FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BLS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1079
Appeal from: BLS17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3064 File number(s): VID 1448 of 2018 Judge(s): O'BRYAN J Date of judgment: 12 July 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing application for judicial review of decision of Immigration Assessment Authority affirming decision of Minister’s delegate refusing grant of protection visa – unreasonableness – where decision of Minister’s delegate was not based on adverse credibility findings – whether Immigration Assessment Authority’s failure to put adverse findings of fact to appellant was legally unreasonable – procedural fairness – whether Immigration Assessment Authority denied appellant procedural fairness by failing to put adverse findings of fact to appellant – appeal dismissed Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Pt 7AA, Div 3, ss 473DA(1), 473DC, 473DD
Cases cited: BCQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 365
DGZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 258 FCR 551
DPI17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 43
DYK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 222
Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 359 ALR 1
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 (2017) 253 FCR 475
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 163 ALD 1
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 353 ALR 600
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
Date of hearing: 10 May 2019 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 40 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A F L Krohn Solicitor for the Appellant: Ambi Associates Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr N M Wood Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs ORDERS
VID 1448 of 2018 BETWEEN: BLS17
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
O'BRYAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
12 JULY 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
O’BRYAN J:
Introduction
On 16 November 2018, the appellant filed a notice of appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 30 October 2018 in BLS17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3064. The appeal is brought under s 24 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 1079
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the IAA's decision was legally unreasonable and whether the appellant was denied procedural fairness by the IAA's failure to put adverse findings of fact to him. The court found that the IAA's decision was not unreasonable as it was based on the appellant's lack of a credible fear of persecution or harm, and not on adverse credibility findings. Furthermore, the court held that the appellant was not denied procedural fairness as the IAA's failure to put adverse findings of fact to him did not result in a miscarriage of justice or affect the outcome of the visa application. The court found that the appellant had the opportunity to respond to the IAA's reasons and that the IAA's decision was based on a proper consideration of all relevant evidence.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the Minister's costs of the appeal. The court held that the IAA's decision was not legally unreasonable and that the appellant was not denied procedural fairness. The court found that the appellant did not demonstrate a credible fear of persecution or harm if returned to Sri Lanka and that the IAA's decision was based on a proper consideration of all relevant evidence.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the decision of the Minister's delegate and concluded that it was not founded on adverse credibility findings. The court reviewed the evidence and found that the delegate's decision was based on the appellant's failure to establish the necessary criteria for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV), rather than on a lack of credibility. The court also considered the Immigration Assessment Authority's role in reviewing the delegate's decision and found that the Authority's failure to put adverse findings of fact to the appellant did not amount to legal unreasonableness. The court reasoned that the appellant was aware of the issues and had the opportunity to address them during the review process. In terms of procedural fairness, the court determined that the appellant was not denied procedural fairness as the Authority's process allowed the appellant to respond to the matters considered in the decision-making process. The court held that the appellant had the opportunity to challenge the findings and provide additional evidence if necessary. The binding legal principle established by this decision is that the failure to put adverse findings of fact to an appellant does not necessarily amount to a denial of procedural fairness if the appellant is aware of the issues and has the opportunity to respond. This decision follows the precedent set in previous cases that procedural fairness is not limited to the specific phrasing of adverse findings but encompasses the overall process that allows for a fair opportunity to respond to the issues.