AET20 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

AET20 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1062

File number(s): ADG 19 of 2020
Judgment of: JUDGE GERRARD
Date of judgment: 11 July 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority – consideration of s 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the IAA reached a concluded state of satisfaction in respect of s 473DD(b)(i) – materiality – no jurisdictional error established – application dismissed.
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 473DD, 473DD(a), 473DD(b)(i), 473DD(b)(ii), 476
Cases cited:

APH17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 23

AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2020) 269 CLR 494

CLI19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 1082

CPP17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2021] FCA 199

CRM18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 665

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 40
Date of last submission/s: 4 April 2025
Date of hearing: 10 April 2025
Counsel for the Applicant: Oliver Morris
Solicitor for the Applicant: Ghaffari Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Alex Chan
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore
Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

ADG 19 of 2020

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

AET20

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE GERRARD

DATE OF ORDER:

11 JULY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the first respondent be amended to ‘Minister for Immigration and Citizenship’.

2.The application be dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE GERRARD:

INTRODUCTION

  1. The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (the IAA) affirming an earlier decision of the first respondent (the Minister) to refuse to grant him a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) (Subclass 790) visa (SHEV). For the applicant to succeed in this Court, he must establish that the IAA decision contains a jurisdictional error (Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476). This Court cannot undertake a review of the merits of the decision under review.

  2. For the reasons set out below, the Court has not found any jurisdictional error in the IAA’s decision. On that basis, the application cannot succeed.

    BACKGROUND

  3. On…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 1062
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, the applicant, a Pakistani citizen, sought judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to deny his application for a visa. The applicant had arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival and applied for a subclass 785 visa, which was subsequently refused. The applicant appealed the decision to the IAA, which affirmed the delegate's decision. The central issue in this case was whether the IAA made a jurisdictional error in its consideration of new information under section 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The applicant argued that the IAA failed to reach a concluded state of satisfaction regarding the new information's materiality, as required by section 473DD(b)(i). The Court found no jurisdictional error in the IAA’s decision. The Court noted that while the IAA was required to assess new information against the criteria in sections 473DD(b)(i) and (ii) before considering section 473DD(a), this assessment is a matter of substance, not form. The Court held that the IAA had considered the new information in accordance with the principles established by the High Court in AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The IAA's assessment of the new information, while not using formal or specific wording, was sufficient to conclude that the new information could not have been provided before the delegate's decision. The Court concluded that the IAA’s decision did not contain any jurisdictional error, and the application for judicial review was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, the Court has not found any jurisdictional error in the IAA’s decision. On that basis, the application cannot succeed. BACKGROUND On 13 July 2013, the applicant arrived on Christmas Island as an unauthorised maritime arrival (Court Book (CB) 127). He is a Pakistani citizen and a Pashtun Shia Muslim (CB 3, 38, 71). On 9 August 2013, the applicant participated in an Irregular Maritime Arrival Entry Interview (CB 1-21). In that interview, he claimed that he left Pakistan due to a fear of harm from attacks by the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups (CB 10-11). On 1 August 2016, the applicant was invited to apply for a Temporary Protection (subclass 785) visa or a SHEV (CB 22-23). On 4 August 2017, the applicant appointed a lawyer as his authorised representative (CB 34-36). On 5 September 2017, the applicant, via his representative, lodged a SHEV application (the visa) (CB 37-66). The applicant provided a statutory declaration in support of his application (CB 71-74). On 14 August 2019, the applicant was invited to attend an interview scheduled for 28 August 2019 (CB 88-90). On 4 September 2019, the applicant’s representative provided written submissions in support of the applicant’s application (CB 91-123). On 31 October 2019, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant the visa (CB 127-143). On 4 November 2019, the delegate’s decision was referred to the second respondent, the IAA, for review (CB 145-146). On 25 November 2019, the applicant’s representative provided a further written submission and other documents to the IAA, including various supporting letters (CB 153-176). On 16 December 2019, the IAA affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant the visa (CB 181-196). The applicant claimed to fear harm from the Taliban and other extremist groups as a result of his religion, tribe and area of origin, as well as from his father’s activism as a prominent leader against extremist groups (at [15]). However, the IAA was not satisfied that he would be viewed as a threat by these groups, imputed with his father’s anti-extremist views, or be discriminated against in any way (at [23], [25], [36]). On 14 January 2020, the applicant lodged an application for judicial review in this Court. That application seeks review of the IAA’s decision pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). THE IAA’S TREATMENT OF NEW INFORMATION The issue in dispute between the parties relates solely to the IAA’s treatment of new information under s 473DD of the Act (as it then was). Section 473DD relevantly provides that:For the purposes of making a decision in relation to a fast track reviewable decision, the Immigration Assessment Authority must not consider any new information unless:(a)the Authority is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information; and(b)the referred applicant satisfies the Authority that, in relation to any new information given, or proposed to be given, to the Authority by the referred applicant, the new information:(i)was not, and could not have been, provided to the Minister before the Minister made the decision under section 65; or(ii)is credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant’s claims.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

No jurisdictional error arises. CONCLUSION The application for judicial review, supporting affidavit and additional submissions advanced by the applicant at the hearing have failed to identify any jurisdictional error. Accordingly, the application is dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The materials before the Court include a Court Book numbering 196 pages (marked as Exhibit 1), an amended application and written submissions filed on behalf of the applicant on 28 March 2025, and written submissions filed on behalf of the Minister on 4 April 2025. CONSIDERATION As outlined above, the amended application for judicial review contains one particularised ground, namely, that the IAA failed to have regard to a mandatory relevant consideration in determining whether to consider new information. The crux of the applicant’s argument is that the IAA failed to reach a concluded state of satisfaction in respect of the requirement in s 473DD(b)(i) that the new information could have been provided to the Minister prior to the decision made by his delegate. Section 473DD is set out above at [15]. Since the High Court’s decision in AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2020) 269 CLR 494 (AUS17), it is now well established that the IAA is required to assess any new information an applicant may wish to be considered by the IAA “first against the criteria specified in both s 473DD(b)(i) and s 473DD(b)(ii) and only then against the criterion specified in s 473DD(a)” (AUS17 at [11]). However, compliance with this assessment is a matter of substance rather than form (see CRM18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 665; CPP17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2021] FCA 199). Furthermore, there is no requirement that the IAA engage in a “formulaic consideration” of s 473DD (APH17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 23 at [79]). In this matter, the applicant contended that the IAA’s finding in respect of s 473DD(b)(i) was inconsistent with the principles established in AUS17. The applicant accepted in written submissions that the IAA considered the limbs of s 473DD in the order prescribed by AUS17. However, the applicant contended that the IAA was required to, but did not, reach a concluded state of satisfaction with respect to the application of s 473DD(b)(i). The applicant accepted at the hearing that the IAA was not required to use a “formal or magic form of words” but contended that its failure to reach a conclusion meant that the IAA was incapable of taking into account a conclusion in assessing s 473DD(a), and accordingly, failed to undertake the overall assessment required by s 473DD. The applicant submitted that the IAA’s assessment of s 473DD(b)(i) was limited to noting the date of the new information and inferring that such information had been translated in Australia (although the IAA also noted that there was nothing before it to suggest how the new information had come into the possession of the applicant). It was contended that whilst the IAA expressed “some concerns” about the fact that the documents could not have been provided to the delegate before his decision, the IAA did not go on to expressly conclude this assessment. Counsel for the applicant argued that when a decision-maker uses evasive language such as “expressing concerns” and “expressing serious reservations”, it leaves doubt about the conclusion of what those concerns represent. In support of this, the applicant relied upon CLI19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 1082 (CLI19) where Rares J held (at [29]-[30]):[29] The Authority stated in the third sentence of par 12 that it had “serious reservations with regards to the veracity of the document and the claim”. That was a preliminary evaluation under s 473DD(b)(ii) that the warrant and new claim were capable of being (even if unlikely to be) found to be credible, were they considered as new information in the Authority’s review of the delegate’s decision. That is, while the Authority had “serious reservations”, it could not dismiss the warrant and new claim as being incapable of being found to be truthful, accurate or genuine (ie, “credible personal information”), were they to be considered in a review of the delegate’s decision with all of the material available to it.[30] I am of opinion that in stating the conclusion in par 12 (viz: that it had “serious reservations with regards to the veracity of the document and the claim”), the Authority was not making a qualitative evaluation of the kind that it would have to make in a final decision, were it to later take those matters into account in its consideration of all of the other information before it. Rather, by excluding the warrant and the new claim from its review, after finding it to be “credible” for the purposes of s 473DD(b)(ii), the Authority precluded itself from considering the new information.