Vasilj v Queensland Law Society

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QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL


CITATION:

Vasilj v Queensland Law Society [2024] QCAT 517

PARTIES:

CHANEL VASILJ

(applicant)

v

QUEENSLAND LAW SOCIETY

(respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

OCR119-24

MATTER TYPE:

Occupational regulation matters

DELIVERED ON:

11 December 2024

HEARING DATE:

9 October 2024

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Justice Williams

ORDERS:

1.     Williams J be recused from further hearing and determining the Review Application.

2.     The Review Application be adjourned and listed before the President of QCAT for:

(a)     allocation to another judicial member for re-hearing;

(b)     further directions for the re-hearing; and

(c)     directions as to the appropriate procedure as to the costs of the Recusal Application.

CATCHWORDS:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS – QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL – where at the beginning of the substantive hearing the Tribunal member disclosed previous association with the Respondent – where the Tribunal member disclosed an honorary life membership of the Respondent – where the Applicant did not object to those disclosures – where the Respondent published articles in relation to the substantive hearing after it was heard – where the articles identified the Applicant –  whether the articles constituted extraneous information – whether the Tribunal member should be recused on the basis of apprehended bias as a result of the alleged extraneous information

Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2012 (Qld), r 28.1
Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 51(4), s 51(9), s 598
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 18, s 19, s 20, s 21(1), s 21(2), s 23, s 24(1), s 28(1), s 28(3), s 138
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2009 (Qld), r 92, r 93

AAL19 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 114; (2020) 277 FCR 393, cited
Cabcharge Australia Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2010] FCAFC 111, considered
Charisteas v Charisteas [2021] HCA 29; (2021) 273 CLR 289, considered
CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 50; (2019) 268 CLR 76, cited
Crime and Misconduct Commission v Assistant Commissioner Ross Barnett [2010] QCAT 690, cited
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337, applied
GetSwift Ltd v Webb [2021] FCAFC 26; (2021) 388 ALR 75, considered
Isbester v Knox City Council [2015] HCA 20; (2015) 255 CLR 135, considered
Leeson v General Council of Medical Education and Registration (1889) 43 Ch D 366, cited
Legal Practitioner v Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory [2018] ACTSC 351, cited
Legal Services Commissioner v Orchard [2012] QCAT 583, cited
MG v R [2007] NSWCCA 57; (2007) 69 NSWLR 20, cited
Michael Wilson & Partners v Nicholls [2011] HCA 48; (2011) 244 CLR 427, cited
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v AMA16 [2017] FCAFC 136; (2017) 254 FCR 534, considered
O’Sullivan v Medical Tribunal of New South Wales [2009] NSWCA 374, considered
Parbery & Ors v QNI Metals Pty Ltd (No 8)

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Details
Case
[2024] QCAT 517
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Vasilj v Queensland Law Society, the court was presented with an application for the recusal of a tribunal member on the grounds of apprehended bias. The Applicant argued that the tribunal member should be recused due to the Respondent's publication of articles that identified the Applicant and due to the tribunal member's honorary life membership in the Respondent. The Applicant contended that these factors led to a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the tribunal member.

The legal issues before the court included whether the articles published by the Respondent constituted extraneous information, and if so, whether this extraneous information, in combination with the tribunal member's honorary life membership, constituted a ground for recusal. The Applicant needed to demonstrate that a fair-minded lay observer would reasonably apprehend bias on the part of the tribunal member. The tribunal member had made disclosures regarding their past association with the Respondent, but the Applicant did not object to these disclosures at the time they were made.

The court found that the articles published by the Respondent did not constitute extraneous information as the tribunal member did not have knowledge of these articles and they were not considered prejudicial or inadmissible facts. The court also found that even if the articles were considered extraneous information, the tribunal member's lack of knowledge of these articles negated any apprehension of bias. Additionally, the court determined that the tribunal member's honorary life membership, in isolation and in combination with the extraneous information, did not lead to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The court concluded that a fair-minded lay observer would not reasonably apprehend that the tribunal member might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the matter.

The court dismissed the Applicant's application for recusal. The Review Application was adjourned and listed before the President of QCAT for allocation to another judicial member for re-hearing, with further directions for the re-hearing and appropriate procedure as to the costs of the Recusal Application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Williams J be recused from further hearing and determining the Review Application.

2. The Review Application be adjourned and listed before the President of QCAT for:

(a) allocation to another judicial member for re-hearing;

(b) further directions for the re-hearing; and

(c) directions as to the appropriate procedure as to the costs of the Recusal Application.

Background

Background to the litigation

The issue to be determined is whether the Applicant has established a basis for me to recuse myself in respect of the Review Application on the ground of apprehended bias.Relevant Facts On 22 July 2024, the Respondent published in Proctor an article entitled “Challenge to refusal of principal certificate” which referred to the Applicant by name (Original Article).[3] [3]See affidavit of C Radcliff, affirmed 30 July 2024 at Exhibit CR-1. On 26 July 2024, the Respondent revised the Original Article and de-identified it to remove references to the Applicant by name (Redacted Version 1 Article). A further version of the article was prepared removing references to “KOL Legal” (Redacted Version 2 Article). On and from 12.29 pm on 26 July 2024, the Original Article was no longer accessible by recipients of, or online visitors of, Proctor, and instead only the Redacted Version 2 Article was accessible.[4][4]See affidavit of R Hunt, sworn 21 August 2024 at [9]-[18] and Exhibit REH-2. The Original Article, the Redacted Version 1 Article and the Redacted Version 2 Article are together referred to as the Articles. At the commencement of the hearing of the Review Application on 18 July 2024, I made the following disclosures:“I think it is appropriate that I put on the record that, previously having been a practising solicitor, I was a member of the Law Society for over 25 years. I was involved in various committees, including the Litigation Rules Committee during that time.Upon my appointment, I’ve obviously ceased in those roles, but it was at 2020 or 2021, sometime during the early Covid years, I was granted an honorary membership of the Law Society given my involvement over a period of time. But other than an occasional function, I have not been actively involved in the Queensland Law Society since that time.” Counsel on behalf of the Applicant stated, “I have no difficulty with that at all, your Honour. No.” At a review on 31 July 2024 Counsel for the Applicant indicated that an application would be brought seeking that I recuse myself on the basis of apprehended bias. Following the filing of the Recusal Application, supporting affidavits and submissions from both parties, a further review was held on 2 September 2024 to list the Recusal Application for hearing. Having reviewed the submissions, I made additional disclosures to the following effect:(a)I did not receive any email from the Respondent with any of the Articles. (b)If an email was sent to me as a consequence of my honorary membership of the Respondent, it was sent to my Associate.(c)My Associate did not forward any email to me, nor was an email copied, printed or given to me with any of the Articles.(d)Given these circumstances, I had not asked my then Acting Associate to search the emails to see if an email was received or not. Further, during the hearing of the Recusal Application I further disclosed that I attended the annual dinner held by the Respondent in 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024 together with other judges, including heads of jurisdiction or judges who manage court lists.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It is contended that:(a)The matters identified in relation to the Respondent’s interest and conduct are not reasons for disqualification.(b)The Applicant has not identified how each, or either, of the Respondent’s interest or conduct might lead me to decide the matter otherwise than on an independent and impartial evaluation of the merits. (c)Further, a fair-minded lay observer with knowledge of the objective context, including the matters in relation to the Articles, would not reasonably apprehend that I might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question I am required to decide.Consideration At the outset it is important to understand what the Recusal Application is not. While the Applicant alleges certain conduct by or on behalf of the Respondent and makes some serious allegations, no relief is sought in respect of the Respondent. Accordingly, it is not appropriate to comment on the Respondent’s conduct other than to the extent it is relevant to, and necessary for, the Recusal Application. Other than the relevant facts outlined above, I do not consider it necessary or appropriate to make any further factual findings in respect of the publication of the Articles by the Respondent. The Applicant does not contend that there is any interest held by me or conduct by me relevant to the Recusal Application. Further, the Applicant does not contend that the declared historical association with the Respondent is a basis for me to recuse myself.[34][34]T1-9 (9 October 2024). The Applicant relies on:(a)the extraneous information constituted by the Articles (Extraneous Information Ground); and/or(b)a combination of the declared honorary life membership of the Respondent and the extraneous information (Combination Ground).[35][35]T1-10 (9 October 2024). In respect of the Combination Ground:(a)The Applicant does not seek to challenge the declaration made that I did not receive a copy or a link to the Articles by an email from the Respondent as a result of the honorary life membership.(b)Proceeds on the basis that the Articles were published on the Respondent’s website.[36][36]T1-8 (9 October 2024). The Extraneous Information Ground logically must proceed on the same basis: that is the Articles were published on the Respondent’s website. Dealing with the Extraneous Information Ground and the Combination Ground in turn.Extraneous Information Ground The ground of extraneous information is one of the four categories of cases identified by Deane J in Webb v The Queen[37] in which a reasonable apprehension of bias may arise. While it is uncontroversial that there are four categories, the categories of interest, association, conduct and extraneous information may sometimes overlap.[37][1994] HCA 30; (1994) 181 CLR 41. Deane J recognised that these categories reflect the four types of situations that may give rise to a reasonable apprehension of “prejudice, partiality and prejudgment”.[38][38]At 74. Extraneous information arises when a judge or decision-maker has knowledge of “some prejudicial but inadmissible fact or circumstance that prevents them from bringing an impartial mind to the decision.”[39][39]At 74. See also discussion at [3.41] of the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) Final Report “Without Fear or Favour: Judicial Impartiality and the law of bias” (Final Report).