SZUYH v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

[2025] FedCFamC2G 948

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

SZUYH v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 948

File number(s):

SYG 498 of 2018

Judgment of:

JUDGE GIVEN

Date of judgment:

19 June 2025

Catchwords:

MIGRATION – Whether Immigration Assessment Authority decision is attended by reasonable apprehension of bias – whether Authority failed to consider claims – whether error in relation to treatment of data breach – whether IMMI17/015 is invalid insofar as it purports to apply to the applicant

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 36(2), 48, 473CB, 476

Cases cited:

ALA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 30

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ (2016) 259 CLR 180

SZTVU v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 268 FCR 497

SZTVU v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCCA 1962

SZUYG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 1224

SZUYG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 2040

Division:

General Federal Law

Number of paragraphs:

54

Date of hearing:

19 February 2025

Place: 

Sydney

The Applicant:

In person

Solicitor for the Respondents:

Mr J Fyfe, MinterEllison

ORDERS

SYG 498 of 2018

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

SZUYH

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:	JUDGE GIVEN
DATE OF ORDER:	19 JUNE 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the first respondent is amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.

2.The application filed on 26 February 2018, as amended, is dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE GIVEN:

1. Before the Court is an application made under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act), by which the applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) dated 15 February 2018.  By that decision, the Authority affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

   BACKGROUND

2. The following background is primarily derived from the written submissions of the first respondent, and (unless otherwise indicated) does not appear to be in dispute.

3. The applicant is a citizen of China, who arrived in Australia in 2008.

4. On 8 July 2013, the applicant lodged an application for a protection visa with his son listed as a secondary applicant (first protection visa application) (Court Book (CB) 19).  On 27 August 2013, a delegate of the Minister refused the first protection visa application (CB 218 to 232).  The applicant sought review of that decision before the (then) Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT).  On 22 October 2013, the RRT affirmed the decision to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa (CB 237 to 249).

5. On 24 October 2013, the applicant's partner (SZUYG), applied for a protection visa with the applicant listed as a secondary applicant (second protection visa application) (CB 257).  On 19 March 2014, a delegate of the Minister refused the second protection visa application (CB 333 to 348) and SZUYG sought review of that decision by the RRT.  On 5 August 2014, the RRT affirmed the decision to refuse to grant protection visas to the applicant and SZUYG (CB 390 to 406), following which they sought review of that decision before the (then) Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA).  On 13 May 2015, the FCCA dismissed that application: SZUYG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 1224, following which, the Federal Court of Australia dismissed an appeal therefrom on 5 December 2019: SZUYG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 2040.

6. On 12 March 2014, the applicant was notified by the first respondent’s Department that on 31 January 2014, personal information had been made public on its website as part of a data breach affecting certain applicants in immigration detention, of which the applicant was one such person (data breach) (CB 370). As a result of the data breach, the applicant was permitted, pursuant to s 48B(1) of the Act, to make a further protection visa application (CB 414 to 415).

7. On 19 September 2017, the applicant lodged a protection visa application (third protection visa application) (CB 422).  While SZUYG was included in the third protection visa application, insofar as it related to her, it was found to be invalid (CB 557). The third protection visa application included a written statement of the applicant dated 15 September 2017 (CB 454 to 455) including information regarding a friend of the applicant (F) who was said to have been granted protection in Canada (CB 474 to 485).

8. On 26 October 2017, the applicant attended an interview with the delegate (CB 562 to 564).

9. On 2 November 2017, the applicant’s migration agent made a written submission to the Department (Department submission) (CB 577 to 580).  The Department submission annexed an abridged copy of a report by KPMG about the data breach (CB 581 to 592), as well as a number of media articles (CB 593 to 652).

10. On 20 November 2017, the delegate refused to grant the applicant a protection visa (CB 658 to 673).

11. On 23 November 2017, the delegate's decision was referred to the Authority (CB 674 to 675).

12. On 28 November 2017, the applicant’s migration agent provided a written submission to the Authority (Authority submission) (CB 687 to 688). The Authority submission requested that the applicant be invited to an interview, pursuant to s 473DC(3) of the Act, and otherwise provided comments on the delegate's decision.

13. On 15 February 2017, the Authority affirmed the decision of the delegate (CB 692 to 711).

    AUTHORITY DECISION

14. The applicant's claims are summarised at [10] of the Authority’s decision (CB 694) as follows: 

    (a)the applicant fears harm from the Chinese authorities because his wife challenged the relatives of a city official in 1993 after they came to her shop and “caused trouble”.  The applicant was hit on the head by a Public Security Bureau (PSB) officer and was left with a scar as a result;

    (b)the applicant’s property was compulsorily acquired in 2008, and he was offered inadequate compensation;

    (c)by his statement dated 15 September 2017, the applicant claimed to be aware of “military secrets” which involved the Chinese government’s plans to demolish F’s house and build a military base.  F hid at the applicant’s home, and the applicant said he borrowed USD $13,000 to help F pay for a people smuggler to get him to Canada.  The agent who assisted F was arrested in 2005 (in relation to a different matter) but the Chinese government discovered that the agent had assisted F, and subsequently that the applicant hid F, put him in touch with the agent and provided him with the relevant funds.  F was granted protection by the Canadian government;

    (d)the applicant’s son (S) returned to China where he now lives, and was questioned about the applicant on his return;

    (e)the Chinese government would be interested in detaining the applicant to obtain information about F, and about what the applicant has said about the demolishing of houses and military bases;

    (f)the Chinese government is active in carrying out surveillance on Chinese nationals overseas and is sensitive about military and intelligence leaks.  The applicant fears he will be arbitrarily detained, subjected to cruel and inhuman treatment, tortured and/or killed by the Chinese authorities as he has “betrayed China” by revealing military information to the Australian government whilst in Australia;

    (g)the applicant would be unable to safely relocate in China as security forces will seek to interrogate and harm him; and

    (h)in relation to the second protection visa application, the applicant claimed that he and SZUYG would be severely persecuted politically and economically if they return to China.  At the hearing, the applicant produced a letter from the Department in relation to the data breach, and said the Chinese government might persecute them because of this.

15. The Authority had regard to the material referred under s 473CB of the Act, and to the Authority submission, which it found did not contain new information (CB 693 at [3] to [4]). The Authority considered the request made by the applicant for an interview, but decided not to request new information or interview the applicant (CB 693 at [5] to [6]).

16. The Authority set out the applicant's claim history (including each of his three protection visa applications), and summarised his claims (CB 693 to 694 at [7] to [10]).

17. The Authority accepted the applicant's identity and that he was a Chinese national (CB 695 at [13]).

18. The Authority then made findings in respect of each of the applicant's claims:

    (a)in respect of the claim to fear harm because he assisted F to leave China, the Authority had regard to the documents submitted by the applicant, but noted that none of them demonstrated that F had been granted protection in Canada as the applicant has claimed.  The information in F's three statements was found to be inconsistent with the applicant's claims.  The applicant's claims were also inconsistent.  The Authority was not satisfied that the applicant assisted F to leave China, or that he was of interest to the Chinese authorities as a result (CB 696 to 697 at [15] to [24]);

    (b)in respect of the applicant's claim that there was an arrest warrant and a 'wanted' circular issued in his name, the Authority had regard to the documents provided but noted that the applicant had a history of obtaining fraudulent documents for immigration purposes, and also noted that the applicant claimed to have been aware of the documents since 2008 but had only told immigration compliance officers in 2013 that there was no reason why he could not return to China.  The Authority also had regard to country information which related to the prevalence of document fraud in China.  The Authority did not accept that the documents were genuine, and did not accept that the applicant was wanted by Chinese authorities (CB 697 to 698 at [25] to [27]);

    (c)in respect of the applicant's claim to have been attacked by the PSB in 1993, the Authority noted that this was 25 years ago, and the applicant did not attempt to leave China at the time.  Indeed, the applicant did not leave until 2008, despite having a valid passport since 2001.  The Authority also noted that there was no corroborative evidence of the assault, and therefore did not accept that the assault occurred (CB 698 at [28] to [30]);

    (d)in respect of the applicant's claim that his house was acquired compulsorily and demolished, the Authority accepted that this occurred but did not accept that it was persecutory or for a Convention reason.  The Authority noted that the applicant had been provided with compensation more than three times the statutory rate in China.  The Authority was not satisfied that the applicant was subject to serious or significant harm, nor did it accept that the amount of compensation given was so small that the applicant's capacity to subsist was threatened (CB 698 to 699 at [31] to [33]); and

    (e)the Authority accepted that the applicant was affected by the data breach, but was not satisfied that the applicant's personal details were accessed.  However, in any event, the Authority was not satisfied that the applicant would be adversely affected by any access.  The Authority had regard to DFAT information to suggest that any risk in China from claiming asylum was dependent on a number of factors including the profile of the applicant.  The Authority noted that there was no evidence that the applicant was of interest to Chinese authorities in 2008 when he left China, or would be on return.  The Authority did not accept that the data breach would give rise to such an adverse profile itself.  As to the claim that the two decisions of the RRT (relating to the first visa application and the second protection visa application) were available on the Authority noted that these published decisions were redacted to remove personal identifiers, and it was not satisfied that the Chinese authorities would be aware that the applicant had lodged two unsuccessful protection visa applications.

19. The Authority also considered at length the applicant's delay in claiming protection (CB 699 to 702 at [34] to [52]), and the applicant's claim to have a poor memory (CB 704 at [65]).

20. Having rejected the applicant's claims at a factual level, the Authority was not satisfied that the applicant met either the refugee criterion (in s 36(2)(a) of the Act) or the complementary protection criterion (in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act) (CB 705 at [71]).

    APPLICATION TO THIS COURT

21. These proceedings were initially commenced by an application to show cause filed on 26 February 2018.  The applicant has been unrepresented since the inception of these proceedings.  The proceedings were initially docketed to another Judge of the Court (first primary Judge).  On 19 March 2018, a Registrar of the Court made procedural orders including that the matter was next to be listed for callover on 6 December 2018 before a Registrar. 

22. On 21 September 2018, the applicant filed an Amended Application.  

23. At the callover on 6 December 2018, the proceedings adjourned for further mention at a time to be administratively advised to the parties.  The proceedings were later placed in the central migration docket.  On 24 October 2024, the parties appeared before a different Registrar (by telephone) for callover, during which the applicant was assisted by an interpreter in the Mandarin language. 

24. On 14 January 2025, the proceedings were docketed to me and I made further orders listing the matter for final hearing before me on 19 February 2025 with a timetable for the preparation of the matter in advance (January Orders).  The January Orders also provided a further opportunity to the applicant to amend and required that each of the applicant and the first respondent file written outlines of submission 14 and 7 days before the hearing, respectively.  Written submissions were filed for the first respondent on 12 February 2025.  The applicant did not file written submissions in time, or at all, and did not avail himself of the opportunity to further amend.

25. On 19 February 2025, the applicant appeared in person before me for hearing, with the assistance of an interpreter in the Mandarin language.  The first respondent was represented by a solicitor.  At the commencement of the hearing, I explained to the applicant the limitations on the role of the Court in determining his application for judicial review of the Authority’s decision.  The applicant indicated that he understood. The Court Book was tendered by the first respondent and marked Exhibit “1R”. 

    Grounds of review

26. Having amended his application in 2018, the grounds of review which the applicant advances are those contained in the Amended Application, as follows (particulars omitted):

    1.The IAA fell into jurisdictional error in denying me a fair process by reason of their being reasonable apprehension of bias.

    2.The IAA fell into jurisdictional error in considering the wrong issue that the purpose for redevelopment was not discriminatory against the applicant when it was the manner of his forcible disposition and demolition that was persecutory.

    3.At paragraphs 59 and 63 the IAA fell into jurisdictional error in failing to apply the SZSSJ assumption while considering the data breach (Minister for Immigration v SZSSJ (2016) HCA at paragraph 91.

    4.IMMI17/015 is invalid in so far as it purports to apply to the applicant.

    5.The IAA failed to consider whether the delegate’s decision is a valid decision.

    6.The IAA failed to consider whether it had jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision.

    Ground 1

27. The first ground alleges that the Authority’s reasons are affected by apprehended bias.  The particulars to the ground essentially contend that the manner in which the Authority considered country information about document fraud caused it to treat the applicant less favourably than other persons because of his race, colour, descent, and national ethnic origin or his immigration status.

28. At hearing, when asked about ground one, the applicant said that his application would be “followed up without doubt”[1] by the Chinese government because of the data breach.  I explained to the applicant that the data breach was not a matter raised by ground 1 (but would be discussed later in the context in which he did raise it) and attempted to redirect his focus to the question of whether a reasonable layperson would think that the Authority did not bring an open mind to his case.  In response, the applicant said that “all of the information that I provided in my application is the truth but the Immigration Department did not even investigate it”.[2]  I reminded the applicant that the Court has jurisdiction only in relation to the decision of the Authority and not of the delegate, and again attempted to refocus him on the relevant test for apprehended bias. 

    [1] Transcript dated 19 February 2025 (Transcript) at T5.31

    [2] Transcript at T6.4 to 5

29. The applicant appeared to take issue with the fact the Authority decided not to obtain any new information from him, in response to his request that he be given an interview.  I asked the applicant specifically what about the Authority’s refusal to give him an interview would give rise to an apprehension of bias and the applicant simply responded that “that in itself was an unjust act toward me”,[3] and reiterated the data breach was unfavourable to him. The applicant then said he hoped, given the prejudice he felt he had experienced before the Authority, that this Court would be able to give him a fair hearing.

    [3] Transcript at T6.31

30. The first respondent submitted that the mere fact of the Authority's reliance on country information as to the prevalence of document fraud would not ordinarily give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.  The Authority's reference to that material is not indicative of a mind not otherwise open to persuasion.  Moreover, there is nothing in the Authority's reasons to suggest that it prejudged the applicant's claims because the applicant is Chinese or comes from China.

31. The first respondent says that the Authority gave a number of cogent reasons for finding that the applicant's documents were fraudulent, and those reasons were grounded in the applicant's own evidence, including the applicant's concession that he had supplied fraudulent documents in the past for immigration purposes, and the inconsistency between the applicant's claim to have known about the documents in 2008 and his claim in 2013 that there was no reason that he could not return to China (CB 697 at [25] to [26]).  In that respect, the country information merely bolstered the Authority's concerns arising from the applicant's evidence.

    Consideration

32. The principles relevant to apprehended bias in the migration context (albeit referring to a Court proceeding not to the Authority) were distilled by the Full Federal Court in ALA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 30 at [35] to [36]:

    35.  Although the application of the apprehended bias test can give rise to difficulties, the parties were in substantial agreement as to the primary elements of the test. That is hardly surprising because the test is relatively well settled. It is whether a fair‐minded and appropriately informed lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the Court might not bring a fair, impartial and independent mind to the determination of the matter on its merits (see, for example, R v Watson; Ex parte Armstrong [1976] HCA 39 ; (1976) 136 CLR 248 ; Livesey v New South Wales Bar Assn [1983] HCA 17 ; (1983) 151 CLR 288 ; Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63 ; (2000) 205 CLR 337 (Ebner); Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design and Developments Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 55 ; (2006) 229 CLR 577 and British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Laurie [2011] HCA 2 ; (2011) 242 CLR 283 (British American Tobacco)).

    36. Other relevant principles are:

    (a)  at least the following two steps are involved in a case involving an allegation of apprehended bias:

    (i)  there must be an identification of what it has said might lead a judge to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits; and

    (ii)  there must be an articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from a course of deciding a case on its merits (Ebner at [8] per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ);

1. In the instant case the applicant has neither distinctly made, nor clearly proved, a claim of apprehended bias.

2. In the context of a decision by the Authority, an appropriately informed lay observer would be informed as to the nature of the Authority’s review powers and that the review is ordinarily conducted without interview.  They would also be informed that there is no general duty on the part of the Authority to investigate.

3. I am satisfied that there is nothing on the face of the Authority’s decision, nor the manner in which it undertook its review which would cause a hypothetical fair‐minded lay observer attributed with appropriate knowledge of relevant matters to apprehend that the Authority brought anything other than an open mind to its task.  Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the error in ground one is established as alleged, as understood by reference to the applicant’s oral submissions to me at hearing, or at all.

   Ground 2

4. By ground 2, the applicant alleges the Authority erred by failing to consider that the acquisition and demolition of his property had occurred in a discriminatory or persecutory way. 

5. The Court explained to the applicant that there was a difference between the Authority failing to consider a claim, and considering but not accepting it.  The Court also explained, by reference to the Authority’s reasons, that it appeared to be the latter which had occurred here.  While it is understandable that the applicant might be unhappy with the conclusion reached in that respect, the Court asked the applicant to explain how it is that he alleges the claim was not considered.  The applicant said “they” (presumably a reference to the Chinese authorities) were not thinking about peoples’ needs or feelings, and undertook the acquisition “for their own benefit”.[4] 

   [4] Transcript at T7.10

6. The first respondent submitted that ground 2 reveals a misunderstanding of the Authority's reasons, and that no such error is demonstrated.  The first respondent says that, properly understood, the Authority's analysis dealt both with the manner or the process by which the applicant's land was compulsorily acquired, which included the payment of compensation, and the ability to appeal regarding the amount of compensation (CB 698 to 699 at [31] and [33]).  

   Consideration

7. I accept the first respondent’s submissions.  The Authority’s finding formed part of the reasons for which it was not satisfied that the applicant was the subject of discrimination or persecution, or that he would be unable to subsist on the basis of the compensation that was given to him.  There was no failure on the part of the Authority to consider the claim in question and I am satisfied that the manner in which the claim was considered, and the Authority's conclusions in that regard, were logical and reasonably open to it on the evidence. 

   Ground 3

8. By ground 3, the applicant contends that the Authority failed to apply the assumption in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ (2016) 259 CLR 180 (SZSSJ) when assessing his claim about the data breach. 

9. When asked at hearing to address ground 3, the applicant said that the data breach “led to great harm to myself in China” and that if he were to return to China, the authorities would use the information released in the data breach to force him, by physical means, “to give a confession”.[5] 

   [5] Transcript at T8.7 to 9 

10. The Court reiterated to the applicant (see [25] above) that it was no part if its jurisdiction to determine the truth of the applicant’s claims.  Rather, the task of the Court was to examine how his claims were dealt with by the Authority.  In respect of the data breach, the Authority was not satisfied that the Chinese authorities had accessed information about the applicant.  However, it went on to consider an alternate reasoning process, namely, in what the position for the applicant might be if the Authority was wrong in that regard.   I reiterated to the applicant that even if it disagreed with the Authority’s conclusion in respect of the data breach, that is not a serious legal error by itself. 

11. The first respondent says that while the Authority was not satisfied that the applicant's personal information had been accessed by the Chinese authorities, it nonetheless considered the situation if this conclusion was incorrect.  In considering the situation if the applicant’s information had been accessed, the Authority concluded that the applicant would not be adversely affected by that access because he was not otherwise a person of interest to the Chinese authorities (and the country information did not suggest that persons would be harmed in China merely for seeking protection in Australia, absent a pre-existing 'flag' against their name) (CB 703 at [59] to [64]).

    Consideration

12. In SZSSJ (supra) at [91], the Court found as follows:

    Sensibly interpreted and applied in the context of making an assessment of whether the Data Breach engaged Australia's non-refoulement obligations with respect to them, the assumption was not simply that some of their personal information might have been accessed by some authorities. The assumption was rather that all of their personal information had been accessed by all of the persons or entities from whom they feared persecution or other relevant harm. That is how the assumption was in fact interpreted and applied by the officer who conducted SZTZI's ITOA and how it could reasonably be expected to be interpreted and applied in the conduct of SZSSJ's ITOA.

13. I accept the submissions of the first respondent and am satisfied that the Authority thoroughly dealt with the data breach question, including by considering the alternate possibility that the applicant’s information had been accessed.  I am satisfied that its conclusions reached on the issue were reasonably and logically open to it and, therefore, that the Authority did apply the presumption in SZSSJ.  Accordingly, the error alleged by ground 3 is not established.   

    Grounds 4, 5 and 6

14. The final three grounds each seem to turn upon the proposition that IMMI17/015 is invalid insofar as it purports to apply to the applicant and, consequentially, that the applicant was not a 'Fast Track Applicant'.  Noting that this proposition is to be a relatively technical legal argument the Court sought to clarify with the applicant whether he drafted these grounds himself, to which question the applicant replied “yes”.[6]  When the Court sought to ask the applicant about the ground, he eventually stated that “the immigration representative…did this for me”.[7]  Thereafter followed a brief exchange between the Court and the applicant in order to try and ascertain what the applicant meant by the ground which he again later claimed to have drafted himself, but later submitted:[8]

    so when I was in the detention centre there, there was a person that understood legal matters and then drafted this for me. About this immigration law, of course, I don’t understand.

    [6] Transcript at T8.31

    [7] Transcript at T8.46

    [8] Transcript at T9.40 to 43

15. The applicant could not otherwise speak to the grounds or the errors they allege.

16. In relation to the final three grounds, the first respondent says that IMMI17/015 does apply to the applicant, and that the applicant’s position that it does not, is inconsistent with authority interpreting s 5(1)(b) of the Act, citing SZTVU v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCCA 1962, in which case the same argument as advanced by the applicant in the instant proceedings was also raised and rejected by Judge Street. The Full Court of the Federal Court dismissed an appeal from that decision in SZTVU v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 268 FCR 497 (SZTVU).

    Consideration

17. Clause 6 of IMMI 17/015 provides that a person specified by their Personal Identification Digit (PID) in Schedule 1 of IMMI 17/015 is a fast-track applicant.  The applicant's PID as contained in the Court Book (CB at 411) is recorded in Schedule 1 of IMMI 17/015.  The first respondent submits that the instrument therefore applies to the applicant.  I agree.

18. In the SZTVU, the Full Court found that the definition of a ‘fast track applicant’ in ss 5(1) and 5(1AA)(b) of the Act was not limited to persons, or classes of persons, who had already made a valid application for a protection visa, and, as such, that the Minister’s power under sub-s 5(1AA) of the Act to make a legislative instrument for the purposes of specifying persons or classes of persons who are fast track applicants for the purpose of paragraph (b) of the definition of ‘fast track applicant’ was not limited to persons, or classes of persons, who had already made a valid application for a protection visa, and, as such, that IMMI17/015 was valid: see SZTVU at [63] to [65] per Derrington and Wheelahan JJ.

19. I accept the submissions of the first respondent that, in the absence of any relevant difference between the instant proceedings and SZTVU, the Court is bound by the Full Court’s decision and that ground 4 must fail.

20. In circumstances where grounds 5 and 6 rely on the proposition that IMMI17/015 is invalid, it follows that those grounds must also fail.

    CONCLUSION

21. The decision of the Authority is not affected from jurisdictional error as alleged by the applicant, or at all.  Absent jurisdictional error, it is a privative clause decision and the application for review, as amended, must be dismissed.  I will so order.

22. I will hear the parties as to costs.

I certify that the preceding fifty-four (54) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Given.

Associate:

Dated:       19 June 2025