Cli19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CLI19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 1082   

Appeal from: CLI19 v Minister for Immigration [2020] FCCA 236
File number(s): NSD 178 of 2020
Judgment of: RARES J
Date of judgment: 16 August 2022
Catchwords: MIGRATION – where Immigration Assessment Authority not satisfied under s 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) exceptional circumstances justified it considering new information and affirmed refusal of protection visa – where visa applicant asked Authority to consider newly discovered warrant for his arrest on terrorism charges in support of claim based on warrant to fear harm if returned to his country of origin – where warrant and new claim not before delegate – where Authority had serious reservations about veracity of warrant and new claim and then found no exceptional circumstances to justify it considering them as “new information” under s 473DD – whether Authority made a jurisdictional error by failing to factor finding that new information was credible, though subject to serious reservations, into subsequent assessment of whether exceptional circumstances justified consideration of new information – Held: appeal allowed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Pt 7AA, ss 473CA, 473DD, 473EA
Cases cited:

AAL19 v Minister for Home Affairs (2020) 277 FCR 393

Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 225 CLR 88

AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2020) 269 CLR 494

Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 78 CLR 353

BDF17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 401

BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 29

CLI19 v Minister for Immigration [2020] FCCA 236

CPP17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2021] FCA 199

CSR16 Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 474

Kioav West (1985) 159 CLR 550

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v BTW17 (2020) 171 ALD 477

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 33
Date of hearing: 16 August 2022
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr B Zipser
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms K Hooper
Solicitor for the First Respondent Minter Ellison

ORDERS

NSD 178 of 2020
BETWEEN:

CLI19

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR CITIZENSHIP, IMMIGRATION, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

16 AUGUST 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 6 February 2020 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:

(a)A writ of certiorari issue to quash the decision of the second respondent made on 28 May 2019. 

(b)A writ of mandamus issue requiring the second respondent to conduct its review according to law. 

(c)The…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 1082
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Cli19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs involved the appellant, Cli19, who had applied for a protection visa in Australia. The appellant had alleged that he faced harm if returned to his country of origin, Sri Lanka. The Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) had reviewed the delegate's decision to refuse the visa, but did not consider new information provided by the appellant, specifically a warrant for his arrest on terrorism charges. The appellant argued that the IAA made a jurisdictional error by not considering the new information despite having serious reservations about its credibility.

The legal issue at the core of this case was whether the IAA made a jurisdictional error by not factoring in the new information, which was credible though subject to serious reservations, into its assessment of whether exceptional circumstances justified its consideration. The court had to determine if the IAA complied with the procedural requirements under s 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) when deciding not to consider the new information.

The court found that the IAA had indeed made a jurisdictional error. It noted that the IAA had to assess whether the new information met the criteria specified in s 473DD(b)(i) and (ii) before determining if exceptional circumstances existed under s 473DD(a). The court held that the IAA's failure to assess the new information against these criteria before concluding that exceptional circumstances did not exist meant it did not perform its procedural duty as required by s 473DD. The court relied on previous cases such as AUS17 269 CLR 494 and BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 29, which emphasized the mandatory nature of taking certain considerations into account in the assessment process.

In conclusion, the appeal was allowed, and the orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia were set aside. The IAA was required to conduct its review according to law, and the Minister was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 6 February 2020 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:

(a) A writ of certiorari issue to quash the decision of the second respondent made on 28 May 2019.

(b) A writ of mandamus issue requiring the second respondent to conduct its review according to law.

(c) The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs.

3. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In his statement of claims that he lodged with his application for the visa, the appellant referred to the incident in January 2013 when S, together with CID (or EPDP) officers came to his home and told him that the Sri Lankan Army had obtained more information about T and wanted to contact him. The delegate’s decision On 10 January 2019, the delegate decided to refuse to grant the appellant’s application for the visa. The delegate found that the appellant’s profile would not be of interest to the Sri Lankan authorities for the reason that apart from T, he had two other brothers who had remained in Sri Lanka, one of whom was a government official and the other a bank manager, and that neither they, nor his extended family, had been involved in any activity in support of the LTTE or had any political profiles. She found that there was no evidence that both the appellant’s and his family’s past circumstances would lead to him being suspected on return of being an LTTE member or supporter, particularly in view of the fact that his two brothers had continued to reside in the Northern Province without incident and were employed in the occupations to which I have referred. She also noted that T’s alleged involvement in the LTTE dated back to 2005 and 2006, that, by the time of her decision, the war had been over for 10 years and a new government had taken power in Sri Lanka with the support of Tamil parties and Tamil voters. She found that the new government had replaced the previous military governors in the Northern and Eastern Provinces with civilians and established a special presidential task force on reconciliation. The delegate concluded that there was no real chance that the appellant would be at risk of suffering significant or serious harm in respect of any of his claims were he to return to Sri Lanka. The proceedings before the Authority The Minister referred the delegate’s decision to the Authority for review under s 473CA and Pt 7AA of the Act. On 25 January 2019, the appellant’s solicitor and migration agent emailed the Authority with a black and white copy of the first page of an uncertified court document purportedly issued as a warrant of arrest by the Magistrate’s Court at Jaffna dated in May 2013, some two days after the appellant had left Sri Lanka by boat to come to Australia. The solicitor told the Authority that this document was an arrest warrant issued against the appellant and that it had not been provided previously to the Department. The email stated that the appellant “has, with the help of his family lawyer in Sri Lanka, procured the document only yesterday on 24 January 2019.” The email promised that a detailed written submission in support of his application would follow. On 4 February 2019, the appellant’s solicitor wrote a submission to the Authority that, among other matters, referred to the fact that the warrant had been issued two days after the appellant had left Sri Lanka illegally by boat. Attached to the submission were colour copies of both pages of the warrant, showing the original handwriting in blue ink and the court stamp in red ink on the first page and the second page that was headed “To be completed by person executing warrant” being left without handwritten details.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister pointed out that, in AAL19 v Minister for Home Affairs (2020) 277 FCR 393 at 407 [47], Logan, Markovic and Anastassiou JJ held that the Authority had no duty to give reasons in respect of whether or not, for the purposes of s 473DD, it was satisfied, in relation to the determination of whether it would consider new information for the purpose of its review. Consideration Like the trial judge’s decision, AAL19 277 FCR 393 was decided before AUS17 269 CLR 494. Their Honours drew on what Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ had said in BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 29 at 39 [16], that when the Authority gave reasons, in accordance with the requirements of s 473EA, for its ultimate decision to affirm or remit a delegate’s decision, it was not required to include any reasons about its exercise or non-exercise of a procedural power, such as that conferred on it in ss 473DC(1) or 473GB(3). In BDF17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 401 at [68], Kenny J applied BVD17 268 CLR at 39 [16], saying that, since s 473DD was a, “procedural power”, in Pt 7AA of the Act, the Authority, “is not required to give comprehensive reasons for its determination to exercise or not exercise power to consider new information pursuant to that provision” (see also at [78]). Her Honour followed the reasoning of Besanko J in CPP17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2021] FCA 199 at [112], that an analysis of the Authority’s reasons could enable the Court to draw implications as to whether the Authority had addressed the requirements of s 473DD, as explained in AUS17 269 CLR 494. In AUS17 269 CLR at 501–502 [11]–[12], 503–504 [16] and [18], Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gordon JJ held that the Authority had to assess whether, first, new information obtained from a referred applicant met one or both criteria in s 473DD(b)(i) and (ii) and, secondly, there were exceptional circumstances under 473DD(a). They said (at 502 [11]):If either the criterion specified in s 473DD(b)(i) or the criterion specified in s 473DD(b)(ii) is met, that is a circumstance which must be factored into the subsequent assessment of whether the new information meets the criterion specified in s 473DD(a).(emphasis added) They said the same process applied if both criteria in s 473DD(b) were met. They held that the Authority would not perform the procedural duty that s 473DD imposed on it in its conduct of a review under Pt 7AA if it determined, in the purported application of the criterion in s 473DD(a), that exceptional circumstances justifying consideration of new information obtained from the referred applicant did not exist, without first assessing that information against the criteria specified in each of s 473DD(b)(i) and (ii) and then taking the outcome of that assessment into account in its assessment against the criterion specified in s 473DD(a). They held that the performance of the procedural duty in s 473DD was in the nature of a requirement to take a mandatory relevant consideration into account.