to its jurisdiction and processes such that its decision was made according to law. Conclusion I am of the view that the Court’s disclosure, which was made out of an abundance of caution for the benefit of all parties at the commencement of the final hearing, is being utilised by the first applicant in an attempt to potentially disrupt and/or delay the current proceedings. It is open to infer, and I do, that rather than there being any logical or reasonable basis to make the recusal application, the first applicant is less concerned with my Judaism and more desirous in engaging in “judge shopping”. The volume of cases in this Court are such that no judge should lightly shirk their responsibility to hear a matter simply because a party holds subjective views which do not otherwise meet the requisite test. The first applicant has failed to identify (beyond mere assertion and suspicion) any basis upon which a fair-minded lay observer might consider that the Court might not undertake determination of the applicants’ judicial review application other than on the law and the respective merit of the case. There is not a sufficient basis in the present case upon which the requisite observer would logically consider that the facts the subject matter of the disclosure might lead me to diverge deciding the applicants’ judicial review application on its merits. Accordingly, the application that I recuse myself is refused and the remaining prayers for relief which are sought by the first application will be determined by me. LITIGATION GUARDIAN ORDER As already outlined, a litigation guardian order was made in this matter at the first Court date. That order was made by consent and had the effect that the first applicant was appointed as the litigation guardian for the second applicant. There is no evidence to suggest that the order was sought, nor consented to, for any reason other than that at the time the proceedings were commenced the second applicant was a minor, noting that she was in fact 17 years of age. The parties did not specifically direct their submissions to this issue at the interlocutory hearing beyond two general categories of submissions made by the first and second applicants respectively. Those submissions were in conflict to a degree.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

While one would not expect the Minister to express any particular view as to the individual composition of the Court, given the existence of a well-established test for judicial recusal (see [64] above) it is odd that the Minister is unable to advance an independent position about the application of that test to the facts, circumstances and evidence in this case. That is moreso given the obligation of all parties to the Court to conduct litigation in accordance with the overarching purpose of civil practice and procedure provisions: see ss 190 and 191 of the Court Act. However, the recusal application will be considered on the basis that the Minister neither opposed, nor contended for, recusal. Consideration Recusal applications are serious matters and should be neither lightly acceded to, nor lightly refused: see Young v Hughes Trueman Pty Ltd (No 5) [2017] FCA 690 per Bromwich J at [4]. Judges should resist being driven from their courts by the conduct or assertion of parties, including assertions of actual or imputed bias: see Raybos Australia Pty Ltd v Tectran Corporation Pty Ltd [No 4] (1986) 6 NSWLR 674 at 689 per Kirby P. The test is to be applied through the prism of the hypothetical fair-minded lay observer who, while not a lawyer nor assumed to have a detailed knowledge of the law, is taken to be reasonable and to not be “wholly uninformed and uninstructed about the law in general or the issue to be decided”: Johnson (supra) at [53] per Kirby J citing R v George (1987) 9 NSWLR 527 at 536 per Street CJ and QYFM (supra) at [45] to [48] per Kiefel CJ and Gageler J. It is necessary to attribute to the fair-minded lay observer knowledge of all of the circumstances of the case: CUR24 v Director of Public Prosecutions (2012) 83 NSWLR 385 at [39] per Meagher JA, which will also include any salient parts of practice and procedure, some of which will be outlined where relevant. Procedural fairness basis In relation to the procedural fairness basis of the recusal application, the first applicant has not pointed to a basis which has a logical connection to a feared deviation from a course of deciding a case on its merits (see Ebner (supra) at [8]). The height of the submissions (albeit no evidence) advanced before the Court at the interlocutory hearing was that the first applicant had a subjective feeling that she had not received a “fair judgment”, despite the fact that the Court had not delivered any judgment in the matter. The first applicant said that: I don’t trust the fair hearing any longer. I feel that you will, kind of – I don’t feel that you are impartial. I mean, I don’t know the reasons. I cannot blame the judge or anything like that, but I immediately said that I don’t feel that it will be a fair judgment. I wanted to change the judge. I don’t know the reasons.[12][12] Transcript 15 August 2023 T17.37 to 17.40 Further, the matters alleged by the first applicant as giving rise to the procedural fairness basis for the recusal application did not occur as alleged and, as such, fail at a factual level.