ANA18 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ANA18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1854

Appeal from: ANA18 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2018] FCCA 1372; ANA18 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor (No 2) [2018] FCCA 1373
File number(s): NSD 1070 of 2018
Judge: DERRINGTON J
Date of judgment: 28 November 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Safe Haven Enterprise Visa refused and IAA affirming decision – general grounds of review made to Federal Circuit Court – general grounds of appeal advanced to Federal Court – to whether the IAA denied applicant procedural fairness – whether IAA considered all claims and integers of claims advanced by the applicant
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited:

ANA18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCCA 1372

BCQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 365

BSQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 469

DBE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 942

DGZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 12

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 194 ALR 244

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263

NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1695

SZNXAV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 775

WZAVW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 760

Date of hearing: 21 November 2018
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 77
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr J Kay Hoyle
Solicitor for the Respondents: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

NSD 1070 of 2018
BETWEEN:

ANA18

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

DERRINGTON J

DATE OF ORDER:

28 NOVEMBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

DERRINGTON J:

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal from the determination of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC), delivered on 1 June 2018, which dismissed an application for judicial review of the Immigration Assessment Authority’s (IAA) affirmation of the decision of a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs.  The delegate’s decision was not to grant the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa (SHEV).

  2. On 21 June 2018, the appellant filed a Notice of Appeal from the decision of the FCC.  The grounds in the Notice of Appeal were, it appears, drafted by the appellant.

  3. It is not irrelevant to note that the appellant is presently in immigration detention at Villawood and has not had access to legal assistance.

    Background

  4. Although the background and history of…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1854
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of ANA18 v Minister for Home Affairs, the appellant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, sought a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa after his application for a subclass 866 Permanent Protection visa was rejected. His visa claim was based on witnessing the shooting of his uncle by the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of Sri Lanka and the subsequent harassment and threats he faced due to his Tamil ethnicity and alleged association with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The delegate refused to grant his visa application, and the decision was affirmed by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT). The appellant then applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa, which was also refused. The matter was referred to the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) for review, which also affirmed the delegate's decision. The appellant sought review of the IAA's decision in the Federal Circuit Court (FCC), which was dismissed, and subsequently appealed to the Federal Court.

The primary legal issues in this case were whether the IAA denied the appellant procedural fairness and whether it considered all claims and integers of claims advanced by the appellant. The appellant argued that the IAA failed to consider relevant considerations and denied him procedural fairness. The court examined the principles set out in NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) and NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs to determine what claims or integers of claims a decision-maker is obliged to consider.

The court found that the IAA did consider the appellant's claims and integers of claims, and that the appellant had been given numerous opportunities to present his claims and evidence. The IAA accepted that the appellant's uncle was shot and killed, but did not accept that this was due to his LTTE profile or that the attack was perpetrated by the CID. The court concluded that the IAA's decision was not flawed and dismissed the appeal. The appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal.

In summary, the Federal Court found that the IAA did not deny the appellant procedural fairness or fail to consider his claims and integers of claims. The court upheld the IAA's decision to affirm the delegate's decision to refuse the appellant's visa application, and dismissed the appeal. The appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

It is not irrelevant to note that the appellant is presently in immigration detention at Villawood and has not had access to legal assistance.Background Although the background and history of the appellant’s visa claims are summarised by the primary judge, it is necessary to mention some of the relevant facts. The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who made an application for a subclass 866 Permanent Protection visa on 5 June 2012. That application was rejected and, subsequently, at the invitation of the Minister, he applied for a SHEV in September 2017. The appellant based his visa claim on several allegations. First, that he is a Tamil Hindu who witnessed the shooting of his uncle, allegedly by the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), a branch of the Sri Lankan government. He claimed the shooters then went after him, but he was able to escape. He alleged that since the shooting, whoever was responsible for the killing have been looking for him. Secondly, he claimed he was constantly harassed and targeted by police officers and other authorities in his village. He said that if he returned to Sri Lanka he will be tortured and killed by the CID because of his uncle and his ethnicity or he may be killed because of his suspected association with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The appellant made his application for a Protection visa on 5 June 2012. On 22 August 2012 he made a statutory declaration to support his application which detailed the foundations of his claims. The delegate refused to grant his Protection visa on 28 March 2018 and the appellant applied for review of that decision to the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT). He provided the RRT with additional information and comments, much of which was a response to the delegate not accepting that men came to look for him on the day his uncle was killed. He also made written submissions to the RRT on 15 April 2013 and 7 May 2013. Those submissions referred to Country Information and responded to other issues raised by the delegate. Nonetheless, on 29 January 2014 the RRT affirmed the delegate’s decision. The appellant then applied for a SHEV and relied on the claims for protection stated in his earlier visa application and linked statutory declaration as well as another statement provided to the RRT. The appellant attended an interview with the Department on 10 October 2017 and, in response to that interview, provided a second statement to the Department on 16 October 2017. In that statement, he said he gets nervous and finds it is hard to re-tell his story. He said that he had been told by his father that his uncle was a LTTE member and held a high position. The appellant said that he had not mentioned this sooner because there was no documentary evidence and no one would have believed him. He further claimed that because of a Departmental data breach, the situation in Sri Lanka is now worse because he believes the government now knows he sought asylum in Australia and so they were now more convinced of his suspected LTTE membership. He also said further that his grandmother has been threatened by the CID who has been searching for him.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 22 November 2017, the delegate refused to grant the appellant the visa and on 30 November 2017, the matter was referred to the IAA. Decision of the IAA In a letter dated 30 November 2017, the IAA acknowledged the matter had been referred to it and noted that the Department had provided to it all documents relevant to the case. It was also noted that new information can only be considered in limited circumstances. On 21 December 2017, the appellant’s migration agent provided a submission to the IAA, some of which referred to information before the delegate and some of which referred to additional information. The submission referred to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Guidance Note on the Psychologically Vulnerable Applicant in the Protection Visa Assessment Process. That document was dated 20 November 2017 and the IAA was satisfied that it could not have been provided to the delegate before the decision. It was submitted that the UN document was relevant when assessing inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence and the plausibility of his claims. The IAA concluded it ought take into consideration the UN document and submissions made in respect of it. The submissions made on behalf of the appellant also asked the IAA to call him for an interview if there were any doubts as to his credibility or any aspect of his claims. The IAA’s decision referred to s 473DB of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act), which provides that, generally, the IAA must review decisions on the papers without interviewing the applicant. Section 473DC provides that the IAA does not have a duty to obtain, request or accept any new information. It was noted that the appellant had been represented by the same migration agent during his visa application process and had been afforded a number of opportunities, both orally and via writing, to present his claims and evidence. As well, he has been given opportunities to address issues arising from his claims and previous findings. For those reasons, the IAA decided it was not necessary for it to interview the appellant. The IAA considered that, overall, the appellant had made five claims. They are outlined at [3] of the IAA’s reasons and [11] of the judgment of the FCC. The appellant claimed a fear of harm because:(1)He witnessed the death of his uncle.(2)His uncle was a member of the LTTE.(3)He was a Tamil.(4)Some of his personal details were published in the data breach. (5)He would return to Sri Lanka a failed asylum-seeker, who fled Sri Lanka illegally. The IAA considered each one of those claims in detail. In relation to the claim that the appellant had witnessed the shooting and death of his uncle it was noted that, whilst his evidence was confused and/or inconsistent (at [15]), the core elements of that story had remained consistent and the IAA was prepared to accept that it had occurred. It was accepted that any implausibility in the appellant’s story likely arose from a combination of the appellant’s age at the time, trauma and lapse of time. The shooting allegedly occurred in 2007 when he was 11 years old and he had made his statements in relation to the incident at least five years after it occurred. Ultimately, while the IAA accepted that the appellant’s uncle was shot and killed, it did not accept that this was because of his LTTE profile, or that the attack was perpetrated by the CID (at [18]). It was noted that the Country Information available to the IAA did not suggest that the CID conducted itself in the way claimed by the appellant.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It is for those reasons that the application for an adjournment was refused.Consideration of grounds of review The application to the FCC contained the following grounds of review:1.The Immigration Assessment Authority failed to consider and take into account a Relevant Consideration.Particulars (i)As a Member of social group Tamil Hindu from Udappu in the North western Province of Sri Lanka(ii)Applicant fear persecution from Sri Lana Government (CID) being targeted as a chief witness to his uncle’s death in Sri Lanka(iii)The Applicant fear of harm because the Sri Lanka government (CID) wanted he to come forward as a witness to his uncle’s death, follow on going investigation and reconciliation for those who lost their life during the civil war, as a chief witnesses to his uncle’s death, the applicant feared to go against the government (CID) and feared from the LTTE groups if he failed to complied. As a result the Applicant cannot express his opinion and he is not safe to go back to Sir Lanka.2. The Respondents denied the applicant procedural fairness and natural justice3.Leave to fill amended application with particulars and any supplementary affidavit and any relevant documents[Errors in original]. Despite the inclusion of item three, before the FCC the appellant did not file an amended application, any affidavit material other than that which supported the application for review and nor did he adduce any further documents. It was, therefore, necessary to consider grounds 1 and 2, only. The primary judge concluded that ground 1 could be taken to claim that each of the three particulars was a “claim” before the IAA, but that the IAA failed to consider them. The learned Judge set out, first, the principles that ought be applied when determining what are an applicant’s claims, or integers of claims, which a decision maker is obliged to consider (at [28]). He considered the Full Federal Court decision of NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263 (NABE (2)), and, particularly from that judgment that:(a)The Tribunal’s function is to respond to the case advanced; the Tribunal is not obliged to consider claims that have not been made.(b)The Tribunal must deal with the case raised by the material and evidence before it. The question is whether the case put before the Tribunal has sufficiently raised the relevant issue that the Tribunal should have dealt with.(c)The Tribunal is not only required to deal with claims expressly articulated by an applicant, and, at the same time, is also not required to consider a case not expressly made or one that does not clearly arise on the materials before the Tribunal. The learned judge below also considered NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1695 where Allsop J (as he was then) cited NABE (No 2) for the proposition that:A practical common sense approach to everyday decision-making requires the unarticulated claim to arise tolerably clearly from the material itself, since the statutory task of the Tribunal is to assess the claims by reference to all the material, not to undertake an independent analytical exercise of the material for the discovery of potential claims which might be made, but which have not been, and then subjecting them to further analysis to assess their legitimacy.