NEW SOUTH WALES. Negligence-Personal injuries-Licensed premises-Invitee-Female-Retiring room
-Wet, greasy substance on floor-Fall by femaleCause-Unusual danger- Proof of inegligence-Owner-Liability-Knowledge-Reasonable care-Evidence -Sufficiency--Verdict for female-Appeal-Point not taken at trial-If so taken point fatal to female's case-New trial--Futility-Pull Court-Juris- diction-Setting aside verdict-Entry of judgment for appellant owner--Supreme Court Procedure Act 1900 (N.S.W.), S. 7-Supreme Court Rules 1953, O. XXII, rr. 1, 15.
The plaintiff slipped and fell on the floor of a wash-room in the defendant's hotel where she had been having dinner. She brought an action for damages for injuries suffered. Evidence was given by her and others that there was some greasy water on the floor where she slipped the existence of the water was denied by the defendant and others. The accident happened at 8.00 p.m. and there was evidence that care had been taken to see that the wash-room was clean and washed out as late as 7.00 p.m. At the trial the defendant did not apply for a verdict and the jury found for the plaintiff.
Held (1) that although the jury could find that the water was there and constituted an unusual danger it was not established that the defendant had actual knowledge, and since it was not possible to conclude what the substance was on the floor or how it got there it was not open to the jury to find that the defendant ought to have known it was there in the circumstances the defendant had exercised the reasonable care he was bound to exhibit.
(2) that the objection, if taken at the trial, would have been fatal to the respondent's case and a new trial would have been futile; in the circumstances the Full Court had jurisdiction under S. 7 of the Supreme Court Procedure Act
1900 (N.S.W.), to set aside the verdict of the jury and to direct that judgment should be entered for the appellant.
Supreme Court Rules 1953 (N.S.W.), O. XXII, IT. 1, 15, discussed. Per Dixon C.J.: (1) A plaintiff is not relieved of the necessity of offering some evidence of negligence by the fact that the material circumstances are peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant. Slight evidence may be enough unless explained away by the defendant and the evidence should be weighed according to the power of the party to produce it.
(2) In a clear case where, on the state of the evidence as the plaintiff has necessarily left it, the defendant is entitled to a verdict, there is no reason why a verdict in favour of the plaintiff who has not made out a cause of action should stand simply because at the trial the defendant has gone to the jury without asking for a direction. At worst it is a matter of costs.
Decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Full Court), reversed.
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL from the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
Hilda…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
Continue reading Hampton Court Ltd v Crooks
Sign in free to access the full text
Details
AGLC
Hampton Court Ltd v Crooks [1957] HCA 28
Case
[1957] HCA 28
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case of *Hampton Court Ltd v Crooks* involved an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The plaintiff, Ms. Crooks, had sued Hampton Court Ltd, the owner of a hotel, for damages for personal injuries sustained when she slipped and fell on a wet, greasy substance on the floor of the hotel's ladies' retiring room. Ms. Crooks alleged she was an invitee and that her injuries resulted from an unusual danger of which the defendant knew or ought to have known. A jury at trial found in favour of Ms. Crooks, awarding her damages. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, however, set aside the verdict on damages, ordering a new trial limited to that issue, but refused to enter judgment for the defendant, finding that the point regarding the plaintiff's failure to establish negligence had not been taken at trial.
The High Court was required to determine two primary legal issues. Firstly, whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a finding of negligence on the part of Hampton Court Ltd, specifically whether the defendant knew or ought to have known of the presence of the dangerous substance on the floor. Secondly, the Court had to consider whether the Full Court of New South Wales had the jurisdiction to set aside the jury's verdict and enter judgment for the defendant, notwithstanding that the specific legal point had not been raised during the trial.
The High Court reasoned that while the jury was entitled to find that a dangerous substance was present on the floor, it was not established that the defendant had actual knowledge of it. Crucially, the nature and origin of the substance remained unknown, making it impossible to infer that the defendant ought to have known of its presence through the exercise of reasonable care. The Court held that the defendant's duty was to exercise reasonable care, not to guarantee absolute safety, and that the evidence did not demonstrate a failure to meet this standard. Furthermore, the Court found that the Full Court possessed jurisdiction under section 7 of the *Supreme Court Procedure Act 1900* (N.S.W.) to enter judgment for the defendant, even though the point had not been taken at trial, particularly as any attempt to cure the defect with further evidence would have been futile.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the verdict of the jury, and directed that judgment be entered for Hampton Court Ltd. The cross-appeal by Ms. Crooks was dismissed, and the parties were ordered to bear their own costs throughout the proceedings.