FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Sabaratnasingam v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
[2000] FCA 261MIGRATION - Refugees Convention - appeal from decision dismissing application for review of decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal - 'no evidence' ground - particular facts alleged not to exist were not facts upon which Tribunal based decision - so-called "internal relocation" - no finding of well-founded fear of persecution in part of country of nationality - question of reasonableness of relocation thus not raised
Migration Act1958 s 476(1)(g)
Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212 applied.
Gersten v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 169 ALR 167 considered.
Kanagasabai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 205 doubted.
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 applied.
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Epeabaka (1999) 84 FCR 411 referred to.
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 referred to.
Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437 applied.
Waterford v The Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54, referred to.Arupillai Sabaratnasingam v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
N 1138 of 1999WHITLAM, LEHANE & GYLES JJ
SYDNEY
10 MARCH 2000
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N1138 OF 1999
On appeal from a Judge of the Federal Court of Australia
BETWEEN:
ARUPILLAI SABARATNASINGAM
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION
AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
WHITLAM, LEHANE & GYLES JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
10 MARCH 2000
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the costs of the respondent.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N1138 OF 1999
On appeal from a Judge of the Federal Court of Australia
BETWEEN:
ARUPILLAI SABARATNASINGAM
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION
AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
WHITLAM, LEHANE & GYLES JJ
DATE:
10 MARCH 2000
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT
WHITLAM J:
This is an appeal from a judgment of Madgwick J ([1999] FCA 1290) dismissing an application under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 ("the Act") for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal") made on 26 August 1998. The Tribunal affirmed the decision made by a delegate of the respondent refusing to grant the appellant and his wife protection visas. It was not satisfied that they were refugees as defined by Art 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol (together "the Convention"). Specifically, the Tribunal found that neither the appellant nor his wife had a well-founded fear of persecution.
The appellant was born on 21 November 1919. His wife was born on 16 July 1931. They are Sri Lankan nationals, who arrived in Australia on 13 June 1996 and applied for protection visas on…
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- Case
- [2000] FCA 261
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Federal Court, in its judgement, held that the Tribunal's approach in assessing the likelihood of persecution if Sabaratnasingam and his wife were returned to Sri Lanka did not involve an error of law. The Court found that the Tribunal had indeed formed an opinion on what was likely to occur if the appellant and his wife were returned to Sri Lanka and had assumed in their favour that they had a subjective fear of persecution in Colombo. The Court also found that the Tribunal's formulation of "persecution" as "serious or significant harm" was not necessarily wrong in law, especially in light of subsequent judicial interpretations that supported a similar understanding of the term. The Court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was not flawed and dismissed the appeal.
The final orders of the Court were to dismiss the appeal and for the appellant to pay the costs of the respondent.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the costs of the respondent.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In determining whether there was a real chance that the appellant and his wife would be persecuted for a Convention reason, the Tribunal had to form an opinion as to what was likely to occur if they were returned to Sri Lanka: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 574. The Tribunal appears to have assumed that the appellant and his wife would re-enter Sri Lanka via Colombo and, further, to have assumed in their favour that they had a subjective fear of persecution in that part of their country. Accordingly, the Tribunal turned its mind to what might happen to the appellant and his wife in Colombo if it were "too dangerous for them to return to Jaffna". The Tribunal found that, even in those circumstances, there was no real chance of persecution. That approach of the Tribunal does not involve an error of law. Cf. Re The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex Parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 at paras, 27-28. The particulars alleged in paragraphs (b) and (c) of ground 4 appear to have been relied on before Madgwick J only for the purposes of the relocation issue. However, before us, the appellant's solicitor latched on to those particulars in order to demonstrate an error of law on the part of the Tribunal in the interpretation and application of the word "persecution". The High Court in Guo (at 570) called persecution the second element of the Convention definition. In its discussion of the Convention definition, the Tribunal said (at p.3): ""Persecution" means serious or significant harm." The appellant's solicitor submitted that statement was wrong in law. He relied on Branson J's disapproval of such a formulation in Kanagasabai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 205. In that case her Honour said (at [27]):"… Nothing in the reasons for decision of the High Court in Guo's case suggests that the High Court intended in that case to reconsider established authority on the meaning of "persecution". It rather intended, as I read the case, to make explicit what had in earlier authority been implicit, namely, that the type of harm which can constitute persecution cannot be trivial or insignificant harm but rather must be harm of significance." Subsequently, in Gersten v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 169 ALR at 167, Katz J declined to follow the decision of Branson J on this point. His Honour remarked that a formulation very like that criticized by Branson J had been employed by other judges of the Court, including Burchett J in Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (unreported, 4 April 1997) at 2-3. Katz J said (at [151]):"In Kanagasabi [sic], as I understand her Honour's reasons for judgment, Branson J took the view that, in order to constitute "persecution" for Convention purposes, a type of harm "cannot be trivial or insignificant harm but rather must be harm of significance" (see at [27] and see also her Honour's reasons in Shetty v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1601 (unreported; 18 November 1999) at [17]). I infer from that formulation of what amounts to "persecution" for Convention purposes that her Honour's difficulty with the formulation used by the Tribunal in the case before her … must have been its inclusion of the adjective "serious" as an alternative to "significant" in order to describe the relevant harm. However, I am unable to regard the addition of that adjective to the formulation as having been intended to do anything more in the context than merely provide a synonym of the adjective "significant". (Compare Branson J's use in her own formulation of the test of persecution for Convention purposes of the phrase "trivial or insignificant harm", which appears to me to have amounted to the use of an antonym of "serious" as a synonym of an antonym of "significant".)"