FXF18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FXF18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 549

File number(s): NSD 995 of 2023
Judgment of: HALLEY J
Date of judgment: 24 May 2024
Catchwords: MIGRATION – leave to appeal and associated extension of time – appeal from primary judge’s interlocutory orders – whether primary judge’s reasons for making interlocutory orders attended with sufficient doubt and whether potential for substantial prejudice if leave not granted – whether primary judge should have recused herself for reasonable apprehension of bias – whether primary judge was correct to dismiss application to reopen case – extension of time granted but application for leave to appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24, 37M and 37N

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 65(1)(b)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 35.15

Cases cited:

Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170; [1981] HCA 39

Burgess v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 259 FCR 197; [2018] FCA 69

Charisteas v Charisteas (2021) 273 CLR 289; [2021] HCA 29

Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397; [1991] FCA 844

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63

FXF18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 729

Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488; [2010] HCA 48

Matson v Attorney-General (Cth) [2021] FCA 161

Ogawa v President of the Australian Human Rights Commission (Leave to Appeal) [2022] FCAFC 161

Sharman Licence Holdings Ltd v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 802

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 120
Date of last submissions: 23 May 2024
Date of hearing: 5 April 2024
Counsel for the First Applicant: The First Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Second Applicant: The Second Applicant did not appear
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the First Respondent: MinterEllison
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

NSD 995 of 2023
BETWEEN:

FXF18

First Applicant

FXG18

Second Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

HALLEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

24 MAY 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The time by which the applicants have to file an application for leave to appeal the interlocutory orders made by Judge Given of the Federal Circuit and Family Court (Division 2) of Australia on 18 August 2023, be extended to 12 September 2023.

2.The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

3.The first applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs, as taxed or agreed.

4.These orders be entered forthwith.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

HALLEY J:

A.       INTRODUCTION

  1. The applicants seek leave to appeal and an associated extension…

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Details
Case
[2024] FCA 549
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

FXF18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs involved two applicants, both citizens of the Russian Federation, who had applied for protection visas in Australia on the basis of their Jewish identity and fear of persecution in their home country. Their applications were refused by a delegate of the Minister, a decision that was subsequently affirmed by the Tribunal. The applicants then sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. After no substantive steps were taken in the proceedings for several years, the case was eventually docketed to a primary judge in December 2022, who listed it for hearing on 19 April 2023. The applicants then filed an application for leave to appeal the primary judge's interlocutory orders and sought an extension of time.

The legal issues before the court included whether the primary judge's reasons for making the interlocutory orders were attended with sufficient doubt to justify a grant of leave to appeal, whether there was a potential for substantial prejudice if leave was not granted, whether the primary judge should have recused herself due to a reasonable apprehension of bias, and whether the primary judge was correct to dismiss the application to reopen the case. The applicants argued that the primary judge should have recused herself due to her conversion to Judaism and that she should have allowed them to make further submissions at the delivery of judgment. The Minister argued that there was no basis for a grant of leave to appeal and that the application should be dismissed.

The court found that the applicants had not demonstrated any basis for concluding that the primary judge's reasoning in declining to recuse herself was attended with sufficient doubt to justify a grant of leave to appeal. The court found that the primary judge's religious faith and gender could not rationally or plausibly be said to give rise to any reasonable apprehension of bias, and that the applicants were not denied any opportunity to make further submissions at the delivery of judgment. The court also found that there was no potential for substantial prejudice if leave was not granted, and that the primary judge was correct to dismiss the application to reopen the case. The court therefore granted an extension of time for the applicants to file an application for leave to appeal, but dismissed the application for leave to appeal itself. The first applicant was also ordered to pay the first respondent's costs, as taxed or agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The time by which the applicants have to file an application for leave to appeal the interlocutory orders made by Judge Given of the Federal Circuit and Family Court (Division 2) of Australia on 18 August 2023, be extended to 12 September 2023.

2. The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

3. The first applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs, as taxed or agreed.

4. These orders be entered forthwith.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In the absence of any confirmation from the second applicant as to her position, I concluded that, in order to ensure that there was no inadvertent prejudice to her, she should remain as a party to the application for leave to appeal but that she should not be exposed to a costs order in the event that the application was unsuccessful. I have therefore in these reasons referred to submissions being made by “the applicants”, on the basis that the first applicant was advancing submissions on both her behalf and on behalf of the second applicant. C. BACKGROUND The applicants are both citizens of the Russian Federation. On 5 April 2014, both applicants arrived in Australia holding Subclass 600 Visitor visas. At the time of her arrival in Australia, the second applicant was a minor but is now an adult. On 2 May 2014, the first and second applicants lodged applications for protection visas. The applicants claimed to be Jewish. The applicants commenced preparation for conversion to Judaism (giyur) after their arrival into Australia. The applicants claim to fear harm in Russia on the basis that they are Jewish. The first applicant claimed she is bisexual and that she fears the repressive policies and practices in Russia towards LGBTQI people, as well as government condoned antisemitism. The second applicant claimed fear of antisemitic treatment in Russia and mistreatment in response to her views about sexual diversity and human rights. The respective applications for protection visas were refused by a delegate of the Minister (Delegate) in separate decisions pursuant to s 65(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), on 24 February 2016 in the case of the second applicant, and on 23 June 2016 in the case of the first applicant. The applicants then sought a review of the Delegate’s decisions. On 15 October 2018, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Delegate to refuse to grant the protection visas to the applicants (Tribunal Determination). On 13 November 2018, the applicants filed an application in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (as it was then known) seeking judicial review of the Tribunal Determination. On 6 December 2018, a Registrar of the Federal Circuit Court made orders by consent, including orders that the first applicant be appointed as the second applicant’s litigation guardian (litigation guardian order). For reasons that are not explained, no substantive steps were taken in the Federal Circuit Court between December 2018 and December 2022. I infer that at least in substantial part this was because of difficulties in conducting in person hearings during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. On 8 December 2022, the judicial review proceedings was docketed to the primary judge and on that day the primary judge listed the proceedings for hearing on 19 April 2023. On 19 April 2023, the hearing proceeded before the primary judge. The applicants were represented by pro bono counsel. At the outset of the hearing, the primary judge dealt with three procedural matters as noted in FXF18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 729 (J) at [9]-[16], namely:(a)giving a disclosure that her Honour had undertaken a conversion to Judaism;(b)vacating, by consent, the litigation guardian order in respect of the second applicant; and (c)an application by the applicants to rely on a further amended application.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister further submits that the first applicant’s subjective perceptions and opinions, detailed in her affidavits and submissions, are not relevant as the test of reasonable apprehension of bias is an objective test.E.4 Consideration I am not satisfied that the applicants have demonstrated any basis on which it could be concluded that the reasoning of the primary judge in declining to recuse herself was attended with sufficient doubt to justify a grant of leave to appeal. The first applicant has not demonstrated any conduct of the primary judge that could logically form any basis to conclude that a fair-minded observer might apprehend that the primary judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the applicants’ judicial review application. First, the religious faith of a judge and gender cannot rationally or plausibly be said to give rise to any reasonable apprehension of bias. It is an objective, not subjective, test. It does not fall to be determined by any idiosyncratic notions of religion or the status of women entertained or held by the first applicant. Second, the applicants were not denied any opportunity to make further submissions at the delivery of judgment on 18 August 2023. A party does not have any right to make further submissions at the time that judgment is delivered, except to the extent that the Court might invite submissions on consequential orders, such as with respect to costs. Further, the applicants were represented by counsel at the judicial review hearing and were provided with a copy of the reasons for judgment on 18 August 2023. Third, the length of time that might have been given to respond to submissions that were ultimately not advanced cannot logically give rise to any prejudice. Further, the length of time that might have been necessary to enable unrepresented litigants to respond to a submission is inherently a discretionary issue that the primary judge was best placed to address and the applicants point to no reason other than that they were self-represented litigants that the time permitted by the primary judge was insufficient and could therefore give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. Fourth, assuming for present purposes that there were some difficulties with the interpretation provided by the interpreter during the judicial review hearing, in the absence of any substantive complaint by the applicants during the hearing, that could not logically give rise to any apprehension of bias. As the primary judge stated at [32] of her Honour’s reasons, which was not challenged, at no point were any concerns raised during the hearing about the quality of interpretation provided, other than a comment following the mid-morning adjournment that the interpreter “cannot hear very well”. I note the critical issue is the absence of any substantive complaint being made to the primary judge in the course of the hearing. Even if a party is represented by counsel, the value of such representation may be substantially diminished if the party cannot follow what is being said in Court and therefore not be in a position to provide any necessary instructions.