Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v AMA16

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v AMA16 [2017] FCAFC 136

Appeal from: AMA16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 303
File number: VID 263 of 2017
Judge: DOWSETT, GRIFFITHS AND CHARLESWORTH JJ
Date of judgment: 30 August 2017
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal against primary judge’s finding that a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) was vitiated by apprehended bias – whether primary judge denied the appellant procedural fairness in finding that the Secretary of the Department had given to the IAA information concerning a serious criminal charge against the first respondent without statutory warrant when it is contended that this issue was not raised below – whether primary judge erred in holding that the IAA’s decision was affected by apprehended bias

Held: appeal dismissed with costs

Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 25D

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 65, 46A, 473BA, 473BB, 473CA, 473CB, 473CC, 473DA, 473DB, 473DC, 473DD, 473DE, 473EA, 473EB, 473FA, 473GA, 473GB, 473JE

Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth)

Public Service Act 1999 (Cth)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) r 4.43

Cases cited:

ALA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 30

Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 72; 225 CLR 88

Crowley v Holmes [2003] FCAFC 189; 132 FCR 114

Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1979] FCA 59; 24 ALR 577

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337

Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd [2007]HCA 22; 230 CLR 89

Isbester v Knox City Council [2015] HCA 20; 255 CLR 135

Islam v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1526

Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association [1983] HCA 17; 151 CLR 288

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) HCA 17; 205 CLR 507

Minister for Natural Resources v New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council (1987) 9 NSWLR 154

O’Sullivan v Medical Tribunal of New South Wales [2009] NSWCA 374

Shrestha v Migration Review Tribunal [2015] FCAFC 103; 229 FCR 301

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 955

SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80

Webb v The Queen [1994] HCA 30; 181 CLR 41

Date of hearing: 7 August 2017
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 101
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr BD Kaplan
Solicitor for the Appellant: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms L De Ferrari
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Victoria Legal Aid

ORDERS

VID 263 of 2017
BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Appellant

AND:

AMA16

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Third Respondent

JUDGES:

DOWSETT, GRIFFITHS AND CHARLESWORTH JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

30 AUGUST 2017

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Details
Case
[2017] FCAFC 136
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v AMA16 was brought by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection against the Federal Circuit Court of Australia's (FCCA) decision, which found that a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) was vitiated by apprehended bias. The first respondent, AMA16, had challenged both the IAA's decision and the Secretary's decision to provide certain documents to the IAA. Ground 1 and 2 of the final judicial review application concerned the IAA's decision, while ground 3 concerned the Secretary's decision. The Minister's appeal raised two main issues: whether the primary judge denied procedural fairness in finding that the Secretary had no statutory mandate to provide the Departmental communications to the IAA, and whether the primary judge erred in holding that the IAA's decision was affected by apprehended bias.

The court found that the Minister was a proper party and contradictor in the judicial review proceeding below. The Minister's interests were affected by the FCCA's orders, as it had portfolio responsibility for the administration of the Act. The court rejected the Minister's application to adduce fresh evidence on the ground of lack of relevance. The court also found that the primary judge's finding that there was no statutory warrant for the Secretary to include the Departmental communications in the material provided to the IAA did not involve procedural unfairness. The relevant particulars in the final judicial review application did not include an express claim that the Secretary lacked power to include the Departmental communications in the material referred to the IAA.

The court concluded that the legislative scheme obliged the IAA to conduct its review of a fast track reviewable decision referred to it by considering the review material provided to it under s 473CB, without accepting or requesting new information and without interviewing the referred applicant. The IAA may, however, invite a person to give new information to it, either orally or in writing. The court found that the primary judge was correct in holding that the IAA's decision was affected by apprehended bias because of the provision to the IAA of the legal advice and Departmental communications, both of which must have been considered to be relevant to whether the delegate's decision should be affirmed, without disclosing that material to the judicial review applicant.

The appeal was dismissed with costs, and the Minister was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs, as agreed or assessed. The court also dismissed the first respondent's notice of objection to competency and notice of contention.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to file and serve the affidavit of Paul Lajos Takas affirmed on 25 July 2017 be refused.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The first respondent’s notice of objection to competency dated 30 March 2017 and notice of contention dated 30 March 2017 be dismissed.

4. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The objection to competency is misconceived. The Minister was a proper party and contradictor in the judicial review proceeding below (see s 479 of the Act). Having portfolio responsibility for the administration of the Act, the Minister’s interests were affected by the FCCA’s orders. The Minister’s application to adduce fresh evidence At the outset of the hearing, the Minister sought leave to file and serve an affidavit of Paul Lajos Takacs affirmed on 25 July 2017. Mr Takacs annexed to his affidavit extracts from the Commonwealth Public Service Gazette for 12 March 2015 regarding candidates for appointment to the then Migration Review Tribunal and RRT. It made reference to the proposed establishment of the IAA within the RRT to review fast track protection visa decisions. It contained the following information:Successful candidates will have very good analytical, interpersonal and communication skills, possess a strong sense of fairness, have sound knowledge of administrative law, exercise good judgement and be able to make and write high quality decisions. The IAA will consist of the Senior Reviewer, a number of reviewers and APS employees allocated to the IAA. Reviewers report to the Senior Reviewer. Also annexed to Mr Takacs’s affidavit was a Certificate of Enrolment for Ms Patricia Anne Tyson, who was the person who constituted the IAA in this matter. The certificate disclosed that Ms Tyson had been entered on the roll of Legal Practitioners of the Supreme Court of the ACT on 16 December 2005. Mr Kaplan, who appeared for the Minister, submitted that the material was relevant to ground 2 of the notice of appeal, concerning apprehended bias. He said that the hypothetical lay observer in the apprehended bias test should be attributed with knowledge of the fact that Ms Tyson had legal qualifications and would, therefore, be able to put out of her mind irrelevant material. He also explained that, even if the proposed tender of the material was rejected, the Minister would submit that the informed lay observer should be attributed with knowledge that Ms Tyson, as an employee under the Public Service Act, was obliged to act in accordance with the APS Values and Code of Conduct associated with such employment. The Court rejected the further evidence on the ground of lack of relevance. The Act is silent on the qualifications of a Reviewer, save that it is provided in s 473JE(1) that Reviewers are to be persons engaged under the Public Service Act. Accordingly, unlike the position in O’Sullivan, the professional qualifications of Reviewers is unspecified in the legislation. The Minister did not point to any legal authority which supported the tender of such material in an apprehended bias case. Indeed, the proposed tender would appear to be contrary to authority (see Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association [1983] HCA 17; 151 CLR 288 (Livesey) at [16] per Mason, Murphy, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ). Disposition of the appeal Ground 1 (procedural unfairness): For the following reasons, I consider that the primary judge’s finding that there was no statutory warrant for the Secretary to include the Departmental communications in the material provided to the IAA did not involve procedural unfairness. The relevant particulars in the final judicial review application did not include an express claim that the Secretary lacked power to include the Departmental communications (as opposed to the legal advice) in the material referred to the IAA. However, as noted above, it is arguable that such a claim was implicit in particular (d) to ground 2. This particular asserted that the Secretary’s provision of “review material” in excess of power necessarily vitiated the IAA’s decision.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The procedure for referring a fast track reviewable decision to the IAA is set out in Div 2 of Pt 7AA. The Minister is obliged to refer a fast track reviewable decision (as defined in s 473BB) to the IAA “as soon as reasonably practicable after the decision is made” (s 473CA). At the same time as the referral is made (or as soon as reasonably practicable thereafter), the Secretary must give to the IAA certain material, which is known as “review material”, in respect of each referred decision (s 473CB(1)). The review material must include a copy of the primary decision-maker’s written reasons for decision and any material provided to the primary decision-maker by the referred applicant. Significantly, the review material must also include (emphasis added): “[a]ny other material that is in the Secretary’s possession or control and is considered by the Secretary (at the time the decision is referred to the [IAA]) to be relevant to the review” (s 473CB(1)(c)). This provision lies at the heart of the appeal. The IAA is obliged to “review” a fast track reviewable decision which is referred to it under s 473CA (s 473CC(1)). Division 3 of Pt 7AA describes the conduct of a review of a fast track reviewable decision by the IAA. Section 473DA is an important provision:473DA Exhaustive statement of natural justice hearing rule (1)This Division, together with sections 473GA and 473GB, is taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to reviews conducted by the Immigration Assessment Authority. (2)To avoid doubt, nothing in this Part requires the Immigration Assessment Authority to give to a referred applicant any material that was before the Minister when the Minister made the decision under section 65. The proper construction of this provision, and whether it entirely ousts the natural justice hearing rule is raised by the notice of contention. It is notable, however, that the exclusion focusses exclusively on the first limb of natural justice, which relates to the fair hearing rule, and not the other limb relating to bias. The legislative scheme obliges the IAA to conduct its review of a fast track reviewable decision referred to it by considering the review material provided to it under s 473CB, without accepting or requesting new information and without interviewing the referred applicant (s 473DB(1)). In other words, the review is generally conducted on the papers and focuses on the review material provided by the Secretary to the IAA. There are provisions in Subdiv C of Div 3 concerning the IAA getting documents or information which were not before the primary decision-maker when he or she made the decision under s 65 and which the IAA considers may be relevant. Such documents or information are described as “new information” (s 473DC). It is made clear that the IAA does not have a duty to get, request or accept, any new information if requested to do so by a referred applicant or anyone else (s 473DC(2)). The IAA may, however, invite a person to give new information to it, either orally or in writing (s 473DC(3)).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Division 5 of Pt 7AA contains provisions concerning the exercise of the IAA’s powers and functions. It is desirable to set out s 473FA, which describes inter alia how the IAA is to exercise its functions:473FA How Immigration Assessment Authority is to exercise its functions (1)The Immigration Assessment Authority, in carrying out its functions under this Act, is to pursue the objective of providing a mechanism of limited review that is efficient, quick, free of bias and consistent with Division 3 (conduct of review). Note: Under section 473DB the Immigration Assessment Authority is generally required to undertake a review on the papers. (2)The Immigration Assessment Authority, in reviewing a decision, is not bound by technicalities, legal forms or rules of evidence. It is notable that it is explicitly stated in s 473FA(1) that, in carrying out its functions, the IAA is to pursue the objective set out therein and that an element of that objective is to provide a mechanism which is free of bias (and consistent with Div 3). The judicial review proceeding below After obtaining leave to amend the judicial review application on three occasions, the first respondent challenged both the IAA’s decision and the Secretary’s decision to provide certain documents to the IAA. Grounds 1 and 2 concerned the IAA’s decision. Ground 3 concerned the Secretary’s decision. It is desirable to say something more concerning the judicial review challenge advanced by the first respondent below having regard to the Minister’s complaint on appeal that there was a denial of procedural fairness concerning the FCCA’s finding that there was no statutory mandate for the Secretary to provide the Departmental communications to the IAA. The material sent to the IAA by the Secretary included a Departmental email dated 30 July 2015. It stated that the first respondent had been charged in Melbourne on 17 July 2015 with assaulting a female in indecent circumstances while being aware that the person was not consenting. It also stated that the charge of indecent assault had a Court date of 11 September 2015 at the Melbourne Magistrates’ Court. Ground 1 of the final judicial review application claimed that the IAA’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error, which was described as “excess of jurisdiction/denial of natural justice”. In essence, this ground focussed on the natural justice hearing rule and the extent to which it had been ousted by s 473DA. The claim that the IAA’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error (excess of jurisdiction/ denial of natural justice) was repeated in ground 2, but this ground focussed on the IAA’s failure to disclose to the judicial review applicant that it had received legal advice (which related to the proper address to which Departmental correspondence should be sent to the visa applicant) and the Departmental communications from the Secretary as part of the “review material”. The particulars to ground 2 included a claim that the Secretary had no power to give legal advice to the IAA as part of the “review material”, and a cross-reference was given to ground 3 of the final judicial review application (see ground 2(b)). There was no similar express claim of a lack of power by the Secretary to give the Departmental communications to the IAA, however, particular (d) claimed that the Secretary’s provision of “review material” in excess of power necessarily vitiated the IAA’s decision. Arguably, this may have implicitly referred to the Departmental communication even though the immediate context might suggest that it related to the legal advice. And particular (f) to ground 2 claimed that the legal advice and Departmental communications were material given to the IAA by a person other than the judicial review applicant that could not be dismissed as not relevant, not credible or not significant and were potentially adverse. It was then contended that the Act did not exclude the common law obligation to provide the judicial review applicant with an opportunity to rebut, qualify or comment upon the legal advice and Departmental communications. Finally, particular (h) to ground 2 stated that, in the alternative, the IAA’s decision was affected by apprehended bias because of the provision to the IAA of the legal advice and Departmental communications, both of which must have been considered to be relevant to whether the delegate’s decision should be affirmed, without disclosing that material to the judicial review applicant.