FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| AMA16 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ORS | [2017] FCCA 303 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Immigration Assessment Authority – protection visa – fast track application – statutory abnegation of the natural justice hearing rule – prejudicial and irrelevant documents provided by the Secretary to the Authority – whether it can be inferred that the Secretary considered the documents to be relevant to the review – reasonable apprehension of bias. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958, ss.5, 422B, 425, 473BB, 473CA, 473CB, 473CC, 473DA, 473DB, 473DD, 473DF, 473GA, 473GB, 473JA, pt.7AA |
| Cases cited: AMA16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 310 FLR 462; [2016] FCCA 1966 Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596 at 598; (1990) 21 ALD 651; (1990) 97 ALR 177; (1990) 65 ALJR 167; [1990] HCA 57 Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth of Australia; Plaintiff M69/2010 v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 243 CLR 319; (2010) 123 ALD 244; (2010) 272 ALR 14; (2010) 85 ALJR 133; [2010] HCA 41 SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152; (2006) 93 ALD 300; (2006) 231 ALR 592; (2006) 81 ALJR 515; [2006] HCA 63 Webb & Hay v R (1994) 181 CLR 41 at 74; (1994) 122 ALR 41; (1994) 68 ALJR 582; (1994) 73 A Crim R 258; [1994] HCA 30 |
| Applicant: | AMA16 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
| Third Respondent: | SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION |
| File number: | MLG 430 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Riley |
| Hearing date: | 17 November 2016 and 2 December 2016 |
| Date of last submission: | 23 December 2016 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 23 February 2017 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the applicant: | Lisa De Ferrari |
| Solicitors for the applicant: | Victoria Legal Aid |
| Counsel for the first respondent: | Nick Wood |
| Solicitors for the first respondent: | Clayton Utz |
| Counsel for the second respondent: | No appearance |
| Solicitors for the second respondent: | Clayton Utz |
| Counsel for the third respondent: | No appearance |
| Solicitors for the third respondent: | Clayton Utz |
ORDERS
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MLG 430 of 2016
| AMA16 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION |
First respondent
And
| IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
Second respondent
And
| SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION |
Third respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This is an application for review of a fast track decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority (“the Authority”). In that decision, the Authority affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
The applicant sought an extension of time in which to file the application to this court. The first respondent consented to the extension of time being granted. An order to that effect was made by a registrar on 29 March 2016.
A preliminary issue arose in this case concerning the Minister’s claim for public interest immunity in respect of certain documents. The court provided a…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read AMA16 v Minister for Immigration & Ors and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2017] FCCA 303
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the common law principles of procedural fairness, particularly the right to be informed of and respond to adverse material, applied to reviews conducted by the IAA. The applicant contended that the IAA had a duty to disclose the legal advice and departmental communications received from the Secretary, as this material was potentially adverse and relevant to the review. The applicant argued that the IAA's failure to do so, or alternatively, the provision of such material by the Secretary, vitiated the decision and demonstrated apprehended bias.
Judge Riley determined that the principles of common law procedural fairness do not apply to reviews conducted by the IAA. This conclusion was based on the specific wording of section 473DA(1) of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth), which states that Division 3 of Part 7AA, along with sections 473GA and 473GB, constitutes an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to IAA reviews. The Court found this provision to be significantly different from equivalent provisions concerning the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, which are not as broadly exhaustive. Consequently, the Court held that the common law obligations identified in cases such as *SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs* do not apply to IAA reviews, and therefore, the applicant's ground of review based on denial of natural justice was not made out.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In any event, the principles of common law procedural fairness do not apply to reviews by the Authority. Section 473DA(1) of the Act provides that: This Division, together with sections 473GA and 473GB, is taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to reviews conducted by the Immigration Assessment Authority. (emphasis added) That provision is relevantly different from s.422B(1) of the Act, which applies to the Tribunal and which provides that:This Division is taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to the matters it deals with. (emphasis added) Section 473DA(1) of the Act means that Division 3 of Part 7AA, s.473GA and s.473GB of the Act state the totality of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to reviews conducted by the Authority. It is open to the Parliament, “by plain words of necessary intendment”,[1] to limit or exclude entirely the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule. In the present case, the Parliament has, by plain words of necessary intendment, significantly limited the natural justice hearing rule. [1] Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596 at 598; (1990) 21 ALD 651; (1990) 97 ALR 177; (1990) 65 ALJR 167; [1990] HCA 57. Cited in Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth of Australia; Plaintiff M69/2010 v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 243 CLR 319; (2010) 123 ALD 244; (2010) 272 ALR 14; (2010) 85 ALJR 133; [2010] HCA 41. There is no equivalent of s.425 of the Act in Division 3 of Part 7AA of the Act or in s.473GA or s.473GB of the Act. Consequently, the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule identified in cases such as SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152; (2006) 93 ALD 300; (2006) 231 ALR 592; (2006) 81 ALJR 515; [2006] HCA 63 do not apply. This ground is not made out. The second ground of review in the amended application filed on 5 December 2016 by leave given on 2 December 2016 is:The decision of the IAA was affected by jurisdictional error (excess of jurisdiction / denial of natural justice):Particulars(a)The IAA made a decision adverse to the applicant, without disclosing to him that it had received legal advice and certain departmental communications from the Secretary as part of the ‘review material’.(b)The Secretary had no power to give legal advice to the IAA as part of the ‘review material’ (see ground 3 below).(c)The IAA was under the duty to consider the ‘review material’. Review of the ‘review material’ that [had] been provided by the Secretary was the precise extent of the IAA’s jurisdiction, duty and power.(d)The Secretary’s provision of ‘review material’ in excess of power necessarily vitiated the IAA’s decision.(e)Provision of legal advice by the Secretary to the IAA, an independent review body, constitutes waiver of any client legal privilege of the Minister.(f)The legal advice and departmental communications were material given to the IAA by a person other than the applicant that could not be dismissed as not relevant, not credible or not significant and were potentially adverse.(g)The Migration Act does not exclude the common law obligation on the IAA of affording an opportunity to rebut, qualify or comment upon material of the kind identified at f. above.(h)If, contrary to g. above, the common law obligation there referred is excluded, the IAA’s decision is affected by apprehended bias. A fair minded and informed observer might conclude that the IAA might not be impartial or approach the issues with an open mind, when it conducts a review ‘on the papers’ after having been provided, by a person within the Minister's department, with undisclosed (and undisclosable, even as to the ‘gist’, under the fair hearing rule) legal advice and departmental communications considered relevant to whether the Minister's decision will be affirmed.