FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CRM18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 665
Appeal from: Application for Extension of Time: CRM18 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2018] FCCA 3312 File number: NSD 2211 of 2018 Judge: ROBERTSON J Date of judgment: 17 May 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether documents or information were not before the delegate of the Minister when the delegate made his decision under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) refusing the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa – whether Immigration Assessment Authority erred in considering “new information” without satisfying itself that there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering that material
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether leave should be granted to permit a factual contention to be raised on appeal which was not raised before the primary judge
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 473DC, 473DD, 473DE Date of hearing: 13 May 2019 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 55 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr D McDonald-Norman Solicitor for the Applicant: Westside Legal Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G Johnson Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted to any order of the Court, save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 2211 of 2018 BETWEEN: CRM18
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
ROBERTSON J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 MAY 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Time be extended so as to permit the applicant to file his notice of appeal out of time.
2.Leave be refused to the applicant to raise on the appeal the ground not raised before the primary judge.
3.The appeal be dismissed.
4.The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ROBERTSON J:
Introduction
These proceedings relate to the judgment and orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia given and made on 30 October 2018 dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) dated 23 April 2018.
The applicant seeks orders: granting leave to file a notice of appeal out of time; granting leave to file and rely on an amended notice of appeal; allowing the appeal; and setting aside the orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 30 October 2018 and, in place of those orders, quashing the decision of the IAA dated 23 April 2018.
The appeal was filed three days outside the 21 day period provided by r 36.03 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).
The application for an extension of time, an application to rely on the ground not raised before the Federal Circuit Court, and the substance of the proposed amendment were heard together.
The applicant is a citizen of Lebanon and a Sunni. He arrived in…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 665
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the delegate had before him the interview conducted with the applicant’s brother, which was referred to twice in the decision. The IAA affirmed the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa, and considered new information provided by the applicant’s brother. However, the IAA was not satisfied there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering this new information. The applicant argued that the IAA had not properly considered the sources for its findings, but the court held that it was not appropriate for the appellate court to embark on the task of inferring the sources for the IAA's findings when the relevant material was not before the court.
Ultimately, the court granted an extension of time for the applicant to file his notice of appeal but refused leave to raise the proposed new ground of appeal that had not been raised before the primary judge. The appeal was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent.
The final orders of the court were as follows: 1) Time was extended to permit the applicant to file his notice of appeal out of time; 2) Leave was refused to the applicant to raise on the appeal the ground not raised before the primary judge; 3) The appeal was dismissed; and 4) The applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or assessed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Time be extended so as to permit the applicant to file his notice of appeal out of time.
2. Leave be refused to the applicant to raise on the appeal the ground not raised before the primary judge.
3. The appeal be dismissed.
4. The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister submitted that if the Court granted the applicant an extension of time (and, presumably, leave to rely on the ground of appeal not raised before the primary judge), the appeal should be dismissed, with costs.Consideration I accept the explanation for the short delay and that in this case the solicitor’s procedural error should not prevent the applicant being able to maintain his challenge the decision of the Federal Circuit Court. I take into account the explanation for the delay, that the delay was short, that the Minister would not suffer prejudice if an extension of time were granted and that the Minister did not oppose an extension of time in order for the Court to consider the proposed ground of appeal advanced by the applicant. I grant the extension of time. For the reasons which follow, I do not grant leave to the applicant to rely on the proposed new ground. In my opinion, the task on which the applicant asks the Court to embark is not one which is appropriate in the exercise of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. The issue sought to be raised is whether or not inferences should be drawn in relation to the sources for four findings by the IAA. On the applicant’s case as sought to be advanced, the IAA had three possible sources for what it said about the applicant’s brother H not having previously raised various claims. One possible source was the applicant’s documents or information that were before the delegate. A second possible source was the applicant’s brother H’s protection visa interview, which the applicant accepted was also “documents or information” that were before the delegate. The third possible source is the applicant’s brother H’s other documents or information, that is, documents or information lying outside the first two possible sources. I do not accept the applicant’s submission that the global or total language of the findings that various claims had not previously been raised by H necessarily meant (as a matter of logic) the decision maker had considered all of the above sources, including new information. Whether the decision maker in fact considered those sources in making the impugned findings depends, at least in part, on what those sources contain. If this ground as sought to be advanced had been raised before the primary judge in the ordinary course, both the second and third possible sources would or should have been before the primary judge. It would then have been possible to see with some accuracy what the source was likely to have been of the four impugned statements by the IAA in its decision and reasons in relation to the applicant. The primary judge would have been able, at least, to see what was in and what was not in the applicant’s brother H’s protection visa interview. This Court is not in that position as that protection visa interview is not before the Court. Similarly, the primary judge would have been able, at least, to see what was in the applicant’s brother H’s other material, that is, material other than his protection visa interview. Again, this Court is not in that position as that other material is not before the Court.