BLS17 v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BLS17 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2018] FCCA 3064
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Immigration Assessment Authority – safe haven enterprise visa (SHEV) (XE-790) – whether the Authority failed to consider a claim – whether the Authority acted unreasonably, illogically or irrationally – whether the Authority denied the applicant procedural fairness – whether the Authority took into account irrelevant material – whether there was a reasonable apprehension that the Authority might not have brought an impartial mind to the matter.
Legislation:
Migration Act 1958, ss.473BB, 473DA, 473DB, 473DC, 473DD, 473DE
Cases cited:
ALA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 30
AMA16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 317 FLR 141; [2017] FCCA 303
CRW16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 710
DGZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 12
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v AMA16 (2017) 254 FCR 534; [2017] FCAFC 136
Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 353 ALR 600; (2018) 92 ALJR 481; [2018] HCA 16
Webb v R (1994) 181 CLR 41; (1994) 122 ALR 41; (1994) 68 ALJR 582; (1994) 73 A Crim R 258; [1994] HCA 30
Applicant: BLS17
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
File number: MLG 682 of 2017
Judgment of: Judge Riley
Hearing date: 23 July 2018
Date of last submission: 23 July 2018
Delivered at: Melbourne
Delivered on: 30 October 2018

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the applicant: Anthony Krohn
Solicitors for the applicant: Ambi Associates
Counsel for the first respondent: Nick Wood
Counsel for the second respondent: No appearance
Solicitors for the respondents: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

  1. The application filed on 5 April 2017, amended on 3 July 2018, further amended on 11 July 2018 and further amended again on 23 July 2018 be dismissed.

  2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding fixed in the sum of $7,328.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT MELBOURNE

MLG 682 of 2017

BLS17

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. This is an application for review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority.  In that decision, the Authority affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection not to grant the applicant a safe haven enterprise (SHEV) (XE-790) visa. 

The applicant’s claims

  1. The applicant’s amended submissions filed on 17 July 2018 set out the applicant’s claims as follows:

    a) The Applicant is a national of Sri Lanka and of no other country. (CB 38)

    b) He has no right to enter and to reside in any other country. (CB 38)

    c) The Applicant is of Tamil ethnicity and a Sri Lankan citizen. (CB 38)

    d) The applicant is Hindu. (CB 38)

    e) In 2004, the Applicant’s sister was taken by force to join the Liberation Tigers of…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCCA 3064
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this matter before Judge Riley, the applicant, BLS17, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Minister for Immigration. The core of the dispute concerned the Immigration Assessment Authority's (IAA) decision-making process, specifically whether the IAA had acted unreasonably or in jurisdictional error by failing to consider certain information and by denying procedural fairness.

The legal issues before the court were twofold. Firstly, whether the IAA's decision not to invite the applicant for an interview was legally unreasonable, having regard to the provisions of Division 3 of Part 7AA of the Act and the High Court's decision in *Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection*. Secondly, whether the IAA had fallen into jurisdictional error by denying procedural fairness, particularly in relation to adverse information concerning allegations of sexual assault that had been investigated by the police but did not result in charges.

Judge Riley reasoned that the IAA's decision not to invite the applicant for an interview was not legally unreasonable. This conclusion was based on the High Court's emphasis in *Plaintiff M174/2016* that the IAA must apply the law within the bounds of legal reasonableness and that statutory conditions, such as those in s.473DD of the Act requiring exceptional circumstances to justify considering new information, must be met. The applicant had failed to address s.473DD or explain how its requirements could have been satisfied. Regarding the procedural fairness ground, the court found that the adverse information concerning the sexual assault allegation, while potentially affecting the assessment of credibility, did not amount to a denial of procedural fairness. The court noted that the police had investigated and decided not to lay charges, indicating that in their view, no crime had been committed, which is distinct from a decision not to prosecute due to insufficient evidence. The court concluded that the applicant had not been denied procedural fairness in this regard.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Nevertheless, in Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 353 ALR 600; (2018) 92 ALJR 481; [2018] HCA 16, the plurality of the High Court held at [21] that the provisions of Division 3 of Part 7AA of the Act are to be applied within the bounds of legal reasonableness. In that particular case, the High Court considered that the decision of the Authority not to obtain certain new information, including by interviewing a certain person, was legally reasonable. Importantly, the High Court emphasised the statutory conditions on the Authority obtaining new information, such as by interviewing the applicant. Those conditions include the conditions in s.473DD of the Act, which provides that:For the purposes of making a decision in relation to a fast track reviewable decision, the Immigration Assessment Authority must not consider any new information unless: (a)the Authority is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information; and The applicant did not address s.473DD of the Act or explain how its requirements could have been met in the circumstances of this case. Consequently, I am not persuaded that it was legally unreasonable for the Authority to not invite the applicant for an interview in all the circumstances of this case. The fourth ground of review in the application is:The Authority fell into jurisdictional error in that it denied procedural fairness. The first particular to this ground is as follows:The Applicant refers to and repeats the particulars (b) and (c) to Ground 3 of this Amended Application. For the reasons expressed above, this aspect of ground 4 is not made out. The second particular to ground 4 is as follows: The Minister’s delegate, and then the Authority had before them material or information adverse to the Applicant personally, relating to allegations which had been the subject of a criminal investigation and were the apparent basis for an intervention order being made against him. These allegations, although not resulting in charges being laid against the applicant, may have allowed an inference of the Applicant having poor judgement and a disrespect for the law, and may have affected the assessment by the Authority of the Applicant’s credibility, but the Authority did not give the Applicant a copy of this material or particulars of it and invite or give him an opportunity to respond, although the Minister’s delegate had not done so either. The crux of this aspect of ground 4 is that the delegate and the Authority are said to have had prejudicial information before them that they did not make known to the applicant. The information concerned an allegation that the applicant had sexually assaulted a 15 year old girl[1] from another asylum seeker family. The police investigated the allegation by interviewing the girl, some members of her family and the applicant. However, the police decided not to charge the applicant with any offence. They decided that no offence was detected. I understand that to mean that, in the view of the police, the applicant had not committed a crime. That is different to a decision not to prosecute on the grounds that the evidence is unlikely to reach the required standard.[1] SCB18, where it is indicated that the applicant was 8 years older than the girl. The events occurred in February 2016, when the applicant was 23, making the girl 15.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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