BLS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BLS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1079

Appeal from: BLS17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3064
File number(s): VID 1448 of 2018
Judge(s): O'BRYAN J
Date of judgment: 12 July 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing application for judicial review of decision of Immigration Assessment Authority affirming decision of Minister’s delegate refusing grant of protection visa – unreasonableness – where decision of Minister’s delegate was not based on adverse credibility findings – whether Immigration Assessment Authority’s failure to put adverse findings of fact to appellant was legally unreasonable – procedural fairness – whether Immigration Assessment Authority denied appellant procedural fairness by failing to put adverse findings of fact to appellant – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Pt 7AA, Div 3, ss 473DA(1), 473DC, 473DD

Cases cited:

BCQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 365

DGZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 258 FCR 551

DPI17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 43

DYK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 222

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 359 ALR 1

Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 (2017) 253 FCR 475

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 163 ALD 1

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 353 ALR 600

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152

Date of hearing: 10 May 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 40
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A F L Krohn
Solicitor for the Appellant: Ambi Associates
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr N M Wood
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 1448 of 2018
BETWEEN:

BLS17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

O'BRYAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

12 JULY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

O’BRYAN J:

Introduction

  1. On 16 November 2018, the appellant filed a notice of appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 30 October 2018 in BLS17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3064. The appeal is brought under s 24 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1079
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

BLS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved the appeal of a Sri Lankan citizen, of Tamil ethnicity, against the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to affirm the delegate's refusal to grant him a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV). The appellant arrived in Australia by boat in 2012 and applied for a SHEV in 2016, claiming fear of harm from the Eelam People's Democratic Party and the Criminal Investigation Department due to his association with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and his Tamil identity. The IAA accepted some of the appellant's claims but denied the visa on the basis that he did not demonstrate a credible fear of persecution or harm if returned to Sri Lanka.

The court examined whether the IAA's decision was legally unreasonable and whether the appellant was denied procedural fairness by the IAA's failure to put adverse findings of fact to him. The court found that the IAA's decision was not unreasonable as it was based on the appellant's lack of a credible fear of persecution or harm, and not on adverse credibility findings. Furthermore, the court held that the appellant was not denied procedural fairness as the IAA's failure to put adverse findings of fact to him did not result in a miscarriage of justice or affect the outcome of the visa application. The court found that the appellant had the opportunity to respond to the IAA's reasons and that the IAA's decision was based on a proper consideration of all relevant evidence.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the Minister's costs of the appeal. The court held that the IAA's decision was not legally unreasonable and that the appellant was not denied procedural fairness. The court found that the appellant did not demonstrate a credible fear of persecution or harm if returned to Sri Lanka and that the IAA's decision was based on a proper consideration of all relevant evidence.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, I dismiss the appeal.Background The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka and is of Tamil ethnicity. In 2012, he left Sri Lanka and arrived in Australia by boat. He was interviewed shortly after arrival (the arrival interview) and again in February 2013 (the entry interview). In his entry interview, the appellant claimed that he feared being killed by the Sri Lankan Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP) and the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) because they suspected him of being connected to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In October 2013, the Appellant applied to the Minister for a permanent protection visa (Class XA) on the basis that he was a person in respect of whom Australia owed protection obligations, either as a refugee under the Refugees Convention, or as complementary protection, under the Act. The application was accompanied by a statutory declaration. In the statutory declaration, the applicant stated that he feared that if he returned to Sri Lanka, he would be harmed or killed by the EPDP or the CID. The basis for the fear was that the EPDP believed that the appellant was from an LTTE family and the CID had targeted and harassed the appellant because he was Tamil. In 2015, the Act was amended such that the appellant could no longer apply for a permanent protection visa, but only for a temporary visa. In January 2016, the appellant applied for a temporary Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV). In the application, the appellant claimed that he left Sri Lanka because the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) had tried to kill him because he was a Tamil and that “many times government people tried to kill me because I’m from LTTE support family”. The appellant was interviewed by a delegate of the Minister (the SHEV interview). The delegate refused the application for a SHEV. The application was then referred under Part 7AA of the Act to the Authority for review of the delegate’s decision. On 9 March 2017, the Authority decided to affirm the delegate’s decision. It is this decision by the Authority which is the essential subject of the present appeal. The Appellant applied to the Federal Circuit Court for judicial review of the Authority’s decision. On 30 October 2018, the Federal Circuit Court dismissed that application.Authority’s decision The Authority summarised the appellant's claims to satisfy the criteria for a SHEV as follows (Authority reasons at [3]):(a)the appellant fears harm from the EDPP because he is from a LTTE family;(b)the appellant fears harm from the CID who have previously tried to extort money from him and his cousin because they thought he and his cousin were earning a lot of money and because they are Tamil;(c)the appellant fears that the Sri Lankan authorities, including the CID, do not want to see Tamil people prosper and make good livelihoods;(d)the SLA tried to kill him because his was Tamil; and(e)the appellant fears harm because he left Sri Lanka illegally. The Authority accepted some, but not all, of the appellant's claims as to what had occurred to him and members of his family in Sri Lanka. Specifically, the Authority accepted the following claims (Authority reasons at [18], see also [39]):I accept that the applicant and his family lived in Jaffna, subject to displacements between 1995 to 1999, until they moved in 2006 to LTTE controlled Kilinochchi; after the SLA took over control of Kilinochchi towards the end of the war, the applicant and his family were placed in Manik Farm IDP [Internally Displaced People] camp from February 2009 to September 2009; on release from the camp his family moved back to Jaffna; and in around April 2010 the applicant moved to Kilinochchi and started a lorry driving business. I accept that the applicant's family moved to Kilinochchi in 2006 after a paramilitary group took his family's NICs [National Identity Cards]; that just after they left their house was burnt down by the SLA/paramilitary group; that the applicant was questioned twice by the CID at Manik Farm; that the applicant was threatened by the CID on his release from Manik Farm; that after his release from Manik Farm the EPDP/CID questioned the applicant a number of times while he was in Jaffna; that the EPDP/CID also questioned his family once and his older brother a number of times, but not to the same extent as the applicant; and that after he moved there in April 2010 the applicant was questioned by the CID and police on occasion in Kilinochchi. The applicant has consistently maintained from his first interview with the Department that his sister was in the LTTE. Although I have some reservations about the applicant's claim that his sister's forced recruitment by the LTTE occurred when she was at school as the LTTE lost control of Jaffna where the family was living at the time in December 1995, I am prepared to accept his general claim that his sister was forcibly recruited into the LTTE in around 2004. I also accept that his sister worked in the medical and food sections of the LTTE; that she received military training from the LTTE; that she left the LTTE around the time the family was sent to Manik Farm and she joined them there; that the family revealed to the SLA that his sister was in the LTTE; that she was not sent for rehabilitation but was released from Manik Farm in September 2009 with the rest of the family; that she and the rest of his family continue to reside in Sri Lanka and they are okay; and that the applicant was not a member of the LTTE.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Appellant applied to the Federal Circuit Court for judicial review of the Authority’s decision. On 30 October 2018, the Federal Circuit Court dismissed that application.Authority’s decision The Authority summarised the appellant's claims to satisfy the criteria for a SHEV as follows (Authority reasons at [3]):(a)the appellant fears harm from the EDPP because he is from a LTTE family;(b)the appellant fears harm from the CID who have previously tried to extort money from him and his cousin because they thought he and his cousin were earning a lot of money and because they are Tamil;(c)the appellant fears that the Sri Lankan authorities, including the CID, do not want to see Tamil people prosper and make good livelihoods;(d)the SLA tried to kill him because his was Tamil; and(e)the appellant fears harm because he left Sri Lanka illegally. The Authority accepted some, but not all, of the appellant's claims as to what had occurred to him and members of his family in Sri Lanka. Specifically, the Authority accepted the following claims (Authority reasons at [18], see also [39]):I accept that the applicant and his family lived in Jaffna, subject to displacements between 1995 to 1999, until they moved in 2006 to LTTE controlled Kilinochchi; after the SLA took over control of Kilinochchi towards the end of the war, the applicant and his family were placed in Manik Farm IDP [Internally Displaced People] camp from February 2009 to September 2009; on release from the camp his family moved back to Jaffna; and in around April 2010 the applicant moved to Kilinochchi and started a lorry driving business. I accept that the applicant's family moved to Kilinochchi in 2006 after a paramilitary group took his family's NICs [National Identity Cards]; that just after they left their house was burnt down by the SLA/paramilitary group; that the applicant was questioned twice by the CID at Manik Farm; that the applicant was threatened by the CID on his release from Manik Farm; that after his release from Manik Farm the EPDP/CID questioned the applicant a number of times while he was in Jaffna; that the EPDP/CID also questioned his family once and his older brother a number of times, but not to the same extent as the applicant; and that after he moved there in April 2010 the applicant was questioned by the CID and police on occasion in Kilinochchi. The applicant has consistently maintained from his first interview with the Department that his sister was in the LTTE. Although I have some reservations about the applicant's claim that his sister's forced recruitment by the LTTE occurred when she was at school as the LTTE lost control of Jaffna where the family was living at the time in December 1995, I am prepared to accept his general claim that his sister was forcibly recruited into the LTTE in around 2004. I also accept that his sister worked in the medical and food sections of the LTTE; that she received military training from the LTTE; that she left the LTTE around the time the family was sent to Manik Farm and she joined them there; that the family revealed to the SLA that his sister was in the LTTE; that she was not sent for rehabilitation but was released from Manik Farm in September 2009 with the rest of the family; that she and the rest of his family continue to reside in Sri Lanka and they are okay; and that the applicant was not a member of the LTTE.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the decision of the Minister's delegate and concluded that it was not founded on adverse credibility findings. The court reviewed the evidence and found that the delegate's decision was based on the appellant's failure to establish the necessary criteria for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV), rather than on a lack of credibility. The court also considered the Immigration Assessment Authority's role in reviewing the delegate's decision and found that the Authority's failure to put adverse findings of fact to the appellant did not amount to legal unreasonableness. The court reasoned that the appellant was aware of the issues and had the opportunity to address them during the review process. In terms of procedural fairness, the court determined that the appellant was not denied procedural fairness as the Authority's process allowed the appellant to respond to the matters considered in the decision-making process. The court held that the appellant had the opportunity to challenge the findings and provide additional evidence if necessary. The binding legal principle established by this decision is that the failure to put adverse findings of fact to an appellant does not necessarily amount to a denial of procedural fairness if the appellant is aware of the issues and has the opportunity to respond. This decision follows the precedent set in previous cases that procedural fairness is not limited to the specific phrasing of adverse findings but encompasses the overall process that allows for a fair opportunity to respond to the issues.