Repatriation Commission v Stoddart [2003] FCAFC 300
VETERANS’ ENTITLEMENTS – claim for pension – veteran suffering from alcoholic liver damage (“ALD”) and post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) – Statements of Principles (“SOP”) to be applied in determining claim for pension – whether open to the Tribunal to conclude that veteran experienced a “severe stressor” as defined in ALD and PTSD SOPs – “threat of death or serious injury” in SOPs can mean actual or perceived threat – whether futile to have claims redetermined by Tribunal
Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth), ss 120, 120A
REPATRIATION COMMISSION v LESLIE STODDART S472 of 2003
CARR, FINN & SUNDBERG JJ 19 DECEMBER 2003 CANBERRA (HEARD IN ADELAIDE)
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
S 472 OF 2003
ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
REPATRIATION COMMISSION APPELLANT
AND:
LESLIE STODDART RESPONDENT
JUDGES:
CARR, FINN & SUNDBERG JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
19 DECEMBER 2003
WHERE MADE:
CANBERRA (HEARD IN ADELAIDE)
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The appeal be dismissed with costs.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
S 472 OF 2003
ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
REPATRIATION COMMISSION APPELLANT
AND:
LESLIE STODDART RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
CARR, FINN & SUNDBERG JJ
DATE:
19 DECEMBER 2003
PLACE:
CANBERRA (HEARD IN ADELAIDE)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
Introduction
This is an appeal from orders made by a judge of this Court on 17 April 2003. His Honour set aside a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, given on 11 September 2002. He also ordered that the respondent’s claims for benefits under the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) (“the Act”) made by the respondent be remitted to the Tribunal for further consideration or for reconsideration.
Factual Background
The respondent served in the Royal Australian Navy between August 1955 and April 1962. For the purposes of the Act, his eligible war service (which was also operational service) was during five periods when his ship was assigned to the Far Eastern Strategic Reserve. Those periods were respectively 21 September 1956 to 31 October 1956, 5 April 1957 to 7 May 1957, 7 June 1957 to 28 June 1957, 30 April 1958 to 13 May 1958, and 18…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Repatriation Commission v Stoddart [2003] FCAFC 300
Case
[2003] FCAFC 300
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The appeal in Repatriation Commission v Stoddart was brought by the Repatriation Commission against the decision of a judge of the Federal Court of Australia, who had set aside a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and remitted the respondent's claims for benefits under the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986. The respondent, who had served in the Royal Australian Navy between August 1955 and April 1959, sought benefits for post-traumatic stress disorder and alcoholic liver damage, claiming that he experienced severe stressors during his operational service. The Commission contested this, arguing that the respondent's service did not involve any actual threat. The Tribunal found that the respondent's claimed stressors were normal duties and events occurring during his naval service and did not constitute severe stressors under the Act. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the Tribunal's decision was correct, particularly focusing on whether the Tribunal had applied the appropriate legal standards in assessing the respondent's claims.
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had correctly applied the relevant legal standards in determining whether the respondent experienced severe stressors during his service. The court had to consider whether the Tribunal appropriately assessed the respondent's perception of threat and whether it made the necessary findings to support its conclusions. The court examined the evidence presented by both parties and the Tribunal's findings to ascertain if there was an error in the application of the law. The Commission argued that the Tribunal's decision was flawed because it did not address the respondent's perception of threat and made no relevant findings on this issue.
In its reasoning, the court found that the Tribunal had indeed erred by not making findings related to the respondent's perception of threat. This oversight was significant because the Tribunal's decision did not view the material through the correct legal lens. The court noted that the Tribunal's decision was not clearly correct on the material before it and that it was possible for a different result to emerge if the Tribunal correctly applied the legal standards. Therefore, the court concluded that it would be inappropriate to dismiss the appeal on the grounds of futility, as there was a possibility of a different outcome on remitter. The court ultimately rejected the appeal, holding that the Tribunal's failure to properly assess the respondent's perception of threat constituted a legal error that warranted a remitter for further consideration.
The court dismissed the appeal with costs, ordering that the respondent's claims be remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration in light of the court's findings. This decision underscores the importance of correctly applying legal standards in administrative law matters and highlights the need for tribunals to make appropriate findings that support their conclusions. The case serves as a reminder that where tribunals fail to apply the correct legal framework, the court may remit the matter for reconsideration to ensure that all relevant factors are properly assessed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
This is an appeal from orders made by a judge of this Court on 17 April 2003. His Honour set aside a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, given on 11 September 2002. He also ordered that the respondent’s claims for benefits under the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) (“the Act”) made by the respondent be remitted to the Tribunal for further consideration or for reconsideration. Factual Background The respondent served in the Royal Australian Navy between August 1955 and April 1962. For the purposes of the Act, his eligible war service (which was also operational service) was during five periods when his ship was assigned to the Far Eastern Strategic Reserve. Those periods were respectively 21 September 1956 to 31 October 1956, 5 April 1957 to 7 May 1957, 7 June 1957 to 28 June 1957, 30 April 1958 to 13 May 1958, and 18 March 1959 to 28 April 1959. The total period of his operational service was 134 days. The applicant contended that, during his operational service, he experienced “severe stressors”, whilst working in the engine rooms of vessels which the Tribunal summarised as: (i)occasions when he was required to check the tunnels and temperature gauges deep down at the bottom of the vessel, a task which he undertook alone without radio or other contact, and where he had no way of communicating if he was in trouble; while doing the task he had to lock doors behind him to ensure the area was completely sealed and water tight. He told the Tribunal that he recalled being terrified when undertaking this task, and perceived his life to be under threat, particularly when the vessel was called to action stations, as in that event there would have been little, if any, chance of him getting out alive; (ii)occasions when the vessel was called to action stations while he was in the engine room below the water line, sealed and water tight. He told the Tribunal that he feared that if the vessel was hit by enemy fire there would be little, if any, chance of him getting out alive, so that he was intensely frightened during periods of his operational service as he did not know whether the call to action stations was an exercise, or the real thing. The respondent gave evidence of other incidents which he claimed involved him experiencing severe stressors, but the Tribunal did not accept them. The respondent complained of incapacity from two conditions: post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and alcoholic liver damage (“ALD”). The appellant disputed that, during his operational service, the respondent ever experienced a severe stressor as defined in the relevant Statements of Principles (“SOP”) that were to be applied in the determination of his claim: the Act, s 120 and s 120A. It sought to show that neither vessel in which he had served during his operational service was in fact under active threat, or was actually called to action stations. The Tribunal concluded: “On the whole of the evidence, the first three (sic) stressors relied upon by the applicant as operational service stressors, namely the tunnels, the boiler/ engine room, and fear of action stations, are all normal duties and events that occur whilst a stoker/mechanical engineer is serving in the navy at any time. There was, in my view, nothing in the evidence to distinguish any factor of these events as occurring during operational service.”
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
The ground of appeal seeks indirectly to reinstate the objective test of threat rejected by the Full Court in Woodward.4. “The Evidence Of “Experiencing A Severe Stressor”” The contention here is that, on the evidence, it cannot be said that the respondent experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that involved threat of the relevant kind. All we need say of this, having had regard to the evidence to which we were taken by both parties, is that it is tantamount to an attack on the reasonableness of the respondent’s perception. This, as we have indicated, was not addressed and was not the subject of findings by the Tribunal.5. Conclusion We have rejected all of the grounds of appeal. Nonetheless the appellant contends that the appeal should be dismissed as it would be futile to have the respondent’s claims redetermined by the Tribunal. On the evidence, it is said, the result could only go one way and that would be adversely to the respondent. It is uncontroversial that it is open to the Court hearing an appeal under s 44(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 to dismiss the appeal if, having found an error of law, it nonetheless considers (i) the Tribunal’s decision was clearly correct on the material before it: see Morales v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 60 FCR 550 at 560-562; Harris v Repatriation Commission (2000) 31 AAR 270; or (ii) the same result would be inevitable on the remitter: Nguyen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 88 FCR 206 at 213-214. But where “it is possible” for reasons of change of mind, reappraisal of the evidence, or otherwise that a different result could ensue, the Court should be slow to exercise its discretion to shut an applicant out of relief on the basis of futility: Santa Sabina College v Minister for Education (1995) 58 ALR 527 at 540; Arnott v Repatriation Commission (2001) 106 FCR 83; S115/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 180 ALR 561 at 567-568. The present is not a case in which we are satisfied that the possibility of a different result would not be there on a remitter. The Tribunal did not view the material before it through the correct legal prism. It did not make findings related to the respondent’s perception of threat. Whether or not the decision at which the Tribunal arrives on the remitter is the same, we are not satisfied that the factual material to which we have been taken is itself so decisive that the Tribunal correctly applying the definition could only come to one conclusion. We would dismiss the appeal with costs.
Decision
Reasons for decision
All we need say of this, having had regard to the evidence to which we were taken by both parties, is that it is tantamount to an attack on the reasonableness of the respondent’s perception. This, as we have indicated, was not addressed and was not the subject of findings by the Tribunal.5. Conclusion We have rejected all of the grounds of appeal. Nonetheless the appellant contends that the appeal should be dismissed as it would be futile to have the respondent’s claims redetermined by the Tribunal. On the evidence, it is said, the result could only go one way and that would be adversely to the respondent. It is uncontroversial that it is open to the Court hearing an appeal under s 44(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 to dismiss the appeal if, having found an error of law, it nonetheless considers (i) the Tribunal’s decision was clearly correct on the material before it: see Morales v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 60 FCR 550 at 560-562; Harris v Repatriation Commission (2000) 31 AAR 270; or (ii) the same result would be inevitable on the remitter: Nguyen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 88 FCR 206 at 213-214. But where “it is possible” for reasons of change of mind, reappraisal of the evidence, or otherwise that a different result could ensue, the Court should be slow to exercise its discretion to shut an applicant out of relief on the basis of futility: Santa Sabina College v Minister for Education (1995) 58 ALR 527 at 540; Arnott v Repatriation Commission (2001) 106 FCR 83; S115/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 180 ALR 561 at 567-568. The present is not a case in which we are satisfied that the possibility of a different result would not be there on a remitter. The Tribunal did not view the material before it through the correct legal prism. It did not make findings related to the respondent’s perception of threat. Whether or not the decision at which the Tribunal arrives on the remitter is the same, we are not satisfied that the factual material to which we have been taken is itself so decisive that the Tribunal correctly applying the definition could only come to one conclusion. We would dismiss the appeal with costs.