FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
FXF18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 549
File number(s): NSD 995 of 2023 Judgment of: HALLEY J Date of judgment: 24 May 2024 Catchwords: MIGRATION – leave to appeal and associated extension of time – appeal from primary judge’s interlocutory orders – whether primary judge’s reasons for making interlocutory orders attended with sufficient doubt and whether potential for substantial prejudice if leave not granted – whether primary judge should have recused herself for reasonable apprehension of bias – whether primary judge was correct to dismiss application to reopen case – extension of time granted but application for leave to appeal dismissed Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24, 37M and 37N
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 65(1)(b)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 35.15
Cases cited: Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170; [1981] HCA 39
Burgess v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 259 FCR 197; [2018] FCA 69
Charisteas v Charisteas (2021) 273 CLR 289; [2021] HCA 29
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397; [1991] FCA 844
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63
FXF18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 729
Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488; [2010] HCA 48
Matson v Attorney-General (Cth) [2021] FCA 161
Ogawa v President of the Australian Human Rights Commission (Leave to Appeal) [2022] FCAFC 161
Sharman Licence Holdings Ltd v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 802
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 120 Date of last submissions: 23 May 2024 Date of hearing: 5 April 2024 Counsel for the First Applicant: The First Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the Second Applicant: The Second Applicant did not appear Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly Solicitor for the First Respondent: MinterEllison Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice ORDERS
NSD 995 of 2023 BETWEEN: FXF18
First Applicant
FXG18
Second Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
HALLEY J
DATE OF ORDER:
24 MAY 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The time by which the applicants have to file an application for leave to appeal the interlocutory orders made by Judge Given of the Federal Circuit and Family Court (Division 2) of Australia on 18 August 2023, be extended to 12 September 2023.
2.The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.
3.The first applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs, as taxed or agreed.
4.These orders be entered forthwith.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
HALLEY J:
A. INTRODUCTION
The applicants seek leave to appeal and an associated extension…
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- Case
- [2024] FCA 549
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the primary judge's reasons for making the interlocutory orders were attended with sufficient doubt to justify a grant of leave to appeal, whether there was a potential for substantial prejudice if leave was not granted, whether the primary judge should have recused herself due to a reasonable apprehension of bias, and whether the primary judge was correct to dismiss the application to reopen the case. The applicants argued that the primary judge should have recused herself due to her conversion to Judaism and that she should have allowed them to make further submissions at the delivery of judgment. The Minister argued that there was no basis for a grant of leave to appeal and that the application should be dismissed.
The court found that the applicants had not demonstrated any basis for concluding that the primary judge's reasoning in declining to recuse herself was attended with sufficient doubt to justify a grant of leave to appeal. The court found that the primary judge's religious faith and gender could not rationally or plausibly be said to give rise to any reasonable apprehension of bias, and that the applicants were not denied any opportunity to make further submissions at the delivery of judgment. The court also found that there was no potential for substantial prejudice if leave was not granted, and that the primary judge was correct to dismiss the application to reopen the case. The court therefore granted an extension of time for the applicants to file an application for leave to appeal, but dismissed the application for leave to appeal itself. The first applicant was also ordered to pay the first respondent's costs, as taxed or agreed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The time by which the applicants have to file an application for leave to appeal the interlocutory orders made by Judge Given of the Federal Circuit and Family Court (Division 2) of Australia on 18 August 2023, be extended to 12 September 2023.
2. The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.
3. The first applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs, as taxed or agreed.
4. These orders be entered forthwith.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister further submits that the first applicant’s subjective perceptions and opinions, detailed in her affidavits and submissions, are not relevant as the test of reasonable apprehension of bias is an objective test.E.4 Consideration I am not satisfied that the applicants have demonstrated any basis on which it could be concluded that the reasoning of the primary judge in declining to recuse herself was attended with sufficient doubt to justify a grant of leave to appeal. The first applicant has not demonstrated any conduct of the primary judge that could logically form any basis to conclude that a fair-minded observer might apprehend that the primary judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the applicants’ judicial review application. First, the religious faith of a judge and gender cannot rationally or plausibly be said to give rise to any reasonable apprehension of bias. It is an objective, not subjective, test. It does not fall to be determined by any idiosyncratic notions of religion or the status of women entertained or held by the first applicant. Second, the applicants were not denied any opportunity to make further submissions at the delivery of judgment on 18 August 2023. A party does not have any right to make further submissions at the time that judgment is delivered, except to the extent that the Court might invite submissions on consequential orders, such as with respect to costs. Further, the applicants were represented by counsel at the judicial review hearing and were provided with a copy of the reasons for judgment on 18 August 2023. Third, the length of time that might have been given to respond to submissions that were ultimately not advanced cannot logically give rise to any prejudice. Further, the length of time that might have been necessary to enable unrepresented litigants to respond to a submission is inherently a discretionary issue that the primary judge was best placed to address and the applicants point to no reason other than that they were self-represented litigants that the time permitted by the primary judge was insufficient and could therefore give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. Fourth, assuming for present purposes that there were some difficulties with the interpretation provided by the interpreter during the judicial review hearing, in the absence of any substantive complaint by the applicants during the hearing, that could not logically give rise to any apprehension of bias. As the primary judge stated at [32] of her Honour’s reasons, which was not challenged, at no point were any concerns raised during the hearing about the quality of interpretation provided, other than a comment following the mid-morning adjournment that the interpreter “cannot hear very well”. I note the critical issue is the absence of any substantive complaint being made to the primary judge in the course of the hearing. Even if a party is represented by counsel, the value of such representation may be substantially diminished if the party cannot follow what is being said in Court and therefore not be in a position to provide any necessary instructions.