GOS18 v Minister for Immigration and Anor
[2020] FCCA 2694
•29 September 2020
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| GOS18 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2020] FCCA 2694 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for protection visa – judicial review of Immigration Assessment Authority decision – no failure to consider relevant material – no unreasonableness or illogicality in decision – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.473CB, 476(1). Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), r.2.08(1). |
| Cases cited: AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 89 BVI18 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2020] FCCA 9 CQR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 61 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairsv Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16 |
| Applicant: | GOS18 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
| File Number: | PEG 673 of 2018 |
| Judgment of: | Judge McNab |
| Hearing date: | 18 March 2020 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 16 April 2020 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 29 September 2020 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Blades |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Scales Community Legal Centre |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Ms Ladhams |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
The application filed on 17 December 2018 and amended on 10 May 2019 be dismissed.
The Applicant pay the costs of the First Respondent fixed in the sum of $7,467.
The name of the First Respondent be changed to the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
PEG 673 of 2018
| GOS18 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
| IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
By application filed on 17 December 2018 and amended on 10 May 2019, the Applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (“the Authority” or “the IAA”) made on 16 November 2018. The Authority’s decision affirmed a decision of a delegate (“the delegate”) of the First Respondent (“the Minister”) refusing to grant a Temporary Protection Visa (class XD, subclass 785) (“TPV”). This proceeding is brought pursuant to s476(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”).
The matter was heard on 18 March 2020.
For the reasons which follow, I have concluded that the application should be dismissed.
Background
The Applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived in Australia on 6 July 2013 as an unauthorised maritime arrival.
In 2014 the Applicant formed a relationship with Person A (“the Applicant’s husband”), and they had a ‘cultural ceremony/marriage’ on 8 May 2014.
The Applicant’s husband had arrived in Australia in November 2011 and on 20 November 2012 he lodged an application for a Protection visa (Class XB).
On 5 March 2015, the Applicant’s son was born.
On 29 April 2016 the Applicant’s husband was granted a Temporary Protection Visa (Class XD). On the same day, the Applicant’s son was also automatically granted a Temporary Protection Visa (Class XD), by operation of r2.08(1) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth).
On 15 July 2016, the Applicant was invited to apply for either a TPV or a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) visa (“SHEV”).
On 5 December 2016, the Applicant applied for a TPV, which included her son as a secondary Applicant.
On 8 March 2018, the Department of Home Affairs (“the Department”) invited the Applicant to a hearing before the delegate.
On 22 March 2018, the Applicant attended the interview with the Department.
On 19 July 2018, the delegate refused to grant the TPV. This decision also refused the Applicant son’s application.
On 26 July 2018, the matter was referred to the Authority.
On 16 November 2018, the Authority affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the Applicant the TPV. The Authority also accepted that the Applicant’s son was not a “fast track applicant” as defined in the Act, that he was granted a protection visa outside the fast track process and found that the matter had been referred to the Authority in error.
Grounds of review
The Applicant, by the amended application filed on 10 May 2019, sought review of the IAA decision. A number of the grounds set out in the amended application were abandoned on the day of the hearing and the following represents the extant grounds:
“1. The IAA’s decision is infected by the Secretary’s failure to provide information in relation to the Applicant’s husband’s claims as relevant information pursuant to the Secretary’s obligations under s 473CB(1)(c) of the Act.
2. The IAA committed jurisdictional error by making unreasonable or illogical findings as to the Applicant's credibility and claims, alternatively by failing to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the Applicant's claims, through:
a. Not accepting at [41] that the Applicant's mother was visited by the CID as it was not part of her evidence during the visa interview when this detail was in fact included in the Applicant's statutory declaration that accompanied her application form.
b. Finding, at [44], that the Applicant was no longer at risk of harm from particular individuals within the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) or CID, when the Applicant's evidence and country information indicted risk of harm from SLA soldiers and CID Officers in general and that risk of such harm is ongoing.
c. Finding, at [48] that the Applicant's specific risk profile from the three week period five years ago is not ongoing or is unlikely put her at a chance or risk of harm, when the IAA had noted that the harassment had continued for far longer than three weeks; at [21] the IAA acknowledged that in 2009 the Applicant was made to strip naked by authorities and left standing naked for hours, that in 2010 soldiers would visit her mother's restaurant and make inappropriate comments to her and also would stop her in the street when she was walking home and then in 2013 they repeatedly tried to get her to marry a member of the SLA army and separately to come alone to the CID camp.
…
f. Finding, at [50], that because the Applicant is educated, articulate and multilingual, any gender based discrimination would not "involve physical harm or harassment, significant economic hardship, denial of access to basic services, and/or denial of capacity to earn a livelihood, that would threaten the Applicant's capacity to subsist, or otherwise amount to serious harm", despite there being no reference in the three country reports relied upon by the IAA linking the risk of sexual assault and rape to only uneducated and inarticulate Tamil women. Furthermore, the IAA failed to consider the psychological harm caused by continued sexual harassment as identified in the Applicant's statutory declaration accompanying her application, where she stated at paragraph 42 that she had completely stopped leaving the house in order to hide from the soldiers after the CID came to her home, and at paragraph 62, that because of the ongoing threats and harassment, she was terrified and so scared that she wanted to kill herself.”
Ground 1
The Applicant’s ground 1 as amended was:
“The IAA’s decision is infected by the Secretary’s failure to provide information in relation the Applicant’s husband’s claim as relevant information pursuant to the Secretary’s obligation under s 473CB(1)(c) of the Act.”
With respect to the new ground 1, the Applicant submits that it is reasonable that the Secretary – who was aware that the Applicant’s husband had made protection claims – should have provided information about those claims to the IAA.
At [13] – [15] of submissions filed on 16 April 2020, the Applicant analogises this matter with BVI18 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2020] FCCA 9 (“BVI18”), saying that she had a reasonable expectation that information would be deemed relevant and provided to the Authority, and that:
a)during the protection visa interview, the delegate twice informed the Applicant that her marriage would be taken into consideration when assessing her claims;
b)the delegate took into account more than the fact of the Applicant’s marriage because it accessed the husband’s Departmental file; and so
c)based on the reasoning in BV118, the Secretary’s failure to provide the husband’s information about his protection claims constitutes a jurisdictional error.
Further, the Applicant submits that while she may not have expressly used the words, her claim to fear harm on the basis of her relationship with her husband was made or alternatively it was clearly identifiable because:
a)she raised that she was married; and
b)she mentioned her husband had been granted a protection visa in her statutory declaration.
The Applicant also says at [19] – [20] of those submissions that:
a)a claim of fear of harm on the basis of her husband’s status was a claim that clearly emerged on the information before the delegate, and in turn before the Secretary when assessing what information should be sent to the Authority: see NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 144 FCR 1; and
b)pursuant to the decision in AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 89, her claim “clearly emerged on the facts”, as it was based on the established facts of her marriage and the established principle of derivative status.
Ground 2
Particular A
The Applicant says at [36] of the submissions filed 26 February 2020 that the IAA fell into error by reason of “unreasonableness or illogicality by finding that evidence at the visa interview consisted only of the Applicant’s oral evidence and failing to consider the evidence provided by way of statutory declaration.”
Alternatively, the Applicant asserts also at [36], that the Authority “failed to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the Applicant’s claims by its overlooking of the relevant portion of the Applicant’s statutory declaration”.
Particular B
The Applicant submits that the IAA fell into jurisdictional error by asking itself the wrong question in relation to the Applicant’s risk of harm at the hands of the Sri Lankan Army (“ the SLA”) and the Criminal Investigation Department (“the CID”). She says at [38] of the submissions filed on 26 February 2020 of her submissions that the Authority:
“… should have asked itself is not whether those individuals would still remain in the area to pose a threat of harm to the Applicant, but whether the SLA and/or CID in general remain in the area and whether there remains a general threat of sexual based violence and harassment to single Tamil women.”
Particular C
The Applicant contends at [40] – [43] of the submissions filed on 26 February 2020 that the Authority made an illogical and/or unreasonable finding in relation to her risk profile.
The Applicant says at [40] that:
“The IAA found, at [48] (CB 275) that the Applicant’s specific risk profile from the three week period five years ago is not ongoing or is unlikely put her at a chance or risk of harm, when the IAA had noted that the harassment had continued for far longer than three weeks; at [21] (CB 271) the IAA acknowledged that in 2009 the Applicant was made to strip naked by authorities and left standing naked for hours, that in 2010 soldiers would visit her mother’s restaurant and make inappropriate comments to her and also would stop her in the street when she was walking home and then in 2013 they repeatedly tried to get her to marry a member of the SLA army and separately to come alone to the CID camp.”
At [41] the Applicant cites Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 (“Guo”) for the proposition that “[a]ssessing what is likely to happen in the future on the basis of past events involves questions of degree”. The Applicant refers to the following passage from Guo at page 574 – 575:
“The extent to which past events are a guide to the future depends on the degree of probability that they have occurred, the regularity with which and the conditions under which they have or probably have occurred and the likelihood that the introduction of new or other events may distort the cycle of regularity. In many cases, when the past has been evaluated, the probability that an event will occur may border on certainty. In other cases, the probability that an event will occur may be so low that, for practical purposes, it can be safely disregarded. In between these extremes, there are varying degrees of probability as to whether an event will or will not occur. But unless a person or tribunal attempts to determine what is likely to occur in the future in relation to a relevant field of inquiry, that person or tribunal has no rational basis for determining the chance of an event in that field occurring in the future.”
The Applicant also cites Abebe v the Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510 at [82] to support the proposition at [42] that “evidence that the Applicant had been persecuted in the past would give powerful support to the conclusion that the claimed fear is well-founded”.
The Applicant says at [43] of the submissions that the IAA was illogical or unreasonable in “discounting or failing to take into account the totality the Applicant’s experience of harassment and sexual assault as a an indication of the likelihood of the harassment continuing into the future, particularly in light of the country information referred to by the IAA.”
Particulars F
The Applicant contends that the IAA fell into legal unreasonableness in its decision making, by finding:
a)The Applicant’s risk profile, should she be returned to Sir Lanka, has changed because she is now a married woman: see [47] of the submissions filed 26 February 2020; and
b)That because the Applicant is “educated, articulate and multilingual, any gender based discrimination would not “involve physical harm or harassment, significant economic hardship, denial of access to basic service, and/or denial of capacity to earn a living, that would threaten the Applicant’s capacity to subsist, or otherwise amount to serious harm”.”: see [48] of the submissions filed 26 February 2020.
In the Applicant’s submissions, to meet the test for legal unreasonableness, the following principles apply:
“The correct approach is to ask whether it was open to the Minister to engage in the process of reasoning in which he engaged and to make the findings which he did: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16 at [132]-[133] per Crennan and Bell JJ. The standard is one of “extreme illogicality or irrationality” and the Applicant must show that a reasonable or rational person would not have made such findings or employed such reasoning. It is not enough that the impugned finding or reasoning is something about which reasonable minds might differ: SZMDS at [135].”
In the Applicant’s submission, the IAA fell into unreasonableness because:
“There is no reference in the three country reports relied upon by the IAA (CB 275) linking the risk of sexual assault and rape to only uneducated and inarticulate Tamil women. Furthermore, the IAA failed to consider the psychological harm caused by continued sexual harassment as identified in the Applicant’s statutory declaration accompanying her application, where she stated at paragraph 42 that she had completely stopped leaving the house in order to hide from the soldiers after the CID came to her home, and at paragraph 62, that because of the ongoing threats and harassment, she was terrified and so scared that she wanted to kill herself (CB 74-76)”
First Respondent’s Submissions
Ground 1
No breach of section 473CB(1)(c)
With regards to this claim the Minister states at [30] – [32] that:
a)at the time the decision had been referred to the Authority, the Applicant had not advanced any claims that she would face a chance of harm due to her husband’s profile in Sri Lanka;
b)no such claim clearly emerged on the material before the delegate;
c)there is no basis on which it can be said that the Secretary erred by not including information about the Applicant’s husbands claims in forming a reasonable and subjective assessment of what material fell within s 473CB(1)(c); and
d)citing Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2018] HCA 16 at [48], the Minister says that had the information about the husband’s claims been provided to the Authority, it would have been new information, and the Authority could not have taken it into account when assessing the Applicant’s protection claims unless it was first satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering it.
Ground 2
Particular A
It is submitted that the finding at [41] was open to the Authority on the evidence before it, because the Authority:
a)was aware that the Applicant had claimed in her written statement that her mother was visited by the CID in 2015;
b)was allowed to take into account the Applicant’s failure to mention this incident at the interview; and
c)outlined a number of other reasons for not accepting that the Applicant’s mother was visited by the CID in 2015.
Particular B
The Minister says that there is nothing unreasonable in the Authority’s finding on the issues of whether the Applicant was no longer at risk from particular people within the SLA, nor did the Authority address the wrong question as it did not purport to address whether the Applicant is at risk from soldiers or officers in general at [44], nor was it required to do so in circumstances where it addressed that separate claim elsewhere.
Particular C
The Minister contends that the Authority’s finding at [48] of the decision was not unreasonable because the Authority was clearly aware of earlier harassment examples (having referred to them earlier) and appropriately considered a range of evidence in reaching its findings, including country information, the Applicant’s current circumstances and any profile that she may have from past harassment.
Particular F
The Minister claims that the finding at [50] was open to the Authority based on country information, and as the Applicant’s expressions of subjective fear from a particular group of people in her statutory declaration were:
a)no longer ongoing;
b)based on general information about incidents involving third persons; and
c)not directly relevant to the Authority’s finding at [50].
Consideration
Ground 1
The Applicant submits that the decision of the IAA is affected by jurisdictional error by reason of the Secretary’s failure to provide information in relation to the Applicant’s husband’s claims, as those claims were relevant information which ought to have been provided pursuant to s473CB(1) of the Act.
Section 473CB(1) provides:
“(1) The Secretary must give to the Immigration Assessment Authority the following material [review material] in respect of each fast track reviewable decision referred to the Authority under section 473CA:
(a) a statement that:
(i) sets out the findings of fact made by the person who made the decision; and
(ii) refers to the evidence on which those findings were based; and
(iii) gives the reasons for the decision;
(b) material provided by the referred Applicant to the person making the decision before the decision was made;
(c) any other material that is in the Secretary's possession or control and is considered by the Secretary (at the time the decision is referred to the Authority) to be relevant to the review;
(d) the following details:
(i) the last address for service provided to the Minister by the referred Applicant for the purposes of receiving documents;
(ii) the last residential or business address provided to the Minister by the referred Applicant for the purposes of receiving documents;
(iii) the last fax number, email address or other electronic address provided to the Minister by the referred Applicant for the purposes of receiving documents;
(iv) if an address or fax number mentioned in subparagraph (i), (ii) or (iii) has not been provided to the Minister by the referred Applicant, or if the Minister reasonably believes that the last such address or number provided to the Minister is no longer correct--such an address or number (if any) that the Minister reasonably believes to be correct at the time the decision is referred to the Authority;
(v) if the referred Applicant is a minor--the last address or fax number of a kind mentioned in subparagraph (i), (ii), (iii) or (iv) (if any) for a carer of the minor”
In order to comply with the obligations under s473CB(1)(c), the Secretary is required to form a view as to what materials held by the Department are relevant to the IAA’s review in a reasonable manner and based on a correct understanding of the law. The assessment of information is at the time the decision is referred to the Authority and not what might be raised by way of new information or new claims: see CQR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 61 at [106].
The Applicant relies on comments made by the delegate in the protection visa interview with the Applicant on 22 March 2018, the transcript of which is contained in the Applicant’s Supplementary Court Book at page 4 – 89. At page 39 of the Supplementary Court Book, the delegate raised with the Applicant that her claims to protection were based on her Tamil race, that she had an LTTE connection and that she had a young son.
At page 40 the Applicant stated:
“my husband has [a] temporary protection visa. If I register the marriage, will I get temporary protection visa as well?”
The delegate clarified that the husband had a temporary protection visa and that the son has a temporary protection Visa because he was part of the husband’s application.
At page 41, the delegate stated:
“the fact that you are married and that you have a son, will be taken into consideration in the overall picture of making the assessment of your case.
…
And then because the time has passed, you will become married and have a son, your health condition all these matters will be taken into consideration.”
The Applicant also made mention of her marriage and her husband’s protection Visa status as part of the background information in her statutory declaration in support of her claim for protection.
On the basis that the material before the delegate and the comments made by the delegate, there was no claim for protection on account of the husband’s protection claims and accordingly there was no obligation on the Secretary to provide information about the husband’s claims to the IAA. The comments of the delegate making reference to the fact that the Applicant was married and that her husband had a protection Visa is not a basis for finding that the delegate would take into account the husband’s claims for protection. There was no claim made such that the circumstances giving rise to the husband’s application being relevant to her application nor does such a claim arise as a result of the Applicant raising that the husband had a TPV.
For these reasons the Secretary did not act unreasonably or in breach of s473CB(1)(c) in not providing documents to the IAA relevant to the husband’s protection visa application.
Ground 2
Particular A
At [41] of the decision the IAA delegate stated that he did not accept that the Applicant’s mother was visited by the CID in 2015, as it was said that this claim did not form part of the Applicant’s evidence during the protection visa interview.
At paragraph [69] of the Applicant’s statutory declaration (found in the Respondent’s Court book at page 77) the Applicant stated:
“the CID are still looking for me. In 2016 the CID went to see my mother in Kilinochchi. My mother was not living in the house we were in when I left Sri Lanka. They found her at her new house. They said “your daughter is going to come home safely to Sri Lanka, the Australian government are sending her home”.”
The IAA considered the claim and therefore must have been aware that the claim was raised by the Applicant. The IAA also gave reasons for finding that the Applicant would not be at risk because from her family: see [36] – [49] of the decision. The IAA also gave reasons for rejecting the Applicant’s claims additional to the Applicant not having raised this matter in the Visa interviews in not accepting that the Applicant’s mother was visited by the CID in 2015. There is no error apparent in the manner in which the IAA considered this matter.
Particular B
By this ground the Applicant submits that the IAA was an error in finding at [44] of the decision that the Applicant was no longer at risk from particular individuals in the Sri Lankan Army (“SLA”) or the CID when country information indicated a risk of harm from the SLA soldiers and CID officers in particular.
At [44] of the decision the IAA found that the Applicant had experienced serious harm from a group of soldiers and officers of the SLA and CID but it did not consider that risk of harm to be ongoing. The Tribunal did consider the risk to the Applicant based on gender at [45] – [52] of the decision. The consideration of ongoing risk to the Applicant was also dealt with at [36] – [40] of the decision. The IAA acknowledged and accepted the Applicant’s claims of harm that occurred in 2009 when where she had been stripped searched and left to stand naked for hours. It also accepted that she was subjected to ongoing harassment in about 2013: see [21] – [28] of the decision. There is no apparent irrationality or illogicality in the manner in which the Tribunal approached this question.
Given the terms of this ground of review, the Applicant is asking the court to engage in merits review. The IAA gave reasons for its finding that the risk of harm was not ongoing. The Court notes in the course of hearing submissions that there was a significant tension between the IAA’s finding on the one hand that the Applicant had been subjected to significant harm in 2009 and 2013 but finding on the other that the risk of significant harm was not ongoing. I do not think that the tension between these positions rises to the point of illogicality or legal unreasonableness given the reasons provided by the IAA.
Particular C
The Applicant submits that the IAA fell into jurisdictional error by making a finding at [48] of the decision that was illogical or unreasonable by:
a)failing to be satisfied that the Applicant’s specific risk profile is ongoing; and
b)where country information relied upon by the IAA (see Applicant’s Court Book at page 275) suggested a person with the Applicant’s risk profile, being a young Tamil woman, had changed as she was now a married woman.
At [48] the IAA stated:
“As above, I have found the chance that the Sinhalese SLA and CID officers that threaten and harm the Applicant and her family would still be in the area is remote, as is the prospects of any further encounters with these men. I am not satisfied that the Applicant specific profile from this three week period five years ago is ongoing or would put her at a chance or risk of harm generally. The Applicant circumstances have also changed. She is now married and has a child. In addition, as above, I found that she would be returning to should anchor to live in a household with a male figure present (her brother-in-law) and strong female figures.”
In my view the finding at [48] of the decision is not illogical or unreasonable, particularly when read with paragraphs [45] – [47] and [49] – [52]. The ground of review raises that the Applicant had been harassed by soldiers who were pressuring her to marry a member of the SLA in 2013. The IAA at [41] of the decision made findings of fact that the Applicant’s profile from the period of harassment in 2013 was not ongoing and refer to the Applicant’s change of circumstances. In particular it raised that she was married with a child and that she would be returning to live in Sri Lanka in a household with her brother-in-law and her mother. The IAA held at [47] of the decision that the mother was a strong female figure who had demonstrated in the past that she was not intimidated or threatened by the authorities even during insecure times. The IAA at [49] of the decision made reference to the improved security situation in Sri Lanka, the reduction in military and security forces in the North and East of Sri Lanka and the support that the Applicant would have from her family. When the decision is read as a whole, the decision of the IAA in relation to this ground is not illogical or legally unreasonable and it cannot be said that extreme irrationality or illogicality is shown: see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR at [148].
Particular F
At [50] of the decision, the IAA held:
“I accept the Applicant may face some societal discrimination on the basis of her gender. However, based on the country information before me, and having regard to her personal circumstances (she is educated, articulate and multilingual), I’m not satisfied that any gender-based discrimination she may experience would involve physical harm or harassment, significant economic hardship, denial of access to basic services, and/or a denial of capacity to earn a livelihood, that would threaten the Applicant’s capacity to subsist, or otherwise it amount to serious harm.”
The Applicant submits at [48] of submissions filed on 26 February 2020 that the this finding was infected by error because there was nothing in the country reports relied upon by the IAA linking the risk to sexual assault and rape to only uneducated and inarticulate Tamil women. It is also said at [48] that the IAA failed to consider “the psychological harm caused by continued sexual harassment as identified the Applicant statutory declaration” whereby it was said that the Applicant had completely stopped leaving her house in order to hide from soldiers after the CID came to her home.
The findings of the IAA at [50] of the decision must be read with the findings made in relation to the Applicant’s personal circumstances made in the preceding paragraphs. In particular the IAA found that there was no ongoing risk to the Applicant from the particular group of people who harassed her in 2013. The Court has held that finding was not unreasonable or illogical.
Further the related findings of the IAA at [51] of the decision in relation to the risks of gender-based and sexual violence were not limited to consideration of women who were educated, articulate and multilingual. The IAA found that the weight of the advice in the reports before the IAA, did not indicate that gender-based and sexual violence continues to occur at a level, frequency extent where considered the Applicant would face a real chance of gender-based violence on her return to her home area.
For these reasons there is no illogicality or legal unreasonableness evident in the findings of the IAA in relation to this ground.
Conclusion
For these reasons the amended application filed on 10 May 2019 must be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding sixty (60) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge McNab
Associate:
Date: 29 September 2020
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