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Stollery v Greyhound Racing Control Board

Stollery v Greyhound Racing Control Board

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Case Copied 27 October 1972 31 min read

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

. Barwick C.J., McTiernan, Menzies, Gibbs and Stephen JJ.

STOLLERY v. GREYHOUND RACING CONTROL BOARD.

(1972) 128 CLR 509

27 October 1972

Inferior Tribunals

Inferior Tribunals—Greyhound Racing Control Board (N.S.W.)—Disciplinary functions—Proceedings after report by member of Board of gift proferred to him—Member present at but taking no part in deliberations or decisions of Board—No dispute concerning facts—Natural justice.

Decisions

October 27.
The following written judgments were delivered:-
BARWICK C.J. The appellant, John Leslie Stollery, appeals by special leave of this Court against a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Court of Appeal Division, discharging a rule nisi for prohibition to restrain further proceedings upon a decision of the Greyhound Racing Control Board (the Board) or in the alternative for certiorari to bring up that decision to be quashed. By its decision the Board purported to disqualify the appellant as a bookmaker registered with the Board for the space of twelve months as from the date of the decision, namely, 13th August 1971. The ground on which the appellant sought the prerogative writs was that in the hearing of the matter in respect of which the decision was given by the Board natural justice was not observed. The Supreme Court was of opinion that it was. (at p512)

2. The facts and circumstances of the matter are few. The Board is constituted by s. 56C (1) of the Gaming and Betting Act, 1912-1968 (N.S.W.) as a body corporate to control and regulate greyhound racing in New South Wales. In particular it is directed to control and regulate greyhound racing and empowered "in accordance with the rules" to "disqualify either permanently or temporarily any greyhound, or owner, trainer, bookmaker or bookmaker's clerk, or other person associated with greyhound racing from participating in or associating with greyhound racing" (s. 56G (1) (c) (iii)), and to make rules "for and with respect to the control and regulation of greyhound racing" (s. 56H (1) ). (at p512)

3. The Board duly made rules which, as operative in August 1971, provided for the registration of owners and trainers of greyhounds and of bookmakers and bookmaker's clerks. A registration as a person in one of these capacities, unless sooner cancelled by the Board, is effective until 31st March next after it was granted (r. 11 (1)). Application for renewal of such a registration is to be made on or before 1st March in the current year of registration. However, if such an application is not made in such time the Board has a discretion to grant or refuse a renewal of the registration (r. 12). Rule 21 (2) sub-ss. (a) and (c), so far as presently relevant, are in the following terms:

"21. (2) Without limitation of its powers under the Act, the Board may - (a) inquire into or investigate or cause to be inquired into or investigated any matter, act or omission which it suspects to be or intended to be or to have been dishonest, corrupt, fraudulent…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [1972] HCA 53
Decision Date: 27 October 1972

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Stollery (the applicant) sought judicial review of a decision by the Greyhound Racing Control Board (the respondent) to refuse to register him as a greyhound trainer. The applicant had been convicted of an offence under the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) and the respondent, relying on its rules and the provisions of the Greyhound Racing Act 1968 (NSW), determined that this conviction rendered him unsuitable to be registered. The matter came before the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the respondent had acted within its statutory powers when refusing to register the applicant as a trainer. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the respondent's rules, which purported to disqualify individuals convicted of certain offences, were valid and whether the respondent had properly exercised its discretion in applying those rules to the applicant's circumstances. The court also considered the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Greyhound Racing Act 1968 (NSW) concerning the eligibility of persons to be registered as trainers.

The High Court held that the respondent had acted unlawfully. The Court found that the respondent's rules, to the extent they purported to create an automatic disqualification based on a conviction for an offence not specified in the Act, were beyond the powers conferred by the legislation. While the Act empowered the respondent to refuse registration if a person was not a "fit and proper person," this required an assessment of the individual's circumstances, not an automatic disqualification based on a broad interpretation of its rules. The Court emphasised that the respondent's discretion must be exercised in accordance with the statute and could not be fettered by its own rules in a manner that removed the necessity for a proper consideration of the applicant's suitability.

The High Court ordered that the decision of the respondent be quashed and remitted the matter to the respondent for reconsideration according to law.

Orders