[2013] AATA 773
Division VETERANS’ APPEALS DIVISION File Number(s)
2013/0073
Re
Howard John Kirk
APPLICANT
And
Repatriation Commission
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal The Hon R Nicholson, Deputy President
Date 25 October 2013 Place Perth Decision Summary
The decision, of the Veteran’ Review Board made on 11 December 2012, is set aside and, in substitution therefor, it is decided that the applicant’s post-traumatic stress disorder is related to his operational service.
...(Sgd) R Nicholson............
The Hon R Nicholson, Deputy President
Catchwords
VETERANS' AFFAIRS – veterans' entitlements – disability pension – applicant served in Royal Australian Navy from January 1967 to January 1971 – applicant rendered operational service 14–25 May 1969 – applicant suffers from posttraumatic stress disorder ("PTSD") – material before Tribunal raises hypothesis that applicant’s PTSD connected with operational service - Statement of Principles concerning posttraumatic stress disorder No 5 of 2008 - whether hypothesis caused by veteran’s operational service
Legislation
Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) ss 5D(1), 7(1), 9(1), 22, 120, 196BCases
Repatriation Commission v Deledio (1998) 83 FCR 82
Bull v Repatriation Commission (2001) 188 OLR 756
Woodward v Repatriation Commission (2003) 131 FCR 473
Collins v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (2007) 96 ALV 536
Byrne v Repatriation Commission (2007) 97 ALD 359Secondary Material
Statement of Principles No 5 of 2008DSM-IV-TR
REASONS FOR DECISION
The Hon R Nicholson, Deputy President
25 October 2013
INTRODUCTION
The applicant, Howard John Kirk, served in the Royal Australian Navy (“RAN”) from 14 January 1967 to 4 January 1971. During that period he rendered “operational service”, for the purposes of the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) (“VE ACT”), from 14 May 1969 to 25 May 1969 on board HMAS Vampire in Vietnam.
The applicant suffered from two conditions accepted as war caused by the Repatriation Commission (“the respondent”) for the purposes of the VE Act, namely, bilateral sensor neural hearing loss, and tinea, and he presently receives a disability pension at 40% of the “general rate” in accordance with s 22 of the VE Act.
On 2 December 2004 a delegate of the respondent decided that the applicant was suffering from “post-traumatic stress disorder” (“PTSD”) and that such condition was not related to his operational service and, therefore, was not a war-caused condition for the purposes of the VE Act.
On 3 January 2007 a delegate of the respondent decided that the applicant was suffering from “ischaemic heart disease” but that that condition was not related to his operational service and, therefore, was not a war-caused condition for the purposes of the VE Act.
On 21 August 2008 the Veterans’ Review Board (“VRB”) decided that the applicant’s conditions of PTSD and ischaemic heart disease were not war-caused conditions for the purposes of the VE Act and it accordingly affirmed decisions of the respondent in those respects.
The applicant applied to the Tribunal for a review of the VRB’s decision.
On 6 March 2009 Deputy President S D Hotop and Dr P A Staer, Member, affirmed the decision under review.
On 18 April…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Tribunal examined the applicant's experience of hearing "scare charges" explode underwater outside the hull of HMAS Vampire on 19 May 1969 while he was on watch in the engine room, which was below the waterline. The Tribunal found that this experience constituted a "severe stressor" as it involved a threat to the applicant's life, which he subjectively perceived as a risk of death. The Tribunal concluded that the applicant's PTSD was a war-caused disease under section 9 of the VE Act, and thus related to his operational service.
The Tribunal set aside the previous decision of the Veterans' Review Board (VRB) and substituted a decision that the applicant's PTSD is related to his operational service. This decision was based on the Tribunal's opinion that the material before it raised a reasonable hypothesis connecting the applicant's PTSD with his operational service, specifically his experience of the severe stressor of hearing "scare charges" explode underwater outside the hull of HMAS Vampire in Vung Tau Harbour on 19 May 1969.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Tribunal, having considered the whole of the material before it, is of the opinion that such material raises a hypothesis connecting the applicant’s PTSD with the circumstances of his operational service. That hypothesis, in general terms, is as follows:·The applicant’s experience of hearing “scare charges” exploding at regular intervals, without warning, underwater outside the hull of HMAS Vampire on 19 May 1969 while he was watch in the engine room (which was below the water line) of that ship which was then in Vung Tau Harbour, Vietnam (a war zone) resulted in him contracting PTSD.Does the material before the Tribunal raise a reasonable hypothesis connecting the applicant’s PTSD with the circumstances of his operational service? The only provision of the SoP which is contended on behalf of the applicant might arguably uphold the raised hypothesis in the present case, is 6(a), namely that the applicant experienced a category 1A stressor before the clinical onset of PTSD. The only “Category 1A stressor” relied upon is that in paragraph 9(a) that the applicant experienced ‘a life-threatening event’. The definition of “experiencing a severe stressor” in the 1999 SoP was explained by the Federal Court (Mansfield J) in Stoddart v Repatriation Commission (2003) 74 ALD 366 at 379 as follows:“[55] In my judgment the language of the definition of 'experiencing a severe stressor’ caters for the applicant experiencing or being confronted with an event or events that involved threat of death or serious injury, or a threat to physical integrity, if the event or events which are said to constitute the threat, judged objectively from the point of view of a reasonable person in the position of and with the knowledge of the person experiencing those events, are capable of and did convey (that is, are subjectively experienced) the risk of death or serious injury or to physical integrity.”His Honour had earlier (at [52]) accepted that the word “threat” in that definition bears its “common meaning” as defined in The Macquarie Concise Dictionary, namely:“… an indication of probable evil to come; something that gives indication of causing evil or harm.”His Honour’s interpretation of the definition of “experiencing a severe stressor” in the SoP was followed by the Full Federal Court in Woodward v Repatriation Commission (2003) 131 FCR 473, and was upheld on appeal by the Full Court in Repatriation Commission v Stoddart (2003) 134 FCR 392.“ In the Tribunal’s opinion, the applicant’s evidence regarding his subjective reaction to hearing “scare charges” exploding under water outside the hull of HMAS Vampire in Vung Tau harbour on 19 May 1969 does accord with “experiencing a severe stressor” (as defined in Clause 6(a) and 9(a) of the SoP) for the purpose of Clause 5 in the SoP. The applicant’s evidence was that he was absolutely terrified and his first reaction to the sound of the scare charges which he heard was that “he was going to die”. He formed the view the ship had been hit either by a torpedo or an enemy mine and he thought about how long he had left to live, particularly because of the hazard of the steam pipes.