Shetty v Minister for Immigration Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Shetty v Minister for Immigration Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1601

MIGRATION – Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of membership of a particular social group – whether Tribunal entitled to isolate question of whether harm feared serious enough to constitute persecution

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 476

Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225, distinguished
Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379, approved, followed
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 144 ALR 567, approved, followed
Kanagasabai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 205, approved, followed
Prahastono v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 77 FCR 260, approved, followed

JACINTHA ASHOK SHETTY v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 110 of 1999

BRANSON J
SYDNEY
18 NOVEMBER 1999

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 110 of 1999

BETWEEN:

JACINTHA ASHOK SHETTY
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

BRANSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 NOVEMBER 1999

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal be affirmed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 110 of 1999

BETWEEN:

JACINTHA ASHOK SHETTY
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

BRANSON J

DATE:

18 NOVEMBER 1999

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an application made under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) which affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent not to grant to the applicant a protection visa.

  2. Section 36 of the Act provides as follows:

    “(1)     There is a class of visas to be known as protection visas.

    (2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol.”

  3. Australia will have protection obligations to the applicant under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol (together hereafter referred to as the “Refugees Convention”) if the applicant:

    “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of [her] nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail [herself] of the protection of that country ….”  (Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention)

    FACTS

  4. The applicant is a citizen of India.  She arrived in Australia on 20 December 1992.  On 8 August 1995 she lodged an application with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (“the Department”) seeking a protection visa.  On 25 August 1998 a delegate of the…

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Details
Case
[1999] FCA 1601
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Shetty v Minister for Immigration Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, a citizen of India, appealed a decision by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs to refuse her application for a protection visa. The applicant argued that she had a well-founded fear of persecution if she returned to India due to her marital status and her past abortion. The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal had erred in its interpretation of the applicable law, whether it had failed to fully address the applicant's claims, and whether it had complied with procedural requirements. The court found that the Tribunal had not erred in its interpretation of the law and had adequately considered the applicant's claims. The court held that the Tribunal's decision was correct and affirmed the decision of the Tribunal.

The court held that the Tribunal's interpretation of the phrase 'membership of a particular social group' was not in error. The court noted that the applicant's argument was based on a different case and that the statement of McHugh J in Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs was not applicable to the present case. The court also held that the Tribunal had adequately considered the applicant's claims and had not failed to address them. The court found that the Tribunal had considered the evidence and had made a decision based on the facts as found. The court further held that the Tribunal had complied with procedural requirements and had provided adequate reasons for its decision. The court dismissed the applicant's appeal and affirmed the decision of the Tribunal.

The orders of the court were that the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal be affirmed. The applicant's appeal was dismissed, and the decision of the Tribunal was upheld. The court found that the Tribunal had not erred in its interpretation of the law, had adequately considered the applicant's claims, and had complied with procedural requirements. The decision of the Tribunal was correct, and the applicant's appeal was dismissed. The court's decision affirmed the importance of the Refugee Review Tribunal's role in determining protection visa applications and the need for the Tribunal to adequately consider the applicant's claims and provide adequate reasons for its decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal be affirmed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Australia will have protection obligations to the applicant under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol (together hereafter referred to as the “Refugees Convention”) if the applicant:“owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of [her] nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail [herself] of the protection of that country ….” (Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention)FACTS The applicant is a citizen of India. She arrived in Australia on 20 December 1992. On 8 August 1995 she lodged an application with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (“the Department”) seeking a protection visa. On 25 August 1998 a delegate of the respondent refused to grant the applicant a protection visa. On 18 September 1998 the applicant sought review of that decision. The applicant is thirty-five years old. She lived in the city now known as Mumbai before coming to Australia. She is a Christian, initially of the Roman Catholic denomination but now a practicing Jehovah’s Witness. It appears that some years ago she converted to Hinduism to marry a Hindu. The marriage was short lived, ending in divorce, and it appears that she may never have truly adhered to the Hindu faith. The applicant was awarded an Arts degree by the University of Bombay and thereafter gained employment in India as a hotel receptionist and in the banking industry. The applicant claims to have entered into a relationship in Australia with a married man. She further claims to have had an abortion in July 1995 after learning that her family in India would not agree to support her were she to return to India. The applicant’s case before the Tribunal was that she feared persecution in India because she is divorced. She claimed that it might be difficult for her to remarry because she is not a virgin and that if she did remarry, “enormous dishonour to the family” would result should her new husband learn of her abortion, and divorce might follow. She claimed that men in India harass women who are divorced or separated and other women can be suspicious of their intentions towards men. Further, the applicant claims that her family would not support her if she returns to India but that she would be ostracised by, and excluded from, her family. She would have to live alone, without support, and would not be able to get a job to support herself because of her fear that she would be harassed by men in the workplace. Evidence was given to the Tribunal that the applicant would be talked about because she is divorced and has had an abortion and people would look down on her. The Tribunal noted additional information available to it that indicated that “while there are many laws in place to protect the rights of women and to advance their status in Indian society, the government often is unable to enforce these laws because of deeply rooted religious and cultural traditions.” The Tribunal also noted reports from the Australian Embassy in New Delhi, that “single women are increasingly moving around the country and settling away from their family following employment or other interests” and that while Indian women experience substantial discrimination, the status of women in India was undergoing a “quiet sea change” with the presence of women in the workforce becoming increasingly acceptable among the growing middle class without a significant male backlash. The Tribunal referred to a 1994 report which showed that divorce is not uncommon in India with more and more people from the middle class seeking to divorce. The Tribunal could find nothing to suggest that Jehovah’s Witnesses are persecuted in India.REASONS OF TRIBUNAL

Decision

Reasons for decision

BRANSON J
However, I add that there is, in my view, no substance to ground (ii) of the application which asserts an error of law involving an incorrect application of the law to the facts as found by the Tribunal. As I understand the applicant’s case, she contends that the Tribunal did not give proper consideration to the applicant’s fears in a “global” sense, and did not give proper consideration to “the likelihood that the applicant would experience serious sexual harassment in the course of any work she could secure.” The reasons for decision of the Tribunal when read as a whole do not, in my view, provide support for this contention.CONCLUSION The decision of the Tribunal is affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BRANSON J

The grounds of the application, as amended at the hearing, are as follows:“(i)The decision involved an error of law, being an error involving an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law, in that the Tribunal incorrectly interpreted the words ‘membership of a particular social group’ in the Convention definition of ‘refugee’.(ii)The decision involved an error of law, being an error involving an incorrect application of the law to the facts as found by the Tribunal, in that the Tribunal failed to fully address the claims made by the applicant as to the persecution which she feared if she returned to India, and in particular to decide whether there was a real chance that the applicant would face sexual harassment amounting to persecution in any employment which she was able to obtain.(iii)Procedures that were required by the Act to be observed in connection with the with the making of the decision were not observed, in that the Tribunal failed to provide reasons complying with s 430(1) of the Migration Act of 1958 (Cth) which adequately explained:(a) Why there was not a real chance that the applicant would face sexual harassment amounting to persecution in any employment which she was to obtain; and(b) On what evidence and by what reasoning (on the assumption that what the applicant feared was the persecution by reason of her status as an divorced or deserted woman) she would be able to escape a real chance of its infliction when living in another part of Bombay or in another city.”CONSIDERATION The applicant contended that the Tribunal was obliged to form a single judgment as to whether the applicant had “… a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reason of … membership of a particular social group” and was not entitled to isolate the question of whether the harm that she feared was sufficiently serious in nature to amount to “persecution” within the meaning of the Refugees Convention. Reliance was placed on the observations of McHugh J in Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225 at 256 that:“The phrase ‘a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of … membership of a particular social group’ is a compound conception. It is therefore a mistake to isolate the elements of the definition, interpret them, and then ask whether the facts of the instant case are covered by the sum of those individual interpretations. Indeed, to ignore the totality of the words that define a refugee for the purposes of the Convention and the Act would be an error of law by virtue of a failure to construe the definition as a whole.” Applicant A was a very different case from the present. It concerned a couple who feared sterilisation. It was understandably conceded by the respondent in that case that sterilisation could be the basis of a well-founded fear of persecution. The statement of McHugh J at 258 that:“Whether or not conduct constitutes persecution in the Convention sense does not depend on the nature of the conduct. It depends on whether it discriminates against a person because of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a social group ….”is to be understood in this context.