FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Shetty v Minister for Immigration Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1601
MIGRATION – Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of membership of a particular social group – whether Tribunal entitled to isolate question of whether harm feared serious enough to constitute persecution
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 476
Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225, distinguished
Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379, approved, followed
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 144 ALR 567, approved, followed
Kanagasabai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 205, approved, followed
Prahastono v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 77 FCR 260, approved, followedJACINTHA ASHOK SHETTY v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 110 of 1999BRANSON J
SYDNEY
18 NOVEMBER 1999
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 110 of 1999
BETWEEN:
JACINTHA ASHOK SHETTY
ApplicantAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RespondentJUDGE:
BRANSON J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 NOVEMBER 1999
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal be affirmed.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 110 of 1999
BETWEEN:
JACINTHA ASHOK SHETTY
ApplicantAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent
JUDGE:
BRANSON J
DATE:
18 NOVEMBER 1999
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
This is an application made under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) which affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent not to grant to the applicant a protection visa.
Section 36 of the Act provides as follows:
“(1) There is a class of visas to be known as protection visas.
(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol.”
Australia will have protection obligations to the applicant under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol (together hereafter referred to as the “Refugees Convention”) if the applicant:
“owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of [her] nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail [herself] of the protection of that country ….” (Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention)
FACTS
The applicant is a citizen of India. She arrived in Australia on 20 December 1992. On 8 August 1995 she lodged an application with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (“the Department”) seeking a protection visa. On 25 August 1998 a delegate of the…
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- Case
- [1999] FCA 1601
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the Tribunal's interpretation of the phrase 'membership of a particular social group' was not in error. The court noted that the applicant's argument was based on a different case and that the statement of McHugh J in Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs was not applicable to the present case. The court also held that the Tribunal had adequately considered the applicant's claims and had not failed to address them. The court found that the Tribunal had considered the evidence and had made a decision based on the facts as found. The court further held that the Tribunal had complied with procedural requirements and had provided adequate reasons for its decision. The court dismissed the applicant's appeal and affirmed the decision of the Tribunal.
The orders of the court were that the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal be affirmed. The applicant's appeal was dismissed, and the decision of the Tribunal was upheld. The court found that the Tribunal had not erred in its interpretation of the law, had adequately considered the applicant's claims, and had complied with procedural requirements. The decision of the Tribunal was correct, and the applicant's appeal was dismissed. The court's decision affirmed the importance of the Refugee Review Tribunal's role in determining protection visa applications and the need for the Tribunal to adequately consider the applicant's claims and provide adequate reasons for its decision.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal be affirmed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: BRANSON J
The grounds of the application, as amended at the hearing, are as follows:“(i)The decision involved an error of law, being an error involving an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law, in that the Tribunal incorrectly interpreted the words ‘membership of a particular social group’ in the Convention definition of ‘refugee’.(ii)The decision involved an error of law, being an error involving an incorrect application of the law to the facts as found by the Tribunal, in that the Tribunal failed to fully address the claims made by the applicant as to the persecution which she feared if she returned to India, and in particular to decide whether there was a real chance that the applicant would face sexual harassment amounting to persecution in any employment which she was able to obtain.(iii)Procedures that were required by the Act to be observed in connection with the with the making of the decision were not observed, in that the Tribunal failed to provide reasons complying with s 430(1) of the Migration Act of 1958 (Cth) which adequately explained:(a) Why there was not a real chance that the applicant would face sexual harassment amounting to persecution in any employment which she was to obtain; and(b) On what evidence and by what reasoning (on the assumption that what the applicant feared was the persecution by reason of her status as an divorced or deserted woman) she would be able to escape a real chance of its infliction when living in another part of Bombay or in another city.”CONSIDERATION The applicant contended that the Tribunal was obliged to form a single judgment as to whether the applicant had “… a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reason of … membership of a particular social group” and was not entitled to isolate the question of whether the harm that she feared was sufficiently serious in nature to amount to “persecution” within the meaning of the Refugees Convention. Reliance was placed on the observations of McHugh J in Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225 at 256 that:“The phrase ‘a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of … membership of a particular social group’ is a compound conception. It is therefore a mistake to isolate the elements of the definition, interpret them, and then ask whether the facts of the instant case are covered by the sum of those individual interpretations. Indeed, to ignore the totality of the words that define a refugee for the purposes of the Convention and the Act would be an error of law by virtue of a failure to construe the definition as a whole.” Applicant A was a very different case from the present. It concerned a couple who feared sterilisation. It was understandably conceded by the respondent in that case that sterilisation could be the basis of a well-founded fear of persecution. The statement of McHugh J at 258 that:“Whether or not conduct constitutes persecution in the Convention sense does not depend on the nature of the conduct. It depends on whether it discriminates against a person because of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a social group ….”is to be understood in this context.