EVN18 v Minister for Immigration
[2020] FCCA 2405
•28 August 2020
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| EVN18 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2020] FCCA 2405 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for judicial review – Immigration Assessment Authority – protection visa – new information – relevant information – no matters of principle – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.473DC, 473DE |
| Cases cited: NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 BIN18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1094 CID16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 485 Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 [2017] FCAFC 210 EFX18 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 3440 CCQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1641 BCQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 365 DDM17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1510 DVO16 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 157 BLS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1079 ANA18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1854 Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CLV16 [2018] FCAFC 80 Sabaratnasingam v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 261 SZCJO v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 48 AXL17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2019] FCA 778 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317 Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114 Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS [2014] FCAFC 16 ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174 AssociatedProvincial Picture House Limited v Wednesbury Corporation [1949] 1 KB 223 BUD17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCAFC 140 VAAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 117 Minister for Aboriginal AffairsvPeko- Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; (1986) 162 CLR 24 |
| Applicant: | EVN18 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
| File Number: | LNG 62 of 2018 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Riethmuller |
| Hearing date: | 7 May 2020 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 21 May 2020 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 28 August 2020 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Barns |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Tasmanian Refugee Legal Service |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Mr Ciolek |
| Solicitors for the First Respondent: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
The application be dismissed.
The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $11,200.50.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
LNG 62 of 2018
| EVN18 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
| IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (‘the IAA’) made on 13 August 2018 confirming a decision of the delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise (Subclass 790) visa (‘protection visa’).
Background
The applicant is a Hazara Shia Muslim and citizen of Afghanistan from a village in Jaghori District, Ghanzni Province. He came to Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival on 4 July 2013.
The applicant applied for a protection visa in January 2017 and participated in a visa interview in July 2017. Following that interview, the applicant provided additional material to the delegate in support of his application. This documentation included a statement made on 25 July 2017, country information, and submissions from his representatives see CB pp.166 to 196.
On 30 October 2017 the delegate refused the visa, finding that the applicant could relocate to Kabul, Afghanistan, and that he would not face a real risk of significant harm in Kabul. As this was a refusal decision, it was referred to the IAA the following day on 31 October 2017.
In the process before the IAA, the applicant provided submissions on three separate occasions: in late-November 2017, March 2018 and April 2018. On 13 August 2018, the IAA affirmed the decision of the delegate. The applicant then sought judicial review of that decision, filing an application in this Court on 17 September 2018.
The applicant sought a protection visa on the basis that he feared harm from the government in Afghanistan, the Taliban and from Islamic State: see paragraph [8] of the decision. The applicant set out that his fears were based upon his ethnicity, religion and status as a failed asylum seeker returning from a western country. The applicant also detailed concerns that the Taliban would target him because he was identifiable as a Hazara from his appearance and language. He further submitted that he did not study their local language and culture or attend religious studies and that he had spent time in Australia as a student. The applicant also expressed fear that he had no support in Afghanistan as he has no family or friends in the country.
In submissions made to the IAA by his representative, the applicant articulated further claims (as summarised by Counsel for the Minister at paragraphs [19] to [20] of the submissions filed on 17 September 2019):
19. In a submission to the Authority by his representative (CB
p 245) the applicant sought to raise the following further grounds (CB p 358 [11]):
19.1. an imputed political opinion in support of the Afghani government
19.2. membership of the particular social groups of
19.2.1. Afghani citizens and/or nationals who have rejected Afghanistan in favour of Pakistan
19.2.2. Afghani citizens and/or nationals who have rejected Afghanistan in favour of a Western country, namely Australia
19.2.3. imputed supporters of the government and of the international community
19.3. a collaborator/supporter of Western−aligned free−thinkers and/or non− conformists and/or dissenters
19.4. as an individual with a mental health disability
19.5. his family's decision to leave Afghanistan for Pakistan, prolonged absence from Afghanistan and presence in Australia
19.6. unfamiliarity with the Afghani languages of Pashto and to a lesser extent Dani
19.7. his Pakistani or American accents
19.8. that he may appear wealthy and that he presents as Western and includes English words in his everyday speech
19.9. that he may be seen as a pro−regime/government supporter having Western links.
20. In his statement (CB271) 'the applicant raised new profile factors in terms of' (CB358 [11])
20.1. his Western mannerisms and postures
20.2. that he instinctively speaks Pakistani Hazaragi and uses English words which he claimed would reveal that he had lived in a Western country and he would be regarded with suspicion.
Further claims
The evidence of the applicant before the delegate was carefully considered by the IAA. The IAA accepted that the applicant did not receive an opportunity to explore all of his claims in the application before the delegate as fully as he would have liked, such as traumatic events that he endured whilst growing up as a child in Pakistan and took account of the context in which evidence was given.
The IAA accepted a number of claims by the applicant as plausible, as set out in paragraphs [41] to [43] of the decision:
41. I have weighed the evidence, including that presented to the IAA, and I am unconcerned about these matters. I consider it plausible the applicant and his siblings were able to attend school in Quetta, notwithstanding they were undocumented Afghan refugees. I accept the applicant’s submissions and find it plausible his uncle could have held property, notwithstanding that he was an undocumented Afghan. I accept he was speculating in his evidence at the interview, and do not give any adverse weight to the fact that he could not explain how his uncle held property.
42. I also consider it plausible that the Hazara community would have local elders that would be able to register a death of an undocumented Hazara living in Pakistan, and that it is not implausible that compensation may have been available to persons impacted by the terrorist attack on the market – particularly if that attack occurred in a part of Quetta where a significant number of undocumented Hazaras live. As the applicant’s siblings have grown up in Quetta, I consider it likely they would present and identify as young Pakistanis, but I do not consider this undermines his claim that they are undocumented Afghan refugees. I also consider it reasonable that the applicant would seek to visit a family friend in Australia who is a Pakistani national, and who the applicant refers to as uncle in terms of an honorific, rather than as an indication that they are related. I found the applicant’s evidence on these matters persuasive, plausible and consistent with other evidence before me.
43. I accept the applicant’s account of having travelled to Pakistan with his family when he was young. I accept he and his siblings schooled there, and that the applicant assisted in his father and uncle’s shop. As above, I accept he faced insecurity, stress and traumatic experiences while living in Pakistan, and that this was a catalyst, or part of the reason, for why he and his family made arrangements for him to leave the country.
However, the IAA did not accept that the applicant was consistent with respect to the details surrounding his father’s death in 2013 (at paragraph [44] of the decision), ultimately rejecting the applicant’s evidence in this regard, after identifying a number of pictures on Facebook and documents which indicated that a person of the same age and name of the applicant’s father had been involved in recent times with the applicant’s mother. Notably, when the pictures were first shown to the applicant by the delegate he claimed not to know the person, and then later claimed that the person was in close relationship with his mother. This led to the IAA member concluding (at paragraphs [58] to [60]) as follows:
58. The representative has contended that the applicant’s claims for protection are not contingent on the death of his father. In terms of his individual claims as they relate to Afghanistan, that is correct. However, this issue raises serious concerns about the applicant’s credibility, both in terms of this issue and his claims overall, and also raises serious concerns about what legal status his father [omitted] has in Pakistan, and what legal status the applicant and his other family members have in Pakistan.
59. I have serious concerns that the applicant is a national of Pakistan, or has residence status in the country. Ultimately, though, the information before the IAA presents an incomplete picture. The applicant has provided a consistent and coherent account of his family’s departure from Afghanistan, and has provided two untested documents (his and his grandfather’s taskeras) as evidence of his Afghan nationality. It may be that his father’s Pakistan identification documents are genuine, and his father is a citizen of Pakistan. Alternatively, it may be the case that his father’s documents are fraudulent.
60. Whatever the case, the evidence is incomplete. I cannot be satisfied the applicant is not a national of Afghanistan, and I cannot be satisfied the applicant is a national of Pakistan. Weighing everything before me, I find that the applicant is a citizen of Afghanistan and I have assessed him against Afghanistan as his receiving country.
The IAA member went on to consider various other claims with respect to potential targeting and safety on the roads against country information and the circumstances of the applicant, rejecting the applicant’s claims that he faced real risk of serious harm.
Grounds of Review
Grounds 1 and 2
The first ground for judicial review was framed with lengthy particulars in the Amended Application filed on 27 August 2019, as follows:
1. The Second Respondent failed to conduct a review as required by s.473C(1) of the Migration Act.
PARTICULARS
I. The purpose of a review pursuant to s473CC(1) was to come to the best or preferable decision on the Applicant’s claims within the procedures set out pursuant to Part 7AA of the Act. These procedures include:
a) The Second Respondent’s discretion to get any information from any person, including an Applicant pursuant to s473DC;
b) The Applicant being able to give new information to the Second Respondent pursuant to s473DC and s473DD;
II. The delegate interviewed the Applicant and found that on the basis of that interview together with the Applicant’s claims and the Country information before the delegate, that the Applicant would face a real chance of serious harm if he were to return to his home province of Ghazni on the basis of his Hazara ethnicity and his Shia Muslim religion; CB211. However, the delegate found the Applicant could reasonably relocate to Kabul; CB214.
III. The Second Respondent upheld the decision of the delegate but did so on a different basis and relying on information not before the delegate. It disagreed with the finding of the delegate about the risk to the Applicant if he returned to home to his province and because of that finding, did not proceed to consider the issue of relocation; CB370 [74]. In coming to this conclusion the Second Respondent relied on new information it acquired concerning the risks to Shia Hazaras, including on the roads; CB361 [22] and CB361 footnote 3.
IV. Further, in his findings concerning complimentary protection assessment, the Second Respondent found that it did not need to decide the issue of relocation because it had found the Applicant would not face a real chance of harm in his home area: CB 376 [107].
…. It was necessary in the conduct of the Second Respondent’s review, in the context of the provisions of the Act and the facts for this case, for the Second Respondent to give the Applicant notice of any new issues, in this case new information, not available to the delegate, relied upon by the Second Respondent to ‘overturn’ a finding of the delegate, arising on the review and give him a realistic opportunity to respond. The Second Respondent’s failure to afford the Applicant a reasonable opportunity to respond constituted a failure to lawfully conduct its review.
As Ground 2 is closely related it is convenient to deal with it at the same time. Ground 2 was framed as:
[2.] The Second Respondent’s failure to invite the Applicant to an interview, or to consider doing so, as was within its power pursuant to s.473DC(3)(b) of the Act was unreasonable in the legal sense.
Particulars
(i) The Second Respondent relied on information that was not before the delegate concerning the finding by the delegate that the Applicant would face a real chance of serious harm if he were to return to his home province of Ghazni on the basis of his Hazara ethnicity and his Shia Muslim religion.
(ii) The Applicant had no opportunity to be heard with respect to the information and on which the Second Respondent acted in determining the Applicant’s claim.
The applicant’s argument was developed on the basis that the IAA upheld the decision of the delegate but on a different basis, relying upon information that was not before the delegate, in order to conclude that there was not a real risk of serious harm to the applicant if he were to return to his home province. The applicant argues that as a result of the different approach taken by the IAA it was necessary for the IAA to give the applicant notice of the new issues and invite the applicant to provide new information.
The new country information
The new country information relied upon by the IAA is referred to in paragraphs [22] and [39] of the decisions. At paragraph [22] of the decision, the IAA said:
22. On 16 April 2018, the applicant provided new country information, specifically a report from Professor William Maley of the Australian National University, dated 4 April 2018. I accept this is new information that was not, and could not have been, provided to the Minister before the delegate made the decision. In undertaking this assessment, I have also obtained new country information, specifically reports discussing the risks to Shia Hazaras in Afghanistan, including on the roads, and the security assessment for persons returning from the west and educated Afghans. The analysis from these reports relates to specific profile groups the applicant claims to be from, and I consider it critical to have regard to up to date analysis about these risk profiles, in particular given the fluid security situation in the country, and the age of some of the reports cited in the delegate’s decision. In terms of the Maley report, and the country advice from EASO and DFAT, I am satisfied there are exceptional circumstances to justify consideration of this new information.3
The information referred to in Footnote 3 is as follows:
3 EASO, "Afghanistan: Individuals targeted under societal and legal norms", 12 December 2017, CISEDB50AD7870; EASO, "Afghanistan: Individuals targeted by armed actors in the conflict", 12 December 2017, CISEDB50AD7868; DFAT, "Country Information Report Afghanistan", 18 September 2017, CISEDB50AD5680.
The IAA also mentioned in passing having regard to ‘the security situation in Pakistan’ (at paragraph [37] citing footnote 5, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (‘DFAT’) report DFAT Thematic Report Hazaras in Afghanistan and Pakistan 26 March 2014, 26 March 2014, CIS2F827D91264.
Based upon this information the IAA rejected the delegate’s findings ‘that the applicant could not return home to Jaghori because of risks on the road for Shia Hazaras’: see paragraph [68] of the decision. The reasoning for this conclusion is set out in the following paragraphs of the IAA decision:
69. DFAT assesses that abduction while travelling by road is a risk for Afghans of all ethnicities and concurs with the assessment of UNAMA and other international sources that the primary motivations for these abductions include taking hostages for ransom, prisoner exchange, or to target those with connections to the government or international community. DFAT states that ethnicity is rarely the primary motivating factor in these incidents but, somewhat inconsistently, also states that Hazaras remain more likely to be selected for abduction or violence if a vehicle carrying a mix of ethnic groups is stopped in these areas (outside the Hazarajat). DFAT states that while ethnicity may not be a primary motivation for an abduction incident, it may have an influence on the selection of victims. In its 2017 report, DFAT observed a decline in the number of abduction incidents involving Hazaras from the previous year, down from 25 to 15. In comparison to 2015, when fifteen abducted Hazaras were killed, all of the 2016 Hazara abductees were released unharmed.12
70. There is a reasonable basis to question DFAT’s assessment about the risks to Shia Hazaras on the roads. First is the above equivocation in DFAT’s own assessment of the risks to Hazaras on the roads and the motivations for abductions. This is apparent from other analysis that indicates that a significant number of attacks/abductions involving Hazaras were likely misreported, that the motivations for these attacks were complex, and that there was little clear evidence that Hazaras involved in these attacks were being targeted for harm for reasons of their ethnicity or religion.13 Lastly, is the decreasing number of these attacks (and fatal attacks) and the fact that there were no abductions of Hazaras in 2016 and 2017 in the applicant’s home province of Ghazni.14
71. In weighing the chance of the applicant being targeted in an attack on the roads, I have also weighed his individual circumstances. I accept the applicant left Afghanistan when he was very young, however I am satisfied from his arrival interview that he speaks Hazaragi. I accept his family left this area, but this is the area in which he would have family and tribal links, which play a central part in Afghan and Hazara societies.15 The applicant is highly intelligent, a strong communicator and able-bodied, with a range of work experience. I accept he has some mental health concerns, but the information before me does not indicate this would prevent him from finding work. I am satisfied he would find work in Jaghori, and would not need to travel outside of the Hazarajat to find work. This would limit the risks to him in travelling on the roads. In any event, abductions in Ghazni have become uncommon.16
72. In view of the evidence before me, while I accept there have been incidents involving Hazaras on the roads, including incidents within Ghazni in the past, I consider there has been a clear decrease in abductions involving Hazara civilians in Afghanistan, in particular in his home province of Ghazni. I also give weight to the analysis above about the motivations for attacks, which raise strong doubts as to whether Hazaras are being targeted on the roads at a significant level, or for reasons related to their ethnic or religious profile. In view of that information, including data about the limited number of attacks, as well as the applicant’s own circumstances, I am not satisfied the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm on the roads into and out of his home area, for reasons of his religious and ethnic profile, or for any related reason.
The IAA goes on to consider the generalised risk to people on the roads (at paragraph [88] of the decision) saying:
88. I have found above that there is no real chance of him being abducted or harmed on the roads because of his profile. Having regard to the general incidence of abductions and attack on the roads,32 I consider the chances the facing a random abduction or security incident unmotivated by any profile factor is even more remote. Particularly, if the applicant limits his journeys between Kabul and the capital. In this regard, I note the applicant does not claim to have family in Kabul or other reasons to stay in or visit the capital. I find there is not a real chance of the applicant facing harm for any reason during a brief stay in Kabul.
The reference in footnotes 14, 16 and 32 is to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (‘UNAMA’) country information provided by the applicant to the delegate in submissions: see CB p.251, being: UNAMA, “Afghanistan Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 2016”, 6 February 2017, CISEDB50AD201 (‘UNAMA Report’).
The other footnotes (12 and 15) refer to two reports (although without pinpoint references) that had been referred to by the delegate:
a)DFAT, “Hazaras in Afghanistan”, 18 September 2017, CISEDB50AD5681, which had also been referred to by the delegate: see CB p.213 at footnote 62;
b)UNHCR, “Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum Seekers from Afghanistan”, 19 April 2016, CIS38A8012660 which had also been referred to by the delegate: see footnote 47 in CBp.212). Footnote 15 also includes a reference to a report by Professor William Maley (“On the return of Hazaras to Afghanistan”, Australian National University, 4 April 2018) that the applicant had provided.
The IAA also relied upon two reports not previously mentioned:
a)European Asylum Support Office (‘EASO’), “Country of Origin Information Report: Afghanistan: Individuals targeted by armed actors in the conflict”, 12 December 2017, CISEDB50AD7868 and the companion volume EASO, “Country of Origin Information Report: Afghanistan: Individuals targeted under societal and legal norms”, 12 December 2017, CISEDB50AD7870
b)DFAT, “Country Information Report Afghanistan”, 18 September 2017, CISEDB50AD5680 (DFAT Country Report September 2017) which appears to be the companion volume to the report DFAT, “Hazaras in Afghanistan”, 18 September 2017, CISEDB50AD5681
The reports detail the nature of country information that was published well before the last submissions of the applicant to the IAA in April 2018 (when he provided Professor Maley’s report), and long before the IAA decision delivered in August 2018. As the applicant relied upon passages of the DFAT “Hazaras in Afghanistan” report and it appears to be the companion volume (published on the same day) to the DFAT report relied upon by the applicant in submissions to the delegate, I do not accept that the applicant was not aware of it, or at least would not have had ready access to that report.
The new information in the EASO report was the reference given in footnote 13 of paragraph [70] set out above, which led to the finding that:
70.… other analysis … indicates that a significant number of attacks/abductions involving Hazaras were likely misreported, that the motivations for these attacks were complex, and that there was little clear evidence that Hazaras involved in these attacks were being targeted for harm for reasons of their ethnicity or religion.
These findings appear to rely upon pp.54 and 55 of the report where it is said:
Both Siddique and Osman gave the view that most of the time when incidents occurred in which Hazara road passengers were singled out and killed or abducted, other reasons led to this targeting. These reasons can be non-political community disputes or the fact that these Hazara were targets for other reasons, for example, being ANSF members. In those cases, according to Borhan Osman, they would have been singled out regardless of their ethnicity [FN omitted]. With the possible exception of the February 2015 Zabul mass abduction, analyst Qayoom Suroush, former researcher with Afghanistan Analyst Network (AAN) and Human Rights Watch, currently researcher at the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), came to the same conclusion earlier, in an AAN report examining incidents targeting Hazara [FN omitted] . While Hazara may seem more at risk while travelling on the roads, sources of the Canadian IRB and the Norwegian Landinfo related this enhanced risk to elements such as the fact that Hazara travel more frequently and are therefore overrepresented on the roads, and that they also often have found jobs in the NGO-sector or as high ranking officials in the government [FN omitted].
Also according to the 2016 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Report to the Human Rights Council, discriminatory intent based upon ethnicity or religion was not documented among the motives for the many instances of targeting the Hazara [FN omitted]. With regards to the targeting of the mostly Hazara village in Sar-e Pul in August 2017, AAN co-director notes that the motive seemed to be the fact that the village was harbouring a local uprising force against the Taliban [FN omitted]. UNAMA did not receive ‘information supporting the claims that the attack on the village had a sectarian or ethnic motivation’ [FN omitted]. In the attack on a Hazara village in Baghlan in May 2016, the Obaid Ali described the motive as being the Hazara support for a military operation against the Taliban, in breach of an agreement between the Taliban and the Hazara community [FN omitted].
Analysts Osman and Qayoum gave the opinion that the reporting on these incidents is often ‘full of mistakes with assumptions relayed as facts’ (452), and risks being ‘misleading’, partly because of a very vocal Hazara activism [FN omitted]. Anand Gopal was of the view that because most Hazara live in non-contested areas (except for certain areas in Ghazni), they are currently ‘probably the least targeted community in Afghanistan in those areas,’ compared to the Pashtun in heavily contested areas [FN omitted]). UNHCR noted however that ‘the Shia community is disproportionately represented among civilian casualties in Kabul and Herat’ [FN omitted].
At the same time discrimination against Hazara persists [FN omitted], although according to the US Department of State Sunni versus Shia discrimination is on the decline and confined to ‘some localities’ [FN omitted].
The selection and weight to be attached to country information is a matter for the decision maker: see NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at paragraph [11] and BIN18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1094 at paragraph [9].
It is accepted that there is not a general obligation under s.473DC(3) of the Migration Act1958 (Cth) upon the IAA to invite a person to provide new information, orally or in writing, simply as a result of the IAA reaching a conclusion that departs from a finding of the delegate: see CID16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 485 at paragraph [32]. The applicant however points out that the exercise of discretionary powers under s.473DC must nonetheless be exercised in a way that is legally reasonable: see Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 [2017] FCAFC 210 (‘CRY16’) at paragraphs [81] to [82]. The applicant argues that in this case it was legally unreasonable not to give him an opportunity to comment on the information when that information purported to show that the circumstances of his home province had changed since the delegate’s decision.
Subdivision C of Div.3 of Pt.7AA of the Act deals with new information in proceedings before the IAA. Section 473DC(1) provides the IAA with power to “get” documents or information, and s.473DC(3) enables the IAA to invite a person to provide new information orally or in writing. There is no obligation upon the IAA to request or accept new information, as is made clear in s.473DC(2): however, this subsection cannot be read as indicating that the discretion to obtain or seek new information could be exercised in a way that was legally unreasonable.
Section 473DE(1) of the Act provides that ‘particulars of any new information’ must be given to an applicant in circumstances where it ‘would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming’ the delegate’s decision. This mandatory requirement does not apply to new information that is not specifically about the applicant, but only about a class of persons for which the applicant is a member: see s.473DE(3)(a).
Section 473DE(3) simply limits the breadth of the mandatory requirement in s.473DE(1). Whilst s.473DE(1) imposes a mandatory obligation upon the IAA in certain limited circumstances, s.473DC provides a separate general power for the IAA to obtain new information, where it considers it appropriate to do so. Section 473DE does not purport to limit the circumstances that may give rise to the need for new information under s.473DC. It simply makes the process mandatory in the limited circumstances that arise under s.473DE. This reading of the sections was confirmed by Thawley J in CCQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1641 (‘CCQ17’) at paragraph [47], where his Honour said:
47. In addition to s 473DC(2), a further important aspect of the statutory scheme is that s 473DE(3)(a) expressly contemplates that new information (such as new country information) can be used to affirm a decision (see s 473DE(1)(a)(ii)) without giving a referred applicant an opportunity to be heard. That does not mean that s 473DC could never be used in circumstances where the exclusion in s 473DE(3)(a) applied. Nor is to say that the particular circumstances of a case may be such that it would be legally unreasonable not to exercise or consider exercising the discretion in s 473DC despite there being no obligation (as a consequence of the exclusion in s 473DE(3)(a)) to afford the opportunity to be heard contemplated by s 473DE.
The general discretion under s.473DC must be seen in the context of the provisions as a whole, of which s.473DE is an important part. As was said in BCQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 365 at paragraph [71]:
71. Part 7AA modifies (by restricting) the common law principles of procedural fairness. The analysis of what might be an unreasonable exercise of, or failure to exercise, a discretionary power contained in Part 7AA must proceed against the statutory context, which includes that modification. Whilst the legislature is taken to have intended that a discretionary power will be exercised reasonably (Li at [63], per Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ; [88], per Gageler J), that which is reasonable is informed by the subject matter, scope and purpose of the legislation under which it is conferred. Part 7AA requires the Authority to review a decision and to conduct that review on the basis of the “review material” and, subject to the statutory exceptions contained in Part 7AA, without obtaining “new information” or affording the referred applicant a hearing. The reasonableness of an asserted failure to consider a discretionary power to disclose material to the referred applicant, and the reasonableness of the exercise of the discretion itself, must be assessed against that statutory scheme.
This passage has been cited with approval in a number of subsequent decisions, see for example: DDM17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1510 at paragraph [25], DVO16 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 157 at paragraph [6], BLS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1079 at paragraph [38], ANA18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1854 at paragraph [60], and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CLV16 [2018] FCAFC 80 at paragraph [12].
As the IAA is not obliged to provide reasons as to why it did not exercise the discretion under s.473DC one must look at the surrounding circumstances of the case in order to make a determination as to whether or not the IAA had failed to even consider inviting an applicant to provide new information, or whether the failure of the IAA to consider obtaining new information lacked an evident and intelligible justification.
In this regard, the circumstances in CRY16 are instructive. In that case, the IAA accepted that the applicant was at real risk of serious harm in his home area, but concluded that he could relocate. Relocation had not been an issue before the delegate. The Full Court’s decision in CRY16 is well summarised (at paragraph [44]) of CCQ17, where Thawley J says:
44. The Full Court explained (at [82]) that the failure by the Authority to consider obtaining new information lacked an evident and intelligible justification, in circumstances where:
(1) the Authority knew that it did not have information on the referred applicant’s particular circumstances and the impact upon him of relocation to Beirut;
(2) (the Authority knew that) the referred applicant was likely to have information on his particular circumstances and the impact upon him of relocation to Beirut;
(3) the Authority did not have that information because the question of relocation was not explored, or the subject of findings, by the delegate; and
(4) the Authority’s failure to consider the exercise of the discretionary power meant that it “disabled itself” from considering what was reasonable, in the sense of “practicable”, in terms of relocation.
In the present case the issue was well known and most of the country information was also identified to the applicant at earlier stages of the process. There was nothing additional relating to the applicant’s personal circumstances that was likely to become relevant in light of the additional country information. Indeed, the applicant argues that had he been given an opportunity to comment on this new information, he would have highlighted to the IAA other aspects of these lengthy reports which were relevant to, and tended against the findings the IAA had made - not that he would have been able to add to the information about his own circumstances, or otherwise provide new information relevant to this issue.
As to the final particular of this ground, there is long standing authority for the obvious logical proposition that a decision maker is not required to consider relocation in cases where they have found that the applicant has not established a real risk of harm in their home area: see, for example, Sabaratnasingam v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 261 at paragraph [13]; SZCJO v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 48 at paragraph [9]; and AXL17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2019] FCA 778 at paragraph [41].
On the material before the court, I am not persuaded that the IAA acted in a way that was legally unreasonable in the context of s.473DC by not providing a copy of, or particulars of the relevant content of, the EASO report to the applicant nor inviting the applicant to provide submissions or new information.
I therefore find that these grounds are not made out.
Ground 3
Ground three alleges that the IAA failed to have regard to relevant information that was before it, and is framed as follows:
3. The Second Respondent failed to consider relevant information in circumstances that amount to jurisdictional error.
Particulars
(i) The Applicant is a Shia Hazara who fears persecution on return to Afghanistan and who provided, inter alia, updated information to the Second Respondent about the security situation in Afghanistan for returning Hazara: CB337.
(ii) One of the findings in favour of the Applicant made by the delegate was that the Applicant would face a real chance of serious harm if he were to return to his home province of Ghazni: CB211.
(iii) The Second Respondent disagreed with that finding and found that the Applicant would not face a real chance of serious harm if he were to return to Ghazni: CB368 [68]; 376 [105], [106]. In finding that the Applicant would not face a real chance of serious harm if he returned to Ghazni, the Second Respondent relied on new country information it had obtained, “specifically reports discussing the risks to Shia Hazaras in Afghanistan, luding on the roads, and a security assessment for persons returning from the West and educated Afghans”: CB361, [22].
(iv) The new information was referred to at footnote 3 of CB 361. The new information consisted of three reports;
Footnote 3
EASO, "Afghanistan: Individuals targeted under societal and legal norms", 12 December 2017, CISEDB50AD7870; (EASO) EASO, "Afghanistan: Individuals targeted by armed actors in the conflict", 12 December 2017, CISEDB50AD7868; (EASO) DFAT, "Country Information Report Afghanistan", 18 September 2017, CISEDB50AD5680 (DFAT Country Report September 2017)
(v) In support of the dispositive finding that the Applicant would not face harm if he returned to his home province of Ghazni the Second Respondent referred to the new information and to a report entitled UNAMA, "Afghanistan Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 2016", 6 February 2017, CISEDB50AD201(‘UNAMA Report’)
(vi) The Second Respondent disagreed with the assessment of the delegate that the Applicant “could not return home to Jaghori because of risks on the road for Shia Hazaras” (CB 368 [68]) and relied on the new information listed above and not before the delegate, in doing so.
(vii) The Second Respondent relied on a report entitled DFAT, "Hazaras in Afghanistan", 18 September 2017, CISEDB50AD5681 (CB368 ) to support its dispositive finding that abductions in Ghazni have become uncommon; see CB369 [71], and that there were no abductions of Hazaras in 2016 and 2017 in the Applicant’s home province of Ghazni; CB 369 [70]. It also used these reports to state, in relation to the risk to the Applicant of travelling on the roads that [in] “any event, abductions in Ghazni have become uncommon.”
(viii) In making the findings referred to at (vi) and (vii) The Second Respondent ignored or failed to consider information before it in the new information that;
a) The decline in the number of Hazaras abducted in 2016 only covered abduction incidents perpetrated by parties to the conflict. They exclude incidents perpetrated by criminals, and by tribal and other groups that do not have a connection to the conflict. It can be difficult to ascertain the motivation for attacks, and to separate criminal attacks from insurgent activity connected to the conflict; DFAT Hazaras Report, 8 [2.32].
b) Hazaras are targeted or singled out as victims; DFAT Hazaras Report, 8 [2.33], [2.34].
c) Notwithstanding the decline in the number of incidents of abduction affecting Hazaras in 2016 compared to 2015, DFAT assesses that Hazaras remain likely to be selected for abduction or violence if a vehicle carrying a mix of ethnic groups is stopped; DFAT Hazaras report, 8 [2.35];
d) UNAMA remains concerned by the continuing trend of abduction of civilians by Anti-Government Elements; UNAMA Report, 66.
e) Several other kidnapping incidents of Hazara on the roads in Sar-e-Pul, Wardak, Ghazni and Ghor in 2016 have been attributed to the Taliban”; EASO report, 58.
The relevant passages of the IAA decision are set out above and need not be repeated.
This ground manifests as a style of a complaint that the decision was made without regard to all of the significant evidence within the reports, (see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317 per Robertson J; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114 (‘MZYTS’); Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS [2014] FCAFC 16; and ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174) or that the conclusions of the IAA are either illogical or legally unreasonable (see AssociatedProvincial Picture House Limited v Wednesbury Corporation [1949] 1 KB 223; Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin [1990] HCA 21; Minister for Immigration v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21, (1999) 197 CLR 611; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16, (2010) 240 CLR 611; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18, (2013) 249 CLR 332; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30).
Whilst a decision maker does not have to refer to every piece of evidence, and can prefer some evidence over other evidence, the Full Court in MZYTS pointed out:
49. The Court is entitled to take the reasons of the Tribunal as setting out the findings of fact the Tribunal itself considered material to its decision, and as reciting the evidence and other material which the Tribunal itself considered relevant to the findings it made: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 (Yusuf) at [10], [34], [68]. Representing as it does what the Tribunal itself considered important and material, what is present — and what is absent — from the reasons may in a given case enable a Court on review to find jurisdictional error: see Yusuf 206 CLR 323 at [10], [44], [69].
50. ... In the context of two or more pieces of apparently pertinent, but contradictory, evidence an expression of a preference for some evidence over other evidence generally requires an articulation of the different effects of the evidence concerned, and then some indication as to why preference is given. All these are matters for the trier of fact. The absence from the recitation of country information of the material referred to in the post-hearing submissions is indicative of omission and ignoring, not weighing and preference.
Whilst a decision maker referring to a lengthy document indicates consideration of its contents, this does not determine the issue, as some parts may be of such significance as to require specific reference or discussion: see generally BUD17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCAFC 140 (‘BUD17’) at paragraph [62].
The legal consequences flowing from a finding that the delegate failed to consider a document, or a critical part of a document will, as the Full Court said in VAAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 117 at paragraph [77] ‘depend on the circumstances of the case and the nature of the document’, noting the statement of Mason J in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko- Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 40, that there is no error where the factor was so ‘insignificant that the failure to take it into account could not have materially affected the decision’. In order to carry out this task, it is necessary, as the Full Court set out in BUD17 at [65], to consider:
(1) the cogency of the evidentiary material; and
(2) the place of that material in the assessment of the review applicant’s claims.
The submissions of the applicant raised a number of issues, which I consider in turn, as follows.
Number of abductions
The applicant argues that the IAA ignored material in the new information and the UNAMA report that was significant and important to the question of whether or not he is at risk on the roads around where he lives (contrary to the findings of the delegate) the IAA.
The IAA (at paragraph [69] of the decision) noted a reduction in abductions (and consequential deaths due to abduction) of Hazaras, relying upon the DFAT report in two important respects:
a)the number of abduction incidents involving Hazaras reducing from 25 to 15; and
b)the number of abducted Hazaras killed in 2015 was 15, yet all of the 2016 Hazara abductees were released unharmed.
The applicant argues that the DFAT Hazaras report qualified this information (at paragraph [2.32]) as follows:
a)the ‘reports cover only abduction incidents perpetrated by parties to the conflict.’
b)the ‘incidents perpetrated by criminals, and by tribal and other groups that do not have a connection to the conflict’ are excluded; and
c)it ‘can be difficult to ascertain the motivation for attacks, and to separate criminal attacks from insurgent activity connected to the conflict.’
The matters set out in paragraph [2.32] of the DFAT report clearly go to the reliability of the figures that the IAA used in the decision. The central question is whether the caveats to the data set out in paragraph [2.32] were so significant that the IAA had to at least mention those caveats in determining the facts, even if it remained open to the IAA to choose to accept the figures in the report. Part of the difficulty confronting the IAA is that the convention based claim requires consideration of whether the potential harm is perpetrated for a convention reason, thus the need to consider the link with the conflict and ethnicity of the applicant which appears in the first part of paragraph [70]. It appears reasonably open to read the country information as indicating that attacks on the roads are not targeting Hazaras, per se (that is actively seeking out Hazaras), rather that when an attack takes place Hazaras may be more likely to be victims. With respect to the complimentary protection part of the claim, the real issue is the overall risk, not the level of risk for Convention reasons. The IAA indicates an awareness of the weaknesses of the data used by DFAT and that this was taken into account in reaching its overall finding. Importantly, the key finding relates to the lack of attacks on Hazaras in the applicant’s home region in 2016 (at the end of paragraph [70]) which is not questioned in the materials. The finding with respect to risks on the roads to Kabul reflects the applicant’s individual circumstances: see paragraph [71]
I am not persuaded that the reliance on the DFAT report in this respect was illogical or legally unreasonable, nor that the reasons indicate that the material going to the weaknesses of the DFAT data was not considered.
Whether Hazara’s were being targeted
The IAA found (at paragraph [70]) of the decision that, ‘there was little clear evidence that Hazaras involved in these attacks were being targeted for harm for reasons of their ethnicity or religion’. The applicant contrasts this finding with a number of passages in the country information that bear on this question:
a)At p.8, paragraph [2.33] the DFAT Hazaras report states that:
DFAT assesses that ethnic targeting can play a role in the selection of victims once an abduction is in progress. There have been recent cases in which Hazaras have been singled out for special attention during an abduction. For example, in November 2015, militants stopped a number of buses travelling through Zabul province en route from Kandahar to Kabul. The militants demanded identification from passengers, and reportedly took away only the Hazara passengers. DFAT is aware of credible anecdotal reports of ‘spotters’ at bus stations calling ahead to tell insurgents or criminals which buses are carrying Hazaras. As a result, some bus companies have reportedly refused to sell tickets to Hazaras because of a perception that having them on board increases the probability that insurgents or criminals will stop their buses.
b)At p.8, paragraph [2.34] the DFAT Hazaras report stated:
It is unclear whether the targeting of Hazaras is due to their ethnicity, because of a perceived association with the government or international community (see ‘People associated with the government or the international community’), because Hazaras are perceived to be more wealthy than other ethnicities (and therefore more likely to be able to pay ransoms), or because Hazaras represent a lower risk target from the abductors’ perspective than other ethnicities.
c)At p.8, paragraph [2.35] the DFAT Hazaras report concludes, with respect to kidnapping and abductions, that:
DFAT assesses that abduction while travelling by road is a risk for Afghans of all ethnicities. Notwithstanding the decline in the number of incidents of abduction affecting Hazaras in 2016 compared to 2015, DFAT assesses that Hazaras remain likely to be selected for abduction or violence if a vehicle carrying a mix of ethnic groups is stopped.
The report, whilst indicating that it is unclear whether targeting of Hazaras is solely due to their ethnicity or other factors associated with the perception of the ethnic group, nonetheless provides that Hazaras ‘remain likely to be selected for abduction or violence’. As indicated above, it appears that the IAA was considering the difference between attackers actively seeking out Hazaras on the roads and the claim that Hazaras are more likely to be harmed if they are traveling in a vehicle (such as a bus) that is attacked. If the decision turned upon a question of whether or not a Convention reason existed, based upon the applicant’s ethnicity, this may have been be a significant error. However, the real issue was an assessment of the risk to the applicant, not the reasons for that risk, and ultimately it was concluded that the applicant was not at risk in his particular circumstances.
Abductions in Ghazni
The IAA found that that abductions in Ghazni have become uncommon (at paragraph [71] of the decision), and that there were no abductions of Hazaras in 2016 and 2017 in the Applicant’s home province: see paragraph [70] of the decision.
The applicant points to the information contained in the UNAMA Report, which says, (at pp.73–74, I note that two copies of the report were provided which appear to be identical, save that the page numbers differ by 7 pages):
UNAMA remains concerned by the continuing trend of abduction of civilians by Anti-Government Elements [FN omitted]. Between 1 January and 31 December 2016, UNAMA documented 360 such incidents involving the abduction of 1,900 civilians and resulting in 135 civilian casualties (86 deaths and 49 injured). While these figures reflect a decrease in the number of recorded incidents of abduction and related civilian casualties compared to 2015, the number of civilians abducted increased by 11 per cent [FN omitted].
Of the 360 incidents, UNAMA attributed 350 to Anti-Government Elements that resulted in the abduction of 1,858 civilians and 130 civilian casualties (84 deaths and 46 injured) [FN omitted]. Taliban claimed responsibility for 14 incidents of abduction that resulted in the abduction of 257 civilians and four civilian deaths.
UNAMA observed that Anti-Government Elements frequently kidnapped civilians based on suspicions that they had connections to, or worked for, the Government, in addition to the targeted abduction and kidnapping of civilian Government employees, including off-duty ANP. However, Anti-Government Elements also abducted civilians for financial gain, with release predicated on payment of a substantial ransom.
Anti-Government Elements released most abductees unharmed following payment of ransoms or negotiations with local elders. Notwithstanding, Anti-Government Elements often killed those abductees identified as off-duty members of the Afghan national security forces, their family members or civilian Government staff, as well as people perceived to be government spies. Anti-Government Elements injured civilians during abductions predominantly by beating or torturing abducted civilians or injuring them by shooting during the initial abduction.
UNAMA documented five situations of mass abduction in which Anti-Government Elements abducted large groups of civilians ranging from 45 to 200, with a view to identifying members of the Afghan national security forces or, in one case, people with links to Taliban [FN omitted]. For example, on 6 February, Anti-Government Elements stopped two private vehicles in Maimana district, Faryab province, and abducted 110 male passengers, subsequently releasing 104 who provided civilian identity cards. Anti-Government Elements released the remaining six detainees after conducting investigations into their identities and determining no connection to Afghan national security forces.
UNAMA is also concerned by the mass abduction of civilians by Anti-Government Elements in an attempt to leverage the Government. For example, on 21 March in Warduj district, Badakhshan province, Anti-Government Elements detained 200 male civilians, including at least four boys, believed to be relatives of members of the Afghan national security forces in response to the arrest of three family members of one of their local high-ranking members. All detainees were subsequently freed following the release of the Anti-Government member’s relatives. Also in Badakhshan province, on 5 October in Raghistan district, Anti-Government Elements abducted more than a hundred people from the Darwaz area as they entered from Raghistan in response to the Government decision to stop fuel transport into Taliban-controlled areas to deter illegal gold mining. Anti-Government Elements released the abductees on 16 October after the Government removed the restrictions on fuel transport.
It is difficult to see how this information, about areas other than Ghazni, is of such significance that it makes the IAA’s decision illogical or legally unreasonable, or that it would be necessary to refer to the information in the decision.
The applicant also relies upon the EASO report, ‘Afghanistan, Individuals targeted by armed actors in the conflict’, at p.55 et seq, and particularly the conclusion at p.58 which indicates that ‘kidnapping incidents of Hazara on the roads in … Ghazni … in 2016 have been attributed to the Taliban.’ It is important to read this sentence in the context of the relevant section of the report which states:
1.2.11.4 Taliban and the Hazara
According to analysts Osman and Gopal, the Taliban follow a strict national agenda. This includes the idea that all segments of society should be represented in their ranks. This means. that other ethnic groups than their Pashtun core should be integrated in their movement [FN omitted]. Taliban do not seek to spark a sectarian war, according to the Christian Science Monitor, ‘not least because they see the Hazaras and other [Shias] as part of a nation they want to fully control’ [FN omitted]. In his 2017 Eid message, the Taliban leader Mawlawi Haibatullah condemned ‘all subversive activities among the brother ethnicities under the name of ethnicity, language, geography, religion and faction’ and, while claiming to be the only defender of national interest, blamed sectarian violence on ‘foreign instigators’[FN omitted]. Targeting Hazara is, according to Anand Gopal, a ‘red line’ for the Taliban [FN omitted].
Although the Taliban retains a deep-seated mistrust of former adversaries from the nineties, in particular [FN omitted] in recent years, some Hazara communities and the Taliban assisted each other in the fight against the Islamic State [FN omitted] There has been an instance where the Taliban claimed to have received a pledge of allegiance by a Hazara commander from Bamiyan [FN omitted] and from Baghlan [FN omitted] and reports of Hazara recruits in Ghazni [FN omitted] and a Hazara commander fighting alongside the Taliban in Kunduz [FN omitted]. The Taliban claim to have support from ‘the majority of the Shia populations in Bamyan, Daikundi and Hazarajat’ [FN omitted]. According to Giustozzi, there are several hundred Hazara fighters in the Taliban ranks, as well as Shia. These are mainly local militias from the southern fringes of Hazarajat, joining the Taliban for local infighting. Only the Haqqani network explicitly bans Shia from its ranks [FN omitted].
Although the Taliban publicly condemned the killing of at least nine Hazara coal miners in [FN omitted], Baghlan in January 2017 (local sources of the AIHRC stated it was actually the local Taliban [FN omitted]. who had committed these murders Several other kidnapping incidents of Hazara on the roads in Sar-e Pul, Wardak, Ghazni and Ghor in 2016 have been attributed to the Taliban [FN omitted].
Whilst the UNAMA report describes a terrible situation generally in Afghanistan, its specific references to civilian Hazaras in Ghazni is different. When discussing abductions of civilians at p.73 et seq, the report says (at pp.74 to 75) that:
UNAMA documented a decline in the number of Hazara civilians abducted in 2016, recording 15 incidents involving the abduction of 82 Hazara civilians, in comparison to 25 incidents in 2015 in which Anti-Government Elements abducted 224 Hazara civilians. In 2016, UNAMA documented the abduction of Hazara civilians in Uruzgan, Sari Pul, Daikundi, Maidan Wardak and Ghor provinces. Anti-Government Elements released all abductees unharmed. In contrast to 2015, UNAMA documented no incidents of the abduction of Hazara civilians in Ghazni province, with sources reporting that abductions in previously affected areas may have been deterred by the establishment of security check-posts by Afghan national security forces.260
[Footnote 260: In 2015, UNAMA documented 10 incidents of abduction targeting Hazara civilians in Ghazni province (63 Hazara civilians abducted in addition to 16 Hazara civilian deaths and one Hazara civilian injured).]
When reading the UNAMA report as a whole, it is clear that the IAA’s findings that there were no abductions of Hazaras in Ghazni in 2016 was open on the material.
I am therefore not persuaded that the applicant has made out this ground.
As the applicant has not made out a ground for judicial review I must therefore dismiss the application.
Costs
It was agreed in this matter that as result of costs thrown away on 1 August 2019 that costs should follow the event, but on the basis of the scale fee increased by 50 per cent, should the Minister be successful and the scale fee reduced by 50 per cent should the applicant be successful. I therefore make orders accordingly.
I certify that the preceding sixty (60) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Riethmuller
Associate:
Date: 28 August 2020
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