FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
CNF18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 446
File number: SYG 1372 of 2018 Judgment of: JUDGE LAING Date of judgment: 31 May 2023 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority not to grant Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) (Subclass 790) visas – whether the Authority erred in its application of s 473DD of the Act – whether the Authority failed to consider an integer of the applicants’ claims – whether the Authority made findings that were illogical, unreasonable or otherwise closed – whether the Secretary’s referral of material under s 473CB of the Act was affected by legal unreasonableness – whether the Authority erred by not inviting further information in accordance with s 473DC of the Act – application succeeds Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 473DD, 473DC, 473CB Cases cited: AWO19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 27
CCM18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 158
CDZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 967
CJD18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 212
CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 50; (2019) 268 CLR 76
CQR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 61; (2019) 269 FCR 367
DIN19 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2021] FCCA 1
DOY21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 163
DPI17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 43; (2019) 269 FCR 134
GJM18 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2020] FCCA 632
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CED16 [2020] HCA 24; (2020) 94 ALJR 706
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99
SZOOR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 58; (2012) 202 FCR 1
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 95 Dates of hearing: 27 March, 12 May 2023 Place: Sydney Counsel for the Applicants: Mr G Schipp Solicitors for the Applicants: Allens Counsel for the Respondents: Mr G Johnson Solicitors for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore Lawyers ORDERS
SYG 1372 of 2018 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: CNF18
First ApplicantCNG18
Second ApplicantCNH18 (and another named in the Schedule)
Third ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First RespondentIMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
order made by:
JUDGE LAING
DATE OF ORDER:
31 May 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.A writ of certiorari issue bringing the decision of the second respondent dated 20 April 2018 into this Court and quashing it.
2.A writ of mandamus issue directing the second respondent to re-determine the review according to law.
Note: The form…
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- Case
- [2023] FedCFamC2G 446
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue in this case was whether the IAA had correctly exercised its discretion in determining that the new information did not meet the criteria for consideration under section 473DD of the Act. The applicants argued that the IAA had failed to properly consider the exceptional circumstances of the case, particularly in relation to a letter from a Church attendee and a psychological report. The Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs argued that the IAA had correctly exercised its discretion and had properly considered the relevant criteria.
In its reasoning, the court noted that the IAA had carefully considered the various pieces of new information and had determined that exceptional circumstances did not justify their consideration. The court found that the IAA had reasonably concluded that the information provided by the Church attendee, while postdating the original decision, did not meet the exceptional circumstances criterion as it largely duplicated information that had already been considered. The court also found that the psychological report, while noting the applicant's symptoms of PTSD and depression, did not provide sufficient evidence to justify its consideration as exceptional circumstances. The court concluded that the IAA had properly exercised its discretion and had not erred in its assessment.
The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed, and the decision of the IAA be affirmed. The court found that the IAA had correctly applied the relevant provisions of the Act and had properly exercised its discretion in determining that the new information did not meet the criteria for consideration under section 473DD of the Act.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicants also took issue with various assessments that the Authority undertook in applying s 473DD of the Act, by which it found that the requirement of “exceptional circumstances” was not satisfied. In this regard, s 473DD of the Act provided:MIGRATION ACT 1958 - SECT 473DDConsidering new information in exceptional circumstancesFor the purposes of making a decision in relation to a fast track reviewable decision, the Immigration Assessment Authority must not consider any new information unless:(a)the Authority is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information; and(b) the referred applicant satisfies the Authority that, in relation to any new information given, or proposed to be given, to the Authority by the referred applicant, the new information:(i)was not, and could not have been, provided to the Minister before the Minister made the decision under section 65; or(ii)is credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant's claims. In Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16; (2018) 264 CLR 217 at [30] per Gageler, Keane and Nettle JJ (footnotes omitted) it was stated:Quite what will amount to exceptional circumstances is inherently incapable of exhaustive statement. The word “exceptional”, in such a context, is not a term of art but “an ordinary, familiar English adjective”: “[t]o be exceptional a circumstance need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare; but it cannot be one that is regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered”. The applicants took issue with the Authority’s finding at [8] that exceptional circumstances did not justify consideration of the letter dated 16 December 2017 which was referred to at [5(b)] of the Authority’s decision. This was from a fellow Church attendee who gave evidence regarding various members of the Applicant’s family’s involvement with the Church and Christian faith. In concluding that the requirement of exceptional circumstances was not met, the Authority observed that it was not in dispute that the Applicant had been attending the Church since mid-2015. The Pastor had already provided a detailed account of his activities, which had been accepted as part of the review material (following exceptional circumstances being found in relation to that account). Whilst the 16 December 2017 letter also provided information regarding the Applicant’s son’s involvement, the son had not made his own claims and there was limited information relating to him. The applicants’ Counsel submitted at the hearing that this letter should have been found to have involved “the same exceptional circumstances” as those found regarding the Pastor’s letter referred to at [5(e)] of the Authority’s decision. However, I am not persuaded that it was closed to the Authority to reason that it had sufficient material before it that rendered this additional letter incapable of meeting the exceptional circumstances criterion. The availability of other, similar material was logically capable of informing the Authority’s assessment in this regard. Whilst the documents at [5(b)] and [5(e)] were not identical, they were directed towards similar ends (i.e. describing the family’s involvement with the Church and what had been understood by the Church community as genuine exhibitions of faith).