CQR17 v Minister for Immigration

[2018] FCCA 627

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CQR17 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2018] FCCA 627

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Immigration Assessment Authority – application for a Safe Haven Enterprise visa – whether the Authority’s reasoning was illogical and unreasonable – whether the Authority failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable manner when dealing with “new information” – whether the Secretary failed to provide all relevant information – no jurisdictional error made out – third further amended application dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5H, 5J, 36, 473CB, 473CD, 473DD, 476

Applicant: CQR17

First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent: IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

File Number: SYG 1878 of 2017

Judgment of: Judge Street

Hearing date: 14 March 2018

Date of Last Submission: 14 March 2018

Delivered at: Sydney

Delivered on: 14 March 2018

REPRESENTATION

Solicitors for the Applicant: Mr S Tambimuttu
Hodges Legal

Solicitors for the Respondents: Ms K Hooper
HWL Ebsworth Lawyers

ORDERS

1. The 3^rd further amended application is dismissed.

2. Grant leave to file in Court the affidavit of Katherine Nicole Hooper on 13 March 2018.

3. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the total amount of $18,000.00 which relevantly includes the costs ordered to be paid on 16 of November 2017 by the applicant to the first respondent and the costs ordered to be paid by the applicant to the first respondent on 21 of December 2017.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 1878 of 2017

CQR17

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Background

1. This is an application for a Constitutional writ within the Court’s jurisdiction under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) in respect of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (“the Authority”) under Part 7AA of the Act made on 18 May 2017 affirming a decision of the delegate not to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa.

2. The applicant was found to be a citizen of Sri Lanka and his claims were assessed against that country. The applicant arrived in Australia on 3 November 2012 as an unauthorised maritime arrival. In summary, the applicant claimed to fear harm by reason of his Tamil ethnicity, an imputed political opinion being pro-Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“LTTE”), by reason of being a Tamil with an actual and perceived link to the LTTE and by reason of being a failed asylum seeker who fled Sri Lanka illegally.

3. The delegate did not accept the particular incidents that the applicant alleged occurred, being the applicant’s detention at Joseph Camp, the applicant’s detention on three occasions and being taken in a white van by the Criminal Investigation Department (“CID”) and the applicant being a person of interest to the Sri Lankan authorities or suspected of having LTTE links based on an imputed political opinion. On 20 October 2016, the delegate found the applicant failed to meet the criteria for the grant of the Safe Haven Enterprise visa.

The Authority

1. Following the delegate’s decision, the Authority wrote to the applicant on 27 October 2016, giving the applicant an opportunity to put on new information and submissions. The applicant’s migration representative provided submissions and supporting material dated 17 November 2016, and submissions dated 15 December 2016, which included references and extracts from country information not before the delegate, and a further submission dated 22 February 2017, which included excerpts from and references to country information that was not before the delegate.

2. The Authority in its reasons identified the background to the application for review and accepted that the applicant was a Hindu Tamil. The Authority referred to having regard to the material referred to by the Secretary under s 473CB of the Act and also referred to the submissions and material provided by the applicant’s migration representative.

The applicant’s submissions to the Authority

1. In relation to the part of the submissions of 17 November 2016 that took issue with the delegate’s findings and referred to country information before the delegate, this was identified by the Authority as not being new information and the Authority had regard to the same. The Authority correctly identified that the applicant’s submission dated 17 November 2016 made a new claim that the applicant was in fact a member of the LTTE and a statement by the applicant dated 2 November 2016, being an additional statement attached to the submission which provided information about the applicant’s claimed role in the LTTE. The Authority referred to the submission and the additional statement providing reasons why the applicant could not disclose earlier the information on which he now seeks to rely. The Authority noted that the applicant claimed that he feared that if he mentioned or admitted his involvement he would be detained indefinitely, jailed or submitted to the Sri Lankan authorities. The applicant claimed that he saw a news article that suspected LTTE members were kept detained in a detention centre. The applicant’s representative submitted that although the applicant would have had some appreciation of the need to provide that information in order for the Department to properly assess his claims, the context of fearing for his life and being accustomed to not sharing the information provides a reasonable explanation as to why the applicant did not disclose it earlier.

2. The Authority identified that the applicant may have initially feared disclosing his membership of the LTTE fearing that he may be detained indefinitely, sent to jail or returned to Sri Lanka and that this may explain why the applicant did not immediately disclose the new information. The Authority found however, that that did not adequately explain why the applicant only chose to disclose his LTTE membership after he was informed of the delegate’s decision and the referral of the matter to the Authority. It was in those circumstances that the Authority did not accept the information could not have been disclosed before the date of the delegate’s decision.

3. The Authority then turned to the applicant’s explanation and the fear of possible adverse consequences when supplying information to officers of the Department or others in the course of the visa application process. The Authority noted in that regard that the applicant had been assisted in preparing and lodging the Safe Haven Enterprise visa application by a registered migration agent who was present throughout the applicant’s Safe Haven Enterprise visa interview. The Authority noted that at that interview the delegate explained to the applicant the importance of giving the Department full, personal and accurate protection claims as early as possible in the protection visa process because if he did not and the application was refused, he may not have another chance to do so.

4. The Authority noted that the applicant was specifically asked if there was any information in his application that he wished to add or correct. The Authority noted that in response, the applicant’s representative clarified some information in the application in respect of names and places but that the applicant otherwise indicated that there was nothing he wished to correct or add. The Authority noted that at the end of the interview there was a break in order to give the applicant an opportunity to discuss in private his claims with his migration representative at the end of the interview. The Authority noted that the delegate asked the applicant whether he had put forward all his claims, to which the applicant responded “Yes.” The delegate also informed the applicant that any additional information provided would be considered prior to the decision being made.

5. The Authority referred to taking into consideration the fact that the delegate drew the applicant and his representative’s attention the failure to mention key aspects of his claims, such as his connections to and/or work for the LTTE may raise questions about his credibility. The Authority referred to the lengthy and detailed post-interview submission that was provided to the delegate and that still, the information that the applicant now seeks to rely upon was not provided until after the date of the decision.

6. The Authority placed weight on the fact that some three months elapsed from the date of the Safe Haven Enterprise visa interview and the date of the delegate’s decision. The Authority was of the view that the applicant had an opportunity to discuss the new claim with his legal representative, raise any concerns he had that may have prevented the earlier disclosure of the claim and discuss any fears he held about the visa assessment process and the implications of disclosing information. The Authority took into account that the submission noted that the applicant would have had some appreciation of the need to provide information in order for the Department to properly assess his claims and that the applicant nonetheless chose not to disclose the information until informed of the decision to refuse the visa. The Authority found the applicant had not explained why his fear of disclosure only changed once he was informed of the outcome of his application.

7. The Authority placed weight on the fact that in the applicant’s entry interview the applicant answered “no” to the question whether he had ever participated in armed conflict or fighting, or ever received training in preparation for conflict and stated under oath in his Safe Haven Enterprise visa that while he had worked for the LTTE, he had never been a member of the LTTE.

8. The Authority noted that the applicant was in a car accident and claimed that he suffered a brain injury as a result, which may impair his ability to recall dates. That car accident occurred on 13 April 2014. The Authority was not satisfied that any injury the applicant had suffered would account for his failure to mention this additional claim at all and that the applicant has not asserted that it did. It was in those circumstances, that the Authority referred to taking into account all of the circumstances into consideration and was not satisfied that exceptional circumstances existed to justify considering the new information. The Authority’s reasons in respect of the new claim are not to be read with a keen eye for error. The Authority expressly referred to the applicant’s credibility. The Authority clearly deliberated upon whether or not the applicant could have provided that information earlier to the Department and the Authority’s reference to the nature of the information identifies the Authority considering whether it was credible personal information which was previously known and had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant’s claims.

9. The substance of the Authority’s reasoning reflects taking into account and considering both limbs of s 473DD of the Act. The Authority’s reasons are to be read as a whole. It is apparent from the Authority’s reasons in relation to other information referred to in respect of the submissions advanced that the Authority was alive to and expressly referred to the consideration of credible personal information in respect of the submissions dated 22 February 2017. On a fair reading the Authority’s assessment of credible personal information was a preliminary assessment, not a final determination of credit. In those circumstances, there is no basis to infer that the Authority adopted an erroneously narrow meaning of exceptional circumstances or failed to take into account both limbs in determining whether or not the new claim was new information that met the requirements of s 473DD of the Act.

10. Whilst dealing with this new information, it is also appropriate to identify a submission that was advanced by the applicant that the Authority’s reasoning in relation to whether the new claim was new information to which the Authority could be satisfied that the cumulative criteria of s 473DD of the Act were met. In that regard, the applicant’s submission that was advanced focused on the fear the applicant may have initially had in disclosing information and that it was illogical or irrational to reject the applicant’s explanation that he was too fearful to provide in the past the information even to his legal representative. The Authority provided logical and rational reasons in support of the adverse findings as summarised above that referred to the opportunity that the applicant had after the interview to raise and discuss such new claim with his representative, as well as the information given to the applicant as to the consequences of a failure to mention claims. In those circumstances, the reasoning of the Authority in respect of the alleged new claim, being the applicant’s membership of the LTTE, which dealt with in paragraphs 4 to 9 of the Authority’s reasons were not illogical or irrational. The determination by the Authority that the new claim did not meet the criteria under s 473DD of the Act was not legally unreasonable for the reasons given by the Authority as summarised above.

The Authority’s assessment of the Refugee Convention criteria

1. The Authority summarised the applicant’s claims for protection and set out the relevant law. The Authority in its reasons referred to the beginning of the Safe Haven Enterprise visa interview where the applicant’s representative submitted that the applicant’s brain injury resulted from a car accident which affects his understanding. The Authority noted that the applicant stated that he could not remember when the car accident was, only that he was in a coma afterwards for some time and that as a result he is quite forgetful and has difficulty relating properly to what people say. The Authority noted that although the applicant appears to have been in a car accident after his arrival in Australia, no supporting medical evidence had been provided and there is no other information before the Authority about the applicant’s disability. The Authority found that it was apparent from listening to the applicant’s responses to the questions of the delegate that the applicant had difficulty in putting dates on events and frequently appeared unable to understand what he was being asked. The Authority also found that it was apparent that there are some discrepancies in the evidence the applicant gave at the interview and with his written claims. The Authority accepted that the applicant was injured in a car accident and accepted that this may have resulted in a brain injury which has presented some challenges for the applicant in effectively putting forward all of his protection claims. The Authority expressly referred to taking this into account when assessing the applicant’s claims and evidence.

2. It is apparent from the Authority’s reasons that the same consideration in relation to the car accident was taken into account in respect of the applicant’s failure to identify the new claim concerning his involvement and being a member of the LTTE. In circumstances where it was not advanced by the applicant, it was open to the Authority to find that the applicant’s injury that he suffered was not one that accounted for his failure to mention the additional claim and materially the Authority noted that the applicant did not suggest that he had.

3. The Authority did not accept the applicant’s claim that because he was employed by the LTTE, he would stay and eat at the LTTE base and would therefore be perceived as a member of the LTTE. The Authority did not consider it plausible that after more than 20 years and knowing that people were forced to undertake work for the LTTE, villagers would firstly remember and secondly, continue to harbour a grudge against the applicant for his role at that time. The Authority was not satisfied the applicant is at risk of harm from the authorities because he was involved in manufacturing gold commemorative plates or coins for the LTTE or because he engraved numbers on pistols and walkie-talkies for members of the LTTE as he claimed in his Safe Haven Enterprise visa interview. The Authority did not accept that by the time the applicant left Sri Lanka the applicant was a person of adverse interest to the authorities on the basis of some jewellery manufacturing work he did for the LTTE during the war. The Authority was not satisfied the applicant is at risk of serious harm from either the villagers or the authorities because of his jewellery manufacturing for the LTTE.

4. The Authority was prepared to accept that the applicant was detained at Joseph Camp. The Authority found the applicant was taken by Criminal Investigation Department (“CID”) to Joseph Camp in 1999, detained for six days and beaten on more than one occasion. The Authority also accepted that the applicant may have been accused of being an LTTE member, although this was primarily because he was a Tamil from an LTTE controlled area. The Authority found that the applicant was detained for a short period in an internally displaced persons (“IDP”) camp, not a rehabilitation camp. In relation to the applicant’s claims of being taken by persons in a white van, the Authority was willing to accept that there was an incident in which the applicant was taken to the fourth floor, detained for a day, slapped by two or three men on two or three occasions who asked about his wife’s brother, and then let go.

5. The Authority did not accept that the alleged more recent incident occurred in 2012. The Authority did not consider it plausible however, that over two years later the authorities would come to take the applicant in a van for questioning, detain and mistreat him in an attempt to get information about a person, R, when nothing had happened in the interim. The Authority found the incident in which the applicant was detained and mistreated for a day by the CID was in 2010 and not 2012. The Authority was not satisfied the applicant is at risk of harm from the authorities either because of his own work as a jeweller in supplying the LTTE or because of his brother in-law R.

6. The Authority accepted that the applicant was detained for six days in Joseph Camp and beaten on more than one occasion, and that this happened during the heightened security environment of the war when many Tamils were unfairly detained and mistreated purely on the basis of their ethnicity. The Authority found on the applicant’s evidence that after the 1999 incident, the applicant was not himself ever suspected of LTTE involvement. Whilst the Authority accepted the applicant was questioned and mistreated in 1999 following the bombing incident, and again in 2010, and that the 2010 incident was an attempt to get information about R who was in the LTTE, no further action was taken against the applicant from then until he left for Australia.

7. The Authority was not satisfied the applicant is at risk of harm on the basis of his ethnicity or imputed political opinion. The Authority found the applicant was not, at the time he left Sri Lanka, actually a person of interest to the authorities and the applicant did not claim to have been otherwise subjected to instances of discrimination on the grounds of his ethnicity. The Authority found that between the end of the war and the applicant’s departure, the applicant was steadily employed in his uncle’s jewellery business and was able to support himself and his family. The Authority noted the applicant has not claimed an inability to subsist or access basic services in Sri Lanka. The Authority was not satisfied that on the applicant’s return to Sri Lanka the applicant would be at risk of harm on the basis of his ethnicity or gender, or on the basis that he has spent considerable periods in both north and east of Sri Lanka.

1. The Authority accepted that the applicant had illegally departed Sri Lanka but found that the process of questioning and the investigation itself does not amount to serious harm. The Authority found there was not a real chance of a custodial sentence being imposed. The Authority found the treatment of the applicant under the Immigrants and Emigrants Act 1948 (Sri Lanka) is not discriminatory conduct, but rather the application of a law which applies to all Sri Lankans. The Authority found that the investigation, prosecution and punishment for illegal departure under the Immigrants and Emigrants Act 1948 (Sri Lanka) would be the result of a law of general application and does not amount to persecution under s 5J(4) of the Act.

2. The Authority was not satisfied that the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm amounting to persecution on the basis of being a returning Tamil asylum seeker who departed Sri Lanka illegally, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Authority was not satisfied the applicant was at risk of harm in returning to Sri Lanka for any of the reasons advanced by the applicant, either now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Authority found the applicant failed to meet the requirements of the definition of refugee in s 5H(1) of the Act and that the applicant did not meet the criteria under s 36(2)(a) and s 36(2)(aa) of the Act and affirmed the decision under review.

Before this Court

1. The grounds of the third further amended application are as follows:

   Ground 1

   The IAA’s decision is infected with jurisdictional error as the IAA’s reasoning at [CB 485, 6] through to [CB 486, 9] (which was used to determine if exceptional circumstances exists to justify considering the new information) was illogical, inconsistent and so unreasonable that no reasonable decision maker would make.

   Particulars

   1. The IAA accepted that the applicant “may have initially feared disclosing his membership of the LTTE fearing that he may be detained indefinitely, sent to jail or returned to Sri Lanka and that this may explain why the applicant did not immediately disclose the new information.” [6]/

   2. On the basis of the IAA’s reasoning at paragraph 6, the following is submitted

   a. The IAA accepted that the applicant may have initially feared disclosing his membership in the LTTE.

   b. The IAA accepted that the applicant feared “he may be detained indefinitely, set to jail or returned to Sri Lanka? Had he immediately disclosed his membership in the LTTE.

   c. The IAA accepted that due to what the applicant feared may happen to him, this explains as to why the applicant did not immediately disclose the new information he provided to the IAA.

   d. The IAA however raised concerns, as “the applicant only chose to disclose his LTTE membership after he was informed of the delegate’s decision…”

   e. The IAA failed to consider its own findings at [6], (that is one of the reasons the applicant feared to disclose his membership in the LTTE “immediately” was due to the applicant fearing he would be returned to Sri Lanka) when raising concerns referred at f. above.

   f. As the delegate refused to grant the applicant the SHEV visa, the logical eventuality would be that the applicant would be returned to Sri Lanka.

   g. The IAA therefore failed to consider that the refusal to grant the SHEV visa caused/triggered the applicant to disclose his membership in the LTTE as the applicant feared he would be returned to Sri Lanka.

   h. At [6] the IAA states “However, I do not consider that this adequately explains why the applicant only chose to disclose his LTTE membership after he was informed of the delegate’s decision and the referral of the matter to the IAA, and I do not accept that the information could not have been disclosed before the date of the delegate’s decision”, implying that an explanation was provided nevertheless though not adequate.

   i. At [7] the IAA then states at [7] “I note the applicant has not explained why his fear of disclosure only changed once he was informed of the outcome of his application”, thereby implying no explanation was provided.

   Ground 2

   The IAA failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable manner when dealing with “new information” (submission and additional statement provided to the IAA at paragraph 6)

   Particulars

   1. The IAA accepted that the applicant feared “he may be detained indefinitely, sent to jail or returned to Sri Lanka” had he immediately disclosed his membership in the LTTE.

   2. The essential reason the IAA was not satisfied that exceptional circumstances exists to justify considering the new information was due to the applicant not disclosing his membership in the LTTE before the date of the delegate’s decision.

   3. Section 473DD (b) of the migration act states,

   (b) the referred applicant satisfies the Authority that, in relation to any new information given, or proposed to be given, to the Authority by the referred applicant, the new information:

   (i) was not, and could not have been, provided to the Minister before the Minister made the decision under section 65; or

   (ii) is credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant’s claims.

   4. The new information the IAA chose not to exercise its discretion to consider is credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant’s claims.

   5. Therefore despite s473DD (b) (i) not being met the IAA was obliged to give consideration to the fact that the new information credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant’s claims.

   Ground 7

   The Secretary failed in its statutory obligation to provide relevant information concerning the applicant’s vulnerability after the serious car accident in April 2014.

   Particulars

   1. Items 1 – 5 (Affidavit page numbers 5, 9, 12, 15, 21) was not before the authority (Affidavit 11/12/2017)

   2. The applicant sustained serious injury on 13/4/2014 (affidavit page number 5)

   3. The Secretary failed to exercise its obligation under s473CB(1)© in a reasonable manner.

   4. The authority’s decision is infected with Jurisdictional Error for this reason.

   5. The applicant was considered “exceptionally vulnerable” after the car accident and this information was known to the Secretary only.

   6. Should the IAA have been provided the relevant information (other material – S473CB(1)© the IAA would not have made findings at [CB 486,9].

Ground 1

1. In relation to ground 1, Mr Tambimuttu, the solicitor for the applicant, submitted that the Authority’s reasons in dealing with the applicant’s new claim reflected illogicality in circumstances where the applicant had identified fearing to disclose his membership of the LTTE because he may be detained indefinitely, sent to jail or returned to Sri Lanka. The Authority referred to that finding in the context of why the applicant did not immediately disclose the information. The Authority referred to the opportunity that the applicant had to disclose the information thereafter and the applicant’s representation by a migration representative.

2. Mr Tambimuttu submitted that the Authority had failed to consider its own findings in paragraph 6 in relation to the applicant’s fear and in relation to why it was that the applicant only chose to disclose the membership after being informed of the delegate’s decision. Mr Tambimuttu submitted that the Authority should have taken into account that the refusal to grant the visa had triggered the applicant to disclose the information about his connections to the LTTE as the applicant feared being returned to Sri Lanka and that that was an adequate explanation. Mr Tambimuttu submitted that the applicant’s fear of being returned to Sri Lanka was an explanation for why the applicant had not earlier disclosed the same prior to the decision of the delegate. The Authority’s reasoning was open for the reasons given by the Authority as referred to above. Those reasons referred to the applicant’s representative, the opportunity before and after the interview, and the timing only after an adverse outcome. For the reasoning of the Authority as summarised above, no jurisdictional error as alleged in ground 1 is made out.

Ground 2

1. In relation to ground 2, Mr Tambimuttu submitted that the Authority had failed to consider both limbs of s 473DD of the Act. Mr Tambimuttu submitted that although there was a reference in paragraph 7 of the Authority’s reasons to issues about the applicant’s credibility, Mr Tambimuttu submitted that this was not and should not be taken to be a reference to credible personal information in relation to s 473DD(b)(ii) of the Act. As earlier identified, the Authority’s reasons are not to be read with a keen eye for error. The Authority’s reasons reflect a consideration and deliberation upon both limbs of s 473DD of the Act.

2. Further, the Authority has, reading its reasons as a whole, expressly referred to personal credible information in paragraph 12. The Authority took into account the significance of the information. This is not a case where there is any proper basis to conclude that the Authority failed to take into account both limbs of s 473DD of the Act for the reasons summarised above. No jurisdictional error as alleged in ground 2 is made out.

Ground 7

1. In relation to ground 7, Mr Tambimuttu had issued to the first respondent, a subpoena in respect of documents that had come into existence as a result of an expedited referral system being a Primary Application Information Service (“PAIS”). That was a service the subject of guidance to permit particular clemency for protection to get accelerated assistance in their representation for the purpose of a protection visa application. It is clear from the application made for protection that the applicant’s migration representatives at the time the application was before the delegate and also before the Authority, were well aware that this was an application that had been started off as a result of a PAIS accelerated referral in circumstances where the applicant had suffered a car accident. It was common ground that there were five documents, which included the PAIS guidelines that were not referred by the Secretary to the Authority under s 473CB of the Act, Those are all documents that came into existence in relation to the PAIS application and ones in which I find the applicant’s migration representatives at the time of the Safe Haven Enterprise visa interview and at the time of the decision of the delegate and at the time of the application to the Authority, were well aware of the application of the PAIS scheme to the applicant in the present case and that there would be documents of the kind referred to.

2. None of the documents were the subject of any request by the applicant’s representative to be taken into consideration by the delegate or by the Authority. No reference was made to the PAIS process or those documents in any submission on behalf of the applicant. The documents on their face were not relevant, credible and significant. It was clearly open to the Secretary to conclude that the PAIS information in relation to the referral of the applicant for protection visa assistance was not relevant within the meaning of s 473CB(1)(c) of the Act. Further, I find that the documents the subject of that referral were not credible and relevant. I reject Mr Tambimuttu’s submissions that the material was of relevance because it identified the applicant was exceptionally vulnerable and it supported the applicant having received sections of counselling and that the applicant had met the criteria for the grant of assistance. None of those matters were relied upon by the applicant or the applicant’s representative in the context of the applicant’s claims to the delegate or the Authority.

3. To the extent that there was a car accident, the Authority accepted that that car accident occurred and that the applicant may have suffered a brain injury, which the Authority took into account in evaluating the applicant’s explanation for his failure to raise the new claim as well as in relation to the assessment of the applicant’s claims in evidence. I do not accept that any of the documents identified could properly be regarded as relevant to the applicant’s claims. Further, even if there was an error by the Secretary in determining whether or not the documents were relevant, it was an error within jurisdiction that would not give rise to a jurisdictional error. No jurisdictional error as alleged in ground 7 is made out.

Conclusion

1. As the third further amended application failed to make out any jurisdictional error, the third further amended application is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding thirty-three (33) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Street

Associate:

Date:  10 July 2018