AAL19 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AAL19 v MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS & ANOR [2019] FCCA 2917
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application for safe haven enterprise visa – exceptional circumstances not demonstrated for the purpose of a consideration of new information – allegation of apprehended bias unsubstantiated – Authority not required to obtain further information in the circumstances – application for review dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5H, 5J, 116(1)(g), 424, 473CB, 473DB, 473DC, 473DD

Cases cited:

CED15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 451

NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CLV16 (2018) 260 FCR 482
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 (2017) 257 FCR 111
BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 254 FCR 221
AQU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 111
DLB17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCAFC 230
CSR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 474
BAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1463
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 (2017) 253 FCR 475
Minister for Immigration and Citizen v SZIAI [2009] 259 ALR 429
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Applicant: AAL19
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
Second Respondent: IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
File Number: MLG 5 of 2019
Judgment of: Judge Egan
Hearing date: 9 September 2019
Date of Last Submission: 9 September 2019
Delivered at: Brisbane
Delivered on: 15 October 2019

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr J. Maloney
Solicitors for the Applicant: Victoria Legal Aid
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr N. Wood
Solicitors for the Respondents: Mills Oakley Lawyers

ORDERS

  1. The amended application for review filed on 27 July 2019 be dismissed.

  2. The First Respondent file and serve written submissions on the question of costs on or before 22 October 2019.

  3. The Applicant file and serve written submissions on the question of costs in response on or before 29 October 2019.

  4. The matter be adjourned on the question of costs to a date to be advised.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT MELBOURNE

MLG 5 of 2019

AAL19

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant is a citizen of Pakistan who was born in 1987 in Parachinar.

  2. The applicant arrived in Australia in 2013 at Christmas Island as an unauthorised maritime arrival.

  3. On 27 March 2017 the applicant lodged an application for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV).

  4. On 8 October 2018 a delegate to the Minister refused to grant the visa. The matter was referred to the Immigration Assessment Authority (the Authority) for review. On 23 October 2018 the Authority received a submission from the applicant’s representative.

  5. On 3 December 2018 the Authority affirmed the decision of the delegate to refuse to grant the visa.

  6. On 2 January 2019 the applicant filed…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCCA 2917
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application for review of a decision made by the Authority regarding an application for a safe haven enterprise visa. The applicant alleged jurisdictional error on the part of the Secretary and the Authority.

The court was required to determine whether the Secretary's decision to provide certain documents to the Authority constituted a "privative clause decision" that could not be challenged except for jurisdictional error, and whether the applicant was estopped from challenging this decision. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the Authority failed to consider exercising its powers under s.473DC of the Act and whether this failure, if it occurred, amounted to jurisdictional error, particularly in light of the applicant's failure to provide updated information.

The court held that the Secretary's decision to provide documents was a privative clause decision under s.474 of the Migration Act, and as the applicant had not challenged this decision, they were estopped from asserting jurisdictional error in relation to the Authority's receipt of those documents. Alternatively, the court found the applicant's assertion to be without merit based on existing jurisprudence. Regarding the alleged failure to consider s.473DC, the court found no basis for this claim, noting that the applicant had the opportunity to provide further information but chose not to. The court applied principles from *Minister for Immigration and Citizen v SZIAI*, stating that a failure to make an obvious inquiry about a critical fact could, in some circumstances, constitute jurisdictional error by constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction. However, in this case, there was no factual basis to conclude that further inquiry would have yielded a useful result or that the Authority's decision was affected by jurisdictional error due to a failure to inquire. The court also found no issue of procedural fairness arose.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

As to Ground 7 of the application for review, the decision of the Secretary to provide the documents at Court Book pages 72 – 74 to the Authority was a “privative clause decision” as defined in ss.474(2) and 474(3) of the Act. As such, the Secretary’s decision could not be called into question unless affected by jurisdictional error as provided for under s.474(1) of the Act. Section 474(1) and (2) provide as follows:Decisions under Act are final(1) A privative clause decision:(a) is final and conclusive; and(b) must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and(c) is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account.(2) In this section:"privative clause decision" means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not), other than a decision referred to in subsection (4) or (5). The applicant has not challenged the Secretary’s decision to provide the documents to the Authority pursuant to the provisions of s.473CB of the Act (see paragraph 9 of applicant’s supplementary submissions filed on 9 August 2019 where it was positively asserted that no such challenge would be made). In those circumstances, the applicant is estopped from asserting jurisdictional error on the part of the Secretary, or the Authority, in respect of the Authority’s receipt of the documents in question. Alternatively, the applicant’s assertion is without merit based upon the decision of the majority in CNY17 on the same point. [15] [15] CNY17 at 149 per Moshinsky J. As to Ground 8 of the application for review, there is no basis for the Court to find that the Authority did not consider whether or not to exercise its powers pursuant to the provisions of s.473DC of the Act. The lack of a reference in its reasons as to whether it considered exercising s.473DC powers or not is not determinative in that regard. The applicant could have updated the Authority with any information touching upon the progress of his criminal proceedings, or the circumstances of his detention, if he or his representatives had considered it relevant. The applicant chose not to do so. In those circumstances, the Authority did not err in failing to obtain further documentation relating to those matters. It was already possessed of the same information which had been provided to the Department prior to the delegate’s decision. It cannot be said that the Tribunal, when so analysing the matters of relevance before it, failed to make an obvious inquiry about a critical fact, as was the subject of consideration by French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Keifel and Bell JJ in Minister for Immigration and Citizen v SZIAI [2009] 259 ALR 429 at [25] - [27], where it was said:“[25] Although decisions in the Federal Court concerned with a failure to make obvious inquiries have led to references to a “duty to inquire”, that term is apt to direct consideration away from the question whether the decision which is under review is vitiated by jurisdictional error. The duty imposed upon the tribunal by the Migration Act is a duty to review. It may be that a failure to make an obvious inquiry about a critical fact, the existence of which is easily ascertained, could, in some circumstances, supply a sufficient link to the outcome to constitute a failure to review. If so, such a failure could give rise to jurisdictional error by constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction.35 It may be that failure to make such an inquiry results in a decision being affected in some other way that manifests itself as jurisdictional error. It is not necessary to explore these questions of principle in this case. There are two reasons for that.[26] The first reason is that there was nothing on the record to indicate that any further inquiry by the tribunal, directed to the authenticity of the certificates, could have yielded a useful result. There was nothing before the Federal Magistrates Court or the Federal Court to indicate what information might be elicited if the tribunal were to undertake the inquiry which was said to be critical to the validity of its decision. The inquiry suggested was telephone contact with the persons whose mobile telephone numbers were shown on the certificates. But the question whether the certificates contained false statements as to authorship or otherwise would not be able to be determined by calls placed to those telephone numbers. If the respondents to the calls admitted to the tribunal or its officers that the certificates contained false statements, then the grounds for a decision adverse to SZIAI would have been strengthened. If the respondents said that the contents were true, it would have added nothing to the statements effectively conveyed by the certificates themselves. The second reason is that the response made by SZIAI’s solicitors to the tribunal’s letter of 14 January 2008 itself indicated the futility of further inquiry. There was nothing that SZIAI or his solicitors were able to add, beyond a bare denial of what appeared in the National Ameer’s letter. For these reasons there is no factual basis for the conclusion that the failure to inquire constituted a failure to undertake the statutory duty of review or that it was otherwise so unreasonable as to support a finding that the tribunal’s decision was infected by jurisdictional error.[27] No issue of procedural fairness otherwise arises. SZIAI was given an opportunity to comment upon the National Ameer’s letter and did so in the limited terms indicated. To invite SZIAI to a further hearing pursuant to s 425 of the Migration Act would have been an empty exercise. There was no such obligation in any event. The National Ameer’s letter was by way of information that the tribunal considered would be a reason, or part of a reason, for affirming the decision under review. It discharged its obligation, pursuant to s 424A of the Migration Act, by giving SZIAI the opportunity to comment on that information. The letter did not raise a new issue in the sense that that term is used in s 425.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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