FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v AMA16 [2017] FCAFC 136
Appeal from: AMA16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 303 File number: VID 263 of 2017 Judge: DOWSETT, GRIFFITHS AND CHARLESWORTH JJ Date of judgment: 30 August 2017 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal against primary judge’s finding that a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) was vitiated by apprehended bias – whether primary judge denied the appellant procedural fairness in finding that the Secretary of the Department had given to the IAA information concerning a serious criminal charge against the first respondent without statutory warrant when it is contended that this issue was not raised below – whether primary judge erred in holding that the IAA’s decision was affected by apprehended bias
Held: appeal dismissed with costs
Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 25D
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 65, 46A, 473BA, 473BB, 473CA, 473CB, 473CC, 473DA, 473DB, 473DC, 473DD, 473DE, 473EA, 473EB, 473FA, 473GA, 473GB, 473JE
Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth)
Public Service Act 1999 (Cth)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) r 4.43
Cases cited: ALA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 30
Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 72; 225 CLR 88
Crowley v Holmes [2003] FCAFC 189; 132 FCR 114
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1979] FCA 59; 24 ALR 577
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337
Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd [2007]HCA 22; 230 CLR 89
Isbester v Knox City Council [2015] HCA 20; 255 CLR 135
Islam v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1526
Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association [1983] HCA 17; 151 CLR 288
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) HCA 17; 205 CLR 507
Minister for Natural Resources v New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council (1987) 9 NSWLR 154
O’Sullivan v Medical Tribunal of New South Wales [2009] NSWCA 374
Shrestha v Migration Review Tribunal [2015] FCAFC 103; 229 FCR 301
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 955
SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80
Date of hearing: 7 August 2017 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 101 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr BD Kaplan Solicitor for the Appellant: Clayton Utz Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms L De Ferrari Solicitor for the First Respondent: Victoria Legal Aid ORDERS
VID 263 of 2017 BETWEEN: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Appellant
AND: AMA16
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Third Respondent
JUDGES:
DOWSETT, GRIFFITHS AND CHARLESWORTH JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
30 AUGUST 2017
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- Case
- [2017] FCAFC 136
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the Minister was a proper party and contradictor in the judicial review proceeding below. The Minister's interests were affected by the FCCA's orders, as it had portfolio responsibility for the administration of the Act. The court rejected the Minister's application to adduce fresh evidence on the ground of lack of relevance. The court also found that the primary judge's finding that there was no statutory warrant for the Secretary to include the Departmental communications in the material provided to the IAA did not involve procedural unfairness. The relevant particulars in the final judicial review application did not include an express claim that the Secretary lacked power to include the Departmental communications in the material referred to the IAA.
The court concluded that the legislative scheme obliged the IAA to conduct its review of a fast track reviewable decision referred to it by considering the review material provided to it under s 473CB, without accepting or requesting new information and without interviewing the referred applicant. The IAA may, however, invite a person to give new information to it, either orally or in writing. The court found that the primary judge was correct in holding that the IAA's decision was affected by apprehended bias because of the provision to the IAA of the legal advice and Departmental communications, both of which must have been considered to be relevant to whether the delegate's decision should be affirmed, without disclosing that material to the judicial review applicant.
The appeal was dismissed with costs, and the Minister was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs, as agreed or assessed. The court also dismissed the first respondent's notice of objection to competency and notice of contention.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave to file and serve the affidavit of Paul Lajos Takas affirmed on 25 July 2017 be refused.
2. The appeal be dismissed.
3. The first respondent’s notice of objection to competency dated 30 March 2017 and notice of contention dated 30 March 2017 be dismissed.
4. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Division 5 of Pt 7AA contains provisions concerning the exercise of the IAA’s powers and functions. It is desirable to set out s 473FA, which describes inter alia how the IAA is to exercise its functions:473FA How Immigration Assessment Authority is to exercise its functions (1)The Immigration Assessment Authority, in carrying out its functions under this Act, is to pursue the objective of providing a mechanism of limited review that is efficient, quick, free of bias and consistent with Division 3 (conduct of review). Note: Under section 473DB the Immigration Assessment Authority is generally required to undertake a review on the papers. (2)The Immigration Assessment Authority, in reviewing a decision, is not bound by technicalities, legal forms or rules of evidence. It is notable that it is explicitly stated in s 473FA(1) that, in carrying out its functions, the IAA is to pursue the objective set out therein and that an element of that objective is to provide a mechanism which is free of bias (and consistent with Div 3). The judicial review proceeding below After obtaining leave to amend the judicial review application on three occasions, the first respondent challenged both the IAA’s decision and the Secretary’s decision to provide certain documents to the IAA. Grounds 1 and 2 concerned the IAA’s decision. Ground 3 concerned the Secretary’s decision. It is desirable to say something more concerning the judicial review challenge advanced by the first respondent below having regard to the Minister’s complaint on appeal that there was a denial of procedural fairness concerning the FCCA’s finding that there was no statutory mandate for the Secretary to provide the Departmental communications to the IAA. The material sent to the IAA by the Secretary included a Departmental email dated 30 July 2015. It stated that the first respondent had been charged in Melbourne on 17 July 2015 with assaulting a female in indecent circumstances while being aware that the person was not consenting. It also stated that the charge of indecent assault had a Court date of 11 September 2015 at the Melbourne Magistrates’ Court. Ground 1 of the final judicial review application claimed that the IAA’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error, which was described as “excess of jurisdiction/denial of natural justice”. In essence, this ground focussed on the natural justice hearing rule and the extent to which it had been ousted by s 473DA. The claim that the IAA’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error (excess of jurisdiction/ denial of natural justice) was repeated in ground 2, but this ground focussed on the IAA’s failure to disclose to the judicial review applicant that it had received legal advice (which related to the proper address to which Departmental correspondence should be sent to the visa applicant) and the Departmental communications from the Secretary as part of the “review material”. The particulars to ground 2 included a claim that the Secretary had no power to give legal advice to the IAA as part of the “review material”, and a cross-reference was given to ground 3 of the final judicial review application (see ground 2(b)). There was no similar express claim of a lack of power by the Secretary to give the Departmental communications to the IAA, however, particular (d) claimed that the Secretary’s provision of “review material” in excess of power necessarily vitiated the IAA’s decision. Arguably, this may have implicitly referred to the Departmental communication even though the immediate context might suggest that it related to the legal advice. And particular (f) to ground 2 claimed that the legal advice and Departmental communications were material given to the IAA by a person other than the judicial review applicant that could not be dismissed as not relevant, not credible or not significant and were potentially adverse. It was then contended that the Act did not exclude the common law obligation to provide the judicial review applicant with an opportunity to rebut, qualify or comment upon the legal advice and Departmental communications. Finally, particular (h) to ground 2 stated that, in the alternative, the IAA’s decision was affected by apprehended bias because of the provision to the IAA of the legal advice and Departmental communications, both of which must have been considered to be relevant to whether the delegate’s decision should be affirmed, without disclosing that material to the judicial review applicant.