SZJYR v Minister for Immigration
[2007] FMCA 1796
•29 October 2007
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZJYR & ORS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2007] FMCA 1796 |
| MIGRATION – Review of Refugee Review Tribunal decision – Tribunal understood claims and relevant circumstances – Tribunal dealt with applicant’s claims as put by applicant – Tribunal did not impose narrow view of political opinion – error in relocation finding – discretionary relief refused – independent and unimpeached ground exists precluding relief – application dismissed. |
| Migration Act 1958, ss.36(2), 36(2)(b), 424A |
| In Udaya Saman Perera Ranwalage v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] 1480 FCA (20 November 1998) Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Y and Ors (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, 15 May 1998) V v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [1999] FCA 428 Randhawa v Minister for Immigration (1994) 52 FCR 437 SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 40 Sabaratnasingam v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 261 SZCJH v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1660 VBAP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs[2005] FCA 965 SZEEU v Minister for Immigration [2006] FCAFC 2 |
| First Applicant: | SZJYR |
| Second Applicant: | SZJYS |
| Third Applicant: | SZJYT |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 11 of 2007 |
| Judgment of: | Nicholls FM |
| Hearing date: | 18 October 2007 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 18 October 2007 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 29 October 2007 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr A Kumar |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Nil |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr M Izzo |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Sparke Helmore |
ORDERS
The application made on 2 January 2007 and amended on 16 May 2007 is dismissed.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 11 of 2007
| SZJYR & ORS |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application filed in this Court under the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”) on 2 January 2007 and amended on 16 May 2007, seeking review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) signed on 28 November 2006 and handed down on 12 December 2006, which affirmed the decision of a delegate of the respondent Minister to refuse to grant protection visas to the applicants.
Background
The applicants are a husband (“the applicant”) (“SZJYR”), his wife (“the applicant wife”) (“SZJYS”) and son (“the applicant son”) (“SZJYT”) who are citizens of India. The applicants arrived in Australia on 22 April 2006 and applied for protection visas on 2 June 2006. On 31 August 2006, a delegate of the respondent Minister refused to grant protection visas. On 8 September 2006, the applicants applied for review of that decision.
Applicants’ Claims to Protection
The applicants’ claims to protection are contained in their application for a protection visa ( reproduced in the Court Book (“CB”) at CB 1 to CB 36), in a statement of the applicant (CB 37), in their application for review (CB 48 to CB 51), in documents submitted at the Tribunal hearing (CB 83 to CB 89) and in a letter from the applicants’ representative to the Tribunal enclosing supporting documents including a transcript of the Tribunal hearing (CB 93 to CB 124).
The applicant claimed to fear persecution due to his involvement with the “Shiv Sena” party in India and that he was beaten and threatened by the Muslim League who told him he would be killed if he worked for the party. He also claimed they attempted to extort money from him and attempted to kill his wife. He claimed that he was unable to obtain protection from the police. He claimed he left the Shiv Sena party due to his fear for his and his family’s safety. The applicant wife and applicant son did not make any specific Refugees Convention related claims. They relied on the applicant’s claims (see CB 32, CB 27, CB 140.7).
The applicants all appeared before the Tribunal at a hearing on 12 October 2006. The Tribunal’s account of what occurred at the hearing is in its decision record (CB 135.3 to CB 136.2). A transcript of the hearing was `submitted by the applicant’s adviser to the Tribunal on 23 November 2006 is at CB 94 to CB 121.
The Tribunal
The Tribunal’s decision record is reproduced at CB 130 to CB 140. The Tribunal found that the applicant was vague about when he left the Shiv Sena party. It concluded any role he had in politics was minor. It did not accept that his role with Shiv Sena was of such nature (“too trivial”) as to result in retaliatory action by its opponents, least of all the “small and locally weak Muslim community”. Further, even if one or more individuals had a political grievance with the applicant (which it did not accept), it found he could reasonably move away from his home area. The Tribunal did not accept that any of the applicant’s claims that flowed from his general claim that Muslims were persecuting him, or his claims that he lost business, or that the applicant’s wife was subject to an attempt on her life, was convincing. While accepting a medical report that the applicant had been injured in July 2004, the Tribunal noted the lack of corroborating evidence, and in any event found that even if the applicant had been injured in an attack by political opponents, it was not repeated and that there was nothing before it to show that it would be likely to be repeated.
The Tribunal found the applicant did not satisfy the criterion set out in s.36(2) of the Act and accordingly, neither did his wife and son (s.36(2)(b) of the Act), and therefore affirmed the decision not to grant protection visas to the applicants.
The Application to the Court
The applicant’s amended application filed on 16 May 2007 seeks review on the following grounds:
“1. The applicants submit that the Tribunal has taken and unduly narrow view of political opinion and has thus misdirected its enquiries.
Particulars
The Tribunal (at CB 139.4) states as follows:
‘…I accept that the applicant did some work of a minor kind for Shiv Sena some years ago, but do not accept that it brought him into such prominence such that as would result in retaliatory action by the opponents of Shiv Sena and least of all by…Muslim community. …’
The Tribunal states (at CB 135.9):
‘…I pointed out the applicant left had Shiv Sena...’
The applicant submits that the Tribunal has taken a very narrow view of the political opinion and has thus misdirected its enquiries. The Tribunal failed to impute as political opinion or part of political opinion the social/charitable activities that he was carried out by the applicant instead confining its enquiries as to what was being done a member of Shiv Sena.
2. The Tribunal breached section 424A(1) of the Act in failing to provide the Applicant to comment on the ‘information’ that it had used.
Particulars
The Tribunal has used information such as information from searches [in Applicant’s submission not excepted under section 424A of the Act] to decide that the Applicant
The Tribunal states at CB 139.5 to CB 139.6 as follows:
I went to recent press reporting of the major role of Shiv Sena in Maharastra and of the persecution of Muslims in the state.
The applicant was vague about when he left Shiv Sena and not well informed about local politics – he did not know the name of the electorate that he worked in which he worked for Shiv Sena. I conclude that any role he had in politics was very minor.
The applicant submits that the above country information is ‘determinative independent country information’ (similar to SZBYJ case) used for a localised area and ought to have been subject to comment from the applicants pursuant to section 424A of the Migration Act. The applicant submits that information is not covered by section 424A(3) (as decided in NAMW) as the Tribunal is testing specific information about specific location and testing the knowledge against the specific information.
The applicant submits that the Tribunal ought to have written to the Applicant asking for comments pursuant to section 424A(1) from the Applicant. The Tribunal is in breach of the section and as per reasoning in SAAP case this constitutes jurisdictional error.
3. The Tribunal determined on the application that the Applicant relocate and thus there was no need to consider other aspects of the claim. The Tribunal failed to consider all the relevant circumstances in its assessment of the relocation option in relation to the Applicant including factors relating reasonableness of relocation and factors whether the Applicant is able to and in a position to be correctly subject to internal flight principles: such failure amounting to failure to constructive exercise jurisdiction and/or breach of section 414 of the Act.
Particulars
The Tribunal when it states at CB 139.8 ‘…I find that he could easily move away from Pune.’ Erred in not taking into all factors in seeking appropriate information from the Applicant and in particular the mobility of the family, the financial resources and the ability of the Applicant to relocate to other parts of India. The language and other barriers to the other members of the family was not taken into account. The Tribunal has failed to address the meaningfulness of such relocation rather by reference to country information and by means of theoretical promulgations.
The Tribunal has failed to consider the practical realities. The Tribunal has failed to consider the ability of the Applicant to be involved in the activities that led to the alleged harm in consideration of the relocation option.
The Tribunal decided solely on the basis of relocation; the Applicant says that the Tribunal failed to look at all aspects of the claim before making a decision on this basis.”
[Errors in original.]
Hearing before the Court
At the hearing before the Court, the applicants were represented by Mr A Kumar of Counsel. Mr M Izzo of Counsel appeared for the first respondent. Relevantly, I have before me for the applicant:
1)An application filed on 2 January 2007.
2)An amended application filed on 16 May 2007.
3)The applicant’s outline of submissions filed on 8 October 2007.
For the respondent:
4)A response filed on 12 January 2007.
5)An outline of the respondent’s submissions filed on 9 October 2007.
Counsel for the applicant confirmed that he intended to rely on the amended application, and that in accordance with his written submissions, he did not press ground 2 of the amended application which asserted error under s.424A of the Act.
The applicant’s first ground is that the Tribunal took “an unduly narrow view of political opinion” and focussed its consideration of the applicant’s claims as to what the applicant claimed had been done, and done to him, as a member of Shiv Sena rather than also taking into account, and failing to impute as part of political opinion, the social and charitable activities that the applicant had carried out.
In essence, the claim was that by dealing with the applicant’s claim to have been involved with a political party and to have also engaged in community activities, the Tribunal erred by adopting a narrow view of what constitutes political opinion for the purposes of the Refugees Convention, and by dealing with both aspects of this claim simply by finding that the applicant had only engaged in minor work for the party and then had left it. The claim is that the Tribunal did not deal with the applicant’s claims that he conducted social and charitable activities and failed to enquire as to whether he would be imputed with a political opinion because of this activity.
Mr Kumar relied on the following extracts from the Tribunal’s decision record in support of this ground:
1)At CB 139.7:
“I accept that the applicant did some work of a minor kind for Shiv Sena some years ago, but do not accept that it brought him to such prominence as would result in retaliatory action by opponents of Shiv Sena and least of all by the small and locally weak Muslim community.”
2)At CB 135.9:
“I pointed out that the applicant had left Shiv Sena in…”
Mr Kumar’s submission was that by “stating” that the applicant had left “Shiv Sena”, the Tribunal found that there was “no political opinion”, and therefore no Convention nexus attributing political opinion to the connection with Shiv Sena. Mr Kumar’s argument was that with reliance on what was said in In Udaya Saman Perera Ranwalage v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] 1480 FCA (20 November 1998) (“Udaya”) per Heerey J, that the Tribunal should have taken a broader view of what constituted political activity. That is, that this view should have included the social and charitable activities undertaken by the applicant. By failing to do so, the Tribunal failed to impute the social and charitable activities as a part of the “political opinion” held by the applicant and in respect of which, he suffered and feared harm from Muslims in his local area.
Mr Kumar’s submission was that whether or not the applicant was a member of Shiv Sena, the Tribunal should have directed its enquiries as to whether the applicant was expressing his political opinion by way of his engagement in community activities.
First, I should note that the two extracts (see [13] above) relied on by the applicant do not follow sequentially as stated in submissions by Mr Kumar. The second extract appears in the Tribunal’s account of what occurred at the hearing. When read in context of what surrounds it, this reveals that after having listened to the applicant’s claims, as ultimately put at the hearing, the Tribunal “commented” that there was: “no convincing reason why anyone should want to harm the applicant”. In these circumstances, the Tribunal asked the applicants why if the family feared otherwise, they could not have moved elsewhere in India. It was during this discussion that the Tribunal pointed out that the applicant had left the Shiv Sena party in 2003 or 2004, and had not participated in the 2004 elections and knew very little about the local political situation. It was also in this context at the hearing, that the Tribunal also put to the applicant it could not conclude that the applicant was either very active at any time, or very involved in politics, such that there was therefore even less reason for anyone wanting to harm him.
The applicants’ claims as ultimately put before the Tribunal were that:
1)The applicant was an active member of the Shiv Sena party (see statement at CB 37.6):
“…I became a active member of the Shiv Sena party which belongs to the Hindus.”
2)With the result that (at CB 37.7):
“As days passed the general public was drawn towards our selfless service and soon our party bred the jealousy and hatred among our other counterparts, I was considered the right hand of our party”
3)He “took a lot of interest” in an incident involving an anonymous call that there was a bomb in a high school in his home town (CB 37.8). He assisted with this incident, and after that time he paid “a keen attention” to “rumours” to see that similar incidents (“bomb in temples, schools, markets etc”) did not occur.
4)He also claimed at CB 38.1:
“Once I was held up in Bhavani Peth and I was beaten up with iron rods and I was given the threat that my family and I will be killed if I would work for the party…”
5)Then further at CB 38.3:
“The rouges were identified as the members of the Muslim league, which left me utterly, shocked and I realized that Muslims had actually got jealous of my work because of my interest in my party and religion…”
6)At the Tribunal hearing, the applicant wife relevantly said:
i)
“he [the applicant] had worked very hard for Shiv Sena…he also wanted to serve the nation. He was inspired by this Shiv Sena party…Serving for the nation, helping poor…”
(See Transcript of the Tribunal’s hearing at CB 99.1.)
ii)
“He had given his heart and soul in serving the nation, and during this time when he was a member…the violence, corruption and then terrorism…was on the rise…he just believe in the spirit, that is what he gave to his work…that’s why they made him the target…”.
(See Transcript of Tribunal’s hearing at CB 99.3.)
iii)
“Then I think in 2002 to 2003…they helped Kashmiri Hindus…he along with the other Shiv Sena…” .
(See Transcript of the Tribunal’s hearing at CB 99.5.)
Following the Tribunal hearing, the applicants’ agent submitted, on their behalf, the following as the “main grounds of the statement and claims”:
“According to the written claims made by the Principal Applicant the Tribunal may be aware that the Applicant had been an active party worker of ‘ShivSena’ who had played a prominent role in helping the community and specially working tirelessly to maintain the law & order in Pune. He states that due to his good work, he became extremely popular amongst the people in the area.
The Applicant has said very clearly that due to his popularity amongst Hindus and helping them magnanimously, he built up anger from a section of the community, namely the members of the Muslims League, a political party that was in rivalry with the Hindus, specially the Shivsena, because of its extreme Hindu ideology. Due to this jealousy, on one particular day the Applicant was subjected to a severe beating by the Muslim League members who had used iron bars to hit the Applicant.” (CB 89.8 to CB 90.1) [Errors in original].
I agree with Mr Izzo that, as presented, the applicant’s claim was that he was an active member of the Shiv Sena political party, and that he had subsequently undertaken community and social work in that context. Further, that he was of such profile that he came to the attention of the political opponents of the Shiv Sena, that is the Muslim League, and had suffered threats and harm from them for this reason.
It should be noted that apart from the applicant wife’s general references at the Tribunal hearing to the applicant helping the poor and helping Kashmiri Hindus, the major part of the applicant’s “community” work appears to be responding to rumours of bomb threats (“working tirelessly to maintain the law and order in Pune”). I do not agree with what is implied in Mr Kumar’s argument on behalf of the applicants that there was a separation in the claims as presented between the applicant’s claimed active membership on behalf of Shiv Sena, and the social and community work that he undertook. There was nothing before the Tribunal to suggest that the applicant was targeted by the Muslim community simply, and solely, and/or separately, on the basis of his having undertaken the social and charitable work such that that work alone could be said to impute some political opinion to the applicant that attracted the attention, and adverse reaction, from the Muslim League.
There is authority to support Mr Kumar’s proposition that a Tribunal should not take an unduly narrow view of the concept of “political opinion” in the context of considering refugee claims:
1)In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Y and Ors (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, 15 May 1998), per Davies J, (one of two cases referred to in Udaya which in turn is relied upon by the applicant in written submissions). This was a case involving the applicant’s stance against criminal conduct by police, and which the Court found was an expression of political opinion. Davies J held, at page 5:
“In the context of the Refugees Convention an opinion could be thought to be political opinion if it were such as to indicate that its holder…held views that were contrary to the interest of the state including the authorities of the state. A person may regarded as an enemy of the state as a result of holding and propounding views which are contrary to the views of the state or its government or which are antithetic to the government and the instruments which enforce the power of the state such as the armed forces, security forces and police forces or which express opposition to matter such as the structure of the state or the territory occupied by it and like matters.”
This was approved by the Full Federal Court in V v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [1999] FCA 428 (“V”) at [16]. The Court observed in relation to the understanding of “political opinion” that:
“It is not necessary that the person to be a member of a political party or other public organisation or that the persons opposition to the instrument of government be a matter of public knowledge” (at 363)
Further, per Hill J at [33], that:
“It is not necessary in this case to attempt a comprehensive definition of what constitutes ‘political opinion’ within the meaning of the Convention. It clearly is not limited to party politics in the sense that expression is understood in a parliamentary democracy…”
In C and Anor v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 94 FCR 366 per Wilcox J, a matter involving applicants who claimed fear arising from the perception that they would inform authorities about illegal activities of a group of criminals, the Court found (at page 375) that in that case the Tribunal had failed to understand that the term “political opinion” was broader than adherence to a political party or support for its policies.
However, on what is before me, I do not accept that the Tribunal adopted an unduly narrow view of the concept of “political opinion”. The applicant’s claims in this regard (including what his wife and son said at the Tribunal hearing and his adviser’s ultimate submissions) were consistent in the following regard. That is, that he became an active member of the Shiv Sena party:
“the general public was drawn toward…selfless service…and our party bred the jealousy and hatred amongst our other counterparts. I was considered the right hand of our party…” (CB 37.7).
The “selfless service” or “community” work insofar as it related to his contribution, was plainly the activity he undertook within the community, at best, the general references to helping the poor and Kashmiri Hindus, but specificially, his claimed part in responding to bomb threats and rumours of bomb threats in schools and temples. That his “work” was related to Shiv Sena and that it was this factor that drew an adverse response from the Muslim League is emphasised by his own statement (at CB 38.3):
“…I realised that Muslims had actually got jealous of my work because of my interest in party and religion…”
Where in its findings and reasons, the Tribunal stated that it accepted that the applicant did some work “of a minor kind for Shiv Sena some years ago”, in the context of the applicant’s claims, this was a clear reference to the community activity that the applicant had put forward. That is, responding to bomb threats, rumours of bomb threats, helping the poor and helping Kashmiri Hindus. All of these activities in the applicant’s various expressions of the claims were part of, and arose out of, the applicant’s membership of, and association with, Shiv Sena.
In finding that this activity did not bring him “to such prominence as would result in retaliatory action by opponents of Shiv Sena and least of all by the small and locally weak Muslim community” (CB 139.7), the Tribunal dealt with the applicant’s claims in a manner consistent with how the claims were expressed and put to it. The Tribunal is not required to deal with a case that is not put to it, nor one that does not arise from the circumstances as presented.
In my view, and contrary to submissions by Mr Kumar, the Tribunal understood the applicant’s claims and the relevant circumstances from which they were said to arise. It clearly envisaged that his activities, and their scale and importance, were relevant to its consideration but found that they were not of such level or character as would result in the retaliatory action to which the applicants claimed they were subjected by elements of the Muslim community.
Further, in directing itself to the risk of persecution should the applicants be returned to India, the Tribunal did not accept that there was a real chance that the applicant would be persecuted in the future for reason of his political opinion. In coming to this view, the Tribunal plainly focused on “his role”, as presented, which it described as “too trivial to attract the kind of hostile attention I am asked to accept”.
Although not specifically argued by Mr Kumar, but to the extent that there may be an inference in his argument (given that he relies on Y) that the Tribunal’s “narrow view” of “political opinion” did not address the applicants beliefs and how they may be viewed by the relevant authorities, then I also note and agree with Mr Izzo’s submission, that with reference to V at 362-363 (per Wilcox J) (and with reference to Y per Davies J), that the concept of “political opinion” also includes and allows for a situation where the holder’s views are “antithetical to instruments of government”.
There is simply nothing before the Court now to say that the applicant’s community work and activities (and it must be said that on the evidence provided by the applicants this appears to amount to preventing bombing incidents from occurring), meets this description. This circumstance holds even for the period after the applicant left Shiv Sena, that is, in either 2003 or 2004 and before the relevant 2004 state election campaign. There was also evidence before the Tribunal that the community work done by the applicant either before he left Shiv Sena, or after, was antithetical to the interests of the government. Further, if anything, an inference can be drawn that the applicant’s claimed activities in this regard were supportive of the interests of government – maintenance of law and order and assisting the poor. I note in this regard that the Tribunal put to the applicant and the applicant wife, that at the time of his leaving Shiv Sena, this party “was a full participant in the State Government” (CB 138.9).
The Tribunal also found that it did not accept that any of the claims that were made that “flow from the general claim that Muslims were persecuting him” were made out (CB 139.9). The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant had lost a business as a result of his resignation from Shiv Sena, it found that the account of the “market” accident relating to the applicant’s wife was “not convincing”, and that neither she nor her husband had any evidence that it was politically motivated (CB 140.2). Further, while it accepted the medical report that the applicant had been treated for various injuries in July 2003, found that there was no corroborating evidence as to the cause of these injuries. But even if they were as a result of an attack, there was no information before it which would lead it to conclude that another such attack was at all likely, and ultimately said that it considered such an attack “very unlikely”.
In all therefore, in relation to this ground, the Tribunal dealt with the applicants’ complaints as put by the applicants themselves. The applicant’s claimed community activities were bound up within and were part of the applicant’s claimed active membership of the Shiv Sena, a Hindu party. The Tribunal simply did not accept that these “minor activities” or “work” were such as to give him prominence as to result in retaliation by opponents of Shiv Sena, and particularly not by a small and locally weak Muslim community. I cannot see that the Tribunal imposed a narrow view of what constitutes political opinion by simply dealing with the applicant’s claims as put by the applicants.
In relation to ground 3 in the amended application, I agree with Mr Kumar that this could not be said to be a relocation finding made consistent with what was set out in Randhawa v Minister for Immigration (1994) 52 FCR 437 (“Randhawa”) (and taking into account what was also said in relation to this concept in SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 40). Plainly, the Tribunal did not give consideration in this regard to a range of factors arising from the circumstances of this case such that it could be said that it addressed the test of what is ‘reasonable’ as explained in Randhawa.
But having said this, it is as Mr Izzo submits, that even if it can be said that the Tribunal purported to make a finding as to relocation and that such finding reveals jurisdictional error, this does not necessarily entitle the applicant to the discretionary relief that he seeks.
Quite separately, the Tribunal found that the applicants did not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugees Convention reason. This was found separate and independent of the reference to the applicant being able to reasonably move away “from Pune”. Having made that earlier finding, which was sufficient to dispose of the relevant question before it: whether it was satisfied that the applicants had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugees Convention reason if they were to return to India, it was not necessary for the Tribunal to consider relocation (see Sabaratnasingam v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 261 (“Sabaratnasingam”) at [13]).
I agree with Mr Izzo that the existence of an independent and unimpeached ground for the decision precludes relief being given in respect of any jurisdictional error that did occur (SZCJH v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1660 at [23], VBAP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs[2005] FCA 965 per North J, SZEEU v Minister for Immigration [2006] FCAFC 2 at [231]-[233] per Allsop J).
In this case, in exercising the discretion available to the Court, I am not persuaded that the Tribunal’s reference to the applicant being able to move “away from Pune”, and to the extent that this falls short of the Randhawa test, is such as to cause the Court to grant the relief sought in the face of a clear, separate and alternative finding that the applicants did not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugees Convention reason.
I note also that in making the reference to the applicant being able to “reasonably move away from Pune” (CB 139.7), the Tribunal made this finding in the context of having plainly stated and found that it did not accept in any event that “one or more individuals had a political grievance against the applicant”.
In all therefore, the applicants’ grounds, as advanced with the assistance of legal Counsel do reveal error in one respect. But I decline to grant the relief sought in light of, and balanced with, a clear, independent and unimpeached finding that the applicants do not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugees Convention reason. The application is therefore dismissed.
I certify that the preceding thirty-nine (39) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Nicholls FM
Associate: Dawnie Lam
Date: 29 October 2007
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