Belmont and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (Migration)

[2024] AATA 3512

Belmont and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2024] AATA 3512 (6 September 2024)

ReviewNumber:      2023/1242

Division	General Division
File Number	2023/1242
Re	John Rudolph Dansel Belmont
APPLICANT
And	Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal	Senior Member R. Bellamy
Date of Decision	26 September 2024
Date of written reasons	2 October 2024
Place	Brisbane

The disqualification application is refused.

................[SGD]...................

Senior Member R. Bellamy

Catchwords

DISQUALIFICATION/RECUSAL APPLICATION – Application for member constituted to decide substantive matter to disqualify herself – Actual bias – Apprehended bias – application refused

Legislation

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Cases

ALA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 30
Buntin and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2024] AATA 1534
Charisteas v Charisteas (2021) 393 ALR 389
CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 50
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337
Isbester v Knox City Council [2015] HCA 20
Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48
QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 15
Re JRL, Ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342, at 352
Sun v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 81 FCR 71

The Queen v Hillen [2019] NTSC 27

Secondary Materials

Direction No 110 – Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA.

REASONS FOR DECISION

Senior Member R Bellamy

2 October 2024

INTRODUCTION

1. This concerns a disqualification application on the grounds of bias. On 26 September 2024, I refused the application. Here are my reasons.

2. Mr Belmont is a citizen of New Zealand. In November 2021, his visa was mandatorily cancelled on character grounds, under s 501 of the Migration Act 1958, because (1) he had been sentenced to a period of at least 12 months imprisonment and (2) he was serving a full-time custodial sentence.[1] He asked the Minister to revoke that cancellation. A delegate of the Minister declined to do that. He then asked the Tribunal to set-aside that decision and, instead, revoke the cancellation. The Tribunal (differently constituted) affirmed the decision. Mr Belmont sought judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision to the Federal Court. The Federal Court found jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision and remitted it. The remitted matter was constituted to me and listed for hearing on 8 and 9 October 2024.  

   [1] Sections 501(3A), (6)(a) and (7)(c) of the Migration Act 1958.

3. On 3 September 2024, Mr Belmont sent an email to the Tribunal in which he suggested that I had a conflict of interest connected to the lawyers who had previously represented him in his Federal Court proceedings. He was concerned that I would be biased against him in the remitted matter. Although he did not make a formal application, I treated his correspondence as an application for me to disqualify myself, and I held an interlocutory hearing. In the hearing, Mr Belmont added that he was worried that other Brisbane based members could be biased against him because he received an unfavourable outcome in his previous Tribunal proceedings in the Brisbane Registry.[2]

   [2] Transcript, page 14, lines 6 to 35.

   BACKGROUND

4. Mr Belmont’s application that I disqualify myself arises primarily from reports in the media about an unrelated case. That case concerned a Mr Leo’o Olo’s application to have his visa cancellation revoked.   

5. On 8 August 2024, I made a decision in Mr Leo’o Olo’s case, which was accompanied by lengthy reasons (“the Leo’o Olo decision”). In the decision, I was critical of Mr Leo’o Olo’s lawyers for presenting a case that was substantially founded on what I considered to be unreliable evidence and unsustainable submissions. The decision was issued to the parties and later published on in accordance with the Tribunal’s normal practice. Mr

   
   

   Leo’o Olo has since sought judicial review of the decision in the Federal Court. That application is currently under the Court’s consideration.

6. On 13 August 2024, a media publication published an article (“Article 1”) about Mr

   
   

   Leo’o Olo’s solicitors that focussed on the Leo’o Olo decision and mentioned some other cases they had been involved in. Some passages in the decision were reported and others were not. The article contained some commentary and interpretation and was, overall, critical of the solicitors. A weekly legal publication later reported on my decision in a similar vein (“Article 2”).  

7. The legal team that represented Mr Leo’o Olo in his Tribunal proceedings represented Mr Belmont in his Federal Court proceedings, however they are not representing him in his remitted Tribunal matter. 

8. The email that Mr Belmont sent the Tribunal said:      

   “I would like to express concerns about my up and coming AAT trial tribunal as i have been told of a possible conflict of interest between member Rebecca Bellamy, Zarifi law firm and Jason Donnelly, who represented me at federal, i have currently won my federal and [am due] to appear on 8th and 9th of October, i do believe this could sway bias favour, for Senior Member Rebecca Bellamy to be against my case [due] to article that was written.” (sic)

9. In that email, Mr Belmont attached a link to Article 2. Later he sent some other documentation.

10. On 12 September 2024, Mr Belmont emailed a PDF of an internet article (“Article 3”), date stamped 8 September 2024. According to the Minister, the publication describes itself as:

    “Australia's most revered and disturbing law journal. For nearly 40 years, with loving attention to detail, it has chronicled the exquisite finery and the dirty linen of the legal profession”.

11. The article was about an application to the Federal Court for judicial review of the Leo’o Olo decision, and an application for judicial review of a decision I made in the case of another non-citizen, “LLQQ”, who was represented in that application by Mr Belmont’s former lawyers. The article referred to aspects of each application. There were some unusual claims about my conduct iand complaints about my reasoning. The article included interpretation and commentary about the Leo’o Olo decision.

12. On 17 September 2024, Mr Belmont sent the Tribunal a copy of a clinical note relating to him, dated 10 September 2024, that relevantly said:

    “Reported, he was showing a media article to this counsellor ‘article that written about the AAT’s Senior and he described this media article ‘caused me highly emotional stressors and traumatized about my case, because the description of the media article associated with my case at AAT upcoming hearing…I don't trust that senior member of AAT who's in charge of my case due to the media article against her.’” (sic)

13. In the hearing, he said “I have not slept for about two weeks. I’m actually quite depressed over this – you know, over this matter”.[3] Mr Belmont did not have a lawyer assisting him in this application. Nor has he engaged a lawyer for his substantive case. He indicated that his previous lawyers would not represent him. As I understood it, other lawyers he had approached had told him there was not enough time to take his case before the hearing.[4] After the interlocutory hearing, I postponed his substantive hearing to give him time to secure legal representation.[5]

    [3] Transcript, page 15, lines 27 to 38.

    [4] Transcript, page 9, lines 24 to 28.

    [5] The Minister consented to this. 

    PRELIMINARY MATTERS

14. A party asserting actual bias carries a heavy onus and the allegation must be distinctly made and clearly proven. A finding of actual bias should not be made other than in exceptional circumstances and is a grave matter.[6] Objections on the ground of actual bias have been described by the High Court as unusual, and normally unnecessary and inappropriate.[7]

    [6] Sun v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 81 FCR 71 at 123 and 127.

    [7] QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 15, per Kiefel CJ and Gageler J at [32].

15. Mr Belmont did not have the benefit of legal advice. I am satisfied that his views were genuinely held and that it was not inappropriate that he raised his concerns. Section 33(1AB) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act1975 (“AAT Act”) provides that:

    “A party to a proceeding before the Tribunal, and any person representing such a party, must use his or her best endeavours to assist the Tribunal to fulfil the objective in section 2A”.

16. The objectives in section 2A of the AAT Act include providing a mechanism of review that, among other things, is fair, just, and promotes public trust and confidence in the decision-making of the Tribunal. Proceedings that are affected by bias are neither fair nor just. Decisions that are later discovered to be nullities because of bias do not promote public trust and confidence in the decision-making of the Tribunal.

    THE LAW

17. The law regarding bias in Australia is well established. The leading case is Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy[8] (“Ebner”). A more recent case, QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs[9] (“QYFM”) contains lengthy analysis of Ebner and other authorities. While these cases concerned judges, it was observed in Ebner that the governing principle has been applied not only to the judicial system but also, by extension, to many other kinds of decision-making and decision-makers.[10]

    [8] (2000) 205 CLR 337.

    [9] [2023] HCA 15.

    [10] Isbester v Knox City Council [2015] HCA 20 at [22]; Ebner at [4].

18. Fairness, and the appearance of fairness, is so fundamental to our justice system that the presence of bias negates the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal.[11] It is settled law that questions of bias should be determined by the judge or decision-maker who is the subject of the objection. The first duty of any court or tribunal is to be satisfied of its own jurisdiction.[12] Accordingly, it falls to me to deal with Mr Belmont’s application.

    [11] QYFM at [26].

    [12] Ibid at [27].

19. The starting point is that I should remain constituted to Mr Belmont’s case unless there are substantial grounds for concluding that bias is established. As the High Court observed in Ebner:

    “Judges have a duty to exercise their judicial functions when their jurisdiction is regularly invoked and they are assigned to cases in accordance with the practice which prevails in the court to which they belong. They do not select the cases they will hear, and they are not at liberty to decline to hear cases without good cause. Judges do not choose their cases; and litigants do not choose their judges. If one party to a case objects to a particular judge sitting, or continuing to sit, then that objection should not prevail unless it is based upon a substantial ground for contending that the judge is disqualified from hearing and deciding the case.

    This is not to say that it is improper for a judge to decline to sit unless the judge has affirmatively concluded that he or she is disqualified. In a case of real doubt, it will often be prudent for a judge to decide not to sit in order to avoid the inconvenience that could result if an appellate court were to take a different view on the matter of disqualification. However, if the mere making of an insubstantial objection were sufficient to lead a judge to decline to hear or decide a case, the system would soon reach a stage where, for practical purposes, individual parties could influence the composition of the bench. That would be intolerable.”[13]

    [13] At [19] – [20].

20. A decision maker is biased if they do not bring an impartial mind to a question they are charged with deciding. In QYFM, Edelman J, in the majority, framed the issue as whether a decision-maker is “sufficiently impartial to permit justice to be done”.[14] His Honour pointed out that the only person truly capable of knowing whether actual bias is present in a person’s mind is that person.[15]

    [14] At [120].

    [15] At [115].

21. I will also consider the potential for apprehended bias. The law recognises that a person may not be conscious of their bias. In that case, a decision-maker cannot be relied on to identify their own bias. The bias is identified by inference.

22. The law also recognises that it is not only crucial that justice is done, but it must also be manifestly and undoubtedly seen to be done. The appearance of bias, even if there is no substance to it, is unacceptable.

23. Unconscious bias, and the appearance of bias where there is none, are both conventionally captured by the test for apprehended bias. That test is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that a judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide.[16] The double use of “might" emphasises that the criterion is concerned with possibility not probability, but the possibility must be real and not remote.[17] It is convenient to deal with apprehended bias before actual bias.

    [16] Ebner at [6]; Charisteas v Charisteas (2021) 393 ALR 389 at [11].

    [17] QYFM at [37].

24. The identification of apprehended bias is a three-step process. First, it is necessary to identify the factor that it is said might lead a decision-maker to resolve the question other than on its legal and factual merits. Second, there must be a logical connection between that factor and the feared departure from the decision maker deciding that question on its merits. Third, the apprehension has to be reasonable from the perspective of a fair-minded lay observer.[18] A lay observer is not a lawyer or a judge.[19]

    [18] Ebner at [8]; QYFM at [38]; Charisteas v Charisteas (2021) 273 CLR 289 at [11].

    [19] QYFM at [113], [172], and [273].

25. In CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 50 at [58], the High Court considered a bias argument in the context of a refusal to grant a protection visa under the Migration Act. Per Nettle and Gordon JJ, the Court described the fair-minded lay observer as someone who, among other things:

    ·knows the nature of the decision, the circumstances which led to the decision and the context in which it was made;

    ·has a broad knowledge of the material objective facts... as distinct from a detailed knowledge of the law or knowledge of the character or ability of the Judge; and

    ·where the statutory scheme is complex, has knowledge of at least the key elements of the scheme.

26. In Johnson v Johnson[20], per Kirby J, the fair-minded lay observer is described as a person who, among other things:

    ·would ordinarily be taken to have sought to be informed on at least the most basic considerations relevant to arriving at a conclusion founded on a fair understanding of all the relevant circumstances;

    ·would be aware of the strong professional pressures on adjudicators (reinforced by the facilities of appeal and review) to uphold traditions of integrity and impartiality;

    ·would not reach a hasty conclusion based on…remarks to the parties or their representatives…taken out of context; and

    ·is neither complacent nor unduly sensitive or suspicious.

    [20] [2000] HCA 48 at [53].

27. I proceed on the basis that the fair-minded lay observer has these attributes.

    CONSIDERATION

28. In the interlocutory hearing, after explaining the law about bias to Mr Belmont, I invited him to tell me the significance of the documents he provided and explain exactly what he was concerned about. The grounds of objection I can distil from his initial email, the other documents he provided, and his oral submissions are:

    (a)  Mr Belmont is worried that I might not be fair to him because of reports that I directed criticism to his previous lawyers in Mr Leo’o Olo’s case;[21]

    (b)  to Mr Belmont’s mind, my comment in the Leo’o Olo decision that “A person who commits serious offences in Australia should expect to be removed” seemed to prejudge the issue;[22]

    (c)   Mr Belmont took exception to my comment in the Leo’o Olo decision that New Zealand is not a country that is poor, unstable, war-torn, barbaric or oppressive. He said “We’ve actually had to do a supervision order there. We only get a minimal amount. We do get WINZ, which is Centrelink here”;[23]

    (d)  things that were said “against” me in Article 3 lead Mr Belmont not to trust me;[24]

    (e)  in the concluding paragraph of a decision I made in relation to another non-citizen, “Mr P”, I said that although I wanted to give his visa back I could not because of the “Direction” (explained below);[25]

    (f)    a search of using the search term “Senior Member Rebecca Bellamy” generated a list of 27 reported decisions. According to Mr Belmont, only 10 of those were decided in favour of the applicant, and five of those “were the refugees, asylums, or the 116s”.[26]

    (g)  the two members constituting the Tribunal in his first hearing, when he was unsuccessful, were from Brisbane. Mr Belmont is worried that they will influence another Brisbane member to decide against him;[27] and

    (h)  Mr Belmont is worried that this bias application might lead me to take a dim view of him which could prejudice his case.[28]

    [21] Transcript, page 8 line 41 to page 9 line 8; page

    [22] Ibid, page 10 lines 3 to 6.

    [23] Ibid, page 9 line 43 to page 10 line 2.

    [24] Clinical records provided by the Applicant on 17 September 2024.

    [25] Transcript, page 15 lines 1 to 23.

    [26] Transcript, page 12 line 44 to page 13 line 5. I note that a “116” is a reference to a type of visa.

    [27] Transcript, page 14, lines 6 to 35.

    [28] Transcript, page 7, lines 1 to 5.

29. Mr Belmont did not take issue with any other parts of the Leo’o Olo decision.

30. The following are matters of public record:

    ·all members of the AAT are required to take an oath or affirmation of office that they will “faithfully and impartially” perform the duties of the office;[29]

    ·one of the statutory objectives of the AAT Act is to provide a mechanism of review that is, among other things, fair and just;[30]

    ·there is a publicly available statutory instrument, commonly referred to as Direction 110,[31] which is a policy document that applies mandatorily to decisions whether to revoke the mandatory cancellation of a visa under s 501CA of the Migration Act. It contains some overarching principles along with eight factors that a decision-maker must take into account, and allocate weight to, where relevant – five Primary Considerations and four Other Considerations. A decision-maker must then conduct a weighing up exercise to reach the decision.   

    [29] Section 10B of the AAT Act.

    [30] Section 2A of the AAT Act.

    [31] Direction No 110 – Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA.

31. I am satisfied that the fair-minded lay observer operating in the context of this matter is aware of the ethical duties of Tribunal members and knows how Direction 110 works. It is reasonable to find that such a person is also aware that the Tribunal is the last stage of merits review. The court will not re-hear a matter but will set-aside a Tribunal decision if there was a material error in the way the decision was reached. Accordingly, applications for judicial review necessarily contain criticisms of the Tribunal, which may or may not be well-founded.

32. Further, such a person knows that courts and tribunals expect a certain standard of professional conduct from all lawyers, and when that standard is not met, it may be the subject of comment in the hearing or the decision, but that is as far as it goes. Relevant to point (a), this is illustrated by the observations of the trial judge in The Queen v Hillen[32]. In that case, an objection was raised on the ground of apprehended bias arising from comments the judge made about the defendant’s counsel in an unrelated matter. The learned Judge said: 

    “I also do not conclude that because I was critical of [the barrister] in one case this would lead to the perception that I would be biased against her in a second case and that such bias would lead to her client not receiving a fair trial. It simply does not follow logically that this would be likely to occur. I would go so far as to say that it is a somewhat novel concept. It is my view that a reasonable observer would conclude that there is no nexus between the events that took place in the previous trial and a forthcoming trial where I do not know the parties or any of the witnesses or know nothing of the facts. I conclude the reasonable observer would expect me to do my job and counsel, whoever they are would act competently.”[33]

    [32] [2019] NTSC 27.

    [33] Ibid, at [40].

1. These observations would be apposite to Mr Belmont’s case if Mr Leo’o Olo’s lawyers were involved in it. They are not. This makes any connection between the future conduct of this case and the identity of his previous legal representative remote. The Minister submitted that, earlier this year, I decided in favour of a non-citizen who was represented by Mr Belmont’s former lawyers,[34] which tends to negate any suggestion of bias in relation to them and underlines the fact that each case is decided on its merits. I accept that submission. I am not satisfied that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that I might not bring an impartial mind to Mr Belmont’s case because of comments I made about the way his previous lawyers conducted an unrelated case.

   [34] Buntin and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2024] AATA 1534.

2. Points (b) and (c) were Mr Belmont’s objections to my observations in the Leo’o Olo decision that:

   “A person who commits serious offences in Australia should expect to be removed”,

   and

   “New Zealand is not a country that is poor, unstable, war-torn, barbaric or oppressive”.

3. In relation to the latter, Mr Belmont did not claim the observation was incorrect, but he seemed to want to convey that things are not great in New Zealand either. 

4. The observations should be viewed in context. They occur in the introductory paragraphs of a 182 paragraph decision. The first paragraph of that decision touches on Primary Considerations 1 (Protection of the Australian community), 2 (Family violence) and 5 (Expectations of the Australian community). It reads:

   “A non-citizen who commits serious offences in Australia should expect to be removed. Mr Leo’o Olo is a non-citizen who inflicted grievous bodily harm on a stranger, hit his young son so hard it caused welts and bruising, and threw his ex-partner down with such force that she bounced into a wall. He should not expect to remain in Australia.”

5. The first sentence paraphrases an overarching principle at paragraph 5.2(3) of Direction 110 which reads:

   “Non-citizens who engage or have engaged in criminal or other serious conduct should expect to be denied the privilege of coming to, or to forfeit the privilege of staying in, Australia.”

6. The fair-minded observer sees the words “expect to” and does not read the sentence as “A person who commits serious offences in Australia should be removed”. They also know that Direction 110 contemplates the possibility that a non-citizen could get their visa back despite serious offending, for example paragraph 5.2(7) provides:

   “Decision-makers must take into account the primary and other considerations relevant to the individual case. In some circumstances, the nature of the non-citizen’s conduct, or the harm that would be caused if the conduct were to be repeated, may be so serious that even strong countervailing considerations may be insufficient to justify not cancelling or refusing the visa, or revoking a mandatory cancellation.” (underlining added for emphasis)

7. The observation that “New Zealand is not a country that is poor, unstable, war-torn, barbaric or oppressive” occurs in paragraph 3. Paragraph 3 relates to Other Consideration (a) (Legal consequences of the decision) and Other Consideration (b) (Impediments to removal), both of which require the decision-maker to consider, and give appropriate weight to, conditions in the receiving country. Generally, under Direction 110, the worse conditions are in the receiving country, the more weight a decision-maker will give in the non-citizen’s favour. Accordingly, relatively good conditions normally make it harder for a non-citizen to get a positive outcome. In that regard, I note that, as Mason J observed in Re JRL, Ex parte CJL:[35]

   “It needs to be said loudly and clearly that the ground of disqualification is a reasonable apprehension that the judicial officer will not decide the case impartially or without prejudice, rather than that he will decide the case adversely to one party.”

   [35] (1986) 161 CLR 342, at 352.

8. If there is information about New Zealand that Mr Belmont wants the Tribunal to consider when determining his substantive application, he can provide it and it will receive appropriate consideration.

9. Mr Belmont has not established a logical connection between the two observations he identified and a reasonable possibility of bias in his case. 

10. With respect to point (d), Mr Belmont was not specific about which aspects of Article 3 caused his feelings of distrust, so I will address the article in general. The article was in a publication that identifies itself as a legal journal. It is accessible only by subscribers. The Minister contended that, given the publication’s description of itself, the article should not be relied upon as necessarily reporting the truth of the matters contained in it. I accept that submission. A fair-minded observer would apply at least a basic level of scrutiny when considering whether to allow themselves to be influenced by any of the claims made.

11. One readily apparent cause for scepticism is the reported claim in Mr Leo’o Olo’s application for judicial review that my observation that New Zealand is not “poor, unstable, war torn, barbaric or oppressive” suggested that I thought that New Zealander’s were less deserving of a positive outcome because New Zealand is such a nice place. As explained above, relatively good conditions in the receiving country tend to make it harder for a non-citizen to get a positive outcome because that is how Direction 110 works. There is no bias, real or perceived, in applying mandatory government policy.  

12. The fair-minded person recognises the use there, and elsewhere in the article, of the unsophisticated rhetorical device whereby a quote is taken out of context and an artificial interpretation is applied. That person does not “reach a hasty conclusion based on…remarks…taken out of context.”[36] The person is also aware that the article is based on claims purportedly made against a decision-maker by people who are dissatisfied with their decisions. Further, Mr Belmont did not establish any logical connection between the

    
    

    Leo’o Olo case and his own.  

    [36] Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48 at [53].

13. I am not satisfied the fair-minded observer might be influenced by Article 3 in their assessment of whether I might bring an impartial mind to the resolution of Mr Belmont’s case.

14. In relation to point (e) a fair-minded lay observer would read the entire decision in Mr P’s case, which is on alongside Direction 110, rather than reaching a “hasty conclusion based on…remarks…taken out of context.” Even reading the paragraph out of context, it is not apparent how it might lead a fair-minded lay observer to think I might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of Mr Belmont’s case.

15. Mr Belmont has not established how the search results, even if they were an accurate list of all the decisions I have made, logically suggest any apprehended deviation from deciding his case on its merits. The Minister submitted, and I accept, that a statistical analysis of a decision-maker’s prior decisions is unhelpful and mostly irrelevant in establishing apprehended bias. As the Full Court of the Federal Court observed in ALA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[37]:

    “…the mere fact that a particular judge has decided a number of cases, the facts and circumstances of which are unknown, one way rather than another, does not go any way to assisting the hypothetical observer making an informed assessment as to whether that judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question in a particular proceeding before that judge.”[38]

    [37] [2016] FCAFC 30.

    [38] At [41].

16. Mr Belmont has not established a realistic possibility that the Tribunal member who previously decided his case would influence other Tribunal members to decide his case other than on its merits. That contention is speculative and ignores the statutory obligations and ethical standards that Tribunal members routinely discharge.

17. The same applies to any suggestion that Mr Belmont’s bringing of the present interlocutory application might create a bias. Mr Belmont did not explicitly raise that as an objection, but he expressed worry about it in the hearing. In any event, Mr Belmont was polite in his correspondence and throughout the hearing. It was apparent that he was reluctant to say anything that he thought might offend me. He had to be encouraged to speak his mind. He created a favourable impression.

18. For the reasons set out above, I am not satisfied that there is a basis to disqualify myself from this case. Nothing in the materials, or that was raised by Mr Belmont in the hearing, establishes apprehended bias on my part or on the part of any of my colleagues in Brisbane. In relation to actual bias, I am satisfied that I take the obligations of my office seriously, and I am able to decide Mr Belmont’s case on its merits, without regard to irrelevant matters such as how I have decided other, unrelated cases.

19. The application is therefore refused.

I certify that the preceding 51 (fifty-one) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member R Bellamy

.......[SGD]...............

Associate

Dated 2 October 2024

Date of hearing	20 September 2024
Date of decision	26 September 2024
Applicant	Mr John Belmont, self-represented
Respondent’s solicitor	Mr Jake Kyranis Sparke Helmore